JUDGMENT : 1. The present appeal has been preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by original defendants against the decree and judgment dated 13.9.2021 passed by learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Ankleshwar, Bharuch, in Regular Civil Appeal No.40/2019 and judgment and decree dated 10.6.2019 passed by learned Principal Civil Judge, in Regular Civil Suit No.17 of 2012. 2. The appellants are the original defendants and the respondents herein are original plaintiffs in the suit. For the brevity and convenience, the parties are referred to in this order as per their character assigned to them before learned trial Court. 3. The plaintiff have instituted the Regular Civil Suit no.17 of 2012 before the Principal Civil Judge, Hansot, contending that they have not relinquished their rights of the properties mentioned in Schedule-I and Schedule-II of the plaint and prayed for declaration that they are having 2/3rd share in the joint property and also praying for injunction that the defendants may not sale, transfer, or alienate the property till the time the plaintiffs receive their share of the property. It is the further case of the plaintiff that both the parties are heirs of deceased Karshanbhai Morarbhai. That Karsanbhai Morarbhai Patel expired on 8th May 1968 without executing any will and, therefore, the property standing in the name of the deceased was the joint properties of the parties. It is the case of the plaintiffs that they have never relinquished their rights from the property in question. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that each year the defendant no.1 was used to give some portion of agricultural income to the plaintiffs and in the year 2012, the defendant no.1 denied to give any share to the plaintiffs from the agricultural income of the property and also threatened that the plaintiffs may not visit him again and also stated that the property in question stands in his own name. Being aggrieved by said action of defendant no.1, the plaintiffs have filed the aforesaid suit to claim their share in the property and also for declaration and injunction. 4. The defendants have resisted the suit by filing statement at Exh.10 and submitted that the plaintiffs have relinquished their share from the property situated at Aniyadra vide entry no.1038 and entry no.1776 which was mutated in village record on 2.7.1977. 4. The defendants have resisted the suit by filing statement at Exh.10 and submitted that the plaintiffs have relinquished their share from the property situated at Aniyadra vide entry no.1038 and entry no.1776 which was mutated in village record on 2.7.1977. It is also contended by the defendant that he had given the land to defendant no.2 and in this connection entry no.1803 was mutated in village revenue record on 13.12.1998. It is also contended that the entry no.1038 was mutated in the year 1968 in village record and after a period of 44 years, the said entry has been challenged. That entry no.1766 was mutated in the year 1977, which is sought to be challenged after a period of 35 years, whereas entry no.103 which was mutated in the year 1998 is sought to be challenged after period of 14 years and, therefore, there is a gross delay and the suit itself is barred under the law of limitation. 4.1 It was further contended that in view of Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act, any entry can be challenged invoking the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and, unless and until it is done, the validity of the entry cannot be questioned in Civil Court. It was also contended by the defendants that they are in possession of the land situated at village-Aniliyadara, Taluka-Hansot since last four decades and they are owner of the land in question and the suit itself is barred by delay and laches and, therefore, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. 4.2 It was also contended that the plaintiff has no any right or share in the property situated at Aniyadra Village. It is also contended that while making the revenue entry in the revenue record, at the relevant time, necessary notice was issued to the plaintiff and after recording the statements, as they have relinquished their rights, names of the defendants were entered as sole owner thereof. He has submitted that the allegation made by the plaintiff regarding fabrication and concoction of entry with the help of the village officer is totally baseless. The defendant has ultimately prayed to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff. 5. He has submitted that the allegation made by the plaintiff regarding fabrication and concoction of entry with the help of the village officer is totally baseless. The defendant has ultimately prayed to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties and considering the evidence on record, the trial Court has ultimately partly allowed the suit of the plaintiff by which the trial Court has held that the land of Revenue Survey No.256 situated at Village-Malanpor, Taluka-Hansot, District-Bharuch, is the ancestral property and said property is in the joint names and no partition has taken place thereof and has also declared that the plaintiffs are having 2/3rd share and the defendants are having 1/3rd share in the said property of Village-Malanpor and directed the Collector to make partition by metes and bounds. The trial Court has refused to grant decree so far as the property situated at Village-Aniyadra is concerned. 6. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the plaintiffs have preferred Regular Civil Appeal No.40 of 2019, challenging said judgment and decree dated 13.9.2021 of the learned trial Court, whereby the entire suit came to be allowed and holding that, in all the suit properties, the plaintiffs have 2/3rd share. It appears from records that the defendants side has not challenged the judgment and decree of the trial Court, nor filed any cross-objection thereof. 7. Being aggrieved with said judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court, the appellants-original defendants have preferred this Second Appeal raising various legal questions of law. 8. Heard learned advocate, Mr.B.A.Surti for the appellants-defendants and learned advocate Mr.Hriday Buch assisted by Mr.Raxit Dholakia for the respondents-original plaintiffs at length. Perused the material placed on record and the decision cited at bar. 9. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of both the sides, this Second Appeal has been heard on following substantial questions of law only:- (i) Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation? (ii) Whether the suit is barred by Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act ? (iii) Whether the suit is hit by Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 ? 10. Learned advocate Mr.Surti for the appellant-defendant has vehemently submitted that the plaintiff has already relinquished her share from the properties in favour of the defendant. (ii) Whether the suit is barred by Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act ? (iii) Whether the suit is hit by Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 ? 10. Learned advocate Mr.Surti for the appellant-defendant has vehemently submitted that the plaintiff has already relinquished her share from the properties in favour of the defendant. He has also submitted that prior to making revenue entry in this regard, notice under Section 135 (D) was also issued and necessary statement of plaintiff along with heirs were recorded and, on that basis, entry regarding relinquishment of rights by the plaintiff and other sisters etc. was recorded in the revenue record. He has submitted that all those entries are made before 44 years, 35 years and 14 years before filing of the suit. He has submitted that in view of these facts, there is clear bar of law of limitation. He has submitted that by estoppel also the plaintiff is prevented from challenging the alleged relinquishment of their right from the property. He has also submitted that the plaintiff has not initiated any proceeding under the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code challenging the said revenue entries. According to his submission, the plaintiff ought to have exhausted the remedy under the revenue laws and, thereafter, could have filed the civil suit. He has also submitted that as the plaintiff has not exhausted the alternative remedy available under the Land Revenue Code, the suit itself is not tenable and no relief can be granted in view of the provisions contained in Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act. 11. He has also submitted that, as per the averments made in the pleadings of the parties, there are three properties, out of which one property is in the Village-Malanpor, there is name of the plaintiff in the revenue record. He has submitted that trial Court has passed the decree in respect of the property at Malanpor but has refused in respect of the property at Aniyadra. He has submitted that the trial Court has considered the aspect of delay and laches in respect of the property at Aniyadra. He has submitted that trial Court has passed the decree in respect of the property at Malanpor but has refused in respect of the property at Aniyadra. He has submitted that the trial Court has considered the aspect of delay and laches in respect of the property at Aniyadra. He has submitted that the appellate Court, while confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court has also granted relief pertaining to the properties situated at Village- Aniyadra on the basis that the relinquishment of the rights of the plaintiff through revenue entry is not legally tenable as it is without any documents of registration. Learned advocate Mr.Surti also submitted that both the Courts have committed error of law in deciding the issue of limitation and regarding the efficacious alternative remedy available to the plaintiff of challenging the revenue entries before the revenue authority under the Land Revenue Code and also the provisions of Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act. He has prayed to allow present appeal and to set aside both the judgments and decree of the Courts below. He has relied upon following decisions in support of his submission:- (i) State of Gujarat v. Kolvada Gram Panchayat reported in 2001 (2) GLR 1245 , wherein it is observed as under:- “4. The following questions of law have been framed by this court : (1) Whether the appellate court was right in law in holding that the impugned order passed by the Collector, Mehsana, dated 29-1-1974 is illegal, void and ineffective in view of section 96 (4) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act and also under section 38 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code ? (2) Whether the appellate court was right in law in holding that the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit ? (3) Whether the appellate court is right in law in coming to the conclusion that the suit is maintainable in view of section 96 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act ? Section 96 (1) of the Act empowers the State Government to vest in a Panchayat, open site the waste, vacant or grazing lands or public roads, streets, bridges, ditches, etc. or any other property in the Gram or Nagar, as the case may be, vesting in the Government. Section 96 (1) of the Act empowers the State Government to vest in a Panchayat, open site the waste, vacant or grazing lands or public roads, streets, bridges, ditches, etc. or any other property in the Gram or Nagar, as the case may be, vesting in the Government. Subsection (4) thereof empowers the Government to resume any such open site or waste, vacant or grazing lands vested by Government in a Panchayat to resume at any time such site or land if it is required by it for any public purposes. The question that arises is whether the land bearing S.No.. 878/2, the subject matter of the lis, can be said to be covered by sub-section (4) of section 96 of the Act. The said sub-section refers to 'any open site or waste, vacant or grazing land'. It is undisputed that the land bearing S.No. 878/2 was being used as Khalvad (thrashing land) by the villagers. The same, therefore, can not be said either to be a 'grazing land', or 'waste land' or 'vacant land'. The words 'open site' or 'waste, vacant or grazing land' have not been defined in the Act and the said words, therefore, should take their natural meaning. As observed hereinabove, the land bearing S.No. 878/2 being used by the villagers can not be said to be 'waste, vacant or grazing land'. But