JUDGMENT : 1. The present application under Section 439, read with section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C.") has been filed by the applicants, Kapil Wadhawan and Dheeraj Wadhawan, seeking default bail in Crime No. RC No.0062020A0005 under Sections-120B, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 of The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “I.P.C.”) read with Sections 7A, 8, 13(2),13(1)(d) of Prevention to the Corruption Act, 1988 Police Station-CBI/ACB, Lucknow, after their bail application for default bail bearing Bail Application No. 7528 of 2022 got rejected by the learned Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, CBI (West), Lucknow, vide order dated 1st October 2022. 2. The facts in brief of the present case, which are relevant for the purposes of deciding the present bail application are mentioned as under: 3. On 2nd November 2019, an FIR No. 540 of 2019 came to be registered at Police Station Hazaratganj, Lucknow on the complaint of one I.M. Kaushal, Secretary, Trust of Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as "U.P.P.C.L.") against Mr. Praveen Kumar Gupta, ex-Secretary (Trust) and Mr. Sudhanshu Dwivedi, who served U.P.P.C.L. in the capacity of Director (Finance) from June 2016 to June 2019. During the investigation names of several other accused came to the light as the investigating agency found these accused also involved and part of deep-rooted criminal conspiracy in the mega scam of several thousand crores Rupees. Investigation of the said case was transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and CBI registered the Regular Case and undertook the investigation. 4. As per the FIR, in pursuance of the implementation of the Uttar Pradesh Electricity Reforms Transfer Scheme, 2000, the Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board was divided on 14th January 2000 into 3 Companies i.e. (i) Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited, (ii) Uttar Pradesh Rajya Vidut Utpadan Nigam Limited, and (iii) Uttar Pradesh Hydro Power Corporation Limited. On 14th January 2000, the employees working in the Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board were assigned to the aforesaid three corporations established in pursuance of the Reform Scheme. In respect of all the employees working in these three power corporations, Uttar Pradesh State Power Sector Employees Trust was constituted on 29th April 2000 under the provisions of the Provident Fund Act, 1952 to manage the general provident fund, gratuity fund, and pension fund of the employees of three electricity corporations so constituted. 5. In respect of all the employees working in these three power corporations, Uttar Pradesh State Power Sector Employees Trust was constituted on 29th April 2000 under the provisions of the Provident Fund Act, 1952 to manage the general provident fund, gratuity fund, and pension fund of the employees of three electricity corporations so constituted. 5. A Trust-deed was executed on 24th April 2000 for the creation of the Trust. As per the trust deed, the aforesaid three funds namely, General Provident Fund, Gratuity Fund, and Pension Fund created for the benefit of employees of three power corporations shall be called "Uttar Pradesh State Power Sector Employees General Provident Fund", "Uttar Pradesh State Power Sector Employees Gratuity Fund" and "Uttar Pradesh State Power Sector Employees Pension Fund". These funds collectively would be referred to as “Funds”. 6. As per the Trust-deed, the funds vest in the Board of Trustees who shall administer the Funds in accordance with the Rules as set out in the Schedule of the Trust-deed. The First Trustees are: (i) ''Chairman cum Managing Director, U.P.P.C.L.' Chairman of the Trust; (ii) ''Chairman cum Managing Director of U.P.R.V.U.N.L.' Member; and (iii) ''Chairman cum Managing Director, U.P. Hydro Power Corporation Ltd.', Member. 7. For the management of the provident fund of the employees joining the U.P.P.C.L. on 14.01.2000 or later, Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Contributory Provident Fund Rules, 2004 was enacted and made applicable with effect from 1st April 2004. Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Contributory Provident Trust (hereinafter referred to as "CPF") was constituted on 25th June 2006 under the Provident Fund Act, 1952. 8. Appropriation and the management of Provident Funds of the employees of the Uttar Pradesh State Power Sector Employees Trust and the Uttar Pradesh Corporation C.P.F. Trust were the responsibility of the Secretary (Trust) and Director (Finance) U.P.P.C.L. The management and appropriation and other related actions concerning the provident fund’s account of the employees were to be performed by the Secretary (Trust) and Director (Finance) of both the Trusts in accordance with the directions issued by the Central Government from time to time. 9. 