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Allahabad High Court · body

2022 DIGILAW 1881 (ALL)

Lalji Yadav v. Union of India, Thru. Secretary

2022-11-29

PRAKASH PADIA

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. Office of the Additional Solicitor General of India has accepted notice on behalf of respondent no.1 and Shri Anand Tiwari, learned counsel has accepted notice on behalf of respondents no.2 to 4. 2. The petitioner has preferred present writ petition inter-alia with the following prayers :- "(i) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 06.02.1989 issued by Respondent No. 4 (ii) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 to consider the grievances of the Petitioner and passed an appropriate order upon the letters pending before Respondents within stipulated period to meet the end of Justice." 3. The facts in brief as contained in the writ petition are that the land of the petitioner was acquired by the respondent-Indian Oil Corporation in the year 1985. Thereafter, an application was submitted by the petitioner seeking his appointment with the respondent-Corporation on the ground that his land has been acquired hence apart from compensation, which was paid in lieu of the land an appointment should also be given by the corporation. The claim for appointment of the petitioner was rejected by the respondent-Corporation because he was over age. Subsequently a meeting was held in the area office of the respondent-Indian Oil Corporation at Allahabad on 18.01.1989.Thereafter a letter dated February 06, 1989 was written by the Deputy General Manager (Personal), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. New Delhi to the Employment Officer, Employment Exchange, Varanasi, U.P. In the said letter name of the petitioner was at item number-1. The letter reads as follows :- "Kindly refer the meeting our Area Manager, Allahabad, Shri P.N. Shukla had with you on 18/1/89 on the subjects : 1. We would like you to confirm that Shri Lalji Yadav has not been sponsored because he is over age. His date of birth being 20.1.60. 2. Although the name of Shri Ashok Kumar S/o Shri Matabhik has appeared twice in the list of land-losers (Sl.Nos. 31-32 & 167-168), but his name has not been sponsored by you so far. You may take necessary action for sponsoring the name of Shri Ashok Kumar. 3. Whereas you have sponsored the name of Shri Ram Ashrey S/o Shri Jagar Dev who is 8th pass. 31-32 & 167-168), but his name has not been sponsored by you so far. You may take necessary action for sponsoring the name of Shri Ashok Kumar. 3. Whereas you have sponsored the name of Shri Ram Ashrey S/o Shri Jagar Dev who is 8th pass. But, you have not sponsored the name of Shri Shyan Narain S/o Shri Sarvesh who is also 8th pass. You may please sponsor the name of Shri Shyam Narain also. 4. You have sponsored the name of one Shri Rajinder Prasad S/o. Sh Tribhuvan whereas as per our list of landlosers, the candidate sponsored by the land-loser is Sh. Rajesh Kumar S/o. Sh Tribhuvan, and not Sh. Rajinder Kumar. You may please clarify this. You may please take necessary action on items mentioned at Sl. Nos. 1 to 4 at the earliest so as to enable us to proceed further on the matter." 4. It is argued that after the aforesaid letter was written no action was taken either by the Employment Exchange Officer or by the Officer of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. It is stated in paragraph 12 of the writ petition that petitioner is continuously approach the respondents no.3 and 4 and thereafter, various representations were made by him but no action has been taken in the matter. Since no action has been taken on the representations made by the petitioner hence present writ petition. 5. On the other hand it is argued by Shri Anand Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondent-corporation that the land of the petitioner was acquired in the year 1985 but nothing has been stated in the entire writ petition that any assurance was given by the corporation to the petitioner to provide employment. It is further argued that the petitioner was sleeping over his rights from last more than 37 years hence apart from merits of the case, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. After land of the petitioner was acquired, he received full compensation as provided under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, which means an amount equal to full market value of the land with interest as well as solatium under sub section (2) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act was paid to him. 7. After land of the petitioner was acquired, he received full compensation as provided under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, which means an amount equal to full market value of the land with interest as well as solatium under sub section (2) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act was paid to him. Time and again controversy to provide employment in lieu of the land acquired by the respondent-Corporation or by other authorities were came up before this Court from time to time. 8. It is well known that there is already surplus staff in most Government Departments and Public Sector Undertakings, and further jobs cannot be given in this manner as that would only be putting a greater burden on the tax payers, and there would be violation of Article 16 of the Constitution. 9. In Writ Petition No. 27690 of 1991, Dau Dayal v. Agra Development Authority and others, decided on 23.3.1995 the then Hon'ble G.P. Mathur, J. held that as there is no provision for granting a job in addition to the compensation provided for in Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, no such job can be granted. 10. In the case of Butu Prasad Kumbhar and Ors. v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others, JT 1995 (3) SC 428 it was held that there is no requirement under Article 21 of the Constitution to provide employment to a member of the family displaced by the acquisition of land. In Director, Mandi Pahshad v. Sohan Lal, 2003 ALJ 540, a Division Bench of this Court held that when the petitioner has received compensation under the Land Acquisition Act he cannot claim appointment in addition. 