ORDER : 1. Being aggrieved by the order dated 15.7.2021 passed below Exh-5 in Civil Suit No. 276 of 2019 by the Chamber Judge, Court No.5, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, the defendant No.1 has preferred the present Appeal from Order under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The appellant is the original defendant No.1 and respondent No.1 is the original plaintiff and respondent No.2 is the original defendant No.2 before the trial Court. For the brevity and convenience, the parties are referred to in this order, as per their status before the trail Court. 3. The short facts of the suit is that the plaintiff has preferred the Suit praying for declaration that plaintiff is having the possession of the land since 2002 and defendant No.2 has derived the ownership by way of Will executed by late Chhaganlal Bapalal and late Chhaganlal Bapalal gave verbal Kabulat to hand over the property in favour of the plaintiff and made further declaration that the defendant No.1 has no right to disturb the possession of the plaintiff and for permanent injunction. It is the case of the plaintiff that the suit property being tenement No. B/4, situated in the Nav Durga Society, Naroda Village, District: Ahmedabad, was in the name of late Chhaganlal Bapalal who has purchased it by way of registered sale-deed in the year 1991 and it was in his possession. That, late Chhaganlal Bapalal had one son Devendra, who died in the year 2001 and during the marriage life of Minaxiben with Devendrabhai, one son namely Ajay was born. 3.1 That, plaintiff having no own residence, he was residing in rented house during the life time of Chhaganlal Bapalal. That, in the year 2002, late Chhaganlal Bapalal executed Will in respect of the Suit property in favour of Manojbhai, son of nephew Harishchandra and verbally stated that after the death of Chhaganlal Bapalal, Manojbhai has to hand over the ownership in favour of the plaintiff of the Suit property. 3.2 On the aforesaid basis, plaintiff filed the Suit for declaration and injunction. Along with the plaint, the plaintiff has also moved an application for interim injunction, restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff and not to evict the plaintiff from the Suit property without following the due process of law. 4. 3.2 On the aforesaid basis, plaintiff filed the Suit for declaration and injunction. Along with the plaint, the plaintiff has also moved an application for interim injunction, restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff and not to evict the plaintiff from the Suit property without following the due process of law. 4. The defendant No.1 has filed his written statement at Exh-20 wherein he has denied all the averments made in the plaint as well as in the interim injunction application. He has contended that the plaintiff has no legal right in respect of the suit land and he is not occupying the same legally. That, the Suit property was purchased by his grand-father from his income by registered Sale-deed on 19.11.1989 and therefore, the property is in the name of his grandfather. He has also contended that his grandfather died naturally on 22.10.2011. He has denied the contention that his widow mother Minaben married elsewhere. According to the defendant No.1, after the death of his father, his mother was taking care of his grandfather. He has also contended that with a view to avoid future dispute in regard to Suit property, his grandfather had transferred the property on 4.6.2007 by registered Sale-deed in the name of his mother and the peaceful possession was handed over to his mother Minaben. 4.1 It is also contended by the defendant No.1 that his mother was residing in the Suit property and as he got the job at Padra, he along with his mother had gone to stay at Padra. That, during this period, without knowledge of him and his mother, the plaintiff came to stay in the Suit property with his grandfather and thereafter his grandfather has died in 2011. It is also contended that thereafter on 18.9.2014, his mother also died and he became the owner of the Suit property by virtue of heirship. He has denied the fact that in the year 2002, Chhaganlal Bapalal executed a Will. It is also contended that even if Will is executed, unless and until Probate thereof is obtained by the plaintiff, he cannot become a owner of the property. It is also contended that the plaintiff has not produced Will as well as other documents. He has denied the fact that in the year 2002, Chhaganlal Bapalal executed a Will. It is also contended that even if Will is executed, unless and until Probate thereof is obtained by the plaintiff, he cannot become a owner of the property. It is also contended that the plaintiff has not produced Will as well as other documents. 4.2 It is contended by the defendant No.1 that when he came to take Key of the Suit property, he came to know that the plaintiff has illegally kept possession of the Suit property. That the plaintiff not vacating property and trying to snatch the property. According to the defendant No.1, plaintiff is occupying illegal and the plaintiff has no right, right in the Suit property. He has also contended that after the death of his grandfather, property is having in the name of his mother. He has prayed to dismiss the suit and to pass decree in his favour directing the plaintiff to handover actual and peaceful possession of the Suit property to him. 5. After hearing both the sides, the trial Court has granted the interim injunction, till final disposal of the Suit. This order has been challenged by the defendant No.1, by filing the present Appeal from order. 