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Allahabad High Court · body

2022 DIGILAW 1822 (ALL)

Shazia Khan v. Munazir Ali

2022-11-18

SARAL SRIVASTAVA

body2022
JUDGMENT : SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J. 1. Heard Sri A.K.S. Yadav, learned counsel for the appellant. 2. The defendants/appellants have preferred the present appeal against the order dated 21.09.2022 passed by the lower appellate court setting aside the order of the trial Court dated 11.03.2019 by which the trial Court has rejected the plaint of Original Suit No. 59 of 2012 instituted by the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 for cancellation of sale deed with respect to the suit property on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 has instituted Original Suit No. 59 of 2012 praying for cancellation of the sale deed alleged to have been executed on 05.12.2006 with respect to the suit property. The suit has been instituted by the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 alleging that respondent no. 2 Araish Ali (defendant no. 2 in the suit) was the son of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 and appellant no. 1 Smt. Shazia Khan (defendant no. 1 in the suit) is the wife of respondent no. 2 (hereinafter referred to as the wife of respondent no. 2). Further allegation in the plaint is that respondent no. 4 (defendant no. 4 in the plaint) is the father of appellant no. 1. 4. The marriage of respondent no. 2, son of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1, was solemnized with appellant no. 1 on 30.04.2006. Thereafter appellant no. 1 started living as the wife of respondent no. 2 in the house of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1. It is further pleaded that appellant no. 1 has colluded with respondent no. 2 to usurp the property of the plaintiff/ respondent no. 1. To achieve the said object, the appellant no. 1 registered a false complaint against the wife and nephew (sister's son) of plaintiff/respondent no. 1 under the Dowry Prohibition Act on 30.11.2006. Pursuant to the FIR dated 30.11.2006 the nephew of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 was arrested and had to remain in jail. 5. It is further stated that respondent no. 4 in collusion with appellant no. 1 had agreed to withdraw the FIR on the condition that the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 transfer the house owned by him by way of a sale deed in favour of appellant no. 1. It was agreed that on the execution of sale deed, the FIR dated 05.12.2006 would be withdrawn. 6. Further case of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 had agreed to withdraw the FIR on the condition that the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 transfer the house owned by him by way of a sale deed in favour of appellant no. 1. It was agreed that on the execution of sale deed, the FIR dated 05.12.2006 would be withdrawn. 6. Further case of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 is that because of the pressure tactics adopted by the appellant no. 1, the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 had no option but to execute the sale deed because of the false criminal case registered against his wife and nephew by appellant no. 1 without getting any sale consideration with respect to the house owned by him. It is stated that he executed the sale deed only in respect to the house. The plaintiff/respondent no. 1 has further stated that he had no knowledge about the execution of the sale deed date 05.12.2006 with respect to the agricultural land described in the plaint, which was got executed by appellant no. 1 by playing fraud. 7. It is the specific case of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 in the plaint that he has not executed any sale deed in respect of the agricultural land which is the suit property, nor he has received any sale consideration as alleged in the said sale deed. The plaintiff/respondent no. 1 in Para-8 of the plaint has categorically stated that the plaintiff/ respondent no. 1 was forced to execute the sale deed of the house and when he reached the Court for the execution of the sale deed, the sale deed was not read over to him and wherever he was asked to put his signature, he had put his signature as he was told that the papers are related to the sale deed in respect of the house. 8. It is the further case of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 that the consolidation proceeding was undertaken in the village in which a chak was carved out, in which the name of the plaintiff/ respondent no. 1 is still recorded and the possession of chak has been handed over to the plaintiff/respondent no. 1. 9. It is stated that the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 came to know about the sale deed dated 05.12.2006 executed in the last week of January 2012 when the appellant interfered with the possession of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 is still recorded and the possession of chak has been handed over to the plaintiff/respondent no. 1. 