9. The amount deducted from the salaries of the member employees of the Uttar Pradesh State Power Sector Employees Trust and the Uttar Pradesh Corporation Contributory Provident Fund Trust were forwarded to the Trust office by all three Corporations which then were required to be invested by the Secretary (Trust) on the approval of Director (Finance) and trustees and in accordance with the directions issued from time to time by the Board of Trustees in various approved schemes. 10. On 08.05.2013, it was resolved by the Board of Trustees of the U.P. State Power Sector Employees Trust that the amount of the General Provident Fund would be invested in term deposits of the nationalized Banks for a period of 1 to 3 years. Further, it was resolved in the meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Uttar Pradesh State Power Sector Employees Trust on 21st April 2014 that in case there were alternative investment avenues available that were as safe as an investment in the Banks and offered more assured interest, they should be presented after deliberations and considerations and, if needed then the Director (Finance) should be duly authorized to take the services of an investment advisor. 11. In pursuance of the aforesaid resolutions till October 2016, Provident Fund amounts of the two Trusts were deposited in the Nationalized Banks in term deposits accruing interest. 12. However, in the month of December 2016 on the proposal of the then Secretary of the Trust, Mr. Praveen Kumar Gupta, after obtaining the approvals from the then Director (Finance), Mr. Sudhanshu Dwivedi, and the then Managing Director, U.P.P.C.L., Mr. A.P. Mishra who was working as Managing Director, U.P.P.C.L., started investing the G.P.F. and C.P.F. funds in the P.N.B. Housing term deposits. In the same series, the G.P.F. and C.P.F. funds were invested as term deposits by Mr. Sudhanshu Dwivedi and Mr. Praveen Kumar Gupta from March 2017 in a private institution named Deewan Housing Finance Ltd (hereinafter referred to as ''DHFL') with the approval of the Managing Director, U.P.P.C.L. Mr. A.P. Mishra without any authority of law in illegal and mala fide manner for personal gains. Mr. Sudhanshu Dwivedi and Mr. Praveen Kumar Gupta from March 2017 in a private institution named Deewan Housing Finance Ltd (hereinafter referred to as ''DHFL') with the approval of the Managing Director, U.P.P.C.L. Mr. A.P. Mishra without any authority of law in illegal and mala fide manner for personal gains. Mr. A.P. Mishra approved investing the amount of two Funds in NBFC, i.e. DHFL in active connivance and furtherance of deep-rooted criminal conspiracy with the purpose and motive of earning huge illegal brokerage and misappropriation of thousand crores Rupees of the contributions made by employees in power companies by the accused. The applicants were the Managing Director and Director of DHFL and they were in complete control of the affairs of DHFL at the relevant time. 13. It is alleged that forged and fabricated minutes of the meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Contributory Provident Fund allegedly held on 24th March 2017 were prepared to justify the illegal investment of a huge sum of money from two funds in DHFL. In the aforesaid meeting, it was allegedly resolved that "the Board of Trustees agreed to consider the investment proposals as per the government notification dated 2nd March 2015 in the securities with higher security and high-interest rates other than deposits of nationalized banks in AAA-rated Companies. As per prevailing practice, further investment and the securities would be decided by Secretary (Trust) on a case-to-case basis with the consent/approval of Director (Finance), U.P.P.C.L. trustee." 14. It has been alleged that as per records available in the office of trust from March 2017 to December 2018, the then Secretary (Trust) Mr. Praveen Kumar Gupta who was in charge of both C.P.F. and G.P.F. Trust after obtaining approval from the then Director (Finance), Mr. Sudhanshu Dwivedi and Mr. It has been alleged that as per records available in the office of trust from March 2017 to December 2018, the then Secretary (Trust) Mr. Praveen Kumar Gupta who was in charge of both C.P.F. and G.P.F. Trust after obtaining approval from the then Director (Finance), Mr. Sudhanshu Dwivedi and Mr. A.P. Mishra who was working as Managing Director of U.P.P.C.L. and transgressing the clear directives of the Government of India as contained in its notification dated 2nd March 2015 which specifically provide that the money of the employees Provident Fund should not be invested in any of the institutions other than scheduled/unscheduled commercial banks, with ill intentions invested more than 50% of the amount of two trusts in term deposit of DHFL, in connivance and furtherance of criminal conspiracy of accused including the present accused-applicants knowing fully well that it did not fall in the category of unscheduled commercial banks and, it was an unsecured private institution. 15. It is also alleged that according to the records available, GPF contributions amounting to Rs.2631.20 crores were invested in DHFL out of which only Rs.1185.50 crores have been received by the trust office and an amount of Rs.1445.70 crores plus interest is yet to be received. Similarly, an amount of Rs.1491.5 crores of the Contributory Provident Fund was invested in the DHFL, out of which Rs.669.3 crores have been received by the office of the trust and Rs.822.2 crores plus interest is yet to be received. Thus, the total amount of Rs.2267.90 crores (Principal Amount) and interest could not be received from the DHFL and DHFL itself has gone into liquidation. 