JUDGMENT : This writ petition has been filed by Prem Singh, now deceased and represented by his heirs and LRs, assailing two orders of release, passed under Section 21(1)(a) of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (for short, ''the Act'), relating to two distinct tenements in House No. C/105/119, Tehsil Sadar, District Gorakhpur. The orders of release passed separately by the Prescribed Authority relating to both the tenements in House No. 105/119 (supra), for short, 'the house in question', have been affirmed in two separate appeals by the Appellate Authority, under Section 22 of the Act, both the appeals being preferred by Prem Singh. 2. The facts leading to this writ petition are these: Smt. Uma Shukla, mentioned in the cause title of the writ petition as Smt. Uma Devi Shukla, wife of Basant Shukla, instituted two separate proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act against two different tenants, occupying different parts of the house in question. P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013 was instituted by Smt. Uma Shukla (for short, 'the landlady') against Smt. Prabhawati Devi widow of the late Seeta, Shrawan and Gopal, both sons of the late Seeta, seeking release of the part of the house in question in their tenancy, on the ground of her bona fide need. 3. The tenement, that Smt. Prabhawati and her sons held, is described at the foot of the application giving rise to P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013. The boundaries given at the foot of the application show the tenement in the occupation of Smt. Prabhawati and her sons as that portion of the house in question, which was located to the east of the part of the said house that Prem Singh occupies, and has well defined boundaries, discernible from the application under reference. 4. Similarly, the other application for release that was instituted against Prem Singh, also on the ground of bona fide need, by the landlady, describes the tenement in his occupation with reference to its boundaries detailed at the foot of the application, registered on the file of the Prescribed Authority as P.A. Case No. 38 of 2013. The tenement in the occupation of Prem Singh is also shown as part of the house in question with its own distinct and different boundaries, as already mentioned. 5. The tenement in the occupation of Prem Singh is also shown as part of the house in question with its own distinct and different boundaries, as already mentioned. 5. The landlady, thus, came up with a case against the two tenants, to wit, Smt. Prabhawati Devi and her sons being one and Prem Singh the other, showing them to be the occupants of two distinct tenements, both part of the house in question, but with their distinct and well defined identities. Looking to the course of action that proceedings arising out of the two applications for release took, it would be apposite to dispose of one part of the objection that Prem Singh has raised against the release order first, before considering the others that involve conventional issues arising in proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, between the landlord and tenant. This course of action is necessitated by the rather ingenuous stand taken by Prem Singh after the Prescribed Authority had passed the order of release relating to the demised premises, subject matter of P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013, founded on compromise between the landlady and the tenants in that case, that is to say, Smt. Prabhawati and her sons. 6. Since both the release orders were passed by the Prescribed Authority together in terms of a common judgment and order, Prem Singh, the tenant in P.A. Case No. 38 of 2013 carried an appeal against the release order passed in P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013, also. A look at the proceedings in P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013 brought by the landlady against Smt. Prabhawati Devi and her sons would show that the parties in that case filed a memorandum of compromise, bearing Paper No. 26-Ga, in terms of which the tenant in the said case agreed to deliver possession of the demised premises, subject matter of proceedings to the landlady. The said compromise was verified by the Court. 7. After verification of the compromise, Prem Singh moved an application before the Prescribed Authority in P.A. Case No. 37 of 2017, which had nothing to do with him on the face of the proceedings, seeking impleadment. The impleadment was granted on 15.09.2015 by the Prescribed Authority. Prem Singh then filed objections to the compromise, already verified, bearing Paper No. 32-Ga, supported by an affidavit dated 18.12.2014. The impleadment was granted on 15.09.2015 by the Prescribed Authority. Prem Singh then filed objections to the compromise, already verified, bearing Paper No. 32-Ga, supported by an affidavit dated 18.12.2014. The Prescribed Authority, however, proceeded to decide P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013 on the basis of compromise between parties to that case, that is to say, the landlady and the tenant, against whom those proceedings were brought and granted release in terms of a judgment passed on compromise, scripted together in a single document, also carrying the judgment and order dated 15.04.2017 passed in P.A. Case No. 38 of 2013 against Prem Singh, the tenant in the other part of the premises. 8. An appeal was filed from the order passed in P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013 as well, by Prem Singh with a case that the compromise was fraudulent proceeding and he was the tenant of the other part of the house in question, falsely shown to be in the occupation of Smt. Prabhawati and her sons by the landlady. The compromise was assailed as an outcome of fraud and the order of release a nullity, that could not be enforced against Prem Singh. Prem Singh, thus, in effect said that he was the tenant in the part of the house in question, that was subject matter of P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013. Smt. Prabhawati and her sons were merely parties, who were put up as sham to obtain a release order against him for one part of the demised premises that he also had in his tenancy occupation. 9. The Appellate Court did not accept Prem Singh's contention as aforesaid for the reason that was dealt with by the Appellate Authority, after the learned Judge had disposed of the issues regarding bona fide need and comparative hardship against Prem Singh, in agreement with the Prescribed Authority. 9. The Appellate Court did not accept Prem Singh's contention as aforesaid for the reason that was dealt with by the Appellate Authority, after the learned Judge had disposed of the issues regarding bona fide need and comparative hardship against Prem Singh, in agreement with the Prescribed Authority. The appellate Authority, therefore, reasoned that even if Prem Singh were to be accepted as a tenant in the other part of the house in question, regarding which proceedings in P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013 were decided in terms of the compromise between the landlady and Smt. Prabhawati Devi, it would make no difference because the release order in that case too would be upheld; the part or extent of the accommodation in Prem Singh's tenancy being what it was shown in P.A. Case No. 38 of 2013 filed against him or also that accommodation, which was made subject matter of proceedings by the landlady in P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013. 