JUDGMENT : Prior to dealing with the respective arguments which had been extended by the learned counsel for the parties to the present civil revision, which has been preferred under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, few facts, which are apparent on record in view of the findings, which are recorded in the impugned order dated 08.12.2020, are required to be dealt with initially before dealing with the rival contentions, which has been argued by the learned counsel for the parties based on the interpretation given to the provisions contained under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC. 2. In fact, as a consequence of the institution of the proceedings under Section 15 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, the issue which was agitated, was pertaining to as to what effect or bearing will the non compliance of the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, would have, for the purposes of striking of the defence in the instant case, which was only confined to be attracted for the purposes of determination of the rent, which the revisionist was otherwise supposed to pay in the light and spirit of the provisions contained under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, because there are three apparent facts, which are not disputed by either of the parties to the present civil revision :- (1) That the revisionist has vacated the premises and handed over the vacant possession. (2) That there existed a relationship of landlord and tenant and (3) That the very genesis of the creation of the tenancy by the lease deed dated 11.06.2018, is still a subject matter of the consideration in the pending civil proceedings before the Civil Judge, Senior Division. However, the third ground referred above may not hold this revision qua the argument which had been extended by the learned Counsels for the parties. 3. By the order impugned, which was rendered in SCC Suit No.39 of 2019, “Hamendra Kumar Agarwal and others Vs. V.B. Autosales”, the consequential effect of the order was that the revisionist defence, was struck of by attracting the provisions contained under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC. 4. 3. By the order impugned, which was rendered in SCC Suit No.39 of 2019, “Hamendra Kumar Agarwal and others Vs. V.B. Autosales”, the consequential effect of the order was that the revisionist defence, was struck of by attracting the provisions contained under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC. 4. To deal with the issue, a prior reference to the provisions contained under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, becomes imminent to be considered, it needs no deliberation by this Court that the provisions contained under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, has to be splited into two parts, in its consideration pertaining to the liability, which the tenant has to discharge on the institution of the proceedings for eviction. 5. The first part of it would be the remittance of an admitted rent which was then due to be paid on the first date of hearing, on the initiation of the proceedings. The second part would be that during the pendency of the proceedings of the SCC Suit, under Order 15 Rule 5, the tenant was supposed to ensure to continue to remit the admitted monthly rent, and in case of default of either of the conditions, the provisions contained under Order 15 Rule 5 of CPC of striking of the defence under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, is to be attracted, but there is a rider attached to it under sub-rule (2) of Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, that before striking of the defence, under either of the two circumstances, that could have had been only when the Court considers, the representation submitted by the defendant/tenant, prior to the attracting the restrictions, which had been imposed by Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, for striking of the defence. 6. In the proceedings, which were held in SCC Suit No.39 of 2019, was only now limited to be confined, to be considered qua the liability of the remittance of the monthly rent, which was claimed in the proceedings for the suit because it is an admitted case of the revisionist that the possession of the disputed tenement was already handed over, and it is on this question of fastening of the liability of payment of monthly rent, which was the subject matter of the consideration. In order to invoke Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, to be read with Section 151 of the CPC, as sought to be attracted by the respondents, they have filed an application to the said effect on 10.10.2019, before the Judge, Small Causes Courts, and particularly, the pleadings which has been raised in paragraph no.2, of the said application, it was qua attracting the first part of the embargos which were created by Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, for the purposes of striking of the defence due to the failure on part of the revisionist, of depositing of the rent on the first date of the hearing. In fact, the application, thus, submitted by the respondents didn’t raised any objection as such, qua the second part of the implications of Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, which creates a liability on the tenant to continue to remit the admitted rent during the course of the pendency of the proceedings of the SCC Suit. 7. If the findings recorded, if it is taken into consideration, in fact the learned court was dealing with an application which was numbered as Paper No.20(ga), which was filed by the plaintiff/respondent, wherein, by filing the said application, he invoked the provisions contained under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, qua its implication relating to the first part. The same was objected by the revisionist/tenant by filing an objection being Paper No.52(ga). 8. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the revisionist, that the objection which was preferred by him in the proceedings before the SCC Court, will constitute, as to be an objection as statutorily contemplated under sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 15 of the CPC, and for all practical purposes, it has to be treated as to be a representation, which was preferred as against the application of the plaintiff/respondents, for striking of the defence due to non compliance of the provisions contained under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC. 9. Learned counsel for the revisionist/tenant submits, that the representation/objection, submitted by the revisionist by way of paper no.52(ga), in fact the same has not been considered. Hence, the impugned order under challenge suffers from the vices of the non compliance of the provisions contained under sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 15 of the CPC. 10. 9. Learned counsel for the revisionist/tenant submits, that the representation/objection, submitted by the revisionist by way of paper no.52(ga), in fact the same has not been considered. Hence, the impugned order under challenge suffers from the vices of the non compliance of the provisions contained under sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 15 of the CPC. 10. In answer to the argument as extended by the learned counsel for the revisionist/tenant, it has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord, that in fact the argument, which have been extended by the revisionist counsel, is contrary to the findings, which has been recorded by the Judge, Small Causes Courts, in the impugned order, which was under challenge before this Court. He submits that its not that the provisions contained under sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 15 of the CPC, was not complied with for the reason being that, according to his contentions in the concluding part of the judgment of 08.12.2020, the learned Judge, Small Causes, did took into consideration, to the objection raised by the revisionist/tenant qua his liability for remittance of the rent, but an exception has been carved out by the revisionist/tenant that merely a reference of an objection, may not amount to be an adjudication in itself, until and unless, the Court records its finding qua the pleadings which has been raised by the defendant/revisionist in his objection, pertaining to the discharge of his liability for the purposes of remittance of rent under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, for the purposes of attracting the embargo of striking of the defence. 11. Learned counsel for the revisionist/tenant in support of his contentions has first made reference to a judgment as reported in AIR 1976 Allahabad 261, “Ladly Prasad Vs. Ram Shah Billa and others”, as decided by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, and particularly, the learned counsel for the revisionist has heavily relied upon, the contents of paragraph no.6, of the said judgment, which is extracted hereunder:- “6. Under Rule 5 the defendant is required to deposit the entire amount of rent or damages for use and occupation which is admitted by him to be due. Under Rule 5 the defendant is required to deposit the entire amount of rent or damages for use and occupation which is admitted by him to be due. If the whole or a part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant in his written statement or during the examination under Order X, the law requires that be shall deposit the amount admitted to be due and thereafter throughout the continuance of the suit continue to deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent or compensation for use and occupation due at the rate admitted by him. If, however, the defendant does not admit that any amount is due to the plaintiff as rent or damages for use and occupation, he need not make any deposit. At this stage the court is not required to decide the questions whether any amount is really due and whether the lease has been validly terminated. The court cannot under this rule order or compel the defendant be deposit the amount claimed by the plaintiff and on the failure of the defendant to make the deposit as claimed by the plaintiff refuse to entertain any defence or strike off his defence. It is only when the defendant commits default in depositing the amount admitted by him to be due or in continuing to deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent or compensation for use and occupation due at the rate admitted by Mm that the court would be competent to refuse to entertain any defence or to strike off his defence. In case the court after considering the representation made by the defendant comes to the conclusion that the circumstances justify grant of further time on security being furnished for the amount, the court will be competent to do so. It is not obligatory on the court to refuse to entertain any defence or to strike off the defence in a case default is committed by the defendant in making the requisite deposits. In the present case the learned Munsif rightly came to the conclusion that looking to the nature of the case Rule 5 was attracted but on being satisfied that circumstances justified it, granted time to the defendants to make the deposit.” 12. In the present case the learned Munsif rightly came to the conclusion that looking to the nature of the case Rule 5 was attracted but on being satisfied that circumstances justified it, granted time to the defendants to make the deposit.” 