9. It is stated that the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 came to know about the sale deed dated 05.12.2006 executed in the last week of January 2012 when the appellant interfered with the possession of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 which gave rise to the cause of action to the plaintiff/ respondent no. 1to institute the present suit. Thereafter, the suit has been filed for cancellation of the sale deed dated 05.12.2006 with respect to the suit property described in Para-1 and 2 of the plaint. 10. In the said suit, the appellant filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. contending inter-alia that the suit is barred by limitation since the sale deed is alleged to have been executed on 05.12.2006 whereas the suit has been instituted on 14.02.2012 after three years which is the period of limitation for a suit for cancellation of the sale deed as provided under Article 59 of the Indian Limitation Act. 11. The trial Court held that on the reading of the plaint, it is evident that the suit has been filed for cancellation of the sale deed dated 05.12.2006 whereas the suit has been instituted in February 2012 and as the period of limitation for filing the suit for cancellation of the sale deed is three years as provided under Article 59 of Limitation Act, 1963, therefore, the suit is barred by limitation. 12. The plaintiff/respondent no. 1 preferred an appeal under Section 96 of the C.P.C. before the appellate Court, registered as Civil Appeal No. 28 of 2019 which came to be allowed by the appellate Court by order dated 21.09.2022 holding that the trial Court has framed Issue no. 10 “whether the suit is barred by limitation.” The trial Court on the said issue on 20.10.2013 passed an order that the counsel for both the parties, i.e. plaintiff and respondents have agreed to the disposal of issue no. 10 after the evidence is led by the parties. 13. The appellate Court found that as there was an order dated 20.10.2013 wherein counsel for both the parties had agreed to the disposal of Issue no. 10 after the evidence is led by the parties. 13. The appellate Court found that as there was an order dated 20.10.2013 wherein counsel for both the parties had agreed to the disposal of Issue no. 10 after the evidence are led, therefore, the trial Court was bound by the order dated 20.10.2013 and until the order dated 20.10.2013 is reviewed, the application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. could not have been disposed of since both the counsel, i.e. counsel for the plaintiff and defendant had consented for disposal of Issue no. 10 after the evidence are led by the parties. 14. Challenging the order, learned counsel for the appellants has contended that on a bare reading of the plaint, it is evident that the suit is barred by limitation. It is contended that it is admitted on record that the sale deed in respect to the suit property had been executed on 05.12.2006 whereas the suit has been instituted in February 2012 and thus, it is manifest that the period of three years has expired, therefore, the plaint is liable to be rejected on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation in view of Article 59 of the Act, 1963. 15. It is submitted that the Court is under obligation to appreciate the pleading in its true spirit and if on reading the plaint and other material enclosed with the plaint that the suit is barred by limitation, the clever drafting of the plaint to bring the suit within limitation cannot save the plaint from being rejected on the ground that it is barred by limitation. 16. He submits that it is evident from the plaint that the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 has admitted the execution of the sale deed and only denies the contents of the documents, and thus, it is evident that he had knowledge about the execution of the sale deed dated 05.12.2006 on the date it was executed and as the suit has been instituted in the year 2012, therefore, it is evident that the suit is barred by limitation and the appellate Court has committed material irregularity in not appreciating the correct facts on record. It is further submitted that even the plaintiff/ respondent no. 1 has admitted in the suit that consolidation proceeding had been undertaken in which an objection has been raised. 17. It is further submitted that even the plaintiff/ respondent no. 1 has admitted in the suit that consolidation proceeding had been undertaken in which an objection has been raised. 17. It is contended that after the execution of the sale deed, appellant no. 1 had submitted an application for mutation of her name in the revenue records which was objected to by the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 in the year 2007 and therefore, it is manifest that the plaintiff/ respondent no. 1 had knowledge about the sale deed on the date of filing of the objection in the year 2007 and, therefore, the suit is even otherwise barred by limitation. In support of his case, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court passed in Civil Appeal No. 10834 of 2010, Sukhbiri Devi and Others vs. Union of India ad Others, Civil Appeal No. 2960 of 2019, Raghwendra Sharan Singh vs. Ram Prasanna Singh (Dead) by LRs. and Civil Appeal No. 500 of 2022, C.S. Ramaswamy vs. V.K. Senthil and Others. 18. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record. 19. Before appreciating the controversy in hand, it would be apposite to appreciate the facts on which the suit has been instituted. 20. The plaintiff/respondent no. 1 has stated in the plaint that he is the owner of the suit property described in Paras-1 and 2 of the plaint. Further case of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 is that respondent no. 2 was the son who was married to appellant no. 1. The appellant no. 1 took respondent no. 2 in confidence and hatched a conspiracy to usurp the movable and immovable property of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1, and to achieve this object, appellant no. 1 registered FIR on 30.11.2006 against the wife and nephew (sister's son) of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1. Thereafter, appellant no. 1 and respondent no. 4 had forced the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 to execute a sale deed in respect of the house owned by him in favour of appellant no. 1 on the condition that on the execution of the sale deed, FIR dated 30.11.2006 shall be withdrawn. It is also pleaded that after registration of the FIR dated 30.11.2006, the nephew of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 was arrested and was in incarceration, in such circumstances, the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 on the condition that on the execution of the sale deed, FIR dated 30.11.2006 shall be withdrawn. It is also pleaded that after registration of the FIR dated 30.11.2006, the nephew of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 was arrested and was in incarceration, in such circumstances, the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 had no option but to execute the sale deed because of the pressure tactics adopted by the appellant no. 1 and in such circumstances, he executed a sale deed only in respect to the house owned by him on 05.12.2006. 21. It is specifically pleaded in the plaint that when the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 reached the Court for the execution of the sale deed, he signed all the papers as he was under pressure because of false FIR against the wife and nephew. It is also pleaded that the contents of the documents were not read over to him and he was under the bonafide belief that he had been signing documents only with respect to the house and not with respect to the suit property. It is also averred in the plaint that the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 has not executed any sale deed in respect of the suit property, nor has received any sale consideration. He executed the sale deed in respect of the house because of pressure tactics adopted by appellant no. 1 by lodging FIR. He signed all the documents under the bona-fide belief that the documents are with respect to the house of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1.The plaintiff/respondent no. 1 has also stated that he is illiterate and he can merely sign his signature. 22. It is stated that he has not executed any sale deed in respect of the suit property and he came to know about the alleged execution of the sale deed in the last week of January 2012 when the appellant no. 1 tried to interfere with the possession of the property and that gave rise him cause of action to institute present suit. 23. From the facts delineated above, it is evident that the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 tried to interfere with the possession of the property and that gave rise him cause of action to institute present suit. 23. From the facts delineated above, it is evident that the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 has pleaded a specific case that he has not executed any sale deed in respect to suit property and in this respect, it would be apt to reproduce Paras-7 and 8 of the plaint: ^^7- ;g dh ekg tuojh 2012 ds vfUre lIrkg esa Áfroknhx.k uEcj 1] 2 o 5 us fookfnr vkjkth xkVk la[;k&204 ij voS/kkfud :i ls tcjnLrh fcuk fdlh vf/kdkj ds dCtk djus dh dksf'k'k dh ysfdu oknh us Lo;a o nhxj yksxksa dh enn ls mijksDr Áfroknhx.k dks muds edln esa dke;kc ugha gksus fn;k rHkh mijksDr Áfroknhx.k us oknh dh dfFkr edku ds c;ukesa ds le; Áfroknhx.k uEcj 1] 2 o 5 us Áfroknhx.k uEcj 3 o 4 dh enn ls mijksDr vkjkth ftldh rQlhy okn okn i= ds iSjk uEcj 2 esa fy[kh gS] dk Hkh dfFkr c;ukek djk fy;kA oknh us mijksDr vkjkth dk fnukad 5-12-2006 dks Áfrokfnuh uEcj 1 ds gd esa dfFkr dksbZ c;ukek rgjhj] rdehy o jftLVªh ugha djk;k vkSj u gh oknh us Áfrokfnuh uEcj 1 ls dfFkr c;ukes dk dfFkr 4]00]000@& :i;s ÁfrQy ÁkIr fd;kA dfFkr c;ukek vd`r o 'kwU; gS] /kks[ks o "kM;U= ij vk/kfjr gS vkSj fcuk ÁfrQy ds gSA oknh us Áfrokfnuh uEcj 1 ls dfFkr edku ds c;ukesa dk Hkh ,d :i;s ÁfrQy ÁkIr ugha fd;kA 8- ;g fd dfFkr edku ds c;ukesa ds le; oknh dfFkr c;ukek djkus ds fy;s etcwj Fkk vkSj tc oknh rglhy igqapk rks dfFkr edku ds dkxtkr rS;kj Fks vkSj oknh dks lgh crk;k x;k fd dfFkr dkxtkr edku ls lEcfU/kr gSa vkSj oknh dks dksbZ Hkh dkxt iढ+dj ugha lquk;k x;kA tgka&tgka pkgs dfFkr nLrkost ys[kd us dfFkr dkxtkr ij oknh ds fu'kku vaxwBs yxok fy;sA oknh iढ+k fy[kk O;fDr ugha gS dsoy oknh us gLrk{kj djuk lh[k fy;s gSaA