10. This Court upon a consideration of the matter is minded to think that the objection that Prem Singh came up with is indeed specious. He did not make any move to seek impleadment in Case No. 37 of 2013 until Smt. Prabhawati and her sons, who were the tenants, against whom the said proceedings were instituted, decided to compromise with the landlady and give up possession of the premises, subject matter of the said case. Rather, as it appears, after impleadment in P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013 and objections to the compromise, Prem Singh did not press his objections before the Prescribed Authority questioning the compromise or led evidence in support of his case to show that, in fact, it was he (Prem Singh), who was the tenant of the premises, subject matter of P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013 and not Smt. Prabhawati Devi and her sons. This is the inescapable conclusion from the order passed by the Prescribed Authority, who has said nothing about Prem Singh's case in challenge to the compromise, though Prem Singh was a party to P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013. Both the cases also appear to have been heard together. 11. This is the inescapable conclusion from the order passed by the Prescribed Authority, who has said nothing about Prem Singh's case in challenge to the compromise, though Prem Singh was a party to P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013. Both the cases also appear to have been heard together. 11. If Prem Singh had come up with evidence to support his case that he was indeed the tenant in the demised premises, part of the house in question and subject matter of P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013, the Prescribed Authority would have dealt with the challenge and decide it one way or the other. In the event, Prem Singh did lead evidence in support of the case that he was the tenant in the demised premises, subject matter of P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013 and that the proceedings against Smt. Prabhawati and the compromise were fraudulent, which the Prescribed Authority did not decide, Prem Singh ought to have filed for review inviting the Prescribed Authority's attention to the case that he had set up through his objections and the evidence that he led to support it. Nothing of the kind was done by Prem Singh before the Prescribed Authority, which may lend support to the case that Prem Singh, after his impleadment in P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013 and objections to the compromise entered into between the landlady on one hand and Smt. Prabhawati and her sons on the other, took steps to establish his rights to the demised shop, subject matter of the aforesaid case. 12. The Appellate Authority also has not noticed any evidence led by Prem Singh to establish that he was indeed the tenant in the demised premises, subject matter of P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013 and that the compromise was indeed a sham. The Appellate Authority refused to accept Prem Singh's case on different grounds, which have already been noticed hereinabove. 13. Before this Court also, there is not the slightest evidence annexed to the writ petition that might have formed part of the record to establish that Prem Singh was the tenant of the demised premises, subject matter of P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013 or that the compromise filed in that case inter partes was indeed a sham. 13. Before this Court also, there is not the slightest evidence annexed to the writ petition that might have formed part of the record to establish that Prem Singh was the tenant of the demised premises, subject matter of P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013 or that the compromise filed in that case inter partes was indeed a sham. The challenge, therefore, raised by Prem Singh to the release order passed in P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013 is absolutely without substance. The orders impugned, insofar as these dispose of P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013 and Rent Appeal No. 8 of 2017, arising from the release order passed in the said case do not merit interference. 14. This confronts the Court with the proceedings arising out of P.A. Case No. 38 of 2013, where Prem Singh is admittedly the tenant in the demised premises, part of the house in question, subject matter of the proceedings for release under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. 15. As would appear from the facts relevant here, P.A. Case No. 38 of 2013 was instituted by the landlady against Prem Singh with allegations that she is the owner and landlady of the demised premises, part of the house in question, as detailed at the foot of the application. The demised premises were purchased by the landlady from its former owners and landlords, Amrit Singh and Bhanu Pratap vide registered sale deed dated 20.05.2010. It is landlady's case that her vendors inherited the demised premises from their mother, Smt. Amrawati Devi widow of the late Yogendra Singh, who died on 05.02.2003. Prem Singh was in occupation of the demised shop as the tenant since the time of Smt. Amrawati Devi. Upon her demise, the title devolved upon her sons, Amrit Singh and Bhanu Pratap, who stepped into Smt. Amrawati Devi's shoes. Amrit Singh and Bhanu Pratap on one hand and Prem Singh on the other, therefore, stood in the relationship of landlord and tenant. Prem Singh would pay rent of Rs.50/- to the previous owner and landlady, Amrawati Devi and after her, to her successors and heirs, Amrit Singh and Bhanu Pratap at the same rate. The landlady purchased the demised premises vide registered sale deed dated 20.05.2010 for her personal need for accommodation and gave information orally to Prem Singh on the following day i.e. 21.05.2010. 16. The landlady purchased the demised premises vide registered sale deed dated 20.05.2010 for her personal need for accommodation and gave information orally to Prem Singh on the following day i.e. 21.05.2010. 16. It is the landlady's further case that after intimating Prem Singh on 21.05.2010 about the acquisition of title by her relating to the demised premises, she offered to accept the rent of Rs.50/- payable by Prem Singh. Prem Singh, despite demand and information about the sale deed in the landlady's favour, did not remit rent to her, though a period of one month expired when rent, reckoned from the date of the sale deed, fell due. The landlady's name in accordance with the registered sale deed dated 20.05.2010, has been mutated in the house tax records of the Nagar Nigam as the owner of the demised premises. The landlady is depositing the house tax and water tax on the basis of the demands raised by the Nagar Nigam. Prem Singh is well aware of the fact that the landlady has purchased the demised premises (including the rest of the house in question) in order to satisfy her requirements for a residence, inasmuch as the landlady does not own in the city of Gorakhpur or in the rural areas of the District any house or open piece of land. 17. The landlady's husband has an ancestral house, located in the commercial area at Reti Chowk, Main Road, Urdu Bazar. The area of location of the house last mentioned is entirely commercial, which cannot be utilized by the landlady or the members of her family for the purpose of their residence. Also, the ancestral house, that the landlady's husband has a share in, is the subject of an ongoing litigation between the landlady's husband and his sister-in-law (Bhabhi) Nirmla Shukla. The landlady's husband carries on his business of manufacturing drinking water in a part of his ancestral house under the name and style of Akanksha Drinking Water. This makes the said house not at all available for the landlady or her family to live in. 18. The landlady stays in a rented accommodation, along with her family, belonging to the owner of Gokul Mishthan, Anil Kumar Gupta, situate at Mohalla Hasanganj, Lal Diggi at a monthly rent of Rs.8000/-. The rented accommodation, wherein the landlady along with her family stays is located on the first floor. 