12. He has submitted that if the ratio as it has been propounded by the judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, if that is taken into consideration, it has rather observed that if the defendant in a proceedings does not admit that any amount is due to be paid to the plaintiff/landlord as a rent or damages. In that eventuality, its none of the responsibility of the Court, at the stage of considering the application under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, and its representation filed to it, to decide the question as to whether any amount is really due to be paid or not, and hence he submits that in view of his objection, which he has filed before the court and which was not considered, it will not be an aspect which was at all required to be considered by the court, as to whether any admitted rent was actually due to be paid to him or not. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent/landlord on the contrary has drawn the distinction qua the ratio laid down in paragraph no.6, of the judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the matters of Ladly Prasad (Supra), and in fact he has contended that the said ratio has been misconstrued by the revisionist/tenant, because in the concluding part of the judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, the distinction, which has been carved out, herein, is that the issue of determination of the implications of Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, will only come into play when the defendant/tenant commits a default in depositing the amount, which is admitted by him to be due to be paid, and particularly, the aspect also of continuing to deposit the rent regularly on the monthly basis and the compensation. In an eventuality, when there is a default in remittance of the monthly rent, which is the second part of Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, when it is not complied with, the defence would be struck of attracting the provisions contained under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC. In an eventuality, when there is a default in remittance of the monthly rent, which is the second part of Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, when it is not complied with, the defence would be struck of attracting the provisions contained under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC. 14. Hence, the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord, submits, that the part of the judgment relied by the revisionist/tenant would be in relation to the implications of the first part of the Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, which will not be attracted, herein, and rather the aspect involved herein is of continuance of the remittance of a rent on a monthly basis, which is the second part of Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, which has not been complied with. In that eventuality, the defence could be struck of, there cannot be any dispute as far as the ratio laid down in paragraph no.6, of the judgment of Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, is concerned. 15. But in that eventuality, this Court will have to deal with the application, which was principally filed by the landlord/respondent for the purposes of invoking the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5, and as it has been argued by the learned counsel for the revisionist, that the distinction drawn by the respondent/landlord’s counsel with regards to the observations which had been made in paragraph no.6, of the Division Bench judgment, in the matters of Ladly Prasad (Supra). it will not apply, because the revisionist/landlord has only attracted the implications of Order 15 Rule 5 qua its part 1, and not in relation to part 2, which is being sought to be distinguished by the respondents counsel while making a reference to the subsequent part of the observations made in paragraph no.6, of the judgment. 16. it will not apply, because the revisionist/landlord has only attracted the implications of Order 15 Rule 5 qua its part 1, and not in relation to part 2, which is being sought to be distinguished by the respondents counsel while making a reference to the subsequent part of the observations made in paragraph no.6, of the judgment. 16. I am in agreement with the argument which has been extended by the learned counsel for the revisionist/tenant because the court concerned, when it is dealing with an application where a landlord has attracted the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, by only attracting its first part for depositing the admitted rent on the first date of hearing, it quite obviously by its rational implications, it eliminates the consideration of the restrictions imposed by the second part of depositing the monthly rent, due to be paid as envisaged by the provisions contained under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC. 17. Hence, the implications of the application which was submitted by the respondent/landlord dated 10.10.2019, could not be expanded, in its application and consideration to bring the case within the ambit of the second part of the provisions contained under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, because as per the judgment of the Division Bench reported in 1976 Allahabad 261, “Ladly Prasad Vs. Ram Shah Billa and others”, paragraph no.6, of the said judgment, was altogether dealing with the different set of circumstances with regards to the implications of both the parts of the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 of CPC, and hence, the distinction, which has been sought to be carved out by the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord while referring to the concluding part of paragraph no.6, of the judgment, of depositing the monthly rent will not be attracted in the instant case, because it was not a case which was at all developed and argued by the counsel for the respondent/landlord before the court below. 