the same having not been constructed upon, would be covered by the words 'open site'. The otherwise open land would not cease to be open land/open site merely because it is being used for some specific purpose. In my view, therefore, the Collector was not acting without the authority of law in ordering to resume the land bearing S.No. 878/2. The next question whether an order made in exercise of power under section 96 (4) of the Act can be challenged before the civil court without availing of a remedy of appeal provided under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). Section 203 of the Code provides for an appeal to a superior officer against any order made by the Revenue Officer. It can not be gainsaid that the Collector is a 'Revenue Officer' as defined under section 3(1) of the Code. An appeal against the order made by the Collector, therefore, should lie to an officer superior (in the present case, the Development Commissioner). It can not be gainsaid that the Collector is a 'Revenue Officer' as defined under section 3(1) of the Code. An appeal against the order made by the Collector, therefore, should lie to an officer superior (in the present case, the Development Commissioner). There are two fold express bar against the civil proceedings under the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876. Section 4 of the said Act expressly bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of the matters enumerated thereunder. Clause (fb) thereof reads as under : Suit to set aside or modify decision determining village site or abadi made by the Collector or a survey officer under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (Bom. V of 1879) or by any Revenue Officer under any other law for the time being in force. Thus, the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of an order made by the Collector determining the village site is expressly barred. Section 11 of the said Act reads as under : Section 11 : SUITS NOT TO BE ENTERTAINED UNLESS PLAINTIFF HAS EXHAUSTED RIGHT OF APPEAL : No civil court shall entertain any suit against the Government on account of any act or omission of any Revenue Officer unless the plaintiff first proves that previously to bringing his suits he has presented all such appeals allowed by the law for the time being in force, as within the period of limitation allowed for bringing such suits it was possible to present. That is, unless the plaintiff proves that he has availed of the remedy of appeal available under the law for the time being in force, no civil court shall entertain suit against the order made by any Revenue Officer. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the plaintiff had not availed of the remedy of appeal against the impugned order of the Collector available under the Code. Thus, the suit was not competent and was rightly dismissed by the learned trial Judge.” (ii) Nazir Mohamed v. J.Kamla and Others reported in AIR 2020 (SC) 4321 , wherein it is observed as under:- “37. Thus, the suit was not competent and was rightly dismissed by the learned trial Judge.” (ii) Nazir Mohamed v. J.Kamla and Others reported in AIR 2020 (SC) 4321 , wherein it is observed as under:- “37. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus : (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact, but the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document, involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. (iii) A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered AIR 1963 SC 302 on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iv) The general rule is, that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding. ......... 53. A suit for recovery of possession of immovable property is governed by the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 3 of the Limitation Act bars the institution of any suit after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed in the said Act. The Court is obliged to dismiss a suit filed after expiry of the period of limitation, even though the plea of limitation may not have been taken in defence.” 12. Per contra, learned advocate Mr.Hriday Buch for the respondent-plaintiff has vehemently submitted that as per the pleadings of the parties, admittedly the suit properties are ancestral properties. He has submitted that the defendant is relying upon the mutation entries of relinquishment of rights, which are alleged to be made in year 1968 and 1977. He has submitted that the defendant was paying share to the plaintiff upto 2012 and as he stopped in giving the share to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has filed the suit. He has submitted that when the property is ancestral property and as there was no actual partition, in view of the provisions contained in the Hindu Succession Act, especially Section 6 and 8, the daughter has every right in the ancestral property as a coparcener. He has submitted that, in the present case, actually there was no partition made between the parties. He has submitted that the first appellate Court has not committed any error regarding the point of limitation. He has also submitted that there cannot be any etsoppel against law. 12.1 He has also submitted that plaintiffs are the co-shares of the suit properties and considering all these facts, the first appellate Court has properly passed decree in favour of the plaintiffs. He has also submitted that there cannot be any etsoppel against law. 12.1 He has also submitted that plaintiffs are the co-shares of the suit properties and considering all these facts, the first appellate Court has properly passed decree in favour of the plaintiffs. He has also submitted that only Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the civil rights of the parties and revenue authority has no jurisdiction to decide the proprietary rights of the person concerned. He has also submitted that Civil Court can decide the legality of any revenue entry but the revenue authority has no power to decide the rights and titles of the party pertaining to lands and properties covered under the Land Revenue Code. He has also submitted that there is no substantial question of law involved in this appeal and, therefore, the appeal itself be dismissed as there is concurrent finding of both the Courts below regarding the property being ancestral property and the parties having legal right in the property. 