Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2022 DIGILAW 1833 (ALL)

Shakil Ahmad v. Union of India

2022-11-22

SANGEETA CHANDRA

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition challenges the order dated 4.9.2014 passed by the Respondent No.5 the Commandant Central Industrial Security Force Unit, Thermal Power Station Panki, Kanpur Nagar, and also the Order dated 04.02.2015 passed by the Deputy Inspector General, CISF North Sector Headquarters, Allahabad, and the order dated 07.09.2015 passed by the Respondent No.3, Inspector General, North Sector, CISF Campus, Malviya Nagar, New Delhi. The petition further prays that the respondents be directed to reinstate the petitioner as Constable and to pay him his regular monthly salary and consequential benefits. 2. It is the case of the petitioner as argued by Sri Siddhartha Khare, that he was appointed as constable in CISF on 25.09.1990, and he remained in service up to 08.02.2006 when he was removed for alleged misconduct of leaving his place of duty at the Watchtower No.3 on 07.08.2005, at around 10:40AM and going to Gate No.2, and misbehaving with his colleagues and making allegations against the senior officers and that he approached the local Police Station straightaway for lodging First Information Report against his three colleagues that they had threatened him with dire consequences instead of informing his superior officers first with regard to the incident which took place at Gate No.02. It has been submitted that on 25.08.2005 the Assistant Commandant CISF Unit GAIL, Patna, was appointed as enquiry officer who proceeded to conduct an ex-parte enquiry against the petitioner in between 15.12.2005 to 19.12.2005, wherein statements of several witnesses were recorded without giving any opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine them. The petitioner was under medical treatment and in no position to participate in the enquiry. An enquiry report was submitted on 10.01.2006 indicating the petitioner with regard to all three charges levelled against him. A copy of the enquiry report was sent to the petitioner on 15.01.2006 granting him time to submit his reply to the show cause notice. The petitioner submitted his reply on 20.01.2006 before the Senior Commandant that the petitioner had in fact been assaulted by three members of the Unit and had received serious injuries for which he was undergoing treatment. The petitioner however was removed from service on 08.02.2006 by the Respondent No.5 with a further direction that he would not be entitled to any additional emoluments for the period of suspension with effect from 07.08.2005 to 08.02.2006. The petitioner however was removed from service on 08.02.2006 by the Respondent No.5 with a further direction that he would not be entitled to any additional emoluments for the period of suspension with effect from 07.08.2005 to 08.02.2006. The petitioner filed an Appeal which was rejected by the respondent no. 04. His Revision was also rejected by the Respondent No.3. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a Writ Petition No. 53433 of 2008 which was partly allowed by means of an Order dated 27.09.2012, on the ground that principles of natural justice had not been followed in the disciplinary proceedings held against the petitioner. The Court by its order dated 27.09.2012 directed that enquiry shall proceed from the stage it stood vitiated i.e. with effect from 15.12.2005. The reinstatement and consequential benefits to the petitioner shall be subject to orders passed in the fresh enquiry. 3. However, after a lapse of nearly two years the respondents by the order dated 19.05.2014 nominated one Inspector and one Assistant Commander as enquiry officers. Dates were fixed for hearing and the petitioner appeared and participated in the enquiry which continued up to 11.07.2014. Thereafter an enquiry report dated 02.08.2014, was filed by enquiry officer and the petitioner was issued a show cause notice to which he replied on 11.08.2014. The Respondent No.5 passed a punishment order on 04.09.2014 compulsorily retiring the petitioner. Aggrieved against such order of punishment the petitioner filed an Appeal which has been rejected by the Respondent NO.4 by its order dated 04.02.2015. The petitioner filed a Revision thereafter which has also been rejected by the Respondent No.3. 4. It has been argued by the petitioner's counsel that on 07.08.2005 the petitioner's duty was at Watchtower No.3 from 05:00 AM to 01:00 PM. Verbal duty was also assigned to the petitioner to remain at Watchtower No.3 and also to periodically do patrolling from Watchtower No.3 to Gate No.2. The duty of the petitioner was cross checked by Shift-in-Charge at 07:25 AM and also at 10:15 AM. The petitioner was found alert and on duty at Watchtower No.3. As instructed, the petitioner started patrolling and at about 10:25 AM he reached Gate No.2 and noticed that the Company Office of the petitioner's Unit at Gate No.2 was open although it was a Sunday, where Head Constable Bhanwaru Ram, Company Head Moharrir Ajaib Singh and Company Writer OPS Yadav were sitting. As instructed, the petitioner started patrolling and at about 10:25 AM he reached Gate No.2 and noticed that the Company Office of the petitioner's Unit at Gate No.2 was open although it was a Sunday, where Head Constable Bhanwaru Ram, Company Head Moharrir Ajaib Singh and Company Writer OPS Yadav were sitting. Out of curiosity the petitioner went inside and asked them as to whether they had forwarded the name of the petitioner for Refresher Course and they replied in the affirmative. The petitioner expressed his annoyance as he was residing in family accommodation along with his wife and children and it would be difficult for him to go for the Refresher Course at such short notice. The petitioner said that had they told him about the Refresher Course earlier it would have been better. However Bhanwaru Ram, Ajaib Singh and OPS Yadav reacted very violently and abused the petitioner. The petitioner resisted but he was caught hold of and beaten up and threatened with dire consequences. The petitioner sustained severe injuries but since it was his duty hour the petitioner came back to his post at Watchtower No.3. The three persons who had beaten him up however poisoned the ears of the Assistant Commandant who further told the Company Commandant on telephone and upon the one-sided version of the three persons who were guilty of beating up the petitioner, the authorities made up their mind that the petitioner was guilty. 5. It has been argued that during the enquiry nine witnesses were examined by the enquiry officer of which two witnesses said that no such incident as was alleged in the chargesheet had taken place on 07.08.2005. Three witnesses stated that they were informed of such incident happening at the office at Gate No.2 but had not actually seen it. The Company Commandant also stated that he was only informed about the altercation and had not actually witnessed it. In their earlier statements recorded in 2005, some of the witnesses had implicated the petitioner but on fresh statements being given by them before the new enquiry officer they denied that any altercation took place and stated that they had earlier given a false statement against the petitioner under the pressure of the superior officers. 