JUDGMENT : Goutam Bhaduri, J. 1. The instant appeal is against the judgment and decree dated 26.11.2014 passed by the learned II Additional Judge, Mahasamund in Civil Suit No.12-A/2014 whereby the ejectment decree has been passed over a part of land bearing Khasra No.1190/2/41/1 to the extent of 375 sqft by holding that the plaintiff is entitled to get the possession of the said part of land. Hence the appeal is by the defendants. 2. Brief facts of the case are that Sunderlal and Pannalal both were real brothers. The defendants Dilip Kumar Mahobia, Khilawan @ Munna Mahobia (appellants herein) are sons of Pannalal. According to the defendants, though the suit property bearing Kh.No. 1190/2/41/1 ad-measuring 375 sqft, which is a part of total land of 3,000 sqft was purchased from Ishak Ali in 1969 and the said property stands recorded in the name of Sunderlal in revenue records but claim of appellants was that half of sale consideration was paid by their father Pannalal, as such, they are co-owners. The present dispute started after legal heirs of Sunderlal, in whose name the property was purchased, sold a part of land bearing Kh.No. 1190/2/41/1 to the extent of 375 sqft to the plaintiff Smt. Sumitra Rani Bagga on 09.09.2008. Thereafter, the purchaser Sumitra Rani filed a suit for ejectment on the ground that she is a bona fide purchaser. 3. In defence, the appellants contended that the property could not have been sold solely by the legal heirs of Sunderlal and raised the plea of adverse possession along-with coownership. The learned court below decreed the suit filed by Sumitra Rani, the purchaser and decree for possession was passed. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that initially when the sale deed was made in name of Sunderlal, certain consideration was paid by both Sunderlal and Pannalal jointly. He further submits that it was also pleaded that the house was constructed on the aforesaid plot, for which, the expenses were jointly incurred by Sunderlal and Pannalal. It is contended that subsequently a civil suit (Ex.D-1) was filed in 1999 by Sunderlal and his two sons i.e., Giridhar Lal Mahobia and Vinod Mahobia for declaration and possession against the defendants Dilip Mahobia and Khilawan @ Munna both were sons of Pannalal (appellants herein). It is contended that subsequently a civil suit (Ex.D-1) was filed in 1999 by Sunderlal and his two sons i.e., Giridhar Lal Mahobia and Vinod Mahobia for declaration and possession against the defendants Dilip Mahobia and Khilawan @ Munna both were sons of Pannalal (appellants herein). Later the said suit was withdrawn in the year 2002 on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction to evaluate the suit property and accordingly the suit was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to present it in proper format before the Competent Court after duly evaluating the property, but eventually it was not done. Thereafter, after 5 years, the sale was made in respect of the same property to the plaintiff-respondent. He would submit that the document Ex.D-7 would show that the appellants are in possession of the disputed property and the electric-meter was also installed in the name of Pannalal. It is submitted that the evidence and pleadings would show that joint consideration was paid by Pannalal and Sunderlal, therefore, the defendants are co-owners being sons of Panna Lal. It is submitted that the statement of Sunderlal recorded in civil suit would show that earlier he is in occupation of the some part of the house whereas their nephews, the appellants are in occupation of the other part. He further submits that the electric meter installed in the name of Pannalal is also admitted in written statement. Therefore, their possession had become adverse to the entire word. 5. Referring to case law laid down in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India 2004 10 SCC 779 , he would submit that the evidence would show that the possession of the appellants was peaceful, open and continuous, therefore, it was known to the public about the continuity of assertion that their possession was adverse to the true owner. He would further submit that the plea of adverse possession being the question of both facts and law, the date on which the adverse possession pleaded is from the date of filing of earlier civil suit, therefore, the appellants had perfected title over the property. Reliance is also made on a decision of Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019) 8 SCC 729 and submits that since the appellants had already perfected their title, they can defend their possession on the basis of adverse holding. 6. Reliance is also made on a decision of Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019) 8 SCC 729 and submits that since the appellants had already perfected their title, they can defend their possession on the basis of adverse holding. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that as per the sale deed dated 04.04.1969, the suit property was exclusively purchased in the name of Sunderlal and therefore, his sons and daughter have sold the property to plaintiff-respondent on 09.09.2008. He submits that after purchase, a notice was sent on 15.11.2010 (Ex.P-7) and the cause of action to file the suit was pleaded that of 09.09.2008. The document would show that the entire ownership of the land was recorded in the name of sellers. He further submits that in the written statement, an inconsistent plea has been taken that they are the co-owners and thus the entire defence is based on the plea of co-ownership but at the same time, the alternate plea of adverse possession has also been taken. He further submits that it is not made clear that on which date the appellants were dispossessed and what is the starting point of such adverse possession to claim the right. 