JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Ms. Shubhangi Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Jyotinder Mishra, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Raj Nath Singh, learned counsel for respondent no.4, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record as well as the written submissions filed by the parties. 2. The instant habeas corpus writ petition has been filed on behalf of the corpus namely Km. Shariya Farhan, aged about 7 years by her mother and natural guardian Smt. Mazia Farhan @ Mazia Sayied (petitioner) with the following prayers:- “i. Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of habeas corpus directing the opposite parties directing and commanding to produce the petitioner/detenue Km. Shariya Farhan, before this Hon'ble Court and handover to her custody of the mother after considering all paramount consideration of the minor Girl detenue. ii. Issue a writ, order, ad-interim Mandamus to this effect, or any direction in any nature which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the circumstances of the case. iii. Issue any other writ order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the circumstances of the case may kindly be passed in the interest of justice." 3. In pursuance of the agreement arrived at between learned counsel for the parties to file written submissions in this case, the written submissions have been filed and are taken on record and these written submissions furnished by the parties are also made part of the record. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner Ms. Shubhangi Singh in her written submissions stated that the marriage of the petitioner was solemnized with the respondent no.4 on 07.02.2012 and out of this wedlock the detenue was born on 28.10.2014. After the birth of the female child the behaviour and conduct of the respondent no.4 become cruel towards the petitioner and the respondent no.4 as well as his family members started torturing the petitioner mentally and physically. 5. It is further stated that in the year 2019 the petitioner again became pregnant, however, her 'Nanad' had brought some midwife in order to know the gender of the 'fetus' and when they got to know that the child in the womb is again a girl, the petitioner was forced to consume some medicine for the purpose of abortion and when her condition become worsen they took her to many clinics in Lucknow. The condition of the petitioner became very critical and in that condition she was taken to the Government Hospital, Hardoi, which is the home town of the brother-in-law of respondent No. 4. 6. It is further stated that thereafter the respondent no.4 and his family members started demanding Rs. 20 lakhs as dowry and also started committing cruelty in lieu of such demand. The brother-in-law of the petitioner (Nandoi) Arshad Jamal was also having a bad eye on petitioner and it was on 25.08.2020 the respondent no.4 on not getting Rs. 20 lacs as dowry had pronounced 'Triple Talak' in single sitting to the petitioner. It is also stated that the petitioner was also subjected to unnatural offence by the respondent no.4 and when she went to the house of respondent no.4, she was assaulted by him and her servant Nizamuddin. It is also submitted that a writ petition containing false averments were also filed by the parents of the respondent no.4 bearing Writ Petition No. 15481 (MB) of 2020 "Smt. Rehana Meraj and another vs. State of U.P. and others" containing the facts that they have disowned their son and daughter-in-law (petitioner). The petitioner has also filed an application under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act for getting residential rights in her matrimonial home and an order in this regard was also passed by the Court. It is also stated that on an F.I.R. was also lodged by the petitioner and the charge-sheet was also filed therein under Sections 498-A, 313, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 D.P. Act and under Section 3/4 of the Muslim Women Protection Rights on Marriage Act 2019. 7. It is next stated that on 25.09.2021 the respondent no.4 had come to the house of the petitioner on the pretext of settling the dispute and had kidnapped the corpus and she did not thereafter return the corpus to the petitioner and in this regard a complaint was also made by petitioner at the Police Station Gudamba, District Lucknow as well as at the Police Station Bazar Khala, District Lucknow but no action was taken. 8. 8. It is further stated that since then the corpus is in illegal detention of the respondent no.4 and he has manipulated the corpus against her mother (petitioner) and have also encouraged her to misbehave with her and he is not allowing her to meet with her mother (petitioner). 9. While referring to the order dated 27.07.2022 of co-ordinate Bench of this Court, it is submitted that the choice or consent of child of very tender age could not be ascertained and, therefore, being of very tender age the custody of the corpus should be granted to the petitioner, as also under Muslim personal law, the custody of the child specially the girl child must be solely with the mother until she attain puberty. 10. It is also stated in the written submissions that during her visits the petitioner came to know that the corpus is ill and it was also evident by the prescriptions of the doctor that adequate medical facilities are not being provided to the corpus. The corpus is suffering from frequent urinary tract infection and her teeth are also creating trouble. The respondent no.4 is a big businessmen having four inter colleges and one degree college and is not having any time for the corpus, while the petitioner is having sufficient time to take care of the corpus. It is also stated that the corpus being a girl-child requires a care and attention of the mother more than the care of the father. 