18. The landlady stays in a rented accommodation, along with her family, belonging to the owner of Gokul Mishthan, Anil Kumar Gupta, situate at Mohalla Hasanganj, Lal Diggi at a monthly rent of Rs.8000/-. The rented accommodation, wherein the landlady along with her family stays is located on the first floor. It has two rooms, a kitchen, a bathroom and a lobby. The landlady's family comprises besides herself, her husband and two children, a daughter Km. Shipra aged about 24 years and a son Shashank Shukla aged about 22 years, a student of M.B.A. The rented accommodation is used by the landlady in the manner that her two children, who are studying, occupy the two rooms available, whereas the landlady and her husband stay in the lobby. There is no other room in the rented accommodation, where the landlady and her husband can live nor is there a drawing room where they can entertain guests. The house in question, including the demised premises, was purchased by the landlady, because it is located in a residential area and close by to the commercial area. 19. It is also the landlady's case that she and her husband have gathered information that Prem Singh has immovable property at several places. The demised premises are part of the old house with a tile-worked roof. Prem Singh is planning, according to the landlady's information, in the near future to vacate the demised premises and move to his own house. This fact was conveyed to the landlady and her husband by her vendor as well. On further inquiries, the landlady discovered that Prem Singh has two residential plots located within the Nagar Nigam area at Mohalla Mahadeo Jharkhandi, Ward No. 1. These plots stand in the name of members of his family. One of these plots has had construction of a house up to the plinth level. The complete location and description of these two plots has been pleaded by the landlady. It is also said that Prem Singh is a native of Tehsil Bansgaon, an old resident and a Zamindar, who has in his native village big houses, groves and fields, which are an index of his high economic status. The landlady requires the demised premises for her personal occupation and that of her family members, so as to solve their problem of short accommodation. The landlady requires the demised premises for her personal occupation and that of her family members, so as to solve their problem of short accommodation. The landlady has to shunt about places in search of rented accommodation and spend a hafty sum of money on rent. In the event, the demised premises are released, the crisis on account of want of residential accommodation would end for the landlady. Prem Singh has three sons in his family and one of them lives in Gorakhpur City. Two of Prem Singh's sons stay with him and both are economically independent. 20. By contrast, the landlady's family survives on her husband's income from business. The landlady is a housewife, who has no source of income of her own. The two children and the landlady are, therefore, dependent upon her husband. The shortage of accommodation for the family is a big crisis and, therefore, the landlady's need is bona fide. It is pleaded that the landlady repeatedly requested Prem Singh to vacate the demised shop, but he did not. Upon expiry of the statutory period for a transferee landlord to bring an application for release under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, the landlady demanded of Prem Singh for the last time on 25.06.2013 to vacate the demised premises, which he refused. In consequence, the proceedings for release were instituted. 21. Prem Singh filed a written statement in answer to the release application. He took a stand that no information was given to him about the sale deed dated 20.05.2010 on 21.05.2010 by the landlady, as alleged. Prem Singh also asserted that for the demised premises, of which boundaries he has disclosed at the foot of his written statement, he went to pay rent to Amrit Singh up to the month of October, 2003, which Amrit Singh refused. Therefore, Prem Singh was depositing rent in Court through Misc. Case No. 21 of 2004 under Section 30(1) of the Act. There are averments to the effect that the landlady's house (which the landlady has described her husband's ancestral house) is in two parts. There are co-sharers occupying the same for residential purposes on the first floor and carrying on a shop at the ground floor. It is pleaded with reference to named individuals, who are residents in the locality in the immediate neighbourhood of the landlady's house that innumerable families are residing in the area. 22. There are co-sharers occupying the same for residential purposes on the first floor and carrying on a shop at the ground floor. It is pleaded with reference to named individuals, who are residents in the locality in the immediate neighbourhood of the landlady's house that innumerable families are residing in the area. 22. It is also Prem Singh's case that the landlady's co-sharer Nirmla Shukla is not engaged in any kind of litigation with her husband. The landlady has in the house under reference three rooms, a lavatory and a bathroom, where here family can comfortably live. She is not staying as a tenant at Mohalla Hasanganj. There is also a suit for injunction pending inter partes. The plots of land, which are said to be owned by Prem Singh, belong to Sudha Sanjay Singh, that she has purchased out of her Istridhan. It has nothing to do with Prem Singh. The other plot too, Prem Singh has no interest in. It is owned by Chhotey Lal and Manti Devi. The tenant has attempted to scout and secure another accommodation on rent, but failed. The tenant, therefore, has no other roof and shelter within the city of Gorakhpur. In the event, the release application were allowed, he would be without a house. The tenant would suffer greater hardship in the event of release than what the landlady would suffer in the event of refusal of the application. 23. The parties have filed affidavits in support of their respective cases and some documents, details whereof are elaborately listed in the judgments of the two Authorities below. These need not be recapitulated. 