JUDGMENT : J.J. MUNIR, J. 1. This tenants' writ petition is directed against an order of release passed by the Prescribed Authority, under Section 21(1)(a) of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (for short ‘the Act’) that has been affirmed in appeal. 2. An application for release was moved by Noor Mohammad, the sole respondent to this writ petition, under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, seeking release of House No. 10/254-J, Heeraman Kaa Purwa, Kanpur Nagar, admeasuring 80 square yards, details of which are mentioned in Schedule A at the foot of the release application. It was registered on the file of the Prescribed Authority/Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Court No. 5, Kanpur Nagar as Rent Case No. 14 of 2013. 3. Noor Mohammad claimed that he is the owner of the aforesaid premises. The premises were said to be 100 years old with an arched roof and in a dilapidated condition. The back portion on the eastern side had already fallen down. The house is constructed on a plot of land in two equal parts. The northern half has two rooms, a kitchen and a courtyard, which is residential and in Noor Mohammad's occupation. The remainder half part of the premises on the southern side has three arched roof rooms, oriented from west to east, where after there is a courtyard, another room and a gallery. However, the eastern room of this part was dilapidated and collapsed quite a long time ago. In its place, Mohd. Ahmad (since deceased), whose heirs and LRs are the petitioners here, constructed a tin-shed worked room and also enclosed a part of the courtyard with a tin-shed, giving it the shape of a room, converting it illegally. 4. It is this part of Noor Mohammad's house, which is disputed and shown in the map accompanying the application by letters A B C D and fully described at the foot of the application in Schedule B. Mohd. Ahmad is a tenant in the part of the house shown in Schedule B at the foot of the release application at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month, apart from water and sewerage tax. Pending the application for release before the Prescribed Authority, Mohd. Ahmad passed away on 15.08.2014 and his heirs and LRs. who are the writ petitioners here, to wit, Mohd. 100/- per month, apart from water and sewerage tax. Pending the application for release before the Prescribed Authority, Mohd. Ahmad passed away on 15.08.2014 and his heirs and LRs. who are the writ petitioners here, to wit, Mohd. Akram, Mohd. Arshad and Mohd. Niyaz, all sons of the late Mohd. Ahmad were substituted as opposite parties nos. 1/1, 1/2 and 1/3. The three heirs and LRs. of Mohd. Ahmad shall hereinafter be referred to as the tenants, unless the context requires individual reference. Noor Mohammad shall hereinafter be called the landlord. 5. It is the landlord's case further in the release application that he has a family comprising 23 members, all of whom reside with him in the half portion of the house shown in Schedule A, that is in his occupation, suffering great inconvenience. The landlord says that on account of shortage of space, his family members have to live in subhuman conditions. One of his sons, Akil Ahmad could not be married because of shortage of space and a younger son, who has married himself, is staying in a rented accommodation in House No. 90/254-J at the rate of Rs. 1,500/- per month. 6. The tenants contested the application by filing a written statement saying that the demised premises no doubt have an arched roof, but the premises are not dilapidated. The demised premises comprise two rooms, a courtyard and a tin-shed. The demised premises, in the condition it exists, has been that way for the past 50 years. It is then said that Ali Ahmad does not stay with his father. He stays along with his wife and children at Chunniganj. Likewise, Mohd. Arif and Mohd. Akil stay elsewhere and have their families. It is the tenants' case that Shakil Ahmad and Wali Ahmad do not get along with the landlord and for the said reason, stay away. The landlord does not need any residential accommodation. 7. The plot of land he has got vacated from an old tenant, Mohd. Sharif, has three rooms, making it a total of six rooms in the landlord's possession. Mohd. Ahmad, who was alive at the time, further pleaded that he is 80 years old and his family comprises besides himself, his son Mohd. Akram, his wife and two children, two other sons Mohd. Arshad and Mohd. Niyaz, both of whom are unmarried. Sharif, has three rooms, making it a total of six rooms in the landlord's possession. Mohd. Ahmad, who was alive at the time, further pleaded that he is 80 years old and his family comprises besides himself, his son Mohd. Akram, his wife and two children, two other sons Mohd. Arshad and Mohd. Niyaz, both of whom are unmarried. The landlord has purchased the demised premises, including the part in his occupation on 20.07.1984, but in compliance with the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act, has not served a notice giving the tenants six months' time to vacate. As such, the release application is not maintainable. 