11. It is also stated that since the corpus has been taken away forcibly on 25.09.2021 the custody of the same with the respondent no.4 is illegal and, therefore, the custody of the child be restored to the petitioner. 12. The petitioner has relied on the following case laws:- "(i) Criminal Appeal No. 520 of 2001 (Syed Saleemuddin vs. Dr. Rukhsana and others) decided on 19.04.2001. (ii) Kumar V. Jahgirdar vs. Chethana Ramatheertha, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4230-4231 of 2003 decided on 29.01.2004 (Hon'ble Supreme Court). (iii) Single Judge Judgement of this Court dated 14.12.2021 passed in Habeas Corpus No. 9307 of 2020 (Master Devansh Agarwal thru. Deepti Goel and another vs. State of U.P. and others). (iv) Judgment of this Court dated 08.10.2020 passed in Habeas Corpus No. 484 of 2020 "Aisha (Minor) and another vs. State of U.P. and others. (iii) Single Judge Judgement of this Court dated 14.12.2021 passed in Habeas Corpus No. 9307 of 2020 (Master Devansh Agarwal thru. Deepti Goel and another vs. State of U.P. and others). (iv) Judgment of this Court dated 08.10.2020 passed in Habeas Corpus No. 484 of 2020 "Aisha (Minor) and another vs. State of U.P. and others. (v) Akbal Ahmad vs. Jamila Khatoon and another, decided on 04.04.2017 by this Court passed in First Appeal Defective No. 27 of 2016. (vi) Vivek Singh vs. Romani Singh passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 13.02.2017 in Civil Appeal No. 3962 of 2016." 13. In the written submissions filed on behalf of the respondent no.4, it is admitted that the marriage between the petitioner and respondent no.4 was solemnized on 07.02.2012 at Lucknow, however, the respondent no.4 had denied all the allegations levelled against him and his family members in the petition. It is further stated that in the Month of March, 2021 amicable dialogue had taken place between the parties with the assistance of their friends and relatives and it was mutually agreed that as the alleged detenue is willing to reside with respondent no.4 she shall stay with him and thereafter the petitioner had left for her maternal home. However, thereafter she filed some false and fabricated complaints in order to pressurize the respondent no.4. 14. It is further stated that the detenue is in the custody of her father and the same by any stretch of imagination could not be termed as 'illegal' and also that the petitioner is not having any financial resources of her own to take care of the corpus. 15. It is also stated that on 15.11.2021 the detenue was produced before the Court and during the course of hearing the Hon'ble Court was pleased to observe that the detenue is prudent enough to understand the questions and has given rational answers and also that it appears that she is annoyed from the conduct of her mother for the reason to be best explained by her mother herself and she has stated that she is very happy with her father and wants to live with him. 16. 16. It is further stated that during the course of hearing on 08.08.2022 efforts were made by the Hon'ble Court to help the petitioner and respondent no.4 to reach an amicable settlement and both parties agreed to mediate the matter and respondent no.4 in order show his bonafide agreed to pay amount of Rs. 1 lac to the petitioner and has also paid the said amount to the petitioner by way of demand draft, which was received and encashed by the petitioner but thereafter she refused to participate in the mediation. 17. It is vehemently submitted that when this Court had arrived at a conclusion that the detenue is of sufficient intellect, her wish and will to remain with the respondent no.4 be honoured and the same could not be ignored. 18. The following case laws have been relied on by respondent no.4 in support of his submissions:- "(i) Nil Ratan Kundu and another vs. Abhijit Kundu reported in (2008) 9 SCC 413 (ii) Vaidehi vs. I. Gopinath, reported in AIR 1993 Madras 34. (iii) Tejaswini Gaud vs. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari reported in (2019) 7 SCC 42 (iv) Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 632 of 2021 (Sushil Kumar Tiwari and others), decided on 06.12.2021 by this Court. (v) Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 521 of 2022 (Granth Verma vs. State of U.P. and others), decided on 22.09.2022. (vi) CRWP No. 7913/2020 "Poonam Kalsi vs. State of Punjab and others", decided on 20.04.2022. (vii) Rohith Thammana Gowda vs. State of Karnataka and others, reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 643. (viii) Salman Ali vs. Majjo Begum, reported in AIR 1985 All 29 ." 19. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the written submissions submitted by the parties and having perused the record, it is evident that certain facts are admitted to the parties. It is admitted to the parties that Km. Shariya Farhan is aged about 7 years and the petitioner is her mother and respondent no.4 is her father. The corpus is living with respondent no.4, while the contention of the respondent no.4 is that it was in March 2021 in pursuance of an amicable settlement held between the parties with the help of their friends and relatives the corpus was given in the custody of the respondent no.4 and the petitioner had left to live with her parents in her maternal home. Per contra petitioner has stated that the corpus was kidnapped by respondent No.4 on 25.09.2021. 