24. The Prescribed Authority framed the following issues (translated into English from Hindi) : (1) Whether the parties stand in the relationship of landlady and tenant? If yes, this P.A. Case is maintainable under Section 21 of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972? (2) Whether this P.A. Case has been presented on the basis of a bona fide need? (3) Whether allowing this P.A. Case would result in greater hardship to the opposite party in comparison to what the applicant would suffer, if the application is rejected? 25. The Prescribed Authority answered all the issues for the landlady and against the tenant, and, accordingly, allowed the release application giving rise to P.A. Case No. 38 of 2013. (3) Whether allowing this P.A. Case would result in greater hardship to the opposite party in comparison to what the applicant would suffer, if the application is rejected? 25. The Prescribed Authority answered all the issues for the landlady and against the tenant, and, accordingly, allowed the release application giving rise to P.A. Case No. 38 of 2013. The tenant was ordered to vacate the demised premises and deliver vacant possession within within 30 days of judgment. In event of default, the landlady was given the right to recover possession through process of Court. 26. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, Rent Appeal No. 7 of 2017 was preferred by the tenant to the District Judge of Gorakhpur. 27. It may be clarified here for the sake of record that connected P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013, that had been brought by the landlady against another tenant was disposed of by the Prescribed Authority by a common judgment, along with P.A. Case No. 38 of 2013. But, unlike P.A. Case No. 38 of 2013, it was decided on the basis of compromise between parties to that case. It was also appealed by the tenant (Prem Singh) alleging that the compromise between the landlady and the tenant in P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013 was fraudulent and to his prejudice. It was the tenant, who was in occupation of the premises, subject matter of P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013, and not the tenants, against whom that case was instituted, compromised and disposed of. The appeal from the aforesaid order being Rent Appeal No. 8 of 2017 was also heard along with the appeal preferred by the tenant from the judgment in P.A. Case No. 38 of 2013. Rent Appeal No. 8 of 2017 was dismissed by the Appellate Authority for reasons that this Court has already approved in the earlier part of this judgment. As such, nothing more requires to be said about the proceedings or judgment in appeal relating to Rent Appeal No. 8 of 2017. 28. The Appellate Authority, that is to say, the District Judge, Gorakhpur proceeded to formulate the following points for determination (relating to Rent Appeal No. 7 of 2017, translated into English from Hindi) : (1) Whether the release application instituted by the respondent/ landlady under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is not maintainable? 28. The Appellate Authority, that is to say, the District Judge, Gorakhpur proceeded to formulate the following points for determination (relating to Rent Appeal No. 7 of 2017, translated into English from Hindi) : (1) Whether the release application instituted by the respondent/ landlady under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is not maintainable? (2) Whether the respondent/ landlord has a bona fide need for the house in question? (3) Comparative hardship in relation to the house in question? 29. It must be recorded here that the fourth point, that was formulated by the Appellate Authority relates to Rent Appeal No. 8 of 2017, arising out of P.A. Case No. 37 of 2013, which we have already disposed of in the earlier part of this judgment. 30. Heard Mr. Adya Prasad Tewari, learned Counsel for the tenant and Mr. Arvind Srivastava, learned Counsel for the landlady. No one has appeared for Smt. Prabhawati Devi, Shrawan and Gopal, respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6. 31. It is argued by Mr. Adya Prasad Tewari, learned Counsel for tenant on the issue of maintainability of the proceedings for release that the application by the landlady under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act did not lie for non-compliance with the first proviso to Section 21. He submits that the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act is mandatory in nature. It postulates that a tenant, who is in occupation of a building before another purchases it from the former owner and becomes the landlord, no application at the instance of the new landlord under Clause (a) of sub-Section (1) of Section 21 of the Act can be entertained, until before the expiry of a period of three years from the date of purchase. In addition, the landlord is required to serve a notice upon the tenant giving him/ her not less than six months' time to vacate, before an application under Section 21(1)(a) can be instituted. 32. The learned Counsel for the tenant argues that the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act is mandatory in nature, which would be evident from the words therein to the effect, ''no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed ...... 32. The learned Counsel for the tenant argues that the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act is mandatory in nature, which would be evident from the words therein to the effect, ''no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed ...... and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, .....'. Mr. Tewari submits that the words predicate an exclusion of the Prescribed Authority's jurisdiction to entertain an application, either before the expiry of three years from the date of purchase by a new landlord, or before the expiry of six months' notice, given for the purpose to the tenant by such landlord. 33. The first proviso engrafts a rule of ouster of jurisdiction for the period of time and the period of notice specified. Unless the period of time after purchase by a successor-landlord has elapsed and also the period of notice, which the landlord has to serve upon the sitting tenant, who has been in occupation before he purchased, the Prescribed Authority has no jurisdiction to act on an application made by the landlord. It is submitted, therefore, that in the absence of service of a notice under the first proviso to Section 21, the application for release instituted by the tenant is not maintainable. 34. The learned Counsel for the tenant points out that a reading of the application for release makes it clear that the landlady has not served a notice upon the tenant, giving him six months' time to vacate before the institution of proceedings. It is pointed out that a reading of the application shows that no notice in writing was ever served upon the tenant and all that was done was the pleading about an oral request or demand to the tenant by the landlord to vacate the demised premises. 