11. It is also settled law that a mandamus may be issued to compel the authorities to do something but it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce legal rights. In so far as present case is concerned, no statute has been shown by the counsel for the petitioner for which a mandamus has been sought for by him. In this connection law is well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 21 in the case of Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh and others, AIR 1977 SC 2149 . In this connection law is well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 21 in the case of Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh and others, AIR 1977 SC 2149 . The paragraph 21 is reproduced hereinbelow : "21. In order that mandamus may be issued to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance." 12. In so far as the present case is concerned, no statutory provisions has been placed by the counsel for the petitioner requiring a job to be given to one member of the family of the person whose land has been acquired. 13. Similar controversy has also came up before Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ravindra Kumar v. District Magistrate, Agra reported in 2005 (2) AWC 1650 . In the aforesaid case following questions were placed before the Full Bench namely:- "(1) Whether Government Orders/Circulars providing employment to one member of a family whose land has been acquired, (over and above the compensation awarded under law) is valid or not ? (2) Whether the acquiring bodies for whose benefit the land is acquired are bound by these Government Orders/Circular ? (3) Whether a writ can be issued directing the acquiring body to consider the claim in accordance with the Government. Orders/Circulars ?" 14. The answer of aforesaid questions were given by the Full Bench in paragraph 25 of the judgement, which reads as follows :- "(1) The Government Orders/Circulars providing employment to one member of a family of a person whose land has been acquired (over and above the compensation awarded under the law) are invalid. (2) The acquiring body for whose benefit the land is acquired are not bound by such Government Order/Circular. (3) No writ can be issued directing the acquiring body to consider the claim in accordance with the aforesaid Order/Government Circular." 15. In view of the settled proposition of law as quoted above, I am of the opinion that no relief could be granted to the petitioner in so far as present writ petition is concerned. 16. (3) No writ can be issued directing the acquiring body to consider the claim in accordance with the aforesaid Order/Government Circular." 15. In view of the settled proposition of law as quoted above, I am of the opinion that no relief could be granted to the petitioner in so far as present writ petition is concerned. 16. In so far as laches on part of the petitioner for approaching this Court is concerned, law is well settled by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Legal Representatives and others Vs. State of U.P. and others reported in (2019) 15 SCC 33 that it is a recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time becomes non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non suited litigants who approached court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay--Estoppel, Acquiescence and Waiver-Acquiescence-Evidence Act, 1872. Section 115. The paragraph 7 is reproduced hereinbelow :- "7. The matter requires examination from another aspect viz. laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where the period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayer for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought within the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation of delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/ reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-existent." 17. Very recently Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Surjeet Singh Sahni Vs. State of U.P. and others in SLP (C) No.3008 of 2022 decided on 28.02.2022 held that mere representation does not extend the period of limitation and the aggrieved person has to approach the Court expeditiously and within reasonable time. The paragraphs 5 & and 6 are reproduced hereinbelow :- "5. As observed by this Court in catena of decisions, mere representation does not extend the period of limitation and the aggrieved person has to approach the Court expeditiously and within reasonable time. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court should dismiss it at the threshold and ought not to dispose of the writ petition by relegating the writ petitioner to file a representation and/or directing the authority to decide the representation, once it is found that the original writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches. Such order shall not give an opportunity to the petitioner to thereafter contend that rejection of the representation subsequently has given a fresh cause of action. 6. Such order shall not give an opportunity to the petitioner to thereafter contend that rejection of the representation subsequently has given a fresh cause of action. 6. Even otherwise on merits also, we are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. The High Court has rightly refused to grant any relief which as such was in the form of specific performance of the contract. No writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall be maintainable and/or entertainable for specific performance of the contract and that too after a period of 10 years by which time even the suit for specific performance would have been barred by limitation." 18. In view of the aforesaid, the Court is of the opinion that neither petitioner has placed before this Court any statutes on the basis of which an employment could be given to him in lieu of the land, which was taken by the Corporation in the year 1985. 19. Accordingly, present writ petition is dismissed.