8. It is also the tenants' case that Rent Case No. 5 of 2010, Noor Mohd. vs. Mohd. Shahid and Others was brought against the tenant there, pleading the same grounds as those here to establish the landlord's bona-fide need and release of that premises was granted in the landlord's favour. Some of the named sons of the landlord were pleaded to be living away from him and it was urged that their need cannot be looked into. 9. Both sides led evidence in support of their case and the Prescribed Authority after considering the case on the issues, amongst others, of bona fide need and comparative hardship, allowed the release application vide judgment and order dated 25.11.2015. The tenants were ordered to vacate the demised premises and handover vacant possession to the landlord within two months. 10. The tenants appealed the said judgment to the District Judge, Kanpur Nagar, sitting as the Appellate Authority under the Act. The tenants' appeal under Section 22 of the Act was registered on the file of the Appellate Authority as Rent Appeal No. 86 of 2015. The appeal was assigned to the Additional District Judge, Court No. 14, Kanpur Nagar and came up for determination before him on 31.05.2018. The order of the Appellate Authority records that it was heard in the absence of the tenants (that is to say the writ petitioners). 11. At the hearing of the appeal, the Appellate Authority has recorded that the tenants did not appear in support of the appeal and to all appearances by one part of the record of the proceedings mentioned in the judgment, judgment was reserved, without hearing the tenants. 11. At the hearing of the appeal, the Appellate Authority has recorded that the tenants did not appear in support of the appeal and to all appearances by one part of the record of the proceedings mentioned in the judgment, judgment was reserved, without hearing the tenants. However, the judgment of the Appellate Authority in the next following paragraph would show that learned Counsel for both parties were heard and records perused, including written argument. The judgment passed by the Appellate Authority shows a rather unfaithful record of proceedings in the appeal. More would be said about it later in this judgment. 12. The Appellate Authority by his judgment and order dated 31.05.2018 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of release. 13. Aggrieved, this writ petition has been filed. 14. Heard Mr. Manish Tandon, learned Counsel for the tenants and Mr. Atul Dayal, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Ayush Khanna, learned Counsel appearing for the landlord. 15. Looking to the course of proceedings and the issue of maintainability of the application for want of notice under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act, this Court does not propose to examine the findings, at least of the Appellate Authority, on the issues of bona-fide need and comparative hardship. It is of utmost importance to these proceedings that there is no quarrel about the fact that the landlord purchased the demised premises through the registered sale deed dated 20.07.1984. The tenants were in occupation since the time of the former owner and landlord. The landlord moved the application for release on 27.02.2013, that is to say, after a period of about 29 years. The tenants, in answer to the application, raised a specific plea about non-compliance of the mandatory provisions carried in the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act. The plea was raised in Paragraph No. 11 of the written statement. It was raised in the following words: ^^;g fd ÁkFkhZ x`gLokeh us fookfnr edku 20-07-1984 dks [kjhnk gS ijUrq mlus /kkjk 21 ds oS/kkfud Áko/kkuksa dk ikyu ugha fd;k gSA vr% uksfVl u nsus ds dkj.k fueqZfDr ÁkFkZuki= iks"k.kh; ugha gS vkSj fujLr gksus ;ksX; gSA** 16. The plea was raised in Paragraph No. 11 of the written statement. It was raised in the following words: ^^;g fd ÁkFkhZ x`gLokeh us fookfnr edku 20-07-1984 dks [kjhnk gS ijUrq mlus /kkjk 21 ds oS/kkfud Áko/kkuksa dk ikyu ugha fd;k gSA vr% uksfVl u nsus ds dkj.k fueqZfDr ÁkFkZuki= iks"k.kh; ugha gS vkSj fujLr gksus ;ksX; gSA** 16. In the replication, that was filed, the aforesaid plea was responded to in Paragraph No. 5, pleading a case that no notice is required to be given after passage of 30 years from the date of purchase of the demised premises by the landlord. The relevant part of the replication carried in Paragraph No. 5 at Page 43 of the paper-book read: ^^;gka ;g fy[kuk lqlaxr gS fd pwafd orZeku okn [kjhn dh frfFk fnukad 20-07-1984 ds rhl o"kZ ds ckn ÁLrqr fd;k x;k gS blfy, iwoZ uksfVl nsus dh dksbZ vko';drk ugha FkhA** 17. The Prescribed Authority dealt with the aforesaid plea answering it against the tenants by holding that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Anwar Hasan Khan vs. Mohd. Shafi and