16. Thus, allegations in sum and substance are that the accused in furtherance of criminal conspiracy with mala fide intention for personal gain and in violation of the relevant provisions of the law have invested a huge amount of two funds i.e. Uttar Pradesh Power Sector Employees General Provident Fund and Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited Contributory Provident Fund in DHFL, a company incorporated under the Companies Act. Their mala fide decision has caused a huge loss to these funds to the extent of Rs.2267.9 crores (Principal Amount) besides interest. The investigation has revealed that the investments have been made in the DHFL by the accused for personal gain as they have received a huge amount from DHFL as a commission for making such investments. 17. Their mala fide decision has caused a huge loss to these funds to the extent of Rs.2267.9 crores (Principal Amount) besides interest. The investigation has revealed that the investments have been made in the DHFL by the accused for personal gain as they have received a huge amount from DHFL as a commission for making such investments. 17. The applicants were produced before the learned Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, CBI (West), Lucknow on 26.5.2022 by the CBI and they were remanded to the custody of the CBI on the same day. After custody of the applicants for 15 days got over, the accused-applicants were remanded to judicial custody on 9.6.2022 in connection with the F.I.R. in question. 18. According to the applicants, 60 days got expired on 24.7.2022 from the date of their custody, i.e., 26.5.2022. It is said that no charge sheet was filed against the applicants within the prescribed time of 60 days and, therefore, the applicants had preferred an application seeking default bail under section 167 of the Cr.P.C. on the said ground. The CBI filed an objection to the said application and said that since the offence under sections 409 and 467 of the I.P.C. had been invoked against the applicants, for which punishment provided is for life and the CBI had already filed charge sheet within the stipulated period of 90 days as per section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. therefore, the application filed on behalf of the accused-applicants for seeking default bail was to be rejected being misconceived. 19. Sri S.C. Mishra and Sri Nandit Srivastava, learned Senior Advocates assisted by Sri Pranjal Krishna, Smt. Janaki Garade, Smt. Urvi Purve, and Sri Samarth Agarwal, learned Advocates, have submitted that under the provisions of section 167 of the Cr.P.C, if the investigating agency has failed to file a charge sheet in respect of the offences for which the accused-applicants have been charged within a period of 60 days from the date of their initial custody, they are entitled to be enlarged on default bail. Learned Senior Advocate has submitted that there is no dispute in respect of the fact that 60 days got expired on 24.7.2022 and the CBI could not file the charge sheet within the outer limit of 60 days and, therefore, the applicants are entitled to be enlarged on default bail. 20. Learned Senior Advocate has submitted that there is no dispute in respect of the fact that 60 days got expired on 24.7.2022 and the CBI could not file the charge sheet within the outer limit of 60 days and, therefore, the applicants are entitled to be enlarged on default bail. 20. It is further submitted that it is the mandate of section 167(2)(a) (ii) of the Cr.P.C. that if the investigating agency fails to file the charge sheet for offences, where the minimum period of 10 years imprisonment as punishment is not provided, the accused is entitled to be enlarged on bail after the lapse of 60 days irrespective of maximum punishment of life. 21. In support of the aforesaid submissions Sri Mishra has placed reliance on judgments in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67 ; M. Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, (2021) 2 SCC 485 ; and a judgment of this court in the case of Sohan Lal v. State of U.P., 1991 SCC OnLine All 469. 22. On the other hand, Sri Anurag Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the CBI has submitted that the accused-applicants are charge-sheeted, inter alia, for the offences under section 407, 467, I.P.C. and these offences entail maximum punishment up to 'for life'. He has submitted that the accused-applicants have been charge-sheeted for committing offences under section 120-B, read with sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, I.P.C. and section 7A, 8, 13(2), read with section 13(1)(d) of Prevention to the Corruption Act, 1988. As per section 109 of the I.P.C. punishment for the said offences would be the same, if the accused-applicants have been charged without the aid of section 120-B IPC. Sri Anurag Kumar Singh learned counsel for the CBI has further submitted that the judgments relied on by Sri Mishra, Learned Senior Counsel do not support his submission. Sri Anurag Kumar Singh has also placed reliance on the same very judgments to buttress his submission that since the punishment for which the accused-applicants have been charged, the punishment provided is up to ‘for life’, the accused-applicants cannot claim that since the charge sheet could not be filed within 60 days, they are entitled to default bail under section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. 