6. In their earlier statements recorded in 2005, some of the witnesses had implicated the petitioner but on fresh statements being given by them before the new enquiry officer they denied that any altercation took place and stated that they had earlier given a false statement against the petitioner under the pressure of the superior officers. 6. It has been argued that the enquiry officer had relied upon the statement of PW-01, PW-03 and PW-06 who were the persons directly involved in the alleged altercation with the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also read out the statements of other witnesses to say that several of such witnesses had given neutral statements or a statement in favour of the petitioner that no such incident of altercation or use of abusive language had occurred on 07.08.2005. The learned counsel for the petitioner after reading out the relevant portions of the statements of all the nine witnesses has referred to the conclusion drawn by the enquiry officer saying that the enquiry officer has deliberately not considered the statements made in favour of the petitioner and has taken into account the statements made against him. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also read out the statement of the petitioner before the enquiry officer and has argued that the version of the petitioner was that he was assaulted by Sarva Shri Bhanwaru Ram, Ajaib Singh and O.P.S. Yadav, pursuant to which he lodged a First Information Report against them and with regard to which criminal proceedings are pending against the three was ignored. He also stated that his injury had been treated by doctors of Government Medical College who should have been examined during the course of enquiry which was not done. It has been argued that there has been no findings recorded by the enquiry officer with regard to the version of the petitioner that he was assaulted and abused by Bhanwaru Ram, Ajaib Singh and O. P. S. Yadav, pursuant to which he had approached the Police and succeeded in lodging the FIR against them on 16.01.2006 only after the intervention of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kanpur. Criminal Case No. 801 of 2011 is pending against the accused at District Kanpur Nagar. An application under section 482 CrPC had been filed by the accused which was rejected by this Court by an order dated 17.04.2015. Criminal Case No. 801 of 2011 is pending against the accused at District Kanpur Nagar. An application under section 482 CrPC had been filed by the accused which was rejected by this Court by an order dated 17.04.2015. Despite such criminal case being pending against his three colleagues, no departmental action has been taken against them for physically assaulting the petitioner. Departmental proceedings were initiated only against the petitioner in pursuance to which the order impugned has been passed. 7. It has been argued that the enquiry report shows that the petitioner had provided several documents regarding the treatment undertaken by him at the hospital subsequent to being assaulted by the three constables Bhanwaru Ram, Ajaib Singh and O. P. S. Yadav, however no finding has been recorded with regard to such documents by the enquiry officer. No finding has also been recorded as to why the submission made by two prosecution witnesses, Raksh Pal and K.D. Singh has been ignored. It has been argued that the impugned order of punishment has been passed ignoring the reply filed by the petitioner to the show cause notice. The Appeal and Revision has also been rejected in a mechanical manner without noticing and dealing with the grounds taken therein. 8. It has been argued that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the charges levelled against him. It has been argued by the petitioners counsel that the petitioner was hardly absent for 10 minutes or so from his duty at Watchtower number three and such a charge could only result in a minor penalty. 9. The learned counsel for the Respondents Sri Bal Mukund, on the other hand, has pointed out that the petitioner was an indisciplined employee and discipline is the mainstay of the Respondent Force. He has referred to several paragraphs of the counteraffidavit filed on behalf of the Respondent No.5. According to such counter affidavit the petitioner was appointed in 1990 as Constable (General Duty) and after completion of training he was posted to various CISF units. Lastly, he was posted at CISF Unit at Panki, Kanpur in 2004. As per the service record of the petitioner during his tenure he was awarded as many as three minor penalties for various which misconducts/indiscipline. These included over stay of leave, dereliction of duty and misbehaving with Shift-in-Charge and making a false complaint against Unit Administration. Lastly, he was posted at CISF Unit at Panki, Kanpur in 2004. As per the service record of the petitioner during his tenure he was awarded as many as three minor penalties for various which misconducts/indiscipline. These included over stay of leave, dereliction of duty and misbehaving with Shift-in-Charge and making a false complaint against Unit Administration. While serving at CISF Unit at Panki, the petitioner was found involved in grave misconduct/indiscipline, and therefore he was dealt with under Rule 36 Of the CISF Rules 2001 and a Charge Sheet containing three charges was served upon him. According to the First Charge the petitioner was detailed for Shift duty from 05:00AM to 01:00 PM at Watchtower No.3 on 07.08.2005. At about 10:40 AM he left his duty post without any prior intimation or permission of the Competent Officer and went to the Company Office located at Gate No.2 on his own. The petitioner committed a serious and indisciplined act of negligence towards his duty. As per Charge No.2, the petitioner on visiting the Company Office at Gate No.2 on his own, created nuisance over there and argued with the Company Writer, and the Head Constable for putting his name for Refresher Course. He threatened Constable Ajaib Singh and two other personnel that he would see them outside the Gate and also made allegations and threatened the Assistant Commandant and a Senior Commandant of dire consequences. He also alleged that because Constable Ajaib Singh is a Sardar (Sikh) and the Assistant Commandant and the Commandant are also Sardars (Sikhs) they were partial to him. The petitioner had thus committed serious misconduct involving himself in breach of communal harmony, and unity of the country and of the Force. Such conduct displayed utter disregard of his superiors and amounted to serious indiscipline. The Third Charge related to the petitioner making a written complaint directly to the Panki Police Station alleging assault by Head Constable Bhanwaru Ram, Constable Ajaib Singh and Constable O.P.S. Yadav, and also that they had threatened to kill him. If there was any complaint, petitioner Shakeel Ahmed should have first informed the matter to the senior officers of the Unit instead of lodging complaint in Panki Police Station directly. This act of the Constable Shakeel Ahmed as a member of a disciplined paramilitary force, amounted to gross indiscipline, irresponsible behaviour and an attempt to tarnish the image of the Force. This act of the Constable Shakeel Ahmed as a member of a disciplined paramilitary force, amounted to gross indiscipline, irresponsible behaviour and an attempt to tarnish the image of the Force. 