35. The learned Counsel for the landlady, on the other hand, urges that service of notice by the landlady giving the tenant six months to vacate, may be mandatory, but the tenant has to plead the bar at the earliest. A failure to plead the bar of want of notice under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act, would amount to waiver on the tenant's part and an estoppel against him in the landlady's favour. A failure to plead the bar of want of notice under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act, would amount to waiver on the tenant's part and an estoppel against him in the landlady's favour. It is pointed out that in the written statement, there is no plea by the tenant saying that the proceedings for release brought by the landlady are barred for want of the six months' notice, envisaged under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act. 36. Upon hearing learned Counsel for parties, this Court finds for a fact that the tenant never raised a plea about the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act being premature for want of the six months' notice envisaged under the first proviso. It is for the said reason that the Prescribed Authority has not at all dealt with the said issue. Instead, the Prescribed Authority has dealt with the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant between parties, which too was questioned by the tenant. 37. The Prescribed Authority in returning findings on Issue No. 1 has held that the relationship of landlord and tenant proved between parties, because the tenant has acknowledged the landlady as the transferee from his landlord. Apart from the said finding, there is not a whisper in the Prescribed Authority's judgment about the issue of prematurity, because apparently the tenant never raised it. 38. The Appellate Authority has noticed and dealt with the plea for the first time and remarked, like this Court finds, that in the written statement the tenant never raised the plea of the bar under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act. He has raised this plea, according to the Appellate Authority for the first time in appeal by seeking an amendment to the grounds of appeal and adding Para 1(a). The Appellate Authority has also recorded it for a fact, which has not been disputed or demonstrably proved before this Court to be contrary to record that the landlady issued a notice to the tenant on 29.05.2013, that was served upon him on 30.05.2013. The proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) commenced on the application, which is dated 06.07.2013. Apparently, therefore, the period of six months did not elapse, but the tenant never raised a plea about prematurity of the release proceedings before the Court of first instance. The proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) commenced on the application, which is dated 06.07.2013. Apparently, therefore, the period of six months did not elapse, but the tenant never raised a plea about prematurity of the release proceedings before the Court of first instance. It was raised for the first time before the Appellate Authority after the proceedings had run their full course before the Prescribed Authority and culminated in the order of release impugned. 39. The Appellate Authority has opined that in the absence of a plea being raised about prematurity of the release proceedings before the Authority of first instance, the plea is no longer open to the tenant to urge in appeal as it would amount to approbation and reprobation. It is further remarked that in case the plea had been raised before the Authority of first instance, it would be open to the landlady to withdraw the application instead of running through the entire course of proceedings and institute the proceedings afresh after expiry of the six months' period. The Appellate Authority has, therefore, held that it is a case where the tenant has waived the plea of prematurity before the Prescribed Authority. 40. In the opinion of this Court, the Appellate Authoritiy's finding on the question of maintainability of the release proceedings is flawless and unassailable. There is no quarrel about the fact that the landlady purchased the demised premises through the registered sale deed dated 20.05.2010 and instituted proceedings in the month of July, 2013. Thus, the period of three years had clearly elapsed after purchase of the demised premises from its former owner by the landlady when she asserted her right to evict the tenant. It is true that the landlady did not wait for the period of six months after service of notice upon the tenant to vacate the demised premises, but it has to be seen whether that renders the application premature. It is one thing to say that the requirement of service of six months' notice before proceedings for release can be instituted is mandatory under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act, and quite another to infer the requirement as a rule of ouster, where the Prescribed Authority's has no jurisdiction to act before the expiry of the period of six months, envisaged under the said proviso. 41. 41. The rule under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act mandating six months' notice by the landlord is a personal right given to the tenant, that is in the nature of a time period for facility and convenience to relocate, finding alternative accommodation before the new landlord commences proceedings for release on the ground of his bona fide need. The right to six months' notice being a personal right that the tenant enjoys can always be waived. The waiver is certainly inferrable from the inaction of the tenant in not pleading the bar of want of six months' notice at the earliest stage when the proceedings commenced before the Prescribed Authority. A right or advantage, that is given by law solely for the benefit and protection of an individual, can be waived unless it is in the nature of a bar to protect a public right or public policy. 42. The bar to the commencement of proceedings for release by a successor or new landlord against an existing tenant that the first proviso to Section 21 envisages, is by no means a bar to action or so to speak postponement of action for the period of notice to serve public interest, protect a public right or advance public policy. It is a right given to protect nothing more than a personal interest of the old tenant, who gets a new landlord. This kind of a right, providing for postponement of action for the period of the mandatory notice of six months, can certainly be waived by the tenant. The distinction about the nature of the bar or right for the protection of a public interest, as distinguished from one that the Statute provides to protect a purely private or personal right or benefit, finds eloquent statement about the principle in Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition By P. St. J. Langan. In Maxwell at Pages 328 to 329, the learned Commentator exposits : "Everyone has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, which may be dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy. Cuilibet licet renuntiare juri pro se introducto. So a person may agree to waive the benefit of the Limitation Act. Cuilibet licet renuntiare juri pro se introducto. So a person may agree to waive the benefit of the Limitation Act. The trustees of a turnpike road may, in demising the tolls, waive a statutory requirement that the demise should be signed by the sureties of the lessee. A railway passenger may waive the benefit of an enactment which entitles him to carry with him so many pounds of luggage, and he does so by taking a ticket with the express condition that he shall carry no luggage.70 The only person intended to be benefited by such an enactment is the passenger himself, and no consideration of public policy is involved. In Corporation of Toronto v. Russell, the Judicial Committee held that where a notice in writing of intention to purchase compulsorily was required to be given to the owner of lands, the provision being entirely for his benefit, he might waive it. The regulations governing the practice and procedure of civil courts may in the same way, when not going to the jurisdiction, be waived by those for whose protection they were intended." 