6. Heard learned advocate Mr. R.N. Jadav for the appellant and Mr. B.C. Rupera, learned advocate for the respondents at length. Perused the material placed on record and the decisions cited at bar. 7. Learned advocate for the appellant defendant No.1 has vehemently submitted that the property is standing in the name of appellant’s mother Minaxiben. He has submitted that originally the property was purchased by late Chhaganlal Bapalal who is grandfather of the appellant. He has submitted that during the life-time of Chhaganlal, he has executed Sale-deed in favour of the appellant’s mother. He has further submitted that it is the case of the plaintiff that late Chhaganlal executed Will in favour of defendant No.1, however, no such Will is produced by the plaintiff. He has also submitted that the possession of the plaintiff of the suit property is illegal. He has submitted that defendant No.1 being heir of deceased Chhaganlal and defendant No.1’s mother, he is entitled to get the possession of the Suit property. He has submitted that the possession of the plaintiff being illegal, he is not entitled to any equitable relief. He has submitted that defendant No.1 being heir of deceased Chhaganlal and defendant No.1’s mother, he is entitled to get the possession of the Suit property. He has submitted that the possession of the plaintiff being illegal, he is not entitled to any equitable relief. He has submitted that the Samjhuti Karaar (Settlement Deed) page-73 is only permissive user agreement and thereby no legal title is vested in the plaintiff to occupy the property in question. He has submitted that the defendant No.1 is true owner of the property, has every right to ask the plaintiff to vacate the suit premises. He has submitted that the trial Court has not considered all these aspects and has passed the impugned order, which is arbitrary one and same is required to be set-aside by this Court. He has prayed to allow the present appeal by setting aside the impugned order. He has relied upon the following decisions in support of his submissions: 1. Behram Tejani v. Azeem Jagani, reported in (2017) 2 SCC 759 ; (para-13) "13. The matter was further elaborated in subsequent decision of this Court in Maria Margarida (Supra) as under: “97. Principles of law which emerge in this case are crystallized as under: (1) No one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long possession of years or decades such person would not acquire any right or interest in the said property. (2) Caretaker, watchman or servant can never acquire interest in the property irrespective of his long possession. The caretaker or servant has to give possession forthwith on demand. (3) The courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a caretaker, servant or any person who was allowed to live in the premises for some time either as a friend, relative, caretaker or as a servant. (4) The protection of the court can only be granted or extended to the person who has valid, subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or license agreement in his favour. (5) The caretaker or agent holds property of the principal only on behalf of the principal. He acquires no right or interest whatsoever for himself in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession.” 2. Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jad De Sequeria (Dead), reported in (2012) 5 SCC 370 ; (Para-27) "27. (5) The caretaker or agent holds property of the principal only on behalf of the principal. He acquires no right or interest whatsoever for himself in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession.” 2. Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jad De Sequeria (Dead), reported in (2012) 5 SCC 370 ; (Para-27) "27. According to the appellant, this Court in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Others v. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Others (2004) 3 SCC 137 has observed that no injunction can be granted against the true owner and Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act cannot be invoked to protect the wrongdoer who suppressed the material facts from the Courts." 8. Per contra, learned advocate for the respondent has submitted that the plaintiff has not claimed the property as of owner. He has submitted that at present the plaintiff is in possession of the property and as the defendant No.1 threatened to forcefully evict the plaintiff from the suit property, the plaintiff has filed the Suit for protection of his possession of the property. He has submitted that Chhaganlal died in the year 2011 whereas his only Son Devendra had died in the year 2001. He has also submitted that Devendra’s wife Minaben has also died in the year 2014. He has submitted that the stand taken by the defendant No.1 that late Chhaganlal executed registered Sale-deed in favour of his mother Minaben, is doubtful as if in reality such registered sale-deed was executed then there was no need of any settlement deed (Page-73) to be executed in the year 2009. He has submitted that even after death of his mother in 2014, the defendant No.1 has not filed any Suit for possession of the property. He has submitted that the present suit has been filed by the plaintiff for his possession of the property and to see that the defendant No.1 do not forcefully evict the plaintiff from the property. He has submitted that the learned trial Court has properly passed the impugned order and there is no perversity or arbitrariness in the impugned order. He has prayed to dismiss the present Appeal from Order. He has submitted that the decisions cited at bar is not applicable to the facts of the case. 9. In rejoinder, learned advocate for the appellant defendant No.1 has submitted that the plaintiff has no locus-standi to file the suit. He has prayed to dismiss the present Appeal from Order. He has submitted that the decisions cited at bar is not applicable to the facts of the case. 9. In rejoinder, learned advocate for the appellant defendant No.1 has submitted that the plaintiff has no locus-standi to file the suit. He has submitted that earlier notice was given in the year 2019 by the defendant No.1 but the same was not complied with. He has prayed to allow the present Appeal from Order. 