10. In the enquiry that was held thereafter punishment order was passed removing him from service on 8 February 2006. His Appeal and Revision having been rejected the petitioner filed Writ Petition which was allowed partly by this Court by its Order dated 27.09.2012, directing the Respondents to conduct a fresh enquiry to enable the petitioner to participate in the proceedings. The Court ordered that the consequent reinstatement and consequential benefits to the petitioner would be subject to the orders which would be passed after completion of the fresh enquiry that is to say, that he would neither be reinstated nor any benefit extended to him till he was exonerated in the enquiry. It has been submitted that the Denovo enquiry was conducted as per the procedure laid down, on a day to day basis. The Prosecution Witnesses and the Court witnesses were examined in the presence of the petitioner, he was also extended sufficient opportunity to cross examine the Prosecution Witnesses. He was given sufficient opportunity to defend the charges framed against him and because of his failure to prove his version, the enquiry officer submitted a report finding him guilty of all charges. There was no procedural irregularity in the conduct of the enquiry. The petitioner was issued show cause notice and Respondent No.5 after considering all evidence on record and also the reply of the petitioner to the show cause notice, imposed the penalty of Compulsory Retirement from service with full pensionary benefits. The Appellate authority did not find any procedural infirmity in the conduct of the discipline proceedings and also did not find the penalty disproportionate to his proven misconduct. The Appeal having been rejected, the petitioner filed a Revision which has also been carefully examined by the Respondent No. 3 and all relevant documents were taken into account and the Respondent No. 3 has rejected the Revision thereafter. 11. It has been argued that the petitioner was detailed to do his duty only on Watchtower No. 3. Instead of remaining on duty at Watchtower No. 3 he reached Gate No.2 of his own volition without being instructed to do so, and without prior permission. 11. It has been argued that the petitioner was detailed to do his duty only on Watchtower No. 3. Instead of remaining on duty at Watchtower No. 3 he reached Gate No.2 of his own volition without being instructed to do so, and without prior permission. There was no need to go to Gate No.2 which was being manned by other three armed personnel. The Watchtower is a static point from where a sentry has to observe the surrounding areas to ensure that there is no unauthorised entry/trespass or scaling over, or intrusion from the perimeter wall. Since the petitioner left his duty post Watchtower No. 3 unattended it was a grave act of indiscipline on his part. The petitioner was detailed for the Refresher Course commencing with effect from 16.08.2005 by the order passed by the Assistant Commandant of the Unit on 05.08.2005. He had been informed well in advance. There was no need for the petitioner to approach the Company Writer so that his name would be deleted from the nomination. When the Company Writer did not agree to change his name the petitioner created a nuisance and started making wild allegations against the Company Writer and also the Head Constable for putting his name for a Refresher Course. The petitioner had started quarrelling, abusing and threatening the three personnel. It was at that point of time that the Assistant Commandant and Senior Commandant had come out of their Office and went near Gate No.2 where they found Head Constable C.B. Chaudhary trying to counsel and placate the petitioner to go to his duty post. The petitioner's version that he was beaten up by the three personnel was unsupported by any evidence. The three personnel had reported the matter to the Assistant Commandant of the Senior Commandant and accordingly report of the same was entered in the General Diary. After completion of Shift Duty at 01:00PM the petitioner reported at the main Gate and attended the Debriefing but he did not report anything to the Shift-in-Charge about any injury caused to him by the Company Writer or the Head Constable. After completion of Shift Duty at 01:00PM the petitioner reported at the main Gate and attended the Debriefing but he did not report anything to the Shift-in-Charge about any injury caused to him by the Company Writer or the Head Constable. It has been stated repeatedly that it is clear from his conduct right after the incident on 07.08.2005 that the petitioner was neither threatened nor beaten up by the three personnel against whom he complained to the Senior Commandant only on 11.08.2005 and sought permission for lodging FIR at Police Station, Panki. Moreover, no information regarding the petitioner approaching the Court of the CJM and thereafter lodging FIR on his intervention has been given to the Unit Commander at Panki, Kanpur. 12. In the counter affidavit filed by the Respondents they have seriously disputed the allegation of the petitioner being injured and being treated at hospital. After the incident on 07.08.2005, the petitioner did not approach any member of the Unit for First Aid and did not apply or seek help for medical treatment on the same day. He also did not inform of any injury to him to the Shift-in-Charge/Company Commander during Shift Debriefing. The medical certificates filed by the petitioner related to medical treatment undertaken by him with effect from 27.09.2005 to 05.10.2005. In this regard the Senior Commandant, CISF had written a letter on 24.11.2005 to the CMS, GSVM Medical College, Kanpur and sought information regarding treatment of the petitioner and also requested a second opinion. In reply, the CMS of GSVM Medical College, Kanpur, through his letter dated 30.11.2005 informed that the petitioner was admitted in hospital on 24.09.2005 for treatment of weakness in his legs and was discharged on 05.10.2005. Further the CMS informed that after investigation neither symptom of any disease nor any injury was noticed on the body of the petitioner. The petitioner had failed to give any valid evidence regarding reported assault on him by Head Constable Bhanwaru Ram and by Constables Ajaib Singh and O.P.S. Yadav. 13. Sri Balmukund, Learned counsel for the respondents has also read out the intemperate language used by the petitioner in his representation/application to his Commandant and has also read out paragraph 19 onwards from the counter affidavit. 13. Sri Balmukund, Learned counsel for the respondents has also read out the intemperate language used by the petitioner in his representation/application to his Commandant and has also read out paragraph 19 onwards from the counter affidavit. He has pointed out the certificate of the treating doctor at Hallet Hospital, Kanpur, saying that such doctor had certified that when the petitioner reported for treatment on 24.09.2005, he had no marks of any injury on examination and he complained of weakness in his legs only. The learned counsel for the respondent has also read out the concluding portion of the enquiry report to say that the petitioner not only misbehaved with his colleagues but also with his Commandant and Assistant Commandant and left his post at the Watchtower No. 3 without permission. He had also filed FIR against his colleagues without proper sanction from the commandant. He referred to 2 judgements of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India and Others vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde (2006 ) 7 SCC 212; and in the case of Deputy Commissioner Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Others vs. J. Husain (2013) 10 SCC 106 . 