20. It is worthwhile to mention at this juncture that this court on 15.11.2021 had interacted with the detenue and on the basis of interaction with the detenue has recorded following observation in the order sheet of 15.11.2021: , "The alleged girl child Km. Shariya Farhan is produced before the Court, when she was asked about her name, father's name and mother's name as well about her educational profile, fluently she replied the Court and by her conversation it appears that she is prudent enough to understand the questions and answer them rationally. It appears that she is annoyed from conduct of her mother for the reason to be explained best by the mother herself, however, she told the Court that she is very happy with her father and wants to live with him. In view of the aforesaid statement of girl child, the alleged detenue and the facts averred in the petition as to the differences between both the spouses leading to several civil matrimonial dispute and criminal cases, a well comprehensive counter affidavit over the matter needs to be asked for." 21. Before proceeding further, it is fruitful to recall that both parties (parents of the corpus) have levelled allegations against each other and have stated in their pleadings that they are in the best position to claim the custody of their child, who is a girl of only 6-7 years and she is helplessly witnessing her parents fighting a legal battle in this court, silently. Rival parties through their pleadings have levelled allegations and counter allegations, the truthfulness of these allegations could not be tested in writ jurisdiction, as the same requires evidence in support of these allegations and counter claims. It is contended by the petitioner that having regard to the personal law of the parties the mother is having a right to keep the custody of child, while the respondent No. 4 has pleaded that the child is not inclined to live with petitioner and also that she has developed a bond with him and it was under a settlement that the custody of the child was given to him. The petitioner claims that child was taken away by respondent No.4 forcefully. The petitioner claims that child was taken away by respondent No.4 forcefully. Now the question arises whether this court should determine the rights of rival parties to the custody of their child ? 22. It is to be recalled that it is the guardians and wards act 1890, which was primarlily enacted to determine the rival rights to the custody of a minor . Interestingly section 17 of this Act enjoins upon the court to have due regard to the personal law of the minor in declaring/appointing a guardian and if the minor is intelligent/old enough to form an intelligent preference to any of the parent, the court may be justified to consider that preference also in coming to the final conclusion, moreover no person can be appointed as a guardian against her/his will. 23. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent decision 2022 SCC OnLine SC 885 Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh vs State of Tamil Nadu and others while adjudicating rival claims of the parents to the custody of their minor child has held in para nos. 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85 and 86 as under : "80. The object and scope of a writ of Habeas Corpus in the context of a claim relating to the custody of a minor child fell for the consideration of this Court in Nithya Anand Raghavan (supra) and it was held that the principal duty of the court in such matters should be to ascertain whether the custody of the child is unlawful and illegal and whether the welfare of the child requires that his present custody should be changed and the child be handed over to the care and custody of any other person. 81. Taking a similar view in the case of Syed Saleemuddin v. Dr. Rukhsana, (2001) 5 SCC 247 , it was held by this Court that in a Habeas Corpus petition seeking transfer of custody of a child from one parent to the other, the principal consideration for the court would be to ascertain whether the custody of the child can be said to be unlawful or illegal and whether the welfare of the child requires that the present custody should be changed. It was stated thus: “11…it is clear that in an application seeking a writ of Habeas Corpus for custody of minor children the principal consideration for the Court is to ascertain whether the custody of the children can be said to be unlawful or illegal and whether the welfare of the children requires that present custody should be changed and the children should be left in care and custody of somebody else. The principle is well settled that in a matter of custody of a child the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration for the court…” 82. The question of maintainability of a Habeas Corpus petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the custody of a minor was examined by this Court in Tejaswini Gaud v. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari, (2019) 7 SCC 42 , and it was held that the petition would be maintainable where the detention by parents or others is found to be illegal and without any authority of law and the extraordinary remedy of a prerogative writ of Habeas Corpus can be availed in exceptional cases where the ordinary remedy provided by the law is either unavailable or ineffective. The observations made in the judgment in this regard are as follows: “14. Writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative process for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an effective means of immediate release from an illegal or improper detention. The writ also extends its influence to restore the custody of a minor to his guardian when wrongfully deprived of it. The detention of a minor by a person who is not entitled to his legal custody is treated as equivalent to illegal detention for the purpose of granting writ, directing custody of the minor child. For restoration of the custody of a minor from a person who according to the personal law, is not his legal or natural guardian, in appropriate cases, the writ court has jurisdiction. xxxxxxxxx 19. Habeas corpus proceedings is not to justify or examine the legality of the custody. Habeas corpus proceedings is a medium through which the custody of the child is addressed to the discretion of the court. xxxxxxxxx 19. Habeas corpus proceedings is not to justify or examine the legality of the custody. Habeas corpus proceedings is a medium through which the custody of the child is addressed to the discretion of the court. Habeas corpus is a prerogative writ which is an extraordinary remedy and the writ is issued where in the circumstances of the particular case, ordinary remedy provided by the law is either not available or is ineffective; otherwise a writ will not be issued. In child custody matters, the power of the High Court in granting the writ is qualified only in cases where the detention of a minor by a person who is not entitled to his legal custody. In view of the pronouncement on the issue in question by the Supreme Court and the High Courts, in our view, in child custody matters, the writ of habeas corpus is maintainable where it is proved that the detention of a minor child by a parent or others was illegal and without any authority of law. 20. In child custody matters, the ordinary remedy lies only under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act or the Guardians and Wards Act as the case may be. In cases arising out of the proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by whether the minor ordinarily resides within the area on which the court exercises such jurisdiction. There are significant differences between the enquiry under the Guardians and Wards Act and the exercise of powers by a writ court which is of summary in nature. What is important is the welfare of the child. In the writ court, rights are determined only on the basis of affidavits. Where the court is of the view that a detailed enquiry is required, the court may decline to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction and direct the parties to approach the civil court. It is only in exceptional cases, the rights of the parties to the custody of the minor will be determined in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction on a petition for habeas corpus.” 83. It is only in exceptional cases, the rights of the parties to the custody of the minor will be determined in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction on a petition for habeas corpus.” 83. In the case of Anjali Kapoor v. Rajiv Baijal, (2009) 7 SCC 322 , where the custody of a minor child was being claimed by the father being the natural parent from the maternal grandmother, the mother having died in child birth, it was held that taking proper care and attention in upbringing of the child is an important factor for granting custody of child, and on facts, the child having been brought up by the grandmother since her infancy and having developed emotional bonding, the custody of the child was allowed to be retained by the maternal grandmother. While considering the competing rights of natural guardianships vis-a-vis the welfare of the child, the test for consideration by the Court was held to be; what would best serve the welfare and interest of the child. Referring to the earlier decisions in Sumedha Nagpal v. State of Delhi, (2000) 9 SCC 745 ; Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal, (1973) 1 SCC 840 ; Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw, (supra) and Muthuswami Chettiar v. K.M. Chinna Muthuswami Moopanar, AIR 1935 Mad 195 , it was also held that the welfare of child prevails over the legal rights of the parties while deciding the custody of minor child. The observations made in the judgment in this regard are as follows: “14. The question for our consideration is, whether in the present scenario would it be proper to direct the appellant to hand over the custody of the minor child Anagh to the respondent. 15. Under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, the father is the guardian of the minor child until he is found unfit to be the guardian of the minor female child. In deciding such questions, the welfare of the minor child is the paramount consideration and such a question cannot be decided merely based upon the rights of the parties under the law. (See Sumedha Nagpal v. State of Delhi.” (2000) 9 SCC 745 (SCC p. 747, paras 2 & 5). 84. In deciding such questions, the welfare of the minor child is the paramount consideration and such a question cannot be decided merely based upon the rights of the parties under the law. (See Sumedha Nagpal v. State of Delhi.” (2000) 9 SCC 745 (SCC p. 747, paras 2 & 5). 84. In Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal (supra), this Court has observed that: “7…the principle on which the court should decide the fitness of the guardian mainly depends on two factors : (i) the father's fitness or otherwise to be the guardian, and (ii) the interests of the minors.” 