18. Learned counsel for the revisionist/tenant has made a reference to yet another judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, as reported in 1981 (7) ALR 556, “Bimal Chand Jain Vs. 18. Learned counsel for the revisionist/tenant has made a reference to yet another judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, as reported in 1981 (7) ALR 556, “Bimal Chand Jain Vs. Gopal Agarwal” and in this case too, he has referred to paragraph no.6, of the judgment, which yet again, had almost reiterated the same principles, that on a comprehensive understanding of the provisions contained under Order 15 Rule 5 of CPC, the obligation of the defendant/tenant to deposit the rent on the first date of the hearing is entirely a different amount, which is admitted by the defendant/tenant, which is to be deposited, and the second part of the provision with regards to the remittance of the regular monthly rent during the pendency of the proceedings is altogether a different prospective, which was considered in paragraph no.6, of the judgment. The Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph no.6, which is extracted hereunder :- “6. It seems to us on a comprehensive understanding of Rule 5 of Order XV that the true construction of the Rule should be thus. Sub-rule (1) obliges the defendant to deposit, at or before the first hearing of the suit, the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and further, whether or not he admits any amount to be due, to deposit regularly throughout the continuation of the suit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual. In the event of any default in making any deposit, "the court may subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (2) strike off his defence". We shall presently come to what this means. Sub-rule (2) obliges the court, before making an order for striking off the defence to consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf. In other words, the defendant has been vested with a statutory right to make a representation to the court against his defence being struck off. If a representation is made the court must consider it on its merits, and then decide whether the defence should or should not be struck off. This is a right expressly vested in the defendant and enables him to show by bringing material on the record that he has not been guilty of the default alleged or if the default has occurred, there is good reason for it. This is a right expressly vested in the defendant and enables him to show by bringing material on the record that he has not been guilty of the default alleged or if the default has occurred, there is good reason for it. Now, it is not impossible that the record may contain such material already. In that event, can it be said that Sub-rule (1) obliges the court to strike off the defence? We must remember that an order under Sub-rule (1) striking off the defence is in the nature of a penalty. A serious responsibility rests on the court in the matter and the power is not to be exercised mechanically. There is a reserve of discretion vested in the court entitling it not to strike off the defence if on the facts and circumstances already existing on the record it finds good reason for not doing so. It will always be a matter for the judgment of the court to decide whether on the material before it, notwithstanding the absence of a representation under Sub-rule (2), the defence should or should not be struck off. The word "may" in Sub-rule (1) merely vests power in the court to strike off the defence. It does not oblige it to do so in every case of default. To that extent, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court in Puran Chand (supra). We are of opinion that the High Court has placed an unduly narrow construction on the provisions of Clause (1) of Rule 5 of Order XV. 19. It had rather observed that striking of the defence, should be derived for the purposes only when it is impermissible to record any specific finding based on the material placed on record with regards to the default committed, and the nature of the default committed, and which is a right expressly vested with the defendant/landlord, which is required to be established by evidence and facts by the plaintiff/landlord while filing his application under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, to enable the Court to arrive at a logical conclusion as to whether the application falls to be under the first part of the Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, or under the second part of Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC. 20. 20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph no.6, of the judgment of Bimal Chand Jain, it had observed that striking of the defence, in either of the circumstances, which already exists on the record it has had to be based upon a sound reasoning, and the circumstances which would be in consonance to the factual consideration required, consideration in each case. It has observed that it is rather a matter of a judgment of a court to decide, whether based on the materials, which has been placed on record before it, whether at all the defence is required to be struck of, and that too the striking of the defence, which has got a wider implications over the rights of the defendant/tenant to raise his defence in the proceedings against him, which should be sparingly used and if at all, it is required to be used, then there has to be an objective consideration of the representation/objection, which is statutorily contemplated under sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 15 of CPC. 21. Since in the instant case only a passing remark has been made by the learned SCC