JUDGMENT : Prashant Kumar Mishra, J. Both the writ appeals would arise out of the common order, dated 15.04.2014 passed in W.P.Nos.24213 of 2008 and 5767 of 2009. While W.A.No.1974 of 2017 is barred by 1312 days, the other writ appeal i.e. W.A.No.43 of 2018 is barred by 1330 days. The petitioners/appellants have filed I.A.No.1 of 2017 and I.A.No.1 of 2018 in the above appeals respectively, seeking condonation of delay of the above mentioned period. 2. These two intra-Court appeals i.e. W.A.No.1974 of 2017 and W.A.No.43 of 2018 were filed against the common order, dated 15.04.2014 passed in W.P.No.5767 of 2009 and W.P.No.24123 of 2008 respectively. W.P.No.5767 of 2009 and W.P.No.24213 of 2008 are filed seeking Writ of Certiorari to call for records pertaining to Award Nos.2 of 2007-2008 and 1 of 2007-2008, dated 02.11.2007 respectively and to set aside the same and further to direct the respondents to notify the structures of the petitioners for acquisition under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The learned Single Judge, dismissed the writ petitions after considering the averments in writ affidavit, counter and rejoinder, observing that the petitioners in both the writ petitions did not dispute with regard to the factum of executing Form-III agreements and Form-IV affidavits and expressed their consent for passing the award agreeing for the amounts indicated by the respondents. Aggrieved by the said orders the above writ appeals were filed with inordinate delay as indicated supra. 3. The appellants offered explanation in seeking to condone delay contained in paragraphs Nos.6 and 7 of the affidavit, which are reproduced hereunder: “I submit that the Writ Petition was dismissed on 15.04.2014. The present Writ Petition was filed by me along with 160 other petitioners. All the petitioners after coming out from the village they were scattered and settled in different villages to eke out their livelihood. Therefore, it is very difficult to communicate the above said dismissal order to all the writ petitioners. All the petitioners are agricultural labours and coolies and they are searching for their livelihood by doing coolie work day to day basis, and they are illiterates and settled in the rural villages. Therefore, it is very difficult to communicate the above said dismissal order to all the writ petitioners. All the petitioners are agricultural labours and coolies and they are searching for their livelihood by doing coolie work day to day basis, and they are illiterates and settled in the rural villages. I submit that all the petitioners are unable to know the status of the Writ Petition all these days and recently now we came to know through some of our claimants in the writ petition and contacted the advocate and requested him to file the Writ Appeal against the dismissal order. Therefore, the delay of 1312 days occurred in filing of the present Writ Appeal against the dismissal order dated 15.04.2014 in W.P.No.5767 of this Hon’ble Court. Therefore, the above delay is neither intentional nor wanton but only due to the reason stated above. If the delay is not condoned the petitioners will be put to suffer irreparable loss and injury.” 4. While considering the application for condonation of delay, the Court has to see whether the delay is inordinate or delay is few days and the reasons assigned are valid and cogent. The party seeking condonation of delay needs to explain the delay properly, the grounds which are reasonable and plausible. 5. In Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh and Ors., (2010) 6 SCC 786 the Hon’ble Apex Court held that while considering the application for condonation of delay, no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not. It has been further stated therein that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and behaves. 6. In Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh and Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 685 after referring to earlier case law, the Hon’ble Apex Court held at paragraphs 24 and 25 as under; “We may state that even if the term “sufficient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to an applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” 7. In Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 the two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statues, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the costs. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” Eventually, the Bench upon perusal of the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to hold that certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and, accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had condoned the delay of more than seven years.” 8. In B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy, (2012) 12 SCC 693 the two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court allowed the appeal filed by the appellant when the learned Single Judge of composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad condoned the delay of 1236 days in filing the appeal against the judgment and decree, dated 18.08.2006 passed by IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. 9. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, (1987) 2 SCC 107 a two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court made a departure and observed as under: “…the legislature has conferred power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression sufficient cause employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice, for that is the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. The learned Judges emphasized on adoption of a liberal approach while dealing with the applications for condonation of delay as ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late and refusal to condone delay can result in an meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated. The learned Judges emphasized on adoption of a liberal approach while dealing with the applications for condonation of delay as ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late and refusal to condone delay can result in an meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated. It was stressed that there should not be a pedantic approach but the doctrine that is to be kept in mind is that the matter has to be dealt with in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner and cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred over the technical considerations. It was also ruled that there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence and that the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice on technical grounds as it is the duty of the court to remove injustice. In the said case the Division Bench observed that the State which represents the collective cause of the community does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status and the courts are required to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of interpretation of the expression sufficient cause.” 10. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: 25. We may state that even if the term sufficient cause has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of reasonableness as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” 11. In Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 the Hon’ble Apex Court broadly culled out the following principles: (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 12. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 12. In so far the above writ appeals are concerned, as can be seen from the certified copies of the common order, dated 15.04.2014 filed in W.A.No.1974 of 2017 and W.A.No.43 of 2018, copy application for obtaining certified copy was made on 12.12.2017. Copy was made ready on 14.12.2017 and thereafter writ appeals were filed on 19.12.2017 and 06.01.2018 respectively. The non filing of even copy applications indicates the negligence on the part of the petitioners and hence their conduct do not deserve any sympathy from this Hon’ble Court. 13. The deponent of the affidavits tried to explain the reason for delay in filing the writ appeals by stating that “the writ petition was dismissed on 15.04.2014. The present writ petition was filed by me along with 160 other petitioners. All the petitioners after coming out from the village they were scattered and settled in different villages to eke out likelihood.” 14. As can be seen from the cause title, most of petitioners settled at nearby villages of the same Mandal, which are located within the limits of YSR Kadapa District. Petitioners No.1 to 6 are residing at Yallagadda village, Thallapaka Panchayat, Rajampet Mandal; petitioner Nos.7 to 27 are residing at Siddulapalli Village, Thallapaka Panchayat, Rajampet Mandal; petitioner Nos.28 and 29 are residing at Chinnampalli Village, Obulavaripalli Mandal, Kadapa District; Petitioners Nos.30 to 79 and 83 to 172 are residing at Siddulapalli Village, Thallapaka Panchayat, Rajampet Mandal, Kadapa District and petitioner Nos.80 to 82 are residing at Chinna Chowk, Kadapa Town, Kadapa District. 15. Similarly, the petitioners in W.A.No.43 of 2018 are residing at Thallapaka Village, Rajampet Mandal; Chinnampalli Village, Obulavaripalli Mandal; Nandalur Mandal; Siddulapalli Village, Rajampet Mandal; Nallamachupalli (V), Badvel Mandal, Yellagadda Village, Rajampet Mandal; Kuruguntlapalli (V), Obulavaripalli Mandal; Thallapaka Village, Rajampet Mandal; Mulakkayalapalli Village, Rajampet Mandal; Chinthakayalapalli Village, Nandaluru Mandal; Mannur (V), Rajampet Mandal; Pothapi Village, Nandaluru Mandal; Middela Village, Nandaluru Mandal; Kuruguntlapalli Village, Obulavaripalli Mandal; Chinna Chowk, Kadapa Town, respectively and all the villages are located within the limits of YSR Kadapa District. 16. Thus, the said stand taken by the petitioners that since all the petitioners in the writ appeals were scattered and settled in different villages may not be true, correct and valid reason. 16. Thus, the said stand taken by the petitioners that since all the petitioners in the writ appeals were scattered and settled in different villages may not be true, correct and valid reason. Though no presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay, gross negligence on the part of the litigant is to be taken note of and the conduct, behavior and attitude of the party relating to its inaction are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. Though the Courts are required to weigh scale of balance of justice in respect of both the parties, the said principle cannot be given a total good-bye in the name of liberal approach. 17. Further, during the course of hearing learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that since the original counsel who represented the writ petitioners before the learned Single Judge has expired, no information could be sent to the petitioners/appellants. Though we do not want to enter into the issue about death of the lawyer and with regard to the particulars as to on what date and which of the petitioners/appellants contacted his lawyer and came to know about his death, the fact remains that the counsel, who represented the petitioners before learned single Judge, has filed writ appeals on 19.12.2017 and 06.01.2018. 18. There is no plausible explanation nor precise dates as to when the appellants came to know about the order passed in the writ petitions and which of the petitioners/appellants contacted their lawyer to file the writ appeal. Thus, the two paragraphs of the affidavit reproduced above appear to be only self-serving statement, which fails to impress us to make out a reasonable, satisfactory or a good cause for condoning such abnormal delay. No reasons much less valid and cogent reasons are assigned to condone the inordinate delay of 1312 and 1330 days. Hence, we see no valid ground to condone inordinate delay in filing writ appeals. 19. In view of the above discussion and in the light of the ratio in the above judgments, we are not inclined to condone the delay of 1312 and 1330 days in preferring W.A.Nos.1974 of 2017 and 43 of 2018 respectively. 20. Accordingly these interlocutory applications are dismissed and consequentially both the writ appeals are dismissed. No costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.