85. This Court considering the welfare of the child also stated that : (SCC p. 855, para 15) “15….The children are not mere chattels : nor are they mere playthings for their parents. Absolute right of parents over the destinies and the lives of their children has, in the modern changed social conditions, yielded to the considerations of their welfare as human beings so that they may grow up in a normal balanced manner to be useful members of the society…. 86. In Elizabeth Dinshaw (supra), this Court has observed that whenever a question arises before a court pertaining to the custody of the minor child, the matter is to be decided not on consideration of the legal rights of the parties but on the sole and predominant criterion of what would best serve the interest and welfare of the child. ” 24. Thus in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajeswari (supra) the paramount consideration before this court is the welfare of child and not the legal rights of the parties, more so in the background of the fact that any adjudication by this court would be subject to the final determination of the rights of the parties in an appropriate proceedings before a competent court. 25. The question how the welfare of the minor is to be assessed is a question which could be decided in a regular proceedings when parties have led their evidence but in the writ jurisdiction the same is to be decided on the basis of affidavits placed by the parties. Thus, a very careful approach is to be adopted by the writ court while determining the welfare of the child . Thus, a very careful approach is to be adopted by the writ court while determining the welfare of the child . However the term welfare could not be measured by money only, nor by physical comfort alone and the concept of welfare of a child must be tajen in the widest sense. The bond or ties of affection of child with any of the parent could not be ignored disregarded while deciding welfare of such child. The security, love and affection of the child towards only one of the parent could not be ignored as the bond such child is having with any of his/her parents would also be essential for overall development of child's personality. 26. At this juncture, It is worthwhile to quote para no. 91 of Rajeshwari's case (supra) "91. Thus, it is well established that in issuing the writ of Habeas Corpus in the case of minors, the jurisdiction which the Court exercises is an inherent jurisdiction as distinct from a statutory jurisdiction conferred by any particular provision in any special statute. In other words, the employment of the writ of Habeas Corpus in child custody cases is not pursuant to, but independent of any statute. The jurisdiction exercised by the court rests in such cases on its inherent equitable powers and exerts the force of the State, as parens patriae, for the protection of its minor ward, and the very nature and scope of the inquiry and the result sought to be accomplished call for the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court of equity. The primary object of a Habeas Corpus petition, as applied to minor children, is to determine in whose custody the best interests of the child will probably be advanced. In a Habeas Corpus proceeding brought by one parent against the other for the custody of their child, the court has before it the question of the rights of the parties as between themselves, and also has before it, if presented by the pleadings and the evidence, the question of the interest which the State, as parens patriae, has in promoting the best interests of the child. Thus it may be safely concluded that in the proceedings before any court for the custody of a minor, the court must have due regard to the minor's welfare as the first and paramount consideration and may not take into considerations as to whether father's claim in respect of upbringing of child is superior to that of the mother's or the mother's claim is superior to that of father. Thus in Habeas Corpus case pertaining to the custody of the child the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. 3. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vivek Singh vs Romani Singh , (2017) 3 SCC 231 has observed that a child, in such type of cases, feels tormented because of the strained relations between his parents and ideally needs the company of both of them and it becomes sometimes a difficult choice for the court to decide as to whom the custody should be given. Even in such a dilemma, the paramount consideration is the welfare of the child. Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of this case the welfare of the child in the considered opinion of this Court would be if she is allowed to remain with respondent No. 4 (father) with whom she is living at present. In reaching this decision this court has been guided by the interaction made by this court with the child on 15.11.2021, whereon the coordinate bench has recorded that she had understood questions put to her (corpus) and had answered rationally and also that she is annoyed from the conduct of her mother (petitioner) for the reasons to be explained best by her mother (petitioner) and she wants to live with her father. No doubt the child also requires the care and attention of her mother, moreso, when she is reaching puberty but at any case she could not be given in the custody of mother when she is not