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner in his reply has referred to the medical certificate issued by the treating doctor of the government hospital to say that the petitioner had gone for treatment of weakness in his legs after more than one month from the date of the incident dated 7 August 2005. Injury, if any which he had sustained in his abdomen due to being beaten up mercilessly by his colleagues would have healed up by then. Moreover, enquiry officer has referred to the petitioner's conduct in getting a false Medical Certificate and lodging FIR against his colleagues without proper approval of the competent officer, but these charges were not mentioned in the chargesheet. Ld counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgement rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Mavji C. Lakum vs. Central Bank of India (2008 ) 12 SCC 726. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that a rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the petitioner in October, 2019 in which he has reiterated the contents of the writ petition while denying the contents of the counter affidavit. 16. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that a rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the petitioner in October, 2019 in which he has reiterated the contents of the writ petition while denying the contents of the counter affidavit. 16. The learned counsel for the Respondent has pointed out that a supplementary counter affidavit has been filed thereafter by the respondents wherein it has been stated that the petitioner was detailed for duty on Watchtower No.3. There were no instructions that the Sentry of Watchtower No.3 would patrol the area from Watchtower No.3 to Gate No.2. It was neither instructed by the Shift-in-Charge nor by the Company Commandant nor by Assistant Commandant. The story of patrolling from Watchtower No.03 to Gate No.2 was fabricated by the petitioner to save himself otherwise there was no need to patrol up to Gate No. 2 which was being manned by three armed personnel. From the evidence that was collected during the enquiry it was found that the petitioner had left his duty post that is Watchtower No.3 without any permission of any Competent Authority and had approached the Company Office located at Gate No.2 and started quarrelling with the Company Writer in vain. The petitioner had been detailed for Refresher Course commencing from 16.08.2005 by the Assistant Commandant by his order dated 05.08.2005 for which he was informed well in advance. On 07.08.2005 while performing duty at the Watchtower No.3 the petitioner left his duty post and approached the Company Office at Gate No.2 and started quarrelling and blaming the Company Writer Constable, O.P.S. Yadav, Constable Ajaib Singh and Head Constable Bhanwaru Ram for putting his name in the refresher course. While blaming them he also started quarrelling and abusing them and threatened the Assistant Commandant and Senior Commandant with dire consequences. When he came out of the Company Office at Gate No.02 Head Constable C.B. Chaudhary tried to console him and requested him to go to his duty post. At the time of attending the Debriefing in the afternoon, the petitioner had not reported anything to the Shift-in-Charge about the quarrel that had taken place at Company Office at Gate No.2 or any injury caused to him by any of his colleagues. Had he been injured he would definitely have informed the Shift-in-Charge immediately on completion of the Shift. 17. Had he been injured he would definitely have informed the Shift-in-Charge immediately on completion of the Shift. 17. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this court has carefully examined the papers submitted by the petitioner during the time of enquiry relating to his date of admission in GSVM Medical College, Kanpur, on 24.09.2005. The doctor writing the clinical history had stated that the petitioner had complained of pain over mid and lower back for the past one and a half months and gradual progressive weakness in lower limbs for past twenty days. The patient had stated himself that he was apparently alright one and a half months ago when following slipping of his foot, he fell. At that time he was able to stand up without any discomfort but 25 days later patient started feeling pain in his mid and lower back and weakness in both lower limbs. Since then the weakness in both lower limbs was gradually progressing and he complained also of tingling in both lower limbs although there was no loss of sensation and other symptoms related with any injury. There was no history of any other chronic illness or pain in the past. In X-Ray that was done of Dorsal and Lumbar Spine there was no sign of injury. Common painkillers like Diclofenac along with NSAID, Multivitamins, Calcium, and Iron was prescribed. 18. This Court has also gone through the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer which became the basis for the passing of the punishment order. There were nine prosecution witnesses including Head Constable Bhanwaru Ram, Constable Ajaib Singh and Constable O.P.S. Yadav, Sub-Inspector C.B. Chaudhary, Assistant Commandant S.P. Tripathi, Assistant Sub-Inspector R.K. Kaushal, Sub-Inspector and Shift-in-Charge and Constables K.D. Singh and Rashpal Singh (PW-04 and PW-05). All the witnesses were given copies of earlier statements made by them on 15.12.2005 and 16.12.2005 before the enquiry officer which inquiry was found vitiated by the High Court and set aside that with a direction for conducting a fresh enquiry. In the enquiry report mention has also been made of documentary evidence. Besides other evidence produced by the prosecution there is a copy of Report filed at 12:10 hours on 07.08.2005 in the General Diary kept at Gate No.02 regarding misbehaviour of the petitioner. In the enquiry report mention has also been made of documentary evidence. Besides other evidence produced by the prosecution there is a copy of Report filed at 12:10 hours on 07.08.2005 in the General Diary kept at Gate No.02 regarding misbehaviour of the petitioner. In the documentary evidence submitted by the petitioner there was a copy of FIR tried to be lodged on 07.08.2005 by Shakeel Ahmed. And copy of application to the Senior Commandant dated 11.08.2005 praying for permission to lodge a report at Police Station, Panki against the three accused. The petitioner had also relied upon copy of Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 807/2011, pending before CJM, Kanpur Nagar. In the enquiry held it had come out that Watchtower No.3 was around 50 - 100 metres away from Gate No.2 and these were two different duty posts. The Sentry at Watchtower No.3 is assigned duty only to keep a watch on an area which he could normally see. Sentry at Watchtower No.3 had to compulsorily stay at his watch post and even for attending nature's call he had to take permission from the competent officer before leaving the Watchtower. Gate No.2 on the other hand has one Junior Commissioned Officer also on duty and if any need arises the Sentry at Watchtower No.3 can take permission of the subordinate officer at Gate No.2 and leave his post at Watchtower No.3. It has also come out in the enquiry report that the petitioner had initially tried to lodge FIR at Police Station, Panki on 07.08.2005 and when the same was refused to be lodged by the Police Station he had sought permission from the Senior Commandant only on 11.08.2005 for getting the FIR lodged against his colleagues. Thereafter, the petitioner had approached the Court of the CJM, in January 2006, and on his intervention the Report was lodged. 