JUDGMENT Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. - These Criminal Appeals (except SB Criminal Appeal No. 295/2002 preferred by the State against judgment of acquittal dated 03.11.2001) under Section 374 Cr.P.C. have been preferred against the judgment dated 08.11.2001, passed by the learned Sessions Court, Prevention of Corruption Cases, Jodhpur in Criminal Case No. 124/97 (28/94) whereby the learned Court acquitted them for the offences under Sections 409, 420, and 471 I.P.C. but convicted the present appellant for the offences under Section 5(1)(c)(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 along with Section 477-A I.P.C. and sentenced them to undergo 3 years R.I. along with Rs. 1000/- fine in default of payment of which they were to further undergo 1 month S.I., and 3 years R.I. respectively. Both sentences were to run concurrently. 2. Mr. Vineet Jain, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Pravin Vyas & Mr. Rajiv Bishnoi appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the above-numbered, first 8 appeals are directed against the conviction pertaining to one F.I.R. bearing registration No. 12/1989. The allegations levelled in the F.I.R. were to the effect that a complaint was received in connection with misappropriation/embezzlement of materials and amounts in the stores of I.T.I. Jodhpur and Polytechnic College, Jodhpur. Records/accounts of the said College were inspected by the A.C.B. Jaipur and a letter dated 03.12.1987 was issued, whereby an enquiry team was constituted for the purpose of inspection/audit, which was carried out from 01.01.1988 till 31.03.1988. The report so generated by the team stated that an amount of Rs. 4,60,572.49 was misappropriated/embezzled, in cash/material by the appellant, store-keeper Bhagwan Pushpani (appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 925/2000) and Surendra Singh, Gurcharan Singh, etc. and R.D. Jain, Registrar of said Mandal. Subsequently, the said F.I.R. was lodged for the offences under Sections 120B, 409, 420, 467 and 471 I.P.C. and Section 5(1)(c)(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. 2.1. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the alleged letter issued to constitute the team to conduct the inspection/audit, was authorized to do so only for the period of 1982-83 until 1986-87 i.e. for a period of five years and that the same is explicitly stated in the audit report, at Ex-P/5. However, the F.I.R. was instituted during investigation for the period 1978-79 was taken as a check period i.e. 9 years instead of 5 years and therefore nine separate charge sheets were filed. However, the F.I.R. was instituted during investigation for the period 1978-79 was taken as a check period i.e. 9 years instead of 5 years and therefore nine separate charge sheets were filed. He also submits that the inspection of the period was neither authorized, nor any appropriate inspection of the accounts of the said period has been carried out. And that therefore, the allegation of embezzlement of amount is a mere conjecture, unsupported by any enquiry or investigation. 2.2. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the star witness in the case of the prosecution, P.W. 12 Champalal, the head of the audit team and author of the aforementioned report, at Ex. P/5, admitted in his evidence that the letter issued on 03.12.1987 to carry out the inspection/audit, has not been produced on record and that he only received Ex. D/1 to conduct the audit from the Accountant, one Mr. K.R. Kumbhat, who has no authority to issue said letter constituting an inspection/audit. 2.3. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that P.W. 12 Champalal also admitted that as per the said Ex. D/1, the inspection/audit was to be carried out by a team of 5 persons, but was in fact conducted only by a team of 3 persons, namely, Mr. Champalal, Guman Mal and Gopalvallabh, and no reason for the same was offered either. 2.4. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that Mr. Champalal has also admitted that during the inspection/audit of the Store Accounts, he did not mark his initials, nor did he make any other mark, on the register, vouchers etc. which is the usual and standard practice during the process of conducting an audit, as also admitted by the other witnesses. 2.5. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that the testimony of P.W. 12 further reveals that while the 3 members of the audit team conducted the audit independently, the inspection/audit report, at Ex. P/5, was jointly prepared by all the 3 members of the team; it was pertinent for the prosecution to produce and examine the other two members of the audit team, which was not done. And that despite the same, the audit report only bears the signature of Mr. Champalal alone, thereby calling into question the authenticity and veracity of the said document. 2.6. And that despite the same, the audit report only bears the signature of Mr. Champalal alone, thereby calling into question the authenticity and veracity of the said document. 2.6. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that although the F.I.R. was lodged against five accused persons, the appellant being the lowest ranking employee, i.e. ministerial staff, and the other accused being of a superior rank i.e. Registrar, neither of them were made accused in the charge sheet, although sufficient material was available there so as to point that the appellant was in fact acting under direct supervision and control of said superior ranking officials. 2.7. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that the audit report so generated, supposedly dealt with the accounts for the year 1979-80, while the audit itself was conducted in the year 1987, and how the same was conducted, and how the audit team was able to carry out the physical verification of the commodities/articles in stock after so many years is unexplained, and not plausible. 3. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor opposes and submits that the learned Court below has rightly passed the impugned judgment after taking into due consideration the overall facts and circumstances of the present case, and after appreciating the evidence placed on record before it. 4. Heard learned counsel for both parties, and perused the record of the case. 5. This Court finds that, as is evident from the record and as rightly pointed out by learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, that the investigation so conducted by the team of 3 persons, namely Mr. Champalal, Guman Mal and Gopalvallabh is fraught with procedural inconsistencies. 6. This Court thus deems it appropriate to grant the appellant herein the benefit of doubt, in light of the version of the prosecution being mere claims, unsubstantiated with proper evidence. 7. This Court observes that the learned Court below, in convicting the appellant herein for the offences under Section 5(1)(c)(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947 and Section 477-AI.P.C., has found that there was misappropriation/embezzlement and in arriving at such a conclusion, heavily relied upon the inspection/audit report, at Ex. P/5, which is itself called into question, for the reasons already aforementioned. v 8. This Court is conscious of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment of Bijender @ Mandar. P/5, which is itself called into question, for the reasons already aforementioned. v 8. This Court is conscious of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment of Bijender @ Mandar. State of Haryana 2022 1 SCC 92 wherein the following observations were made:- "Incontrovertibly, where the prosecution fails to inspire confidence in the manner and/or contents of the recovery with regard to its nexus to the alleged offense, the court ought to stretch the benefit of doubt to the accused. Its nearly three centuries old cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that "it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer." The doctrine of extending benefit of doubt to an accused, notwithstanding the proof of a strong suspicion, holds its fort on the premise that "the acquittal of a guilty person constitutes a miscarriage of justice just as much as the conviction of the innocent. The burden to prove the guilt beyond doubt does not shift on the suspect save where the law casts duty on the accused to prove his/her innocence." 9. This Court further observes that the manner in which the inspection/audit was conducted, from its inception from the letter issued through which the inspection/audit team was constituted, and although it entailed 5 officials, only 3 officials carried out the inspection/audit, and further that the manner in which the inspection/audit was carried out dehors the established procedure, as deposed by the officials of the team itself, coupled with the fact that while the report was jointly generated by all the officials of the three member team, it bore only the signature of Mr. Champalal, and the signatures of the other members were conspicuously absent. This entire process, from the beginning until the very end casts a shadow of doubt on the version of prosecution. And the learned Court below has based the conviction primarily on the audit report so generated by the three member team, and since the superstructure of the conviction has been based on the shaky foundation of the said report, at Ex. P/5, which has been generated by questionable means, it fails. 10. And the learned Court below has based the conviction primarily on the audit report so generated by the three member team, and since the superstructure of the conviction has been based on the shaky foundation of the said report, at Ex. P/5, which has been generated by questionable means, it fails. 10. As a consequence of the above discussion and keeping in mind the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bijender (supra), this Court finds that the conviction of the appellant herein is bad in the eye of law, and therefore the impugned judgment, dated 08.11.2001 is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the present appellant is hereby acquitted of all the charges levelled against him herein. The appellant is on bail; he need not surrender. 11. Accordingly, S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 925/2001, S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 926/2001, S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 927/2001, S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 928/2001, S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 929/2001, S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 930/2001, S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 931/2001 & S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 933/2001 are allowed, as indicated above. However, since the appeal bearing Criminal Appeal No. 295/2002 preferred by the State against the judgment of acquittal dated 03.11.2001 also pertains to the same controversy, therefore, the same is hereby dismissed.