comfortable with her, moreso in absence of any compelling circumstances. No doubt the child also requires the care and attention of her mother, moreso, when she is reaching puberty but at any case she could not be given in the custody of mother when she is not comfortable with her, moreso in absence of any compelling circumstances. Thus, for the reasons mentioned herein before, I do not find any merit in the petition so far as shifting of custody of minor from respondent no.4 to the petitioner is concerned, this prayer is accordingly refused and it is directed that till any effective order is passed by the competent court in regular proceedings with regard to the custody of minor child (corpus), the custody of child will continue to remain with respondent no.4 (father). However, the petitioner being the mother may be granted visitation rights. 4. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amyra Dwivedi vs. Abhinav Dwivedi, Civil Appeal No. 2067 of 2020 dated 06.03.2020 in Para No. 4 and 5 opined as under:- "4. In Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/0052/2020 : 2020 AIR 577, this Court held that the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration in matters relating to custody of children. In this context, we may refer to paragraph 22 of the judgment, which reads as follows: A child, especially a child of tender years requires the love, affection, company, protection of both parents. This is not only the requirement of the child but is his/her basic human right. Just because the parents are at war with each other, does not mean that the child should be denied the care, affection, love or protection of any one of the two parents. A child is not an inanimate object which can be tossed from one parent to the other. Every separation, every re-union may have a traumatic and psychosomatic impact on the child. Therefore, it is to be ensured that the court weighs each and every circumstance very carefully before deciding how and in what matter the custody of the child should be shared between both the parents. Even if the custody is given to one parent the other parent must have sufficient visitation rights to ensure that the child keeps in touch with the other parent and does not lose social, physical and psychological contact with any one of the two parents. Even if the custody is given to one parent the other parent must have sufficient visitation rights to ensure that the child keeps in touch with the other parent and does not lose social, physical and psychological contact with any one of the two parents. It is only in extreme circumstances that one parent should be denied contact with the child. Reasons must be assigned if one parent is to be denied any visitation rights or contact with the child. Courts dealing with the custody matters must while deciding issues of custody clearly define the nature, manner and specifics of the visitation rights. 5. When a court grants visitation rights, these rights should be granted in such a way that the child and the parent who is granted visitation right, can meet in an atmosphere where they can be like parent and child and this atmosphere can definitely not be found in the office of District Legal Services Authority. That atmosphere may be found in the home of the parent or in a park or a restaurant or any other place where the child and the parent are comfortable. " 27. Thus, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in view that both parents are resident of Lucknow, following directions are issued with regard to the visitation rights:- (1) Mother-Petitioner shall be entitled to meet child on each Sunday for 3 hours at any time between 10:00 am. to 6:00 pm. at the residence of Respondent no.4. (2) If on any Sunday due to any extreme exigency the child is not available, the mother would be entitled to meet her on the next day (Monday) for two hours (between 5:00 pm. to 8:00 pm.) (3) The mother would be entitled to offer some eatable items as well some toys or clothes to the child, during such meeting. (4) On festivals like Eid-ul-fitr, Eid-ul-Adha or Shabe Barat, Moharram, etc., mother may visit the child, both in the morning and in the evening as per her convenience. (5) On the birthday of the child, this Court hope and expect that both parents may leave their differences apart and must spend sometime with the child together. (4) On festivals like Eid-ul-fitr, Eid-ul-Adha or Shabe Barat, Moharram, etc., mother may visit the child, both in the morning and in the evening as per her convenience. (5) On the birthday of the child, this Court hope and expect that both parents may leave their differences apart and must spend sometime with the child together. In this scenario Respondent no.4 must also invite petitioner to join the celebration and if they are unable to do so, mother shall be allowed to meet child on each birthday for 2-3 hours at the house of respondent no.4. (6) This Court also directs the school where the Minor-Km. Shariya Farhan is studying to write the name of mother also in the school register as well as in the WhatsApp group of the parents, if any, and she would also be given information pertaining to parent teacher meeting, school function, etc. (7) The mother apart from meeting on each Sunday is allowed to contact child twice in a week through video call and respondent no.4 would be responsible to arrange presence of minor child on such video call made by petitioner. 28. It is made clear that petitioner would be at liberty to move appropriate Court for custody of the child.