19. The enquiry has been conducted in a very meticulous manner. The Charges have been mentioned, the Prosecution Witnesses and Documentary Evidence have been mentioned. the Defence Witnesses and Documents have also been mentioned and then the statements of all the Prosecution Witnesses have been mentioned and also the cross-examination done by the petitioner. Thereafter the petitioner's defence statement has been mentioned. The Presenting Officers Brief Note has also been mentioned. The petitioner's reply to the Presenting Officer's Brief Note has also been mentioned. the Defence Witnesses and Documents have also been mentioned and then the statements of all the Prosecution Witnesses have been mentioned and also the cross-examination done by the petitioner. Thereafter the petitioner's defence statement has been mentioned. The Presenting Officers Brief Note has also been mentioned. The petitioner's reply to the Presenting Officer's Brief Note has also been mentioned. Thereafter, the admitted facts have been mentioned and also the facts which were disputed. In the facts that could not be disputed by the petitioner in his statement at page no. 184 of the Paper Book was the fact that he had been detailed to do his duty at Sentry Post on Watchtower No. 3 only. It was also not disputed by him that the petitioner had not taken prior permission of any competent officer to leave his post at Watchtower No.3 or to approach the Company Office at Gate No.2. It could not be disputed by him that Gate No.2 office was not in his watch duty. It was also not disputed by the petitioner that he left Watchtower No.3 unattended at around 10:40 AM. It was also not disputed by the petitioner that he did not inform any superior officer/duty in charge that he had gone to the Office at Gate No.2 and he had entered into an altercation with his three colleagues posted there. It was however stated by him that he had been beaten up severely and that they had tried to strangle him and caused severe back injury to him but he admitted that he informed non one in the Unit immediately after his duty or during or soon after Debriefing. He also could not dispute that he had knowledge of order passed by the Assistant Commandant on 05.08.2005 of his being detailed for Refresher Course. He said he only wanted to find out from the Company Writer as to why he had been given such short notice to join the Refresher Course. When he was threatened and beaten up, he did not report the matter even at the Unit Dispensary immediately or soon thereafter. He said he only wanted to find out from the Company Writer as to why he had been given such short notice to join the Refresher Course. When he was threatened and beaten up, he did not report the matter even at the Unit Dispensary immediately or soon thereafter. The enquiry officer had found on the basis of evidence led by the prosecution and by the petitioner in his defence that dereliction of duty, altercation with colleagues, attempt to malign the CISF by making false allegations against superior officers that they had a communal bias and over reaching his superiors and directly reporting the incident to Police Station, Panki had been proved. 20. The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the judgement rendered by the Supreme Court in Mavji C. Lakum vs. Central Bank of India (Supra). This Court has gone through the judgement and finds that the appellant therein was a peon in a bank since 1951 he was promoted in the year 1963, and thereafter was served two chargesheets to which he replied. Upon enquiry being held he was discharged from service in May 1984. The petitioner challenged the order before the Court of Civil Judge. The Suit was dismissed but in the Appeal the District Court directed reinstatement but denied back wages. It permitted the bank to hold a fresh enquiry. The High Court in Second Appeal awarded 75% back wages from the date of filing of Suit. As the order of reinstatement had become final, the appellant was reinstated. The bank started fresh enquiry and found the petitioner guilty of two charges while for rest of the charges he was not found guilty. After considering his reply he was inflicted a composite punishment of discharge alongwith censure entry which he challenged before the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that there was no evidence supporting major charges. There was however some evidence of misconduct on the part of the appellant. The Tribunal partly allowed the claim and the order of Discharge was set aside. The Tribunal imposed the punishment of withholding one increment with future effect. The appellant was retired in 1994 thereafter. The bank challenged Award before the High Court. The Writ Court set aside the award. The Appellant challenged the Single Judge order in Appeal which Appeal was dismissed on grounds of maintainability. 21. The Tribunal imposed the punishment of withholding one increment with future effect. The appellant was retired in 1994 thereafter. The bank challenged Award before the High Court. The Writ Court set aside the award. The Appellant challenged the Single Judge order in Appeal which Appeal was dismissed on grounds of maintainability. 21. The Supreme Court first considered the question of maintainability and held that since the appellant had asked for a Writ of certiorari and had filed a Writ Petition both under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution the Writ Appeal was maintainable and should not have been dismissed by the Division Bench. However the Court instead of remanding the matter to the Division Bench took into account the fact that the controversy started in 1984 and twenty four years had so far been lost. The Appellant was discharged in the year 1984 and since then he was fighting for his rights. He had been paid his back wages in part but the Tribunal's order setting aside his order of punishment of Discharge had been set aside by the Writ Court. The Supreme Court held that the order of punishment was examined by the Tribunal in exercise of its power under Section 11 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, and the Tribunal had come to the conclusion that the enquiry was fair and proper but of the seven charges levelled against the petitioner only two could be proved. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the charges that could be proved only warranted minor punishment of censure or stoppage of increments the Tribunal had considered that for thirty years long service rendered by the appellant there was not a single allegation against him. He had also got promotion to the post of head peon during the period. The Tribunal also noted the fact that there was no past record of habitual misconduct on the part of the appellant. The Tribunal had observed that it appeared that due to some sort of bitterness between the workman and the staff members, the workman had committed some misconduct like remaining absent from duty on various occasions and being rude and rough in his behaviour with his superiors. The Tribunal had observed that it appeared that due to some sort of bitterness between the workman and the staff members, the workman had committed some misconduct like remaining absent from duty on various occasions and being rude and rough in his behaviour with his superiors. The Supreme Court observed that the Writ Court had wrongly come to the conclusion that under Section 11 A of the Industrial Disputes Act the Tribunal could not have interfered with the punishment when it had found on evidence that the enquiry held against the appellant was fair and proper. The Supreme Court observed that under Section 11 A of the Industrial Disputes Act the Tribunal was quite justified in using its discretion. The Tribunal had first recorded a finding that misbehaviour was not wholly proved and whatever misconduct was proved, did not deserve the extreme punishment of discharge. The Writ Court was of the opinion that if the enquiry was held to be fair and proper then the Industrial Tribunal could not go into the question of evidence or the quantum of punishment. The Supreme Court held that it was not a correct appreciation of the law. Even if the enquiry was found to be fair that would be only a finding certifying that all possible opportunity was given to the delinquent and the principles of natural justice and fair play were observed. That did not mean that the findings arrived at were essentially correct findings. If the Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that the findings could not be supported on the basis of evidence given or that the punishment given was shockingly disproportionate, the Tribunal would be justified in interfering with the quantum of punishment. The Tribunal no doubt has to give reasons as to why it was not satisfied either with the findings or with the quantum of punishment and that such reasoning should not be fanciful or whimsical but there should be good reasons. The Tribunal had not committed any error in observing that for good long thirty years there was no complaint against the work of the Appellant and that such a complaint suddenly surfaced only in the year 1982 and what was complained of was his absence on some days and his argumentative nature. The Tribunal had not committed any error in observing that for good long thirty years there was no complaint against the work of the Appellant and that such a complaint suddenly surfaced only in the year 1982 and what was complained of was his absence on some days and his argumentative nature. The Supreme Court relied upon observations made in Messers Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company of India (Private) Limited vs. the Management, AIR 1973 SC 1227 , to observe that upon finding that - "...if the decision of the authority was illegal or that it was based on material not relevant, or relevant material was not taken into consideration, or that it was so unreasonable that no prudent man could have reached to such a decision, or that it was disproportionate to the nature of the guilt held established so as to shock the judicial conscience. The Tribunal could have substituted the penalty..." 22. The case of the petitioner herein is clearly distinguishable. 23. The Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon State Bank of India and Others vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde (supra) wherein the Supreme Court was considering a judgement of the High Court of Bombay by which imposition of penalty of removal inflicted upon the respondent, a bank officer, preceded by a regular disciplinary enquiry, was set aside with the direction to the Appellant to reinstate the respondent with all consequential benefits including that of back wages. The respondent being a Manager had convinced the Branch Manager of another Branch of the same Bank to open a Current Account in the name of a client who was introduced by him by giving his old address at Bombay as the address of the client. Certain cheques were issued in the name of a Trust. the respondent ensured that such cheques were deposited in the Current Account of the client he had introduced, and was also instrumental in sanctioning of overdraft facility against such cheques. He had emphatically stated that it would be his responsibility if anything went wrong. The Trust lodged a complaint alleging fraud. The Bank initiated disciplinary proceedings against him. Regular enquiry was held, thereafter the respondent was dismissed. Appeal filed by the respondent had been rejected by the Appellate Authority. He had emphatically stated that it would be his responsibility if anything went wrong. The Trust lodged a complaint alleging fraud. The Bank initiated disciplinary proceedings against him. Regular enquiry was held, thereafter the respondent was dismissed. Appeal filed by the respondent had been rejected by the Appellate Authority. The respondent challenged the order in the Writ Petition where it appears that pursuant to observations made by the High Court, the Bank reduced the punishment of dismissal to removal. The High Court on the reappreciation of evidence, reversed the finding of the enquiry officer and set aside the order of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate authority. 24. The Supreme Court observed that it was unfortunate that the High Court had acted as an Appellate authority. The High Court's jurisdiction was circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by re-appreciating the evidence as an Appellate authority. The Supreme Court quoted earlier binding precedents of (i) Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. Mohammed Nasrullah Khan 2006 (2) SCC 373 ; and (ii) Union of India vs. Sardar Bahadur 1974 (2) SCC 618; where the Supreme Court had observed that - "...a disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. .......If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of evidence cannot be convassed before the High Court. A finding cannot be characterised as perverse or unsupported by any relevant material, if it was a reasonable inference from proved facts.." 25. In Union of India vs. Paramananda 1989 (2) SCC 177 ; the Supreme Court had observed -- "we must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings or punishment cannot be equated with an Appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the enquiry officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or Rules made under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the enquiry officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or Rules made under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the Rules and in accordance with the principles of natural justice, what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is malafide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal To concern itself with. the Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the enquiry officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter." 26. In Union Bank of India vs. Vishwamohan 1998 (4) SCC 310 , the Supreme Court had observed that it needs to be emphasised that in banking business, absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every Bank employee and in particular the Bank Officer. 27. Similar observations were made by the Supreme Court in the case of Chairman and MD United Commercial Bank vs. P.C. Kakkar 2003 (4) SCC 364 ; where it was observed that "every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interest of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer - - -." 