43. The principle also finds eloquent statement in Craies On Statute Law Seventh Edition By S. G. G. Edgar at Page 269 : "If the object of a statute is not one of general policy, or if the thing which is being done will benefit only a particular person or class of persons, then the conditions prescribed by the statute are not considered as being indispensable. This rule is expressed by the maxim of law, Quilibet potest renuntiare juri pro se introducto. As a general rule, the conditions imposed by statutes which authorise legal proceedings are treated as being indispensable to giving the court jurisdiction. But if it appears that the statutory conditions were inserted by the legislature simply for the security or benefit of the parties to the action themselves, and that no public interests are involved, such conditions will not be considered as indispensable, and either party may waive them without affecting the jurisdiction of the court. But if it appears that the statutory conditions were inserted by the legislature simply for the security or benefit of the parties to the action themselves, and that no public interests are involved, such conditions will not be considered as indispensable, and either party may waive them without affecting the jurisdiction of the court. Where a statute deprives a person of a legal remedy, but does not deny him a cause of action (e.g. the Statute of Frauds and its replacements 59 or a Statute of Limitation), courts of justice, whether under the specific rules of procedure or under their general course of practice, treat the right of the defendant to bar the remedy as waived if he does not plead the statute which bars it. "It is evident," said Alderson B., "that a party who has a benefit given him by statute may waive it if he thinks fit."" 44. The principle was considered by this Court in Smt. Kalpana Gulati and others v. 8th Addl. D.J. Allahabad and others, (1999) 2 AWC 1656 and it was held that the notice under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act, though mandatory, can be waived by the tenant. In Smt. Kalpana Gulati (supra), it was observed : "10. Section 21(1)(a) of the Act permits the landlord to file an application for eviction of tenant from a building for his personal need or for the need of his family members. The first proviso has been added to Section 21(1) of the Act to save the tenants from unnecessary harassment [The Relevant part of Section 21 is as follows:--Section 21-Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant. The first proviso has been added to Section 21(1) of the Act to save the tenants from unnecessary harassment [The Relevant part of Section 21 is as follows:--Section 21-Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant. (1) The Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists namely:--(a) that the building is bonafide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust; Proviso: Provided that where the building was in the occupation of tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years.]. It is for their protection and benefit. The proviso says that a purchaser of a premises can not file an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act unless three years have elapsed from the date of purchase and the purchaser (the new landlord) has given six months notice to the tenant. It is true that the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act can not be allowed unless and until three years have elapsed from the date of the purchase. It is also true that six months notice is mandatory. These are the rights given to the tenant so that a premises may not be sold merely for evicting him. These provisions are for his benefit and are mandatory. But like other rights can always be waived." 45. In Izhaar Ali and another v. Prescribed Authority/ J.S.C.C., Sitapur and others, (2014) 107 ALR 88, it was observed : "5. These are the rights given to the tenant so that a premises may not be sold merely for evicting him. These provisions are for his benefit and are mandatory. But like other rights can always be waived." 45. In Izhaar Ali and another v. Prescribed Authority/ J.S.C.C., Sitapur and others, (2014) 107 ALR 88, it was observed : "5. Supreme Court in Nirbhai Kumar's case (supra) held that although Proviso to section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, which contemplates of six months previous notice, is mandatory for initiation of proceeding under section 21(1)(a) of the Act, but the tenant has right to waive it. The petitioners filed his written statement and has not raised the plea regarding six months' previous notice. Thus the petitioners waived their right as contemplated under the proviso to section 21(1)(a). Proposed amendment amounts to withdrawal of the waiver of the petitioner which cannot be permitted to be withdrawn by way of amendment. Supreme Court in Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram and Company [ (1976) 4 SCC 320 ], Heera Lal v. Kalyan Mal [1998 (32) ALR 442 (SC); 1998 RD 140 ], Gautam Swaroop v. Leela Jetly [ (2008) 7 SCC 85 ], Sumesh Singh v. Phoolan Devi [2009 (75) ALR 789 (SC)] and Vishwanath Agrawal v. Savitri Bera [ (2009) 15 SCC 693 ] held that an admission cannot be permitted to be withdrawn by amendment. Same principle will apply in this case also." 46. The issue was subject matter of consideration before the Supreme Court in Martin & Harris Ltd. v. VIth Additional Distt. Judge and others, (1998) 1 SCC 732 . In Martin & Harris Ltd. (supra), it was held : "13. It is not possible to agree with the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the provision containing the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act was for public benefit and could not be waived. Judge and others, (1998) 1 SCC 732 . In Martin & Harris Ltd. (supra), it was held : "13. It is not possible to agree with the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the provision containing the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act was for public benefit and could not be waived. It is, of course, true that it is enacted to cover a class of tenants who are sitting tenants and whose premises are subsequently purchased by landlords who seek to evict the sitting tenants on the ground of bona fide requirement as envisaged by Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, still the protection available to such tenants as found in the proviso would give the tenants concerned a locus poenitentiae to avail of it or not. It is easy to visualise that proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act would be between the landlord on the one hand and the tenant on the other. These proceedings are not of any public nature. Nor any public interest is involved therein. Only personal interest of landlord on the one hand and the tenant on the other hand get clashed and call for adjudication by the prescribed authority. The ground raised by the landlord under Section 21(1)(a) would