court, while passing the impugned order, and that too without making any observations, as to what implications would the finding have for the purposes of striking of a defence, the decision taken by the Judge SCC, would be in derogation to the legislative intent of the provisions contained under sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 15 of the CPC. 22. Learned counsel for the revisionist/tenant has made a reference to yet another judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the matters of “Kunwar Baldevji Vs. XIth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and others”, in fact the learned counsel for the revisionist/tenant has made a reference to paragraph no.12, of the judgment relied by him, but the conclusion, which has been arrived at by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, and as per the ratio laid down in paragraph no.12, the reference of which has been made, it was pertaining to the question of interpretation which was to be given to the statutory provisions, qua the question which was formulated to be placed before the Larger Bench to be considered, as it has been observed in paragraph no.2, of the judgment, which is extracted hereunder :- “2. Above Writ petitions have been listed, before us on a reference made by a learned Single Judge. Referring order dated September 10, 2002 is extracted : “I have heard the learned counsel for both sides. Order 15, Rule 5 CPC as added in U.P. requires that the tenant/defendant should deposit the arrears of rent which is admitted by him to be due with interest at the first hearing. He should also deposit future rent month to month during the pendency of the suit. Failing such deposit the defence in the suit is liable to be struck off. In this particular case, the tenant/petitioner in his written statement has denied the relationship of the landlord and tenant, and therefore obviously no rent could be said to be admittedly due. He did not deposit any amount towards rent. His defence was struck off on the finding that relationship of the landlord and tenant exited. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the clear words of Order 15 Rule 5 as interpreted by a decision of this Court in the case of Rakesh and Company v. Heera Lal 2001 (44) ALR 804 for the proposition that only such amount is liable to be deposited which is admitted to be due. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents, Sri R.B. Singhal submits that words "rent admitted by the tenant to be due" used in Order 15, Rule 5 CPC should be interpreted to mean "rent found by the Court to be due although not admitted fry the tenant to be due". Prima facie the Rules of interpretation of statutes do not permit of doing such violence to the words of the statute, as to make their meaning just reverse or what the language suggests. Exceptions may be possible (a) where the language used in a statute is ambiguous or capable of two interpretations, or (b) where but for such interpretation absurdity or serious anomaly would result. However, learned counsel for the respondents relies upon certain single judge decisions in support of his contention. The decisions are as follows: (i) Jai Chand Gangwar v. IIIrd A.D.J., 1995 (25) ALR 14. (ii) Guru Charan Lal v. IIIrd A.D.J., 1984 (2) ARC 144. (iii) Kishan Lal v. 1st A.D.J., 1983 (2) ARC 453. (iv) Thakur Prasad v. Guru Prasad MANU/UP/0311/1979 : 1979 (5) ALR 221. The decisions are as follows: (i) Jai Chand Gangwar v. IIIrd A.D.J., 1995 (25) ALR 14. (ii) Guru Charan Lal v. IIIrd A.D.J., 1984 (2) ARC 144. (iii) Kishan Lal v. 1st A.D.J., 1983 (2) ARC 453. (iv) Thakur Prasad v. Guru Prasad MANU/UP/0311/1979 : 1979 (5) ALR 221. Of the above the case of Guru Charan Lal and the case of Kishan Lal do not deal with the issue directly. The other two cases namely Jai Chand Gangwar and Thakur Prasad do support the respondent. However, the only reason that can be spelt out in support of the conclusion or interpretation of Order 15, Rule 5, appears to be the anxiety on part of the learned Judges that the tenant may not deny the liability to pay rent and drag on the proceedings of the suit. Now liability under Order 15, Rule 5 is of two kinds (1) firstly regarding arrears of rent and (2) secondly regarding the current rent. Both these can be avoided only by denial of the landlord's title, which is highly risky for any tenant as it gives another ground for eviction. Besides as stated above the languages of the statutory provision does not permit of the interpretation. And none of the two decisions aforesaid have considered the said language while giving the interpretation. To any mind the aforesaid anxiety would not be sufficient justification on part of the Court to adopt as interpretation which is just reverse of the statutory language. In the; circumstances being unable to agree with the decision in the two cases of Jai Chand Gangwar and Thakur Prasad, I refer the following question for consideration by a larger Bench- “Whether the defence, can be struck of under Order 15, Rule 5 CPC for non-deposit of rent which is not admitted to be due despite the express words to the contrary in that statutory provision? Let the papers of this case be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders. Further proceedings in SCC Suit No. 2 of 2002 will remain stayed till further orders.” 23. Let the papers of this case be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders. Further proceedings in SCC Suit No. 2 of 2002 will remain stayed till further orders.” 