10. It is well settled principles of law that in an Appeal against exercise of ‘discretion’ by the Court of first instance, the power of appellate Court to interfere with the exercise of discretion is restrictive. Merely because on facts, the appellate Court would have concluded differently from that of the Court below, that would not , by itself, provide justification for appellate Court to interfere. To justify interference, the appellant would have to demonstrate that the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunction. An appeal against the exercise of discretion is an appeal on principle. In the case of Wander Ltd. V. Antox India P. Ltd, (Supra) wherein it has been adumbrated that the Appellate Court ought not to “re-assess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below if the one reached by that Court was reasonably possible on the material. The Appellate Court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under Appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner, the fact that the Appellate Court would have taken a different view, may not justify interference with the trial Court’s exercise of discretion”. 11. In view of the above settled principles of law, power of this Court, as an Appellate Court, to interfere with the order passed by the trial Court is very limited and only in exceptional circumstances, the Appellate Court can interfere with the discretionary order passed by the trial Court. 11. In view of the above settled principles of law, power of this Court, as an Appellate Court, to interfere with the order passed by the trial Court is very limited and only in exceptional circumstances, the Appellate Court can interfere with the discretionary order passed by the trial Court. The Appellate Court cannot re-evaluate the entire evidence and arrive at a conclusion contrary to the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court. However, in case where the order passed by the trial Court is found to be invalid, illegal, arbitrary, perverse or contrary to the settled principles of law, the Appellate Court has all powers to interfere with the same. Considering the above principles of law, this Court has only to see as to whether the trial Court has committed any error in passing the impugned order. It has also to see whether the main basic principles of law namely, prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss are satisfied or not in passing the order. 12. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of both the sides, coupled with the aforesaid principles of law and the material placed on record as well as the decisions cited at bar, it reveals that there is no dispute as to the possession of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property. It reveals from the record that the suit property is standing in the name of defendant No.1’s mother in the records. Now, it is the case of the plaintiff that by virtue of the Will of the deceased Chhaganlal, he has become owner of the property. Against this, it is the case of the defendant No.1 that he has become owner of the property after death of his mother. The question of ownership of the property needs to be decided on the basis of the evidence that may be lead by both the parties. However, one thing is crystal clear that at the time of filing of the suit, plaintiff is in possession. It also appears that in the year 2019, the defendant No.1 had issued notice to the plaintiff, however, the defendant No.1 has not initiated any legal action for evicting the plaintiff from the Suit property. Even on perusal of the Settlement Deed (Annexure “E”) Page73, it appears that the present plaintiff was residing with the deceased and he was maintaining deceased Chhaganlal. Even on perusal of the Settlement Deed (Annexure “E”) Page73, it appears that the present plaintiff was residing with the deceased and he was maintaining deceased Chhaganlal. This averment itself suggests that the entry in the Suit property by the plaintiff was not illegal one and it was at the instance of the deceased Chhaganlal. Therefore, the possession of the plaintiff can be treated as an permissive one keeping the question of ownership alive, which is to be proved by both the sides by leading appropriate evidence in the matter. Under these circumstances, it is necessary for the defendant No.1 to take legal recourse for eviction of the plaintiff. 13. Now, considering the prayer of the plaintiff in the interim injunction application, he has only prayed that without following the due process of law, his possession may not be disturbed by the defendants. Now, considering the impugned order of the trial Court, it clearly appears that it has considered all these aspects of the matter. The impugned order of the trial Court is not perverse or arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order of the Court below. 14. In view of the above discussion, the present Appeal from Order is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed. No order as to costs. Civil Application, if any, stands disposed of.