23. The applicants were not named as accused in the F.I.R. or the charge sheet and supplementary charge sheet earlier filed. The applicants were in CBI custody in Mumbai for some other offences allegedly committed by them. The accused-applicants are Managing Director/ Directors of the company Dewan Housing Development Finance Ltd. (DHFL) where the investment of Rs. 4,122.7 crores from four GPF and CPF Trusts of Uttar Pradesh Power Companies was made unauthorizedly in connivance with the accused-applicants to earn huge commission offered by the accused-applicants on behalf of M/s DHFL and out of this amount of Rs. 4,122.7 crores Rs. 2267.9 crores and interest thereon allegedly got misappropriated by the DHFL, a company controlled by the accused-applicants. The CBI had investigated their role in the commission of fund misappropriation of thousands of crores, i.e. public money by them and a charge sheet has been filed against them. DHFL and accused-applicants are accused of misappropriating several thousand crores of rupees from financial institutions of the country besides the amount of two trusts of power companies of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. 24. The only question which requires consideration in the present case is whether the accused who are allegedly involved in the commission of the offence(s) for which punishment is up to ‘for life’, but minimum punishment of ‘ten years is not provided, would he be entitled to default bail under the provisions of section 167(1)(a)(ii), Cr.P.C. as the charge sheet has not been filed within a period of sixty days. 25. Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under: "Section 167, Cr.P.C.-Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours. (1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty- four hours fixed by section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate. (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorize the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that- (a) the Magistrate may authorize the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days; if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorize the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding,- (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this subsection shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;] (b) no Magistrate shall authorize detention in any custody under this section unless the accused is produced before him; (c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered on this behalf by the High Court, shall authorize detention in the custody of the police. Explanation I.-For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail;] Explanation II.-If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under paragraph (b), the production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the order authorizing detention.] (2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or subsection (2), the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of a sub-inspector, may, where a Judicial Magistrate is not available, transmit to the nearest Executive Magistrate, on whom the powers of a Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate have been conferred, a copy of the entry in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall, at the same time, forward the accused to such Executive Magistrate, and thereupon such Executive Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, authorise the detention of the accused person in such custody as he may think fit for a term not exceeding seven days in the aggregate; and, on the expiry of the period of detention so authorised, the accused person shall be released on bail except where an order for further detention of the accused person has been made by a Magistrate competent to make such order; and, where an order for such further detention is made, the period during which the accused person was detained in custody under the orders made by an Executive Magistrate under this sub- section." 