7. Referring to the statement of Dilip Kumar, the appellant, he would submit that they have not acknowledged the title of Sunderlal. They would submit that there is no document to show that half of the sale consideration was paid by Pannalal while the sale was made in favour of Sunderlal in the year 1969. He submits that admittedly the evidence would show that the taxes were paid by Sunderlal and no document of electricity connection is also placed. He would further submit that the appellants herein have not filed any application for cancellation of sale deed and the plea is not clear as to on which date they came into possession to claim adverse possession. He would submit that in the written statement it is pleaded that they are co-owners, so if the coownership is not proved then the alternate plea of adverse possession cannot be raised. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the documents. The respondents herein filed a suit for ejectment of a part of purchased land of Kh.No. 1190/2/41/1. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the documents. The respondents herein filed a suit for ejectment of a part of purchased land of Kh.No. 1190/2/41/1. The cause of action is said to have arisen after the purchase of suit property was made on 09.09.2008. The sale deed (Ex.P-2) shows that Girdharlal, Vinod Kumar and consenting party Smt. Prabha Kumari who were sons and daughter of Sundarlal had sold certain part of land i.e., 375 sqft to Sumitra Rani Bagga in respect of Kh.No. 1190/2/41/1. Subsequent to the purchase, her name was recorded in revenue documents and Rin-Pustika was prepared which are proved vide Ex.P-4 & P-5 and the tax was also paid by the purchaser vide Ex.P-6. In para 2 of the written statement, it is pleaded by the appellants that prior to 12 years from execution of the sale deed, they had perfected their title by adverse possession whereas in Para-3 of the written statement, it is pleaded that Sunderlal & Pannalal were real brothers by relation and on 04.04.1969, the subject property was purchased for a sale consideration of Rs.4000/- and half-half amount was paid by each of them. The further pleading is made that since Pannalal was in Government Service, as such, in his name, the property was not purchased and thereafter, the house was constructed by Pannalal in 1972 and they had never occupied the subject suit land as a licensee in status but as a owner. There is no evidence on record to show that initially when the purchase was made, the father of appellants have paid half of the consideration. In the written statement, at one part they have pleaded that they have become owners by virtue of adverse possession whereas in subsequent pleading it is stated that they are co-owners. 9. The supreme Court in Kishan Singh vs. Arvind Kumar (1994) 6 SCC 591 has laid down that a possession of coowner or of a liecensee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become adverse must be established by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. It is further held that mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession. 10. The Supreme Court further in Ram Nagina Rai Vs. It is further held that mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession. 10. The Supreme Court further in Ram Nagina Rai Vs. Deo Kumar (deceased) by Legal representatives (2019) 13 SCC 324 held that the plea of adverse possession and co-ownership cannot go together. It further held that when the defence of adverse possession is raised, the burden is on them to prove affirmatively that the bar of limitation prescribed under Article 65 of the Schedule of Limitation Act 1963 viz., 12 years is applicable in the matter to file a suit for possession of immovable property based on title. It further held that the limitation of 12 years begins when the possession of defendants would become adverse to that of plaintiffs. The Apex Court held that Article 65 presupposes that the limitation starts only if the defendants prove the factum of adverse possession affirmatively from a particular time. It was laid down that adverse possession means a hostile assertion i.e., a possession which is exclusively or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner. The person who bases his title on adverse possession must show, by clear and unequivocal evidence, that the possession was hostile to the real owner and it amounted to the denial of his title to the property claimed. 11. The appellants in written statement pleaded that they are the real owners and they heavily relied upon a document Ex.D-1 and submits that earlier a Civil Suit No.185-A/2002 filed by Sunderlal, Girdharilal & Vinod against the present appellants seeking declaration and possession wherein after filing of the written statement, the amendment was preferred and the suit was dismissed with permission to prefer it in competent Court after due evaluation of the suit property. Nothing was adjudicated in such suit. In the statement of Sunderlal (the father of sellers) recorded in such suit, he maintained the stand that he had purchased the suit property exclusively of his own fund. Therefore, there is no admission on behalf of Sunderlal that it was a joint possession. It is only the plea of appellants that the property was purchased by joint consideration. 12. While considering such plea, when co-ownership and adverse possession are pleaded together the issue arises whether it can be given weightage. The Supreme Court in Narasamma Versus A. Krishnappa (dead) through L.Rs. It is only the plea of appellants that the property was purchased by joint consideration. 12. While considering such plea, when co-ownership and adverse possession are pleaded together the issue arises whether it can be given weightage. The Supreme Court in Narasamma Versus A. Krishnappa (dead) through L.Rs. (2020) 15 SCC 218 has observed that simultaneously the pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and will remain as contradictory pleas. In this behalf, the Court referred to four earlier decisions, which succinctly set forth the legal position. Paras 32, 33, 34 & 35 are relevant here and quoted below : “32. The question which confronts us is not the aforesaid, but whether simultaneously a plea can be taken of title and adverse possession i.e., whether it would amount to taking contradictory pleas. In this behalf, we may refer to the four judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent herein, which succinctly set forth the legal position. 