Others, (2001) 8 SCC 540 , there was no necessity of serving the notice of six months envisaged under the first proviso to Section 21 to maintain an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. Shafi and Others, (2001) 8 SCC 540 , there was no necessity of serving the notice of six months envisaged under the first proviso to Section 21 to maintain an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. The findings of the Prescribed Authority in this regard is extracted below: ^^bl lEcU/k esa foi{kh }kjk Lohd`r rF; gS fd mDr edku lu 1984 esa ;kph@yS.M ykMZ }kjk [kjhnk x;k Fkk tSlk fd mlus viuh vkifRr@tokcnkok Ái= la[;k 11 ds vfrfjDr dFku ds iSjk 13 esa Lohdkj fd;k gSA vr% bl fcUnq ij U;k;ky; dk ;g vfHker gS fd ;kph us Á'uxr lEifRr dks tfj, Ø; tc lu 1984 esa ÁkIr fd;kA rRi'pkr orZeku voeqDr ÁkFkZuk i= lu 2013 esa ÁLrqr fd;k ,slh fLFkfr esa uksfVl fn, tkus dh dksbZ ck/;rk ugha gSA fof/k O;oLFkk & dQhy vgen cuke lrfoUæ dkSj] 2006 ¼1½ ,ŒvkjŒlhŒ 451 esa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; }kjk fu.khZr fd;k x;k gS fd ;fn voeqDr ÁkFkZuk i= edku Ø; djus ds ikap o"kZ ls vf/kd le; ds i'pkr ÁLrqr fd;k x;k] bl Ádkj uksfVl dh vko';drk ugha gSA blh Ádkj ,d vU; fof/k O;oLFkk & vuokj glu [kku cuke eksgEen 'kQh rFkk vU;] 2001 ¼2½ bykgkckn jsUV dslst+ 554 esa Hkh ;g vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k x;k gS fd Ø; ds 3 o"kZ ds i'pkr uksfVl dh vko';drk ugha gksrh gSA** 18. The appeal that the tenants preferred raises specific grounds in the memorandum, numbered Ground Nos. 1, 2 and 3, that read to the following effect: “1. Because the Learned Lower Court has not considered that the notice for six months in view of the provision of section 21(1) of proviso i is mandatory which was not complied by the opposite party/land lord and this law has been wrongly considered by Learned Lower Court in view of the law held in 2006 (1) ARC 459 and 2001 (2) ARC 554 and passed impugned order. 2. Because the Learned Lower Court has not considered the latest law of Hon'ble Supreme Court which was held in 2011 (1) ARC 513 . 3. Because the Learned Lower Court has also not considered properly that the notice was not waived by the appellant and the mandatory provision has been wrongly ignored in the impugned order and passed impugned order.” 19. 3. Because the Learned Lower Court has also not considered properly that the notice was not waived by the appellant and the mandatory provision has been wrongly ignored in the impugned order and passed impugned order.” 19. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the tenants that the Appellate Authority has incorrectly recorded the fact that they did not appear at the hearing to press their appeal or that the appeal was heard in their absence with the Appellate Authority hearing the respondent alone and perusing records. Normally, this kind of a submission would not at all be entertained by this Court. This submission in normal course is one which had to be agitated by way of a review before the Appellate Authority; in fact, before the same Judge, who passed the impugned judgment in appeal. Here, however, there are very startling features that impel this Court to doubt the correctness of the record of proceedings by the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority while writing the impugned judgment has recorded in Paragraph Nos. 8 and 9 as follows: ^^8- vihykFkhZ ds fo}ku vf/koDrk dks ckj&ckj volj nsus ds mijkUr Hkh vihykFkhZ }kjk cgl ugha dh x;h o mls fyf[kr cgl nkf[ky djus dh Lora=rk nsrs gq, i=koyh fu.kZ; gsrq lqjf{kr dh x;hA 9- eSaus mHk;i{kksa ds fo}ku vf/koDrkx.k ds dFku dks lquk ,oa lEiw.kZ i=koyh dk lE;d ifj'khyu fd;k rFkk fyf[kr cgl dk voyksdu fd;kA** 20. It is indeed beyond understanding how the Appellate Authority could say in Paragraph No. 8 with so much of emphasis that the learned Counsel for the tenants (appellants before him), despite being given repeat opportunity, did not appear and argue the appeal and, therefore, giving him liberty to file written submissions, judgment was reserved and, then say in the following paragraph that the learned Judge has heard learned Counsel for both parties, perused the entire records etc. The manner, in which the appeal was heard by the Appellate Authority, casts a grave doubt about the hearing before him. The record betrays a hurried disposition, where a fair hearing for the tenants appears to have been a causality. 21. The manner, in which the appeal was heard by the Appellate Authority, casts a grave doubt about the hearing before him. The record betrays a hurried disposition, where a fair hearing for the tenants appears to have been a causality. 