26. A three judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) considered the question that whether the accused charged with an offence punishable with imprisonment for a period from 4-10 years would be entitled to default bail on expiry of 60 days on the ground that no charge sheet has been filed within the statutory period and whether the period of investigation for such an offence would be 60 or 90 days. The majority view is of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta. Hon'ble Mr. The majority view is of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur held that an offence punishable with a sentence of death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years is a serious offence requiring intensive or perhaps extensive investigation and it would, therefore, appear that given the seriousness of the offence, the extended period of 90 days should be available to the investigating officer in such cases. Paragraph 27 of the said judgment, which is relevant is extracted hereinbelow: "27. Indeed, an offence punishable with a sentence of death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term that may extend to 10 years is a serious offence entailing intensive and perhaps extensive investigation. It would therefore appear that given the seriousness of the offence, the extended period of 90 days should be available to the investigating officer in such cases. In other words, the period of investigation should be relatable to the gravity of the offence – understandably so. This could be contrasted with an offence where the maximum punishment under the IPC or any other penal statute is (say) 7 years, the offence being not grave enough to warrant an extended period of 90 days of investigation. This is certainly a possible view and indeed the Cr.P.C. makes a distinction in the period of investigation for 'default bail' depending on the gravity of the offence. Nevertheless, to avoid any uncertainty or ambiguity in interpretation, the law was enacted with two compartments. Offences punishable with imprisonment of not less than ten years have been kept in one compartment equating them with Offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life. This category of Offences undoubtedly calls for deeper investigation since the minimum punishment is pretty stiff. All other Offences have been placed in a separate compartment, since they provide for a lesser minimum sentence, even though the maximum punishment could be more than ten years imprisonment. While such Offences might also require deeper investigation (since the maximum is quite high) they have been kept in a different compartment because of the lower minimum imposable by the sentencing court, thereby reducing the period of incarceration during investigations that must be concluded expeditiously. While such Offences might also require deeper investigation (since the maximum is quite high) they have been kept in a different compartment because of the lower minimum imposable by the sentencing court, thereby reducing the period of incarceration during investigations that must be concluded expeditiously. The cut-off, whether one likes it or not, is based on the wisdom of the Legislature and must be respected." 27. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta, who along with Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur constituted a majority in the said judgment made the position categorical and clear and held that if the offence was punishable with life imprisonment, even if the minimum sentence provided is less than 10 years, the period of detention for default bail would be 90 days. Paragraphs 62-67 which are relevant are extracted hereinbelow: "62. We are only concerned with the interpretation of the phrase "for a term of not less than ten years" occurring in Section 167(2)(a)(i), which provides a period of 90 days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term not less than 10 years. 63. In my view, without indulging in semantic gymnastics, this provision's meaning is absolutely clear. It envisages three types of Offences: (i) Offences that are punishable with death; (ii) Offences that are punishable with imprisonment for life; (iii) Offences that are punishable with a term not less than 10 years. 64. In my view the language of the statute is unambiguous. Out of the three categories of Offences, we need to deal only with that category of Offences where the punishment prescribed is not less than 10 years. If an offence is punishable by death then whatever the minimum punishment, the period of investigation permissible would be 90 days. Similarly, if the offence is punishable with life imprisonment, even if the minimum sentence provided is less than 10 years, the period of detention before 'default bail' is available would be 90 days. 65. Keeping in view the legislative history of Section 167, it is clear that the legislature was carving out the more serious Offences and giving the investigating agency another 30 days to complete the investigation before the accused became entitled to a grant of 'default bail'. It categorizes these Offences into three classes: I. the first category comprises those Offences where the maximum punishment was death; II. It categorizes these Offences into three classes: I. the first category comprises those Offences where the maximum punishment was death; II. the Second category comprises those Offences where the maximum punishment is life imprisonment. III. The third category comprises Offences that are punishable with a term of fewer than 10 years. 