33. In Karnataka Board of Wakf vs. Union of India (2004) 10 SCC 779 it has been clearly set out that a plaintiff filing a title over the property must specifically plead it. When such a plea of adverse possession is projected, it is inherent in the nature of it that someone else is the owner of the property. In that context, it was observed in para 12 that “..... The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced.” 34. The aforesaid judgment in turn relied upon the judgment in Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar (1996) 1 SCC 639 , which observed in para 4 as under : (SCC pp. 640-41) : “4. As regard the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor-in-title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years i.e. upto completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the appellant's claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant. 35. In order to establish adverse possession, an inquiry is required to be made into the starting point of such adverse possession and, thus, when the recorded owner got dispossessed would be crucial. Please see P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma (2007) 6 SCC 59 .” (Emphasis supplied) 13. Therefore, the defence on which the appellant tried to stand was on inconsistent pleas of co-ownership and adverse possession. In order to prove adverse possession, at para 38 of Narasamma Versus A. Krishnappa (supra) the Supreme Court further relied upon decision in Ram Nagina Rai v. Deo Kumar (2019) 13 SCC 324 wherein it was held that when there is permissive possession given by the owner and the defendant claims that the same had become adverse, it is required to be specifically pleaded and proved as to when the possession becomes adverse in order for the real owner to lose title 12 years hence from that time. In the entire written statement of the appellants, it is silent about the starting point of adverse possession. 14. In examination of the statement of defendant Dilip Kumar on oath, the admission exists that no document has been placed to show that half of the sale consideration was paid by Pannalal when the property was purchased from Irshad Ali. It is also admitted that initially the sale deed was executed in the exclusive name of Sunderlal. Another admission further exists in the affidavit of appellant Dilip Kumar that when the house was constructed in 1972, the permission was granted in the name of Sunderlal. Though the submission is made that Pannalal used to pay half of the tax to Sunderlal, yet no such document is placed and on the contrary, the tax receipts were issued in the name of Sunderlal. There is no averments as to when the hostile possession started. 15. Though the submission is made that Pannalal used to pay half of the tax to Sunderlal, yet no such document is placed and on the contrary, the tax receipts were issued in the name of Sunderlal. There is no averments as to when the hostile possession started. 15. The Supreme Court in Uttam Chand (Dead) through LRs Versus Nathu Ram (dead) through LRs (2020) 11 SCC 263 at para 15 has relied on principles laid down by a Constitution Bench in M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5J) v. Suresh Das (2020) 1 SCC 1 wherein at paras 1142-1143 it was held that the plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other. Possession is adverse in the sense that it is contrary to the acknowledged title in the other person against whom it is claimed. At para 1143, the constitution Bench further held that a person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous possession which meets the requirement of being nec vi nec clam and nec precario. It is further held that to substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence. It is well settled that evidence can only be adduced with reference to matters which are pleaded in a civil suit and in the absence of an adequate pleading, evidence by itself cannot supply the deficiency of a pleaded case. A plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner and the law does not readily accept such case unless the clear pleadings with evidence are established. 16. The evidence relied in this case is merely based on a part of the civil suit filed by Sunderlal and his sons which has not reached its logical conclusion and except this, nothing has been placed on record to show that the appellants were holding the property to the knowledge of true owner Sunderlal and their possession had become hostile. The evidence relied in this case is merely based on a part of the civil suit filed by Sunderlal and his sons which has not reached its logical conclusion and except this, nothing has been placed on record to show that the appellants were holding the property to the knowledge of true owner Sunderlal and their possession had become hostile. That apart, the plea of co-ownership has been taken which mutually destroys the plea of adverse possession. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, when the sale was made to plaintiff-respondent, she would become the owner of the suit property. The appellants have admitted about the existence of the sale deed dated 09.09.2008 (Annexure P-2) in favour of the respondent. No counter claim was filed for cancellation of such sale deed and even for the sake of arguments if it is admitted that the appellants' father Pannal paid half of the price by way of sale consideration and claims himself to be a co-owner, the possession of co-heir would be in law treated as possession of all the co-heirs. In N. Padmamma Vs. S. Ramakrishna Reddy (2015) 1 SCC 417 , it was held that a co-heir in possession cannot render its possession adverse to the other co-heirs not in possession, merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part, in derogation of the title of his other co-heirs. In the instant case, the appellants raised the plea of co-owner and even if one of the co-owners has sold the property to a stranger then in absence of challenge to such sale deed, the plea of adverse possession in alternate cannot be entertained. 17. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in this appeal warranting interference in the judgment and decree passed by the court below. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. In the facts and circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs.