JUDGMENT : Renu Agarwal, J. 1. This present appeal is filed by the State under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. against the judgment and order dated 13.05.1993 passed by 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Hardoi in Sessions Trial No. 163 of 1992 whereby acquitting the accused-respondent under Sections 498-A, 304B IPC read with Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Arval, District Hardoi. 2. Shorn off unnecessary fact, the FIR discloses that the cousin sister of complainant, namely, Sushila, was married to respondent-Virendra as per Hindu rites and rituals. Dowry was also given in the marriage but accused-respondent-Virendra, Mansa Ram and Smt. Marro, mother of the accused Virendra were not happy with the dowry given by the parents of the deceased. The accused was demanding motorcycle in dowry and on account of this demand, the accused-respondent sent back the complainant’s sister to her parental home. His cousin complained about the demand of dowry by accused-respondent and they tried to mediate the matter with accused-respondent but his cousin, namely, Sushila (now deceased) was not accepted by the accused-respondent without motorcycle. Later on, the deceased was sent to her in-laws house but she was being tortured on account of additional demand of motorcycle. Virendra, Mansa Ram and Smt. Marro murdered the complainant’s cousin Sushila by throttling and then the complainant and other family members reached to the matrimonial home of his cousin Sushila and found her lying dead in the north side of room of the house. The FIR of the incident was lodged on 20.01.1992 at about 11 a.m., the same was endorsed in GD No. 9 dated 23.01.1992 at about 9:10 a.m. and investigation was conducted by the Circle Officer Jang Raj Singh who recorded the statements of witnesses and prepared the site plan. The inquest was conducted by S.I. R.A Singh on 20.01.1992 at about 11:00 a.m. and dead body of the deceased was sealed and sent for post-mortem through Constable Dori Lal and Shiv Ratan. The post-mortem was conducted on 21.01.1992. The investigating Officer after collecting the necessary evidence, filed the chargesheet on 01.05.1993 in the Court. 3. Accused-respondent was summoned by the Magistrate and after the compliance of Section 207 of Cr.P.C., the accused were committed to Court of Sessions who framed the charges against the accused-respondent under Section 498-A, 304-B IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The investigating Officer after collecting the necessary evidence, filed the chargesheet on 01.05.1993 in the Court. 3. Accused-respondent was summoned by the Magistrate and after the compliance of Section 207 of Cr.P.C., the accused were committed to Court of Sessions who framed the charges against the accused-respondent under Section 498-A, 304-B IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The charges were read over and explained to the accused persons. The accused persons denied from the charges and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution adduced PW-1 Sewa Ram and PW-2 Maiku as witnesses of fact. Following witnesses have proved the case : (i) PW-1, Sewa Ram, the complainant of the case (ii) PW-2, Maiku, father of the deceased. 5. No other witness is adduced in Court as the genuineness of all the documents of the prosecution was admitted by the learned defence counsel. 6. After the closure of the evidences, the accused-respondent was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. to explain the circumstances proved against them. In the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., all the accused-respondent denied the charges levelled against them and stated that the complainant demanded the jewellery of the deceased from them, they denied to handover the jewellery of the deceased to complainant due to this animosity, they have been falsely implicated in the present case. All the witnesses are the family members of the deceased and they falsely implicated the accused persons in order to grab the jewellary of the deceased. The accused were provided opportunity to adduce their oral or documentary evidence in their defence which they denied. 7. After hearing both the learned counsel and perusal of the record, the learned trial court found that the evidence of witnesses is simply hearsay evidence and the witnesses, namely, Makrand, Rampal, Paatiram and Vishram Singh were not examined by the prosecution to prove the version of the FIR, therefore, the learned trial court acquitted all the three accused from charges under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 8. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 13.05.1993, the present appeal is filed by the State on the ground that learned Sessions Judge ignored the provisions of Sections 106 and 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. 8. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 13.05.1993, the present appeal is filed by the State on the ground that learned Sessions Judge ignored the provisions of Sections 106 and 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. Learned trial court noted in the judgment that “as to how after there is continued demand of dowry made by the accused persons, the matter was not reported to the police authorities”. The judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge is based on surmises and conjectures and finding of acquittal is based upon the contradictions in the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 which are not relevant in the present case. Therefore, judgment and order dated 13.05.1993 passed by the Sessions Judge is perverse and against the record and is liable to be set aside and the accused-respondent No.1 is liable to be convicted and sentenced according to law. 9. Heard Sri Arunendra, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State-appellant, Sri Rajendra Singh Kushwaha, learned counsel for the accused-respondent and perused the record. 10. From the order of this Court dated 22.03.2022, it transpires that accused-respondent no. 1-Virendra is alive, whereas accused-respondent nos. 2 and 3, namely, Mansa Ram and Smt. Marro respectively have died and their appeal has been ordered to be abated by this Court. 11. Vide order of this Court dated 25.08.1993, the leave to appeal has already been granted. 12. Learned AGA argued that learned trial court disbelieved PW-1 and PW2 without any ground and ignored the provisions of Sections 106 and 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act and drew presumption of no guilt against the accused-respondent. The burden of proof lies upon the accused-respondent to prove as to how the deceased died in her matrimonial home. It is also argued that there was persistent demand of motorcycle in ‘Vidai’ ceremony as well as in ‘Gauna’ ceremony. In the Gauna ceremony, mosquito-net, transistor, utensils, watch etc. were given by parents to their daughter Sushila, the deceased but on account of demand of motorcycle, she was killed in her matrimonial home, therefore, the judgment and order dated 13.05.1993 is liable to be set aside. 13. On the other hand, Sri Rajendara Singh Kushwaha, learned counsel for the accused-respondent No.1 submitted that there is no direct evidence against the accused-respondent and the evidence of witnesses, examined by the prosecution, is simply hearsay evidence. 13. On the other hand, Sri Rajendara Singh Kushwaha, learned counsel for the accused-respondent No.1 submitted that there is no direct evidence against the accused-respondent and the evidence of witnesses, examined by the prosecution, is simply hearsay evidence. He further argued that witnesses, namely, Makrand, Ram Pal, Paati Ram and Biaram are not produced in Court. PW-1 clearly refused that he was any additional demand of motorcycle from him and PW-2 deposed that he was bringing his daughter from her matrimonial house and her daughter returned saying that her jewellery has been kept by her in-laws. The accused never tortured the deceased on account of demand of dowry. The version of the FIR is clearly hearsay. The prosecution case is not corroborated with medical evidence, therefore, the judgment passed by the trial court is in consonance with the law and fact and the appeal is liable to be rejected. 14. After perusal of the record, it is found that only two witnesses PW-1 Sewa Ram, the complainant and PW-2 Maiku, father of the deceased, Sushila, were adduced as witnesses in the Court. The genuineness of the papers of the prosecution was admitted by learned counsel for the defence, therefore, the prosecution did not produce formal witnesses in the Court. PW-1 stated in his examination-in-chief that the deceased was his cousin and was married to accused Virendra. The accused-respondent demanded motorcycle from the parents of the deceased. No demand was made from PW-1. The deceased was not sent to her matrimonial home just after her marriage as she was suffering from abscess as she was unable to sit and move. Later on she was sent to her in-laws house within a year of marriage with household goods. After 12 to 13 days of her ‘vidai’ ceremony, the parents of the deceased and he himself went to the in-laws of the deceased for her ‘Vidai’ and she was sent to her parental house with a warning that she will come with motorcycle only otherwise she will be killed. She was not ready to go to her matrimonial home but the parents consoled her and sent her back. Thereafter, in the month of ‘Ashadh’, Maiku Lal tried to bring his daughter from her matrimonial home but the accused denied to sent her without motorcycle. She was not ready to go to her matrimonial home but the parents consoled her and sent her back. Thereafter, in the month of ‘Ashadh’, Maiku Lal tried to bring his daughter from her matrimonial home but the accused denied to sent her without motorcycle. Later on, Paati Ram son of Makrand informed him at 3:00 p.m. that the accused-respondent killed the deceased in her matrimonial home and her dead body was lying in the floor. The witnesses proved the written report as Exhibit Ka-1. 15. PW-2, the father of the deceased, Maiku stated that he gave Rs. 5000/-in the ‘Barichcha’ ceremony and other household goods to his daughter. She could not be sent to her matrimonial house due to nonfulfillment of demand of motorcycle and later on, she was sent to matrimonial house at the time of ‘Gauna’ and household goods were given to her. They showed their inability to give motorcycle in dowry. The witnesses attributed the role of demand of dowry to Virendra, Mansa Ram and Smt. Marro. On account of not fulfilling the additional demand of motorcycle as dowry, the deceased was killed by her in-laws. 16. PW-1 specifically stated in his statement that accused-respondent did not demand the motorcycle from him but demand was made from the parents of the deceased. Thus, this witness did not prove the demand of dowry. PW-2, the father of the deceased, stated in his examination-in-chief that accused-respondent did not send the deceased, Sushila due to demand of dowry but during the cross-examination he stated that the respondent sent his daughter with him but her daughter started weeping in the way and returned to her matrimonial house as the jewellery of deceased was kept by the accused-respondent, therefore, this witness also did not corroborate the demand of motorcycle. 17. It is pertinent to mention here that the Paati Ram son of Makrand, who first acknowledged the death of the deceased, was not produced in the court to prove the death of deceased on account of demand of dowry and there is no link evidence to the fact that how witness Makrand got information about death of deceased. Prosecution withheld other witness of facts. Witnesses Ram Pal, Paati Ram and Vishram Singh are not adduced in Court. Prosecution withheld other witness of facts. Witnesses Ram Pal, Paati Ram and Vishram Singh are not adduced in Court. However, the respondent-accused Smt. Marro stated in her statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that the husband of deceased himself informed the complainant about the death of the deceased, Sushila. 18. From the perusal of the inquest report, it transpires that the dead body of the deceased was lying on the ground and following injuries were found on her body : (i) 3 contusions of both ribs. (ii) a light injury on the neck near right ear. (iii) 2 black contusions on the left side of neck below left ear. (iv) dried blood on the nose. (v) abrasion on left elbow. 19. According to inquest report, deceased died due to antemortem injuries and dead body was sent for postmortem for ascertaining the cause of death. 20. According to the postmortem, conducted by doctor S.K. Srivastava report following antemortem injuries were found on the person of the deceased : (i) abraded contusion 6cm x 4cm present on right side of neck at level of thyroid cartilage 5cm below right angle of mandible. (ii) abraded contusion 7cm x 5cm on left side of neck 5.5. cm below from left angle of mandible. (iii) abrasion 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm present on back of left elbow joint. 21. No other injury is found on the body of the deceased, therefore, the injuries noted in the autopsy and in the inquest do not correspond and the doctor opined that ‘death occurred due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation’. 22. From the evidence on record, the case of the prosecution is not that the deceased died due to strangulation. Prosecution did not adduce any evidence to prove that deceased died due to strangulation. According to the post-mortem report, no ligature mark is found on the body of the deceased. No any robe, scarf or any such article is recovered from the possession of the accused-respondent. However, the genuineness of papers is admitted by the defence counsel but the medical evidence did not support the prosecution version as this is not a case of strangulation. During the course of inquest also, none of the witness mentioned that there was any sign of strangulation on the body of the deceased. 23. However, the genuineness of papers is admitted by the defence counsel but the medical evidence did not support the prosecution version as this is not a case of strangulation. During the course of inquest also, none of the witness mentioned that there was any sign of strangulation on the body of the deceased. 23. Initially, the prosecution case is that the deceased was done to death by throttling but in the evidence, the witnesses set up the theory of strangulation. In the statement in oath, it is stated that when Maiku, father of the deceased reached to matrimonial home of his daughter, the police had already sealed the whole dead body of his daughter, only her face was open and he saw only her face. Two abrasions found on the neck of the deceased and one abrasion on left elbow joint. Doctor opined the cause of death due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation. No ligature mark is found on the dead body of the deceased as to show that the death of deceased was caused by strangulation, therefore, the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 is contrary to the evidence of doctor as stated in the post-mortem report, therefore, it can be safely concluded that the medical report does not corroborate the prosecution case. 24. It also transpires from the evidence that deceased returned from the way to her matrimonial home and was saying while weeping that her jewellery was kept by her in-laws and it is the defence of the accused persons that the deceased was demanding jewellery from her father-in-law and when he denied, the false and fabricated report is lodged against them. There is sharp contradiction in the statements of PW-1 and PW-2. PW-1 admitted that accused did not make any demand of dowry. He is a hearsay witness regarding demand of dowry. No previous complaint of demand of dowry is mentioned in the FIR or elsewhere. The deceased travelled to and fro from her matrimonial home as well as her parental home. No complaint is made to any person regarding demand of dowry. Hence from the evidence on record, no demand of dowry is proved. No cruelty soon before the death is proved. The deceased travelled to and fro from her matrimonial home as well as her parental home. No complaint is made to any person regarding demand of dowry. Hence from the evidence on record, no demand of dowry is proved. No cruelty soon before the death is proved. The medical evidence does not corroborate the case of prosecution, hence the aforesaid case makes it clear that prosecution has failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused-respondent beyond all reasonable doubt. 25. Learned AGA could not evince that finding given by the Court below acquitting the accused/respondent, was factually or legally incorrect. 26. In the case of Babu vs. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Paragraphs 12 to 19 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under:- "12. This court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more, the probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165 ; Shambhoo Missir & Anr. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165 ; Shambhoo Missir & Anr. v. State of Bihar AIR 1991 SC 315 ; Shailendra Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 2003 SC 1104 ; Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699 ; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 2006 SC 2500 ; State of U.P. v. Ramveer Singh AIR 2007 SC 3075 ; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 2066 ; Arulvelu & Anr. v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 ; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98 ; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 445 ). 13. In Sheo Swarup and Ors. v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council observed as under: "...the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses...." 14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See: Tulsiram Kanu v. The State AIR 1954 SC 1 ; Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216 ; M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200 ; Khedu Mohton & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 66 ; Sambasivan and Ors. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 ; Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85 ; and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755 ). 15. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 66 ; Sambasivan and Ors. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 ; Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85 ; and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755 ). 15. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 , this Court reiterated the legal position as under: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 , this Court re-iterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 , this Court re-iterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368 , the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that an "order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused." 18. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne alias Baijnath & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271 , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances includes: (i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; (vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras (2009) 10 SCC 401 . 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference." 27. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Achhar Singh Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 2021 SCC Online HP 870 in this regard has laid down as under :- "It is thus a well crystalized principle that if two views are possible, the High Court ought not to interfere with the trial Court's judgment. However, such a precautionary principle cannot be overstretched to portray that the "contours of appeal" against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC are limited to seeing whether or not the trial Court's view was impossible. It is equally well settled that there is no bar on the High Court's power to re-appreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal. This Court has held in a catena of decisions (including Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , 42. State of Andhra Pradesh v. M. Madhusudhan Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 582 20-21 and Raveen Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2020 SCC Online SC 869, 11.) that the Cr.P.C does not differentiate in the power, scope, jurisdiction or limitation between appeals against judgments of conviction or acquittal and that the appellate Court is free to consider on both fact and law, despite the self-restraint that has been ingrained into practice while dealing with orders of acquittal where there is a double presumption of innocence of the accused". 28. Hon'ble Apex Court recently in Geeta Devi Versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 SCC Online SC 57, has rehashed the principle of law laid down in Chandrappa Versus State of Karnataka, (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 162, which is as under:- "If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 29. The trial court has given very valid, convincing and satisfactory reason while passing the order of acquittal against the accused-respondent relying on the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, as such, the medical evidence does not corroborate with the oral and documentary evidences of PW-1 and PW-2 and the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 is not in consonance with the medical evidence, therefore, there appears no good ground to interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court and to interfere in the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial court acquitting the accused-respondent by means of impugned judgment and order dated 13.05.1993. 30. We find no factual or legal error in the appreciation of the evidence by the trial court while acquitting the accused-respondent by means of impugned judgment and order dated 13.05.1993. Moreover, the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. 31. We, therefore, do not consider it to be a fit case to interfere in the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial court. 32. Consequently, the instant appeal is dismissed. 33. Having been affirmed the judgment of trial court in the present case, the accused-respondent No.1/Virendra shall file a personal bond and two sureties to the satisfaction of the Court concerned in terms of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C. 34. Let a copy of this order as well as record of trial Court be transmitted to the Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. 35. Office is directed to send a copy of this order to the court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.