66. In the first two categories, the legislature made reference only to the maximum punishment imposable, regardless of the minimum punishment, which may be imposed. Therefore, if a person is charged with an offense, which is punishable by death or life imprisonment, but the minimum imprisonment is less than 10 years, then also the period of 90 days will apply. However, when we look at the third category, the words used by the legislature are "not less than ten years". This means that the punishment should be 10 years or more. This cannot include Offences where the maximum punishment is 10 years. It means that the minimum punishment is 10 years whatever the maximum punishment. 67. While interpreting any statutory provision, it has always been accepted as a golden rule of interpretation that the words used by the legislature should be given their natural meaning. Normally, the courts should be hesitant to add words or subtract words from the statutory provision. ……" 28. In paragraph 75 of the said judgment also it has been said that in respect of offence under section 304-B of I.P.C. that since the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term, which shall not be less than 7 years, but may extend to imprisonment for life, then the fact that the minimum sentence provided is 7 years would make no difference. It is only when the maximum sentence is less than life imprisonment, then the minimum sentence must be 10 years to fall into the third category of cases. 29. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Gupta had given examples of such cases, e.g. Offences punishable under sections 21-C and 22-C of the Narcotic Drug and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 which provide a minimum sentence of 10 years and a maximum sentence of 20 years. The conclusions have been recorded in paragraphs 84.1 to 84.4, which reads as under: "84.1. 29. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Gupta had given examples of such cases, e.g. Offences punishable under sections 21-C and 22-C of the Narcotic Drug and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 which provide a minimum sentence of 10 years and a maximum sentence of 20 years. The conclusions have been recorded in paragraphs 84.1 to 84.4, which reads as under: "84.1. I agree with both my learned brothers that the amendment made to the Prevention of Corruption Act,1988 by the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 applies to all accused charged with Offences under this Act irrespective of the fact whether the action is initiated under the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, or any other law; 84.2. Section 167(2)(a)(i) of the Code is applicable only in cases where the accused is charged with (a) Offences punishable with death and any lower sentence; (b) Offences punishable with life imprisonment and any lower sentence and (c) Offences punishable with a minimum sentence of 10 years; 84.3. In all cases where the minimum sentence is less than 10 years but the maximum sentence is not death or life imprisonment then Section 167(2)(a)(ii) will apply and the accused will be entitled to grant of 'default bail' after 60 days in case charge-sheet is not filed. 84.4. The right to get this bail is an indefeasible right and this right must be exercised by the accused by offering to furnish bail." 30. In the case of M. Ravindran (supra) question before the Supreme Court was as to whether the indefeasible right accruing to the accused under section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. gets extinguished by the subsequent filing of an additional complaint by the investigating officer. The Supreme Court in passing remarks in paragraph 17.7 in the said judgment observed that the majority opinion in Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) was that 90 days remand extension under section 167(2)(a)(i) would be available in respect of Offences where the minimum period of the sentence is 10 years stipulated. 31. Paragraph 17.7 is extracted hereinbelow: "17.7 Therefore, as mentioned supra, Section 167(2) is integrally linked to the constitutional commitment under Article 21 promising protection of life and personal liberty against unlawful and arbitrary detention and must be interpreted in a manner that serves this purpose. 31. Paragraph 17.7 is extracted hereinbelow: "17.7 Therefore, as mentioned supra, Section 167(2) is integrally linked to the constitutional commitment under Article 21 promising protection of life and personal liberty against unlawful and arbitrary detention and must be interpreted in a manner that serves this purpose. In this regard we find it useful to refer to the decision of the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67 , which laid down certain seminal principles as to the interpretation of Section 167(2), CrPC though the questions of law involved were somewhat different from the present case. The questions before the three-Judge Bench in Rakesh Kumar Paul were whether, firstly, the 90-day remand extension under Section 167(2)(a)(i) would be applicable in respect of Offences where the maximum period of imprisonment was 10 years, though the minimum period was less than 10 years. Secondly, whether the application for bail filed by the accused could be construed as an application for default bail, even though the