be personal to him and similarly the defence taken by the tenant would also be personal to him. Six months' breathing time is given to the tenant after service of notice to enable him to put his house in order and to get the matter settled amicably or to get alternative accommodation if the tenant realises that the landlord has a good case. This type of protection to the tenant would naturally be personal to him and could be waived. In this connection we may profitably refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Krishan Lal v. State of J&K [ (1994) 4 SCC 422 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 885 : (1994) 27 ATC 590] wherein Hansaria, J., speaking for a Bench of two learned Judges has made the pertinent observations concerning the question of waiver of a mandatory provision providing for issuance of notice to the parties sought to be proceeded against by the person giving the notice, in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Report as under: (SCC p. 430) "16. ... ... As to when violation of a mandatory provision makes an order a nullity has been the subject-matter of various decisions of this Court as well as of courts beyond the seven seas. This apart, there are views of reputed text writers. Let us start from our own one-time Highest Court, which used to be Privy Council. This question came up for examination by that body in Vellayan Chettiar v. Govt. of the Province of Madras [ AIR 1947 PC 197 : 74 IA 223] in which while accepting that Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is mandatory, which was the view taken in Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secy. of State for India-in-Council [(1927) 54 IA 338] it was held that even if a notice under Section 80 be defective, the same would not per se render the suit requiring issuance of such a notice as a precondition for instituting the same as bad in the eye of law, as such a defect can be waived. This view was taken by pointing out that the protection provided by Section 80 is a protection given to the person concerned and if in a particular case that person does not require the protection he can lawfully waive his right. A distinction was made in this regard where the benefit conferred was to serve ''an important purpose', in which case there would not be waiver, (see paragraph 14). 17. This point had come up for examination by this Court in Dhirendra Nath Gorai v. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh [ AIR 1964 SC 1300 : (1964) 6 SCR 1001 ] and a question was posed in paragraph 7 whether an act done in breach of a mandatory provision is per force a nullity. This Court referred to what was stated in this regard by Mookherjee, J. in Ashutosh Sikdar v. Behari Lal Kirtania [ILR 35 Cal 61 : 11 CWN 1011] ILR at p. 72 and some other decisions of the Calcutta High Court along with one of the Patna High Court and it was held that if a judgment-debtor, despite having received notice of proclamation of sale, did not object to the non-compliance of the required provision, he must be deemed to have waived his right conferred by that provision. It was observed that a mandatory provision can be waived if the same be aimed to safeguard the interest of an individual and has not been conceived in the public interest." Consequently it must be held that the provision for six months' notice before initiation of proceedings under Section 21(1) of the Act, though is mandatory and confers protection on the tenant concerned, it can be waived by him. ......." 47. In Anwar Hasan Khan v. Mohd. Shafi and others, (2001) 8 SCC 540 , the question about the mandatory nature of the notice contemplated under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act was considered for the proposition that if proceedings were initiated after expiry of the period of three years from the date of purchase by the successor-landlord, the notice of six months was still mandatory. In Anwar Hasan Khan (supra), the aforesaid question was answered, thus : "10. Keeping in mind the object of the Act to provide safeguards to the tenant, the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act was added to ensure that the unscrupulous litigants do not transfer properties only for the purposes of creating grounds for eviction of the tenant in occupation thereof. The aforesaid proviso, however, was not intended to put any restriction upon the owners of the property not to transfer it under any circumstances. To ensure that the sale transaction was valid and not mala fide, a statutory bar was created vide the aforesaid proviso for the transferee to seek the eviction of the tenant with respect to such purchased property. The proviso mandates that no application shall be entertained by the prescribed authority on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act unless a period of three years had elapsed since the date of such purchase. It further provides that no application under the said clause shall be entertained unless the landlord had given a notice to the tenant not less than six months before the filing of such application and such notice may be given even before the expiration of a period of three years. It further provides that no application under the said clause shall be entertained unless the landlord had given a notice to the tenant not less than six months before the filing of such application and such notice may be given even before the expiration of a period of three years. The object of the service of the notice is to furnish information to the tenant about the requirement of the landlord in order to enable him to search for an alternative accommodation or to find out as to whether the sale made by his erstwhile owner was genuine and bona fide or not. The proviso and the notice contemplated under it was never intended to be permanent clog on the rights of the purchaser. The period contemplated for not initiating the eviction against the tenant on the ground as specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act was intended to be for a period of three years and in no case for more than three years and six months. Any proceedings initiated for release of building under occupation of tenant on the aforesaid ground after the period contemplated under the aforesaid proviso does not require the service of the aforesaid notice of six months." 48. The decision in Anwar Hasan Khan was referred to a Larger Bench of their Lordships noticing the conflicting decisions in Martin & Harris Ltd. and Anwar Hasan Khan, both of which were two Judge Bench decisions, which came to be decided in Nirbhai Kumar v. Maya Devi and others, (2009) 5 SCC 399 . In Nirbhai Kumar, it was held : "2. ....... Consequently it must be held that the provision for six months' notice before initiation of proceedings under Section 21(1) of the Act, though is mandatory and confers protection on the tenant concerned, it can be waived by him. In Nirbhai Kumar, it was held : "2. ....... Consequently it must be held that the provision for six months' notice before initiation of proceedings under Section 21(1) of the Act, though is mandatory and confers protection on the tenant concerned, it can be waived by him. On the facts of the present case there is no escape from the conclusion that the appellant, for reasons best known to it, consciously and being alive to the clear factual situation that the suit was filed on that ground prior to the expiry of six months' notice, did not think it fit to pursue that point any further and on the contrary joined issues on merits expecting a favourable decision in the suit and having lost therein and got an adverse decision did not think it fit even to challenge the decision on the ground of maintainability of the suit while filing an appeal and argued the appeal only on merits and only as an afterthought at the stage of writ petition in the High Court such a contention was sought to be taken up for the first time for consideration. On the facts of the present case, therefore, it must be held that the appellant had waived that contention about the suit being premature having been filed before the expiry of six months from the date of the suit notice. 