23. The observation made in paragraph no.12, which has been relied by the learned counsel for the revisionist may not have any basic relevance for the purposes of deciding the present case, because the question which was sought to be answered by the Division Bench, was pertaining to depositing of an admitted rent on the first date of hearing, which is and was not an issue under consideration in the instant case, when the impugned order was passed, and hence an inference which was drawn, therein, in paragraph no.12, of the judgment, relied by the learned counsel for the revisionist, may not be having any bearing as such as far as the present case is concerned. 24. Learned counsel for the revisionist/tenant has also made a reference to yet another judgment rendered by the coordinate Bench of this Court in the Civil Revision No.60 of 2015, “Nattha Singh Vs. Raj Kumar”, whereby the judgment a bunch of civil revisions, have been decided under Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, considering its implications, with regards to the aspect of striking of a defence by the impugned order, which was a subject matter of challenge in the said case. 25. The coordinate Bench based upon the principles laid down by the various judgments, thereto, including the judgment of Haider Abbas Vs. Additional District Judge, 2006 (24) LCD 452, as well as Atma Ram Vs. Shakuntala Rani, (2005), 7 SCC 211, has recorded its findings in paragraph no.15, as to under what circumstances, the defence could be struck of, as it has a vital adverse bearing over the rights of the defendant in the suit, where he or she is rendered incapacitated to put his defence, in a proceedings drawn against him. 26. Even in this judgment too, the observations which has been made was with regards to the first part of the Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, and not with regards to the second part of the Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, which has been sought to be argued by the learned counsel for the parties to the present civil revision. Paragraph nos.13 and 14, of the judgment of the coordinate Bench, as rendered in the matters of Nattha Singh (judgment) is extracted hereunder:- “13. Rule 5 of Order 15 C.P.C. was enacted by the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act 1972. It provided that unless the defendant deposited the admitted rent or compensation at or before the first hearing of the suit and also deposited the monthly rent regularly, his defence was liable to be struck off. There was a further provision entitling a defendant to make a representation and obtain further time to make the deposit. The Rule was repealed by U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 and was re-enacted as follows: "Striking off defence an failure to deposit admitted rent, etc.-(1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid the court may subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off his defence. Explanation 1 ... ... ... Explanation 2 ... ... ... Explanation 3 ... ... ... (2) Before making an order for striking off defence, the court may consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within ten days of the first hearing or of the expiry of the week referred to in sub-section (1) as the case may be. ... ... Explanation 3 ... ... ... (2) Before making an order for striking off defence, the court may consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within ten days of the first hearing or of the expiry of the week referred to in sub-section (1) as the case may be. (3) The amount deposited under this rule may at any time be withdrawn by the plaintiff; Provided that such withdrawal shall not have the effect of prejudicing any claim by the plaintiff disputing the correctness of the amount deposited; Provided further that if the amount deposited includes any sums claimed by the depositor to be deductable on any account the court may require the plaintiff to furnish security for such sum before he is allowed to withdraw the same". 14. Three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bimal Chand Jain’s case (supra) has held as follows: “6. It seems to us on a comprehensive understanding of Rule 5 of Order XV that the true construction of the Rule should be thus. Sub-rule (1) obliges the defendant to deposit, at or before the first hearing of the suit, the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and further, whether or not he admits any amount to be due, to deposit regularly throughout the continuation of the suit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual. In the event of any default in making any deposit, "the court may subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off his defence". We shall presently come to what this means. Sub-rule (2) obliges the court, before making an order for striking off the defence to consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf. In other words, the defendant has been vested with a statutory right to make a representation to the court against his defence being struck off. If a representation is made the court must consider it on its merits, and then decide whether the defence should or should not be struck off. In other words, the defendant has been vested with a statutory right to make a representation to the court against his defence being struck off. If a representation is made the court must consider it on its merits, and then decide whether the defence should or should not be struck off. This is a right expressly vested in the defendant and enables him to show by bringing material on the record that he has not been guilty of the default alleged or if the default has occurred, there is good reason for it. Now, it is not impossible that the record may contain such material already. In that event, can it be said that sub-rule (1) obliges the court to strike off the defence? We must remember that an order under sub-rule (1) striking off the defence is in the nature of a penalty. A serious responsibility rests on the court in the matter and the power is not to be exercised