21. This conclusion of ours is buttressed by the fact that the most import point that the tenants had canvassed in support of their case, that is to say, non-compliance with the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act, does not find the slightest mention by the Appellate Authority in the judgment impugned. The memorandum of appeal raises the issue through three well drafted grounds and the Prescribed Authority has dealt with the issue. If the appeal had indeed been heard with the learned Counsel addressing the Appellate Authority, there is no reason why the most crucial point that the tenant had raised about the mandatory compliance of six months' notice envisaged under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act, would not have been dealt with. The total absence of a finding regarding this issue, in the opinion of this Court, would vitiate the judgment of the Appellate Authority. It would require the appeal to be re-heard, granting opportunity to the tenants. 22. The course of hearing of the appeal seems to have been for some reason hurried and slipshod before the Appellate Authority. This Court is of opinion that the Prescribed Authority dealt with issue of the mandatory notice envisaged under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act, guided by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Anwar Hasan Khan (supra), which was later on reconsidered by a three Judge Bench in Nirbhai Kumar vs. Maya Devi and Others, (2009) 5 SCC 399 , where the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Martin and Harris Ltd. vs. VIth Additional District Judge and Others, (1998) 1 SCC 732 was approved as the correct view. In Nirbhai Kumar, it was remarked that Martin and Harris Ltd. was not brought to the notice of the Bench hearing Anwar Hasan Khan. In Nirbhai Kumar, the relevant part of the holding bearing on the issue of mandatory character of the notice under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act, reads: “4............. A three years' period becomes relevant when there is a change of ownership. In Nirbhai Kumar, the relevant part of the holding bearing on the issue of mandatory character of the notice under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act, reads: “4............. A three years' period becomes relevant when there is a change of ownership. This three years' period is a sort of moratorium intended for the tenant's protection. It is to be noted that the crucial expression in the proviso is “and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years.” In other words, notice can be given either before or after the three years' period. After expiry of the three years' period the protection given to the tenant from being evicted has no further relevance. Thereafter it is only the question of notice. 5. Above being the position the decision in Martin and Harris Ltd. Case (1998) 1 SCC 732 , expressed the correct view. Unfortunately, the said decision does not appear to have been placed before the Bench which heard Anwar Hasan Khan Case (2001) 8 SCC 540 .” 23. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the landlord that a notice under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act was indeed served and was part of the record of the Prescribed Authority vide list, Paper No. 65. This Court does not wish to comment on the said issue, because we are of opinion that the matter requires to be re-determined by the Appellate Authority after hearing the parties afresh, bearing in mind the correct position of the law. The fact whether a notice under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act was served is an issue, which the Appellate Authority ought to go into, carefully examining the records. This is all the more so because the Prescribed Authority has not at all adverted to any notice served under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act. 24. This is all the more so because the Prescribed Authority has not at all adverted to any notice served under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act. 24. Since the hearing of the appeal has been noticed to be slipshod and irregular, where the tenants do not seem to have been heard either at all or in an irregular fashion, it would be apposite that the appeal we propose to remand for hearing afresh be heard in the manner that the issue of mandatory compliance with the requirement of notice, under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act, be determined in the first instance. If the said issue is answered in favour of the landlord, the other two issues of bona fide need and comparative hardship be also heard and determined afresh. Needless to say that in the event the issue of notice under the proviso to Section 21 of the Act is answered against the landlord and in favour of the tenants, the other issues would not require determination. 25. In view of what has been said above, this petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The impugned order passed by the Appellate Authority in Rent Appeal No. 86 of 2015 is hereby quashed. The appeal is restored to the file of the Appellate Authority, who will proceed to hear the appeal afresh, affording opportunity of hearing to both parties. The appeal shall be decided bearing in mind the guidance in this judgment. 26. There shall be no order as to costs.