4. ..... A three years' period becomes relevant when there is a change of ownership. This three years' period is a sort of moratorium intended for the tenant's protection. It is to be noted that the crucial expression in the proviso is "and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years". In other words, notice can be given either before or after the three years' period. After expiry of the three years' period the protection given to the tenant from being evicted has no further relevance. Thereafter it is only the question of notice. 5. Above being the position the decision in Martin & Harris Ltd. case [ (1998) 1 SCC 732 ] expressed the correct view. Unfortunately, the said decision does not appear to have been placed before the Bench which heard Anwar Hasan Khan case [ (2001) 8 SCC 540 ]." 49. Thereafter it is only the question of notice. 5. Above being the position the decision in Martin & Harris Ltd. case [ (1998) 1 SCC 732 ] expressed the correct view. Unfortunately, the said decision does not appear to have been placed before the Bench which heard Anwar Hasan Khan case [ (2001) 8 SCC 540 ]." 49. It would, thus, be seen that while notice of six months to the tenant by the new landlord is necessary, if he chooses to proceed against a sitting tenant from time of the former landlord's ownership, under Section 21 of the Act, irrespective of the fact whether three years moratorium under the first proviso to Section 21 has expired or not, the mandatory notice can be waived by the tenant. The waiver can come about in consequence of the tenant not raising the plea at the earliest opportunity, which comes by when he files his written statement before the Prescribed Authority. In the instant case since no objection about prematurity of the proceedings instituted under Section 21 was taken on account of the landlady's failure to serve the six months' notice envisaged under the first proviso to Section 21 aforesaid, the bar must be held to have been waived. The very belated introduction of the plea about want of notice through an amended ground in the memorandum of appeal by the tenant has rightly not been accepted by the Appellate Authority. In the clear opinion of this Court, no exception can be taken to the said view. 50. This Court is, therefore, of opinion that the tenant has unequivocally by his inaction in failing to raise the plea of a bar to the proceedings for want of six months' notice before the Prescribed Authority while filing his written statement, waived the bar. The Authority below, which bears reference merely to the Appellate Authority in this case, has rightly held the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, maintainable. 51. Turning to the question of bona fide need, there are concurrent findings of fact recorded by the two Authorities below that the landlady is living in a rented accommodation on the first floor owned by one Anil Kumar Gupta, situate at Mohalla Hasanganj, Lal Diggi at a monthly rent of Rs.8000/-. The accommodation comprises two rooms, a kitchen, a bathroom and a lobby. The accommodation comprises two rooms, a kitchen, a bathroom and a lobby. The landlady's children are aged 24 years and 22 years-both students. The children are in occupation of the two rooms, properly so called in order to facilitate their studies. The landlady and her husband stay in the lobby and have no place to entertain guests. The landlady, who has to live in a rented accommodation, in the opinion of this Court, certainly has a bona fide need, which cannot be doubted. The Authorities below have accepted the evidence and returned a finding about the landlady's bona fide need based on the case that she has pleaded and evidence produced. There is no warrant for this Court to interfere with the said findings of fact recorded by the two Authorities below concurrently upon an appraisal of the parties' case, taking a plausible view of the evidence on record, in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 52. Likewise, both the Authorities below have held for the landlady on the issue of comparative hardship. It has been opined by the two Authorities below that there is no evidence produced to show that in fact the tenant made efforts to search alternative accommodation, which attracts the principle that at tenant who does not search for alternative accommodation and prove the fact that he did, must have the issue of comparative hardship answered against him. Even otherwise, given the circumstances of the landlady and her family and the fact that they are themselves staying in a rented accommodation, it would be quite irrelevant if the tenant is put to some inconvenience on account of eviction to accommodate the landlord as it is said, that eviction must entail some inconvenience to the tenant. In this case too, it will be so as well. But, for the inconvenience that the tenant would suffer, the landlady cannot be asked to stay in a tenanted accommodation or told how she should satisfy her need in some manner other than what the landlady has thought to be the way to do it. The comparative hardship unequivocally lies in favour of the landlady on the facts found by the two Authorities below. 53. There is no warrant for this Court to differ on the said issue with the view that the Authorities below have taken. 54. The comparative hardship unequivocally lies in favour of the landlady on the facts found by the two Authorities below. 53. There is no warrant for this Court to differ on the said issue with the view that the Authorities below have taken. 54. In the circumstances, this petition fails and is dismissed. 55. The interim order is hereby vacated. 56. However, considering the facts that the tenant has been in occupation of the demised shop for a considerable period of time, he is allowed six months time to handover peaceful and vacant possession of the shop in dispute provided he executes an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority, Gorakhpur, embodying the following terms within one month of the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order : (1) The tenant shall handover peaceful and vacant possession of the demised shop to the landlord on or before 21.05.2023. (2) During the period of six months that the tenant remains in occupation, he will not sublet the shop, damage or disfigure it in any manner whatsoever. 57. In the event, an undertaking, as above directed, is not filed before the Prescribed Authority by the tenant within the time allowed or the undertaking violated, the release order shall become executable forthwith.