expiry of the statutory period under Section 167(2) had not been specifically pleaded as a ground for bail. The majority opinion held that the 90-day limit is only available in respect of Offences where a minimum ten-year imprisonment period is stipulated and that the oral arguments for default bail made by the counsel for the accused before the High Court would suffice in lieu of a written application. This was based on the reasoning that the Court should not be too technical in matters of personal liberty. Madan B. Lokur, J. in his majority opinion, pertinently observed as follows: "29. Notwithstanding this, the basic legislative intent of completing investigations within twenty-four hours and within an otherwise timebound period remains unchanged, even though that period has been extended over the years. This is an indication that in addition to giving adequate time to complete investigations, the legislature has also always put a premium on personal liberty and has always felt that it would be unfair to an accused to remain in custody for a prolonged or indefinite period. This is an indication that in addition to giving adequate time to complete investigations, the legislature has also always put a premium on personal liberty and has always felt that it would be unfair to an accused to remain in custody for a prolonged or indefinite period. It is for this reason and to hold the investigating agency accountable that time limits have been laid down by the legislature… xxx 32…Such views and opinions over a prolonged period have prompted the legislature for more than a century to ensure the expeditious conclusion of investigations so that an accused person is not unnecessarily deprived of his or her liberty by remaining in prolonged custody for an offence that he or she might not even have committed. In our opinion, the entire debate before us must also be looked at from the point of view of the expeditious conclusion of investigations and the angle of personal liberty and not from a pure dictionary or textual perspective as canvassed by the learned counsel for the State. xxx 41. We take this view keeping in mind that in matters of personal liberty and Article 21 of the Constitution, it is not always advisable to be formalistic or technical. The history of the personal liberty jurisprudence of this Court and other constitutional courts includes petitions for a writ of habeas corpus and other writs being entertained even based on a letter addressed to the Chief Justice or the Court." (emphasis supplied) Therefore, the Courts cannot adopt a rigid or formalistic approach whilst considering any issue that touches upon the rights contained in Article 21." 32. The said judgment in M. Ravindran (supra) was not on the issue regarding a custody period of 90 days for offences where the maximum punishment is imprisonment ‘for life’ but the minimum punishment is not prescribed in the statute, as the issue is in the present case. The language of section 167(2)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. is clear and while interpreting any statutory provision it is the golden rule of interpretation that the words used by the legislature should be given their natural meaning. The text of section 167 of the Cr.P.C. is explicit and needs no great interpretation. The language of section 167(2)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. is clear and while interpreting any statutory provision it is the golden rule of interpretation that the words used by the legislature should be given their natural meaning. The text of section 167 of the Cr.P.C. is explicit and needs no great interpretation. The legislature in its wisdom has extended a custody period of 90 days without filing the charge sheet in respect of the three kinds of Offences where punishment is prescribed: a. death; b. imprisonment for life; or c. minimum sentence provided is not less than 10 years. If the punishment provided for an offence is life, then the custody period is extendable to 90 days irrespective of the fact that a minimum sentence of 10 years is not provided as in the case of an offence under section 304-B of the I.P.C. Any offence for which the sentence provided is more than 10 years, custody period would be extendable to 90 days. 33. The offences for which the accused-applicants have been charge sheeted involve intensive and extensive investigation as mind-boggling financial fraud regarding siphoning and misappropriation of public funds of thousands of crores is involved in the present case. The role of the accused-applicants was required to be investigated deeply and further, the offence is under sections 467 and 409 of the I.P.C. provide punishment up to ‘for life’ and, therefore, I am of the view that the extended period of 90 days would be available to the investigating agency for such an offence. In view thereof, I do not find much substance in the submissions of Sri S.C. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate. The accused-applicants did not get entitled to default bail on an expiry of 60 days from the date of their custody in the present case. The present application thus is hereby rejected.