12.2 He has also submitted that the defence taken by the defendants regarding alternative remedy under the revenue law and bar of Section 41 (h) of Specific Relief Act is not legally tenable. He has prayed to dismiss the appeal. He has relied upon the oral order dated 29.1.2020 passed by Coordinate Bench of this Court in Second Appeal No.113 of 2003, in the case of Heirs of Late Bhupat Rana and Others v. Jayaben Punjabhai @ Kanchanbhai Punjabhai and Others, in support of his submissions. 12.3 He has submitted that reliance placed on the decision of Nazir Mohamed (supra) by the appellant is helpful to the respondent herein, as for entertaining Second Appeal, the condition precedent is that there should be existence of substantial question of law. According to him, in the present appeal, since there is no substantial question of law involved, the appeal be dismissed accordingly. 13. In rejoinder, learned advocate Mr.Surti has submitted that, considering the facts of the present case, Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act will not be applicable. He has also submitted that even as per the averment made in the plaint, the property is alleged to be self-acquired property of the deceased Karshanbhai. He has submitted that the property in question is not ancestral property. He has also submitted that only heirs have relinquished their share in favour of Laxmanbhai i.e. defendant. He has also submitted that even as per the averment made in the plaint, the property is alleged to be self-acquired property of the deceased Karshanbhai. He has submitted that the property in question is not ancestral property. He has also submitted that only heirs have relinquished their share in favour of Laxmanbhai i.e. defendant. He has submitted that so far as the property at Malanpor is concerned, the defendant has no dispute and that part of the judgment of the trial Court is also not disputed by the defendant, as the defendant has not filed any appeal before the first appellate Court in this regard. He has also submitted that the Court below has not framed any issue regarding Section 203 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. He has also submitted that the entire suit is based on the revenue entries and, therefore, since there is alternative remedy available to the plaintiff under the revenue law, no relief whatsoever ought to have been granted in favour of the plaintiff under Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act. 14. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of both the sides coupled with the material placed on record and decisions cited at bar, it is an admitted position that there is no dispute as to the relationship between the parties. It is also admitted fact that property was standing in the name of deceased Karshanbhai and the plaintiff is his daughter and the defendant is son. On perusal of the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below, it appears that both the Courts below have concurrently observed that plaintiff has right in the property as a coparcener. The difference between the observation and conclusion by the trial Court and the first appellate Court is pertaining to the rights of the plaintiff regarding properties at Village-Aniyadra. According to the trial Court, in view of the revenue entries of the year 1968 and 1977 of relinquishment of rights by the plaintiff in favour of her brother, the plaintiff has no right so far as property situated in Village-Aniyadra is concerned. The trial Court has also observed that the suit in respect of the properties of Village- Aniyadra is clearly time barred. The trial Court has also observed that the suit in respect of the properties of Village- Aniyadra is clearly time barred. The trial Court has also observed that so far as property at Villlage-Malanpor is concerned, the same is standing in the names of both the parties and, therefore, the trial Court has passed decree in favour of plaintiff so far as property at Malanpor is concerned. 15. Against the said decision of the trial Court, the first appellate Court has also granted decree in respect of the properties situated in Village-Aniyadra, on the basis that there is no registered document in respect of relinquishment of right by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant pertaining to the properties at Village-Aniyadra. At the same time, the first appellate Court has confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court passed in respect of property at Village-Malanpor. 16. Now, in the present case, the substantial questions of law, which have been referred to herein above, are pertaining to applicability of law of limitation to the suit. Now, so far as question of limitation is concerned, it is admitted fact that plaintiff has filed the suit in the year 2012 alleging that till 2012, defendant no.1 was giving shares from the income of property situated at Village-Aniyadra and Malanpor. The plaintiff has based her right over the property on the basis of the revenue entries which suggests that the property was in the name of her father, deceased Karshanbhai. Now, admittedly in this case, the revenue entries pertaining to relinquishment of right by the plaintiff in favour of defendant Laxmanbhai is of the year 1968 and 1977 and another entry which pertains to the transferring of the land in favour of defendant no.2 is of 1998. Thus, considering the year of the revenue entries and date of filing of the suit, so far as it relates to properties situated at Village-Aniyadra is concerned, is clearly barred by law of limitation. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that in respect of the property, if there is any family settlement between the members of the Hindu family, it can be in writing or even there may be oral partition. Now, admittedly in this case, the revenue entries have been made after following due procedure of issuing notice under Section 135 (D) of the Code and after recording statements of relevant persons. Now, admittedly in this case, the revenue entries have been made after following due procedure of issuing notice under Section 135 (D) of the Code and after recording statements of relevant persons. It is also well settled that the relinquishment of one’s right from immovable property does not require any registration. Even by oral or by conduct, one person can relinquish his rights from property in favour of any other family member. To decide the point of relinquishment, the conduct of the person concerned needs to be taken into consideration. Now, considering the facts and the evidence on record, it clearly appears that so far as the prayer pertaining to properties situated at Village-Aliyadra is concerned, the same is time barred. However, so far as property situated at Village- Malanpor is concerned, it is not time barred as the same is mutated in the name of the plaintiff and defendant and there is no entry made regarding relinquishment of right of the plaintiff from that property. Thus, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it clearly appears that the trial Court has properly considered this point of law of limitation and held that it is partly applicable to the facts of the present case. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that substantial question of law regarding law of limitation needs to be answered to the effect that entire suit is not barred by limitation. 17. Now, so far as substantial question of law regarding Section 11 of Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 and in relation to bar of Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act are concerned, both are interrelated and, therefore, they are discussed together. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to refer to Section 41 (h) of Specific Relief Act and Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, which are as under:- “41. Injunction when refused.- An injunction cannot be granted- (a) .................................... (h) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust;” “11. Injunction when refused.- An injunction cannot be granted- (a) .................................... (h) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust;” “11. Suits not to be entertained unless plaintiff has exhausted right of appeal:- No Civil Court shall entertain any suit against the Government on account of any act or omission of any Revenue Officer unless the plaintiff first proves that previously to bringing his suits he has presented all such appeals allowed by the law for the time being in force, as within the period of limitation allowed for bringing such suits it was possible to present.” 18. Considering the provision contained in Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, it is crystal clear that this provision bars the entertainment of any suit by the Civil Court, when any suit is filed against the Government on account of any act or omission of any revenue officer, unless the plaintiff first proves that previously to bringing his suit, he has presented all such appeals allowed by the law for the time being in force, as within period of limitation allowed for bringing such suits. Thus, this provision is only applicable when any plaintiff files any suit against the Government for his redressal on account of any act or omission made by the revenue officer. In such suit, the plaintiff has to exhaust all the remedies, which are available under the revenue laws. It does not speak against the right of plaintiff to file suit against the private party based upon any revenue entry. It is settled law that the revenue authority has no jurisdiction to decide the question of title to the property. It is the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide any civil right pertaining to any property belonging to person concerned. Therefore, considering the aforesaid provisions of Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, the submission made on behalf of the appellant is devoid of merits. Accordingly, when there is no other alternative remedy for seeking declaration of one’s civil rights pertaining to the title to the property and for partition thereof, except to approach the Civil Court, the provisions of Section 11 of the Act, 1876 and bar prescribed under Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as referred to herein above, have no application. Considering these legal aspects, this Court is of the considered opinion that the substantial issue raised in respect of applicability of Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 and Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 deserves to be decided in negative. 19. Thus, in view of above discussion, it is crystal clear that the suit of the plaintiff in respect to the properties situated at Village-Aniyadra is clearly time barred, whereas in respect to the properties situated at Village-Malanpor is not barred by limitation. It is also clear that there is no need of any registration of the Act of relinquishment of right by one coparcener from the ancestral property in favour of other family member. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered view that the first appellate Court has committed error of facts and law in passing decree for the properties situated both in Village-Aniyadra and Village-Malanpor and to that extent, the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court deserves to be set aside. At the same time, the judgment decree passed by the learned trial Court is to be upheld. 20. In view of above discussion, present Second Appeal is liable to be partly allowed. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice, following final order is passed:- Present Second Appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 13.9.2021 passed by learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Ankleshwar, Bharuch in Regular Civil Appeal No.40 of 2019 is hereby partly set aside, so far as it relates to granting decree in respect of properties situated in Village-Aniyadra is concerned. However, the judgment and decree relating to confirming the judgment and decree of learned trial Court passed on 10.6.2019 in Regular Civil Suit No.17 of 2012 pertaining to the property situated at Village-Malanpor is hereby confirmed. The parties are directed to bear their respective cost of all the proceedings. Decree to be drawn accordingly in present Second Appeal. In view of above order, Civil Application for stay also stands disposed of accordingly. Along with the copy of this judgment and decree, R & P, if any, be sent back to the learned trial Court.