mechanically. There is a reserve of discretion vested in the court entitling it not to strike off the defence if on the facts and circumstances already existing on the record it finds good reason for not doing so. It will always be a matter for the judgment of the court to decide whether on the material before it, notwithstanding the absence of a representation under sub-rule (2), the defence should or should not be struck off. The word "may" in sub-rule (1) merely vests power in the court to strike off the defence. It does not oblige it to do so in every case of default. To that extent, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court in Puran Chand vs. Pravin Gupta, (civil revision no.356 of 1978 dated 30.10.1980 by Allahabad High Court). We are of opinion that the High Court has placed an unduly narrow construction on the provisions of clause (1) of Rule 5 of Order XV.” 27. Learned counsel for the respondent/landlord has referred to the judgment as reported in 1987 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 527, “Anandi Devi Vs. We are of opinion that the High Court has placed an unduly narrow construction on the provisions of clause (1) of Rule 5 of Order XV.” 27. Learned counsel for the respondent/landlord has referred to the judgment as reported in 1987 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 527, “Anandi Devi Vs. Om Prakash”, and particularly, he has referred to as to what scope and interpretation has to be assigned qua the ratio which has been referred to in the matters of Bimal Chand Jain, and he has referred to paragraph no.7, of the said judgment, which is extracted hereunder:- “The scope of this Rule was considered by this Court in Bimal Chand case. It was held: (SCC pp. 488-89, para 6) “6. It seems to us on a comprehensive understanding of Rule 5 of Order XV that the true construction of the Rule should be thus. Sub-rule (1) obliges the defendant to deposit, at or before the first hearing of the suit, the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and further, whether or not he admits any amount to be due, to deposit regularly throughout the continuation of the suit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual. In the event of any default in making any deposit, "the court may subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (2) strike off his defence". We shall presently come to what this means. Sub-rule (2) obliges the court, before making an order for striking off the defence to consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf. In other words, the defendant has been vested with a statutory right to make a representation to the court against his defence being struck off. If a representation is made the court must consider it on its merits, and then decide whether the defence should or should not be struck off. This is a right expressly vested in the defendant and enables him to show by bringing material on the record that he has not been guilty of the default alleged or if the default has occurred, there is good reason for it. Now, it is not impossible that the record may contain such material already. In that event, can it be said that Sub-rule (1) obliges the court to strike off the defence? Now, it is not impossible that the record may contain such material already. In that event, can it be said that Sub-rule (1) obliges the court to strike off the defence? We must remember that an order under Sub-rule (1) striking off the defence is in the nature of a penalty. A serious responsibility rests on the court in the matter and the power is not to be exercised mechanically. There is a reserve of discretion vested in the court entitling it not to strike off the defence if on the facts and circumstances already existing on the record it finds good reason for not doing so. It will always be a matter for the judgment of the court to decide whether on the material before it, notwithstanding the absence of a representation under Sub-rule (2), the defence should or should not be struck off. The word "may" in Sub-rule (1) merely vests power in the court to strike off the defence. It does not oblige it to do so in every case of default. To that extent, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court in Puran Chand (supra).” 28. In fact, if the ratio laid down by the Bimal Chand’s Jain judgment (Supra), as already dealt with above, is taken into consideration in relation to its finding recorded in paragraph no.6, for the purposes of striking of a defence is taken into consideration, this Court is of the view that it would not a finding relating to the second part of Order 15 Rule 5, which has been sought to be argued with regards to the aspect of continuance of the remittance of monthly rent regularly during the pendency of the proceedings, and hence the implications which has been drawn as per the findings recorded may not be attracted and that too in the light of the observations as it has been made in paragraph no.9, of the judgment, as to what effect would it have if the decision on the representation, which is statutorily contemplated under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, is not taken into consideration, qua the pleadings which has been raised in an application filed by the tenant under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC. 29. 