oknh us dfFkr dkxtkr ij edku dk c;ukek le>dj vius fu'kku vaxwBs yxk fn;sA dkfrc us ;k Áfroknhx.k us ;k lc&jftLVªkj ds dk;kZy; esa fdlh us Hkh oknh dks dksbZ dkxtkr iढ+dj ugha lquk;s vkSj oknh us edku ds dkxtkr le>dj vius fu'kku vaxwBs yxk fn;sA ;fn oknh dks ;g ekywe gksrk gS fd Áfroknhx.k edku ds vykok oknh dh vkjkth dk Hkh dfFkr c;ukek djk jgs gSa rc dHkh Hkh oknh dfFkr c;ukesa ij vius fu'kku vaxwBs ugha yxkrkA dfFkr c;ukek ckcr vkjkth futkbZ ljklj xyr] voS/kkfud o 'kwU; gS vkSj fcuk ÁfrQy ds gS rFkk oknh ij dkfcys ikcUnh ugha gSA dfFkr c;ukesa ds vk/kkj ij Áfrokfnuh uEcj 1 dk uke dHkh Hkh jktLo vfHkys[kksa esa ntZ ugha gqvk vkSj ugha oknh us dfFkr c;ukesa ds vk/kkj ij fookfnr vjkth ij Áfrokfnuh uEcj 1 dk dCtk o n[ky djk;kA pdcUnh ds nkSjku Hkh pd oknh ds uke cuk;k x;k gS vkSj oknh dks gh pd ij dCtk o n[ky fnyk;k x;k gSA 8&v ;g fd ekU; U;k;ky; ds vkns'kkuqlkj Áfroknh uEcj 8 dks Qjhd eqdnek cuk;k tk jgk gS Áfroknh uEcj 8 gSA** 24. There is a specific pleading of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 in the suit that he has never executed the sale deed dated 05.12.2006 in respect of the suit property. The plaintiff/respondent no. 1 had denied the execution of the sale deed dated 05.12.2006 by him and, therefore, this Court is not inclined to accept the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 has admitted the execution of sale deed but has only denied the contents of the sale deed and, therefore, the suit is barred by limitation in view of Article 59 of the Act, 1963. 25. The law on the point that in considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. is settled that the Court is required to see only the averments made in the plaint, and if on the reading of the plaint, a cause of action is made out, the plaint under Order 7 rule 11 C.P.C. cannot be rejected. 26. In the instant case, the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 has denied the execution of the sale deed dated 05.12.2006 and has averred in the plaint that he came to know about the execution of the sale deed dated 05.12.2006 only in the last week of January 2012 when the respondents started interfering with the peaceful enjoyment of the suit property. 27. The specific case of the plaintiff/respondent in the present case is not that he had executed the instrument (sale deed) dated 05.12.2006 and he did not know the contents of the sale deed, rather the plaintiff/respondent has denied the execution of the sale deed dated 05.12.2006 in respect to suit property and has further detailed in the plaint that under compelling circumstances, he signed all the documents as asked by the defendant/appellants believing it to be the document with respect to the sale of his house. Therefore, the question as to whether the averments made in Paras 7 and 8 of the plaint are true or not, can be adjudicated only after the evidence is led by the parties. In case the averments of the plaint are found to be correct based on evidence on record, then the limitation would be counted from the date the plaintiff/appellant came to know about the alleged sale deed dated 05.12.2006 in respect of the suit property. 28. In case the averments of the plaint are found to be correct based on evidence on record, then the limitation would be counted from the date the plaintiff/appellant came to know about the alleged sale deed dated 05.12.2006 in respect of the suit property. 28. In a case where the instrument is alleged to have been got executed or obtained by fraud, the starting point of limitation to set aside or cancel such an instrument is the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud. In this respect, it would be useful to reproduce Para-6 of the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Md. Noorul Hoda vs. Bibi Raifunnisa and Others, (1996) 7 SCC 767 , which is reproduced herein-below: “6. The question, therefore, is as to whether Article 59 or Article 113 of the Schedule to the Act is applicable to the facts in this case. Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 had provided inter-alia for suits to set aside decree obtained by fraud. There was no specific article to set aside a decree on any other ground. In such a case, the residuary Article 120 in Schedule III was attracted. The present Article 59 of the Schedule to the Act will govern any suit to set aside a decree either on fraud or any other ground. Therefore, Article 59 would be applicable to any suit to set aside a decree either on fraud or any other ground. It is true that Article 59 would be applicable if a person affected is a party to a decree or an instrument or a contract. There is no dispute that Article 59 would apply to set aside the instrument, decree or contract between the inter se parties. The question is whether in case of person claiming title through the party to the decree or instrument or having knowledge of the instrument or decree or contract and seeking to avoid the decree by a specific declaration, whether Article 59 gets attracted? As stated earlier, Article 59 is a general provision. In a suit to set aside or cancel an instrument, a contract or a decree on the ground of fraud, Article 59 is attracted. The starting point of limitation is the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud. As stated earlier, Article 59 is a general provision. In a suit to set aside or cancel an instrument, a contract or a decree on the ground of fraud, Article 59 is attracted. The starting point of limitation is the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud. When the plaintiff seeks to establish his title to the property which cannot be established without avoiding the decree or an instrument that stands as an insurmountable obstacle in his way which otherwise binds him, though not a party, the plaintiff necessarily has to seek a declaration and have that decree, instrument or contract cancelled or set aside or rescinded. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 regulates suits for cancellation of an instrument which lays down that any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable and who has a reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, can sue to have it adjudged void or voidable and the court may in its discretion so adjudge it and order it to be delivered or cancelled. It would thus be clear that the word 'person' in Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act is wide enough to encompass a person seeking derivative title from his seller. It would therefore, be clear that if he seeks avoidance of the instrument, decree or contract and seeks a declaration to have the decrees set aside or cancelled he is necessarily bound to lay the suit within three years from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the decree set aside, first become known to him.” 29. It is also pertinent to mention the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Saranpal Kaur Anand vs. Praduman Singh Chandhok and Others, (2022) 8 SCC 401 wherein Apex Court in paragraphs 11 and 12 has held as under: “11........The general principle, which also manifests itself in Section 17 of the Limitation Act, is that every person is presumed to know his own legal right and title in the property, and if he does not take care of his own right and title to the property, the time for filing of the suit based on such a right or title to the property is not prevented from running against him. The provisions of Section 17(1) embody fundamental principles of justice and equity viz. The provisions of Section 17(1) embody fundamental principles of justice and equity viz. that a party should not be penalised for failing to adopt legal proceedings when the facts or the documents have been wilfully concealed from him and also that a party who had acted fraudulently should not be given the benefit of limitation running in its favour by virtue of such frauds. However it is important to remember that Section 17 does not defer the starting point of limitation merely because the defendant has committed a fraud. Section 17 does not encompass all kinds of frauds, but specific situations covered by clauses (a) to (d) to Section 17(1) of the Limitation Act. Section 17(1)(b) and (d) encompass only those fraudulent documents or acts of concealment of documents which have the effect of suppressing knowledge entitling the party to pursue his legal remedy. Once a party becomes aware of antecedent facts necessary to pursue legal proceedings, the period of limitation commences. 12. Therefore in the event the plaintiff makes out a case that falls within any or more of the four clauses to sub-section (1) to Section 17 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for filing of the suit shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud/ mistake or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it or if the document is concealed till the plaintiff has the means of producing the concealed document or compelling its production a fortiori.” 30. Thus, in the present case, the question of limitation is not a pure question of law but a mixed question of fact and law. Perhaps, keeping this fact in mind, learned counsel for the appellant has also consented before the trial Court which has been recorded in the order of the trial Court dated 21.09.02022 that Issue No. 10 shall be decided after the parties lead their evidence. 31. Now, coming to the first judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 10834 of 2010, decided on 29.10.2022, this Court may note that in the said case, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, namely, Rama Nand, was the bhumidhar of certain extent of agricultural land situated in Village Naraina in Delhi. The said plot of agricultural land was acquired and an award was passed in relation to its acquisition on 09.01.1976. The said plot of agricultural land was acquired and an award was passed in relation to its acquisition on 09.01.1976. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, namely, Rama Nand died, leaving behind his widow, two sons, namely, Nahar Singh and Dhan Singh, and four daughters. The widow of the late Rama Nand also died. The policy provided that the bhumidhar was entitled to allotment of alternative residential plot in lieu of the acquired land. Late on, the alternative plot was allotted in the exclusive name of Dhan Singh, upon his production of the registered relinquished deed as per a letter dated 08.03.1991. The fact of allotment of the plot in favour of Dhan Singh came in the knowledge of his brother Nahar Singh, who filed an objection on 05.04.1991 with regard to the allotment of the plot in the exclusive name of Dhan Singh. Subsequently, Nahar Singh died on 14.05.1993. Thereupon, his widow and children stepped into his shoes. As per the plaint case, the original plaintiff no. 1 submitted several representations to the authorities to refrain them from allotting the alternative plot in the exclusive name of Dhan Singh. Subsequently, they instituted Suit No. 410 of 2000 on 14.06.2000 seeking a decree for a declaration that the appellants be declared as joint coowner of the residential plot allotted in the name of Dhan Singh. In the said suit, the defendant raised a plea that till the relinquished deed dated 21.10.1985 is held to be illegal, null, void, and not binding upon the plaintiff/appellants, they cannot be declared as co-owner of the suit. It is pleaded that in the instant case the relinquished deed dated 21.10.1985 came to the knowledge of the plaintiff on 08.03.1991 and the suit has been filed in the year 2000, therefore, the suit is barred by limitation. In such a factual backdrop, the Apex Court held that the question of limitation can be decided as a preliminary issue, and on consideration of the fact in the said case, the Apex Court was of the view that the Trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation. 32. In another judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 2960 of 2019, decided on 13.03.2019, it may be noted that the facts of the said case are distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 32. In another judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 2960 of 2019, decided on 13.03.2019, it may be noted that the facts of the said case are distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In the said case, the respondent filed T.S. Suit No. 19 of 2003 against the appellant-original defendant in the Court of Munsif Danapur for a declaration that the deed of gift dated 06.03.1981 executed in favour of the appellant is showy and sham transaction and no title and possession with respect to the gifted property ever passed to the appellant -original defendant and the same is not binding on him. In the said case, an application was filed under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit is barred by law of limitation on the ground that the deed of the gift having been executed on 06.03.1981, the suit under Article 59 of the Limitation Act ought to have been filed within three years from the date of execution of gift deed, whereas the same has been filed after more than 22 years from the date of execution of the gift deed. In that case, the fact as emanates from the judgment are that the plaintiff/respondent had knowledge about the execution of the registered gift deed dated 06.03.1981, but they did not raise any objection till the year 2003 and in such factual backdrop, the Apex Court held that the suit is barred by limitation. 33. In another judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 500 of 2022 decided on 20.09.2022, the Apex Court was considering a case where the original plaintiff/respondent instituted a suit for a decree of cancellation of the registered sale deed executed by the original plaintiff. The suit has been instituted in the year 2015/2016 i.e. after about a period of 10 years from the date of execution of the registered sale deed. The suit has been instituted in the year 2015/2016 i.e. after about a period of 10 years from the date of execution of the registered sale deed. The suit was instituted on the ground that the sale deed has been got executed by fraud and misrepresentation and the plaintiffs signed the said documents believing or treating it as a joint venture agreement and the plaintiffs did not go through the contents of the said documents and as in the year 2015, they came to know about such fraud and obtaining the documents of the sale deed by misrepresentation, therefore, considering Section 17 of the Act, the said suit cannot be said to be barred by limitation. In the said case, the Apex Court while considering the import of the pleading in the plaint of the suit found that only bald averments have been made with regard to the fraud and in such factual backdrop, the Apex Court held that mere stating in the plaint that fraud has been played is not enough and the allegation of fraud must be specifically averred in the plain, otherwise merely by using the word ‘fraud’ the plaintiffs would try to get the suits within the limitation, which otherwise may be barred by limitation. So, this judgment is also distinguishable on facts and law enunciated in the said judgment in the said judgment is not applicable in the present case. Therefore, this judgment also does not come in aid to the appellant. 34. Thus, for the reasons given above, this Court does not find any illegality in the order passed by the lower appellate court in setting aside the order passed by the trial Court rejecting the plaint on the ground of limitation. 35. Accordingly, the appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.