28. In Cholan Roadways Limited vs. G. Thirugnanasambandam 2005 (3) SCC 241 ; the Supreme Court had reiterated that - "It is now well settled principle of law that the principles of Evidence Act have no application in the domestic enquiry." 29. The Supreme Court allowed the Bank's Appeal by referring to its earlier judgements in cases of delinquent Bank employees and by observing that - "....the scope of judicial review is very limited. Sympathy or generosity as a factor is impermissible. The Supreme Court allowed the Bank's Appeal by referring to its earlier judgements in cases of delinquent Bank employees and by observing that - "....the scope of judicial review is very limited. Sympathy or generosity as a factor is impermissible. In our view loss of confidence, is the primary factor and not the amount of money misappropriated...." 30. The aforesaid case cited by the learned counsel for the Respondents cannot be said to be fully applicable as it relates to a Bank Employee on whom allegations of fraud were levelled. This Court finds that whenever Banking Companies are concerned the Supreme Court has been averse to show interference as for a Bank employee utmost integrity and devotion to duty is required as it is a position of trust. 31. In Deputy Commissioner Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan vs. J. Hussain (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the case of an employee/peon in a Central School who had been charged of forcibly entering the office of the Principal in a fully drunken state. The respondent in his reply had admitted that he entered the office of the Principal in that condition however he claimed that he did not enter the office of the Principal forcibly. Immediately after the incident the police had been called and the respondent had been medically examined as well. The medical examination had confirmed that the respondent was under the influence of liquor. The respondent also offered his unconditional apology for consumption of alcohol and requested the disciplinary authority to take a sympathetic view of the matter and pardon him. Since the respondent had admitted the charge, no regular enquiry was held and on the basis of admission the order of removal was passed. The Central Administrative Tribunal dismissed the Original Application. The respondent filed a writ petition. 32. The High Court found the penalty of removal from service to be disproportionate to the nature and gravity of his misconduct. Thus, invoking the doctrine of proportionality, the High Court had directed reinstatement of the respondent into service with continuity only for the purpose of pensionary benefits with no back wages for the period of his absence. The appellant School challenged the reasoning and rationale of the direction in Appeal. 33. Thus, invoking the doctrine of proportionality, the High Court had directed reinstatement of the respondent into service with continuity only for the purpose of pensionary benefits with no back wages for the period of his absence. The appellant School challenged the reasoning and rationale of the direction in Appeal. 33. The Supreme Court observed that the only question to be examined was as to whether the penalty of removal from service offended the principle of proportionality that is, whether the penalty is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct to the extent that it shocks the conscience of the court and is to be treated so arbitrary, as to term it as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 34. The Supreme Court observed in paragraph 7 and 8 of the judgement as follows - "7. When the charge is proved, as happened in the instant case, it is the disciplinary authority with whom lies the discretion to decide as to what kind of punishment is to be imposed. Of course, this discretion has to be examined objectively keeping in mind the nature and gravity of the charge. The disciplinary authority has to decide a particular penalty specified in the relevant Rules. A host of factors go into the decision making while exercising such discretion which include, apart from the nature and gravity of the misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of duties assigned to the delinquent, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in the department or establishment where he works, as well as extenuating circumstances, if any exist. "8. The order of the Appellate Authority while having a relook at the case would, obviously, examine as to whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is reasonable or not. If the Appellate authority is of the opinion that the case warrants lesser penalty, it can reduce the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority. Such a power which weighs with the Appellate authority departmentally originally is not available to the Court or a Tribunal. The Court while undertaking judicial review of the matter is not supposed to substitute its own opinion on there appraisal of facts. Such a power which weighs with the Appellate authority departmentally originally is not available to the Court or a Tribunal. The Court while undertaking judicial review of the matter is not supposed to substitute its own opinion on there appraisal of facts. (See UT of Dadra and Nagar Haveli vs. Gulabhia M. Lad 2010 (5) SCC 775 ); In exercise of power of judicial review, however, the court can interfere with the punishment imposed when it is found to be totally irrational or is in outrageous defiance of logic. This limited scope of judicial review is permissible and interference is available only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of good faith. Otherwise, merely because in the opinion of the court lesser punishment could have been more appropriate, cannot be a ground to interfere with the discretion of the departmental authorities." 35. The Supreme Court observed that only when the punishment is found to be outrageously disproportionate to the nature of charge, principle of proportionality comes into play. The Court should take into account that the punishment is not vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence so as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to a conclusive evidence of bias. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review. The Supreme Court also took into account the fact that the respondent was working as a peon in a school and he had barged into the office of the Principal in an inebriated state. It observed that such penalty was not so disproportionate to the extent that it shocked the conscience of the court. The High Court had observed that the respondent was a married man with a family consisting of a number of defendants and was suffering hardship, however, the Supreme Court observed that in all cases dealing with penalty of removal, dismissal or compulsory retirement, hardship would result. That would not mean that in a given case punishment of removal can be discarded by the court. That cannot be a ground for the court to interfere with the penalty. The Supreme Court placed reliance upon Hombegowda Educational Trust vs. State of Karnataka (2006) 1 SCC 430 ; where it was observed as follows: - "20. A person when dismissed from service is put to a great hardship but that would not mean that a grave Misconduct should go unpunished. The Supreme Court placed reliance upon Hombegowda Educational Trust vs. State of Karnataka (2006) 1 SCC 430 ; where it was observed as follows: - "20. A person when dismissed from service is put to a great hardship but that would not mean that a grave Misconduct should go unpunished. Although the doctrine of proportionality may be applicable in such matters, but a punishment of dismissal from service for such a misconduct cannot be said to be unheard of. Maintenance of discipline of an institution is equally important. - - -." 36. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that Courts should not be guided by misplaced sympathy or compassionate ground, as a factor in judicial review while examining the quantum of punishment. The Supreme Court referred to judgement rendered by it in Ranveer Singh vs. Union of India, 2009 (3) SCC 97 , as well. The appellant in that case was working as a constable in Border Security Force. Penalty of removal from service was imposed upon him on account of his failure to return to the place of duty despite instructions given to him and refusal to take food in protest when he was punished, and refusal to do pack drill while undergoing rigourous imprisonment. The Supreme Court had held that the punishment imposed upon him was not disproportionate. 37. Similarly, in the case of Charanjit Lamba vs. Army Southern Command, 2010 (11) SCC 314 ; the Supreme Court had upheld punishment of dismissal of the appellant who was holding the rank of Major in the Indian Army and had exhibited dishonesty in making a false claim of transport charges of household luggage. 38. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Meghalaya Vs. Mecken Singh N. Marak 2008 (7) SCC 580 has observed that while considering the proportionality of punishment, the Court should also take into consideration, the mental set up of the delinquent, the type of duty to be performed by him and similar relevant circumstances which go into the decision making process. 39. In S.R. Tewari Vs. Union of India 2013 (6) SCC 602 while discussing scope of judicial review the Supreme Court observed that Courts can interfere with quantum of punishment only where the punishment awarded is found to be shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. 39. In S.R. Tewari Vs. Union of India 2013 (6) SCC 602 while discussing scope of judicial review the Supreme Court observed that Courts can interfere with quantum of punishment only where the punishment awarded is found to be shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. It is only in extreme case which on the facts shows perversity or irrationality that there can be a judicial review of punishment and Courts should not interfere merely on compassionate grounds. 40. Most recently, the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and Others vs. Heem Singh, 2020 SCC online SC 886 ; has observed in paragraph 15 that the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings is different from that in a criminal case. Placing reliance upon its observation in Suresh Pathrella vs. the Oriental Bank of Commerce (2006) 10 SCC 572 ; the Supreme Court differentiated between the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings and criminal trials by observing that while the standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. On preponderance of probabilities the Supreme Court relied upon Constitution Bench decision of M. Siddiq vs. Suresh Das (2020) 1 SCC 1 ; Where the Supreme Court observed in paragraphs 720 and 721 that the court in a civil trial applies the standard of proof of a preponderance of probabilities. "This standard is also described sometimes as a balance of probability or a preponderance of the evidence. "Phipson on evidence", formulates the standard succinctly : If therefore, the evidence is such that the court can say "we think it more probable than not", the burden is discharged; but if the probabilities are equal, it is not. In Miller vs. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All England Report 372, Lord Denning J. defined the doctrine of the balance of preponderance of probabilities in the following terms:- "(i) - - It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If evidence is so strong against the man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence, "of course it is possible, but not in the least probable", the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice." 41. The Supreme Court in Heem Singh (Supra) thereafter observed in paragraph 39 as follows: - "in exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint constructs the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the Rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy - deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact-finding authority and autonomy of employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the Court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from Perversity. Failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognised it for long years in allowing for the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of evidenced misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have to be termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere rectification of the hands off Mantra when they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an Initial or threshold level scrutiny is undertaken. This is to satisfy the conscience of the Court that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the Court to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in the disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which the judges craft is in vain. - -." 42. The court in the aforesaid case held that removal from service of the respondent was an appropriate and proportionate punishment as acquittal in the criminal case did not conclude the disciplinary proceedings. The disciplinary enquiry was not governed by proof beyond reasonable doubt or by the rules of evidence which govern the criminal trial. There were circumstances emerging from the record of the disciplinary proceedings which brought legitimacy to the contention of the State that to reinstate such an employee back in service will erode the credibility of State and public confidence in the image of the police force. 43. In the case of the petitioner he belonged to a Central Paramilitary Force and discipline and devotion to duty assigned to personnel is the key to maintenance of order. The petitioner admittedly was assigned duty at Watchtower No.3. He was to remain on duty till 01:00 PM and would have had to take permission from a Superior Officer or atleast inform a Superior Officer before leaving his Sentry Post unattended. He did no such thing. The petitioner admittedly was assigned duty at Watchtower No.3. He was to remain on duty till 01:00 PM and would have had to take permission from a Superior Officer or atleast inform a Superior Officer before leaving his Sentry Post unattended. He did no such thing. He went to Gate No.2 and stated an altercation with his colleagues posted there which resulted in fisticuffs. The petitioner did not inform any Competent Officer of the incident either immediately or soon after debriefing. The lodging of criminal complaint and of FIR at the intervention of the CJM Kanpur Nagar only substantiate the stand of the Respondents that the petitioner is a wilful and indisciplined employee. 44. This Court having considered all the circumstances which led to the passing of the impugned order does not find it appropriate to interfere in the punishment of compulsory retirement. He would be entitled to all service benefits of a duly retired employee. 45. The Writ Petition lacks merit and is dismissed. 46. No order as to costs.