29. In that eventuality, the ratio of Anandi Devi, which has been sought to be impressed upon in the light of the observations made in paragraph no.7, to be read in relation to paragraph no.9, is just in contravention to the stand which had been taken by the landlord before the court below, when he filed an application for attracting Order 15 Rule 5, by attracting the first part, which has been argued otherwise, has to be a case falling within the domain of the consideration of the second part of the Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, for non remittance of the rent regularly, on monthly basis as contemplated, therein. Hence, this judgment is of no avail even if it is read in the context of ratio laid down by the Allahabad High Court, in the judgment reported in 2008 (71) ALR 588, “Roshni Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd, Vs. 1st Additional District Judge, Bareilly and others”, which has been heavily relied by the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord, particularly, while making reference to paragraph no.12, of the judgment, as to what implications would it have, when the first part of Order 15 Rule 5, when it deals with the depositing of the admitted rent on the first date of hearing qua its anomaly for non remittance of the monthly rent due to be paid, as observed in paragraph no.12, of the judgment, which is extracted hereunder:- “12. It is, therefore, clear that Order XV Rule 5 CPC is in two parts. The first part deals with the deposit of the "amount admitted by him to be due" while the second part deals with the "monthly amount due" whether or not the tenant admits any amount to be due. Thus, in a case where the defendant denies the existence of landlord and tenant relationship, he may not be required to deposit the amount admitted to be due at or before the first hearing of the suit but he would still be required to deposit the "monthly amount due" within a week from the date of its accrual throughout the continuation of the suit because such deposit has to be made whether or not he admits any amount to be due.” 30. Even if the finding which has been recorded in paragraph no.20, which has been referred to, by the learned counsel for the respondent in support of his contentions, this Court is of the view that according to their own case, which has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondent, before the court below, the paragraph no.20 of judgment, will have no implications or would not be of much relevance, as such, because the respondent/landlord’s own case was not under the second part as it was dealt in paragraph no.20, of the judgment. Hence, the ratio relied by learned counsel for the respondent/landlord, will not apply if it is strictly read in consonance to the contents of his application filed under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC. 31. In that eventuality, and for the reasons aforesaid, this Court is of the view that the landlord/respondent cannot take an advantage to argue the implications of Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, contrary to his own pleadings which has been raised in the application, when he has attempted to shift upon and bring his case on the basis of the first part of Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, due to inaction on the part of non depositing of the admitted rent on the first date of hearing. All the judgments, which has been referred to and relied by the respondents/landlord are in relation to the first part of the remittance of the admitted rent on first date of hearing. Hence, they will not be applicable in the present set of circumstances, which would be a case contrary to the case, which was pleaded by the respondent/landlord in his application filed before the court below. 32. Besides this, this Court is of the view that when the statute has specifically provided a consideration of the objection submitted by way of representation in the light of the pleadings raised in the objection, may it be that a default is an aspect, which is admitted; the remittance of the rent may be an aspect which is admitted; but still while deciding the application under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, which has been apparently filed under the second part of it, the court was bound up to deal with the objection, and its applicability qua the plea raised in the application filed by the respondent/landlord. 33. 33. Having not done so, the impugned order of 18.12.2020, merely being based upon the premise, since the default has been admitted to have been committed by the tenant in the remittance of the rent as observed in the second last paragraph of the judgment impugned in question, that could have been suitably decided by the court, only subject to the consideration of the objection/representation raised by the revisionist/tenant under sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 Order 15 of the CPC. Since not having done so, and since no rationale has been applied by the court as to from, which prospective the application of the landlord was being required to be considered, that could have been better decided had the objection/representation was considered by the court. 34. Since this judgment impugned runs contrary to the very statutory intention of deciding the representation, prior to attracting Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, the impugned judgment dated 18.12.2020, cannot be sustained, the same is hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back to the learned Judge, SCC, to re-decide the application under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, strictly in terms of the objection/representation raised in the application itself, and also subject to consideration of the objection raised by the revisionist/tenant in his objection filed before the court below on 10.08.2020. 35. It is hope and trusted that the Judge, SCC, will consider and decide the application afresh, within a period of two months from the date of the production of a certified copy of this judgment. 36. Subject to the aforesaid observations, the civil revision stands allowed. The matter is remitted back to the learned Judge, SCC, for reconsideration of the application filed under second part of Order 15 Rule 5 of C.P.C.