JUDGMENT : (Prayer in W.P.No.22098 of 2013: Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records of the 2nd respondent made in FPA No.21/MDS/2000 dated 9.1.2001 and quash the same as far as this petitioner is concerned in espect of the property bearing door no.38, Munusamy Road, Taskar Town, Bangalore 51. Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records of the 2nd respondent made in FPA No.19/MDS/2000 dated 9.1.2001 and quash the same as far as this petitioner is concerned in respect of the property bearing door no.38, Munusamy Road, Taskar Town, Bangalore 51.) 1. The issues involved in these Writ Petitions are common and hence, they are taken up together, heard and disposed of through this Common Order. 2. The subject matter of challenge in both these Writ Petitions pertains to the proceedings of the 2nd respondent dated 9.1.2001, wherein, the Appellate Tribunal confirmed the Order of the Competent Authority and dismissed the appeals filed by the petitioners under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as ‘SAFEMA’). 3. The case of the petitioners is that the subject property (hereinafter referred to as the ‘KGF property’) was originally owned by one Abdul Razaak. He was detained under the provisions of Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as ‘COFEPOSA’). Notice dated 13.2.1980 was issued to him under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA to show cause as to why the immoveable properties belonging to him should not be forfeited as illegally acquired properties. He sold the property in favour of Smt. Shalamma and Smt. Gokulamma through a registered sale deed dated 3.3.1988. They in turn sold the property in favour of the petitioners under two sale deeds dated 14.12.1994. The further case of the petitioners is that they demolished the old building and they had put up a new building after getting necessary permission and were in possession and enjoyment of the same. The petitioners claim that they are bonafide purchasers for value and they were not aware about the proceedings initiated against Abdul Razaak under COFEPOSA and the forfeiture proceedings initiated against his immoveable properties under SAFEMA. 4. The petitioners claim that they are bonafide purchasers for value and they were not aware about the proceedings initiated against Abdul Razaak under COFEPOSA and the forfeiture proceedings initiated against his immoveable properties under SAFEMA. 4. It is stated that the petitioners were informed by the counsel who was appearing for Abdul Razaak that forfeiture order has been passed on 20.3.1998 by the competent authority under SAFEMA and the subject property has been forfeited. The petitioners were also informed that the appeal filed by Abdul Razaak against the Order of the competent authority was also dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal through an Order dated 9.12.1999. 5. The petitioners filed an appeal before the 2nd respondent and it was taken up for hearing along with the connected appeals and it was dismissed by an Order dated 9.1.2001. Aggrieved by the same, these Writ Petitions have been filed before this Court. 6. The 1st respondent has filed counter affidavit in both the Writ Petitions and has taken a stand that the transactions made by Abdul Razaak after the issuance of the notice under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA are null and void and hence, there is no question of going into the issue of whether the purchase was made bona fide for valid consideration. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that the 2nd respondent had taken into consideration all the grounds put forth by the petitioners and there is no scope to interfere with the same. The 1st respondent has also denied the claim made by the petitioners with regard to recording of reasons under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA and providing an opportunity to the petitioners. The 1st respondent has taken a stand that all these grounds were raised by the detenue and it has been rejected and confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal and the petitioners cannot once again raise the same grounds. The 1st respondent has contended that the subject property has to be brought for auction sale since it has already been forfeited and there is no scope for upholding the claim made by the subsequent purchasers. 7. Heard Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Mr.A.Kumaraguru, learned counsel for the respondents. 8. The 1st respondent has contended that the subject property has to be brought for auction sale since it has already been forfeited and there is no scope for upholding the claim made by the subsequent purchasers. 7. Heard Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Mr.A.Kumaraguru, learned counsel for the respondents. 8. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners made the following submissions: a) The requirement of recording reasons in writing under Section 6 (1) of SAFEMA is mandatory before passing orders, forfeiting the property and in the absence of the same, the forfeiture order itself is illegal. To substantiate this submission, the learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgments in: * P.P. Abdulla and Anr. v. Competent Authority and Ors. reported in (2007) 2 SCC 510 . * Aslam Mohammad Merchant v. Competent Authority and Ors. reported in (2008) 14 SCC 186 . * R. Ramakrishnan v. The Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property, reported in 2011 (2) MWN (Cr.) 582. b) The petitioners have put up a construction after getting proper sanction from the concerned authorities and out of the total land, only 75% of the land was forfeited and whereas construction is in the entire property. In view of the same, there is acquiescence on the part of the 1st respondent from forfeiting the entire property. To substantiate this submission, the Learned Senior Counsel relied upon the following judgments: * Bishan Das and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors., reported in AIR 1961 SC 1570 . * R.S. MuthuswamyGounder v. A. Annamalai and others, reported in AIR 1981 Mad 220 . c) The petitioners are bona fide purchasers for value and there was absolutely no intimation that was available to the petitioners to verify in the registration office that proceedings have been initiated under the SAFEMA and hence the property in the hands of the petitioners cannot be forfeited under the provisions of Section 7 of SAFEMA. To substantiate this submission, the Learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Gulshan Ahuja and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2005 Criminal LJ 1667. To substantiate this submission, the Learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Gulshan Ahuja and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2005 Criminal LJ 1667. d) In the present case, the vacant site alone was forfeited and the concept of what is annexed to the soil, goes with the soil, has not been accepted as an absolute rule of law in this country and the petitioners should have been made to atleast pay the value of the land as on the date of forfeiture. An Order to that effect that was passed by the Appellate Tribunal in the case of Abdul Razaak on 8.12.2001 was relied upon to substantiate this submission. e) The Government of India, Ministry of Finance issued a Notification dated 23.6.1994 wherein a decision was taken to drop all the cases where the value of the property involved does not exceed Rs.1 lakh and in the case of the petitioner, the value of the property when it was purchased by Abdul Razaak was Rs.17500/- and when it was purchased by the petitioners, its value was Rs.98500/-. Hence the property must be relieved from the forfeiture proceedings. To substantiate this submission, the judgment of the Kerala High Court, dealing with this Notification was relied upon, viz., K.A. Ibrahim Kutty v. The Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property and Anr., in O.P.No.31748 of 1999, Order dated 14.3.2000. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that all the grounds raised by the detenue was rejected and it was confirmed upto this Court and hence, the petitioners cannot once again raise the same grounds. It was further contended that the notice under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA was issued on 13.2.1980 to the detenue and thereafter, he has dealt with the property in the year 1988 and the property was subsequently transferred to the petitioners in the year 1994 and all these transfers are null and void under Section 11 of SAFEMA and therefore, all the rights claimed by the petitioners is non est in the eye of law. In the Writ Appeal filed by the detenue, it has been categorically held that insofar as the KGF property is concerned, the transfer itself was null and void and therefore no right accrues to the subsequent purchasers. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the respondents sought for the dismissal of this Writ Petition. In the Writ Appeal filed by the detenue, it has been categorically held that insofar as the KGF property is concerned, the transfer itself was null and void and therefore no right accrues to the subsequent purchasers. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the respondents sought for the dismissal of this Writ Petition. 10. This Court has carefully considered the submissions made on either side and the materials available on record. 11. The first two grounds raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners are straight away liable to be rejected by this Court. When the notice was issued under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA on 13.2.1980, the petitioners were not even in the scene and they came into the scene only in the year 1994. The detenue had challenged the forfeiture proceedings and had lost it till this Court and the forfeiture proceedings, insofar as the subject property is concerned, was confirmed by this Court in W.A.No.968 of 2000, by an Order dated 30.9.2011. It may be true that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its subsequent judgments had held that it is mandatory to produce the reasons in writing which made the Competent Authority believe that the properties are illegally acquired properties. This is a ground which can be raised only by the detenue since he has to satisfy the Competent Authority that the properties were legally acquired. A subsequent purchaser can never undertake this exercise and hence, even if the reasons had been provided in writing to the petitioners, nothing much could have been done by them. Hence, the judgments cited by the learned Senior Counsel will not come to the aid of the petitioners. 12. Similarly, the ground of acquiescence raised by the petitioners is unsustainable since the authority cannot be following up on the transfer of property done by the detenue after the issuance of Section 6(1) notice and it is almost impossible for the competent authority to keep watching as to who is putting up a construction in the forfeited property. Hence, the petitioner having put up a construction, cannot be permitted to raise the ground of acquiescence since the building was not put up with the permission or knowledge of the competent authority. 13. In the present case, the property was admittedly transferred after the issuance of notice under Section 6(1) of the Act on 13.2.1980. Hence, the petitioner having put up a construction, cannot be permitted to raise the ground of acquiescence since the building was not put up with the permission or knowledge of the competent authority. 13. In the present case, the property was admittedly transferred after the issuance of notice under Section 6(1) of the Act on 13.2.1980. In view of the same, Section 11 of SAFEMA straight away comes into operation and for proper appreciation, the said provision is extracted hereunder: “11. Certain transfers to be null and void.–Where after the issue of a notice under section 6 or under section 10, any property referred to in the said notice is transferred by any mode whatsoever such transfer shall, for the purposes of the proceedings under this Act, be ignored and if such property is subsequently forfeited to the Central Government under section 7, then, the transfer of such property shall be deemed to be null and void.” 14. The Honourable Supreme Court in Aamenabai Tayebaly v. Competent Authority reported in (1998) 1 SCC 703 , after considering the scope of Section 11 of SAFEMA, has held as follows: “10. It is true that the SAFEMA has been enacted to provide for the forfeiture of illegally acquired properties of smugglers and foreign exchange manipulators and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. It is also true that Section 2 sub-section (1) of the SAFEMA lays down that “the provisions of this Act shall apply only to the persons specified in sub-section (2)”. When we turn to sub-section (2) of Section 2 we find a list of persons mentioned therein at clauses (a) to (e). In Section 2 sub-sections (2)(a) and (b) are mentioned persons who are themselves detenus under the Act. Clause (c) refers to every person who is a relative of a person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b); clause (d) refers to every associate of a person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b); while clause (e) refers to any holder of any property which was at any time previously held by a person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) unless the present holder or, as the case may be, anyone who held such property after such person and before the present holder, is or was a transferee in good faith for adequate consideration. It is obvious that the purchaser's vendor Tahira Sultana was covered by Section 2 sub-section (2)(c) as she was the wife of the COFEPOSA detenu Talab Haji Hussein. The property standing in her name, therefore, could be processed under the provisions of the SAFEMA. It is true that a purchase from a relative of the COFEPOSA detenu would not be covered by Section 2 sub-section (e). Accordingly the purchaser Tayab Ali cannot be covered by Section 2(2)(e) of SAFEMA. However difficulty in his case arises independently of the provisions of Section 2 sub-section (2)(e) as we will presently show. The property in question at the relevant time stood in the name of the purchaser's vendor Tahira Sultana. As she was the relative of the COFEPOSA detenu, her husband, the competent authority issued a notice to her under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA in connection with Dharam Jyoti Building flat, the disputed property herein. After hearing her, the competent authority passed an order under Section 7 of SAFEMA forfeiting the said property on 12-10-1977. It is this order which was challenged by her in the Bombay High Court. She had undertaken not to alienate the said property and still in flagrant breach thereof she sold the property in 1981 to the purchaser Tayab Ali. Apart from the fact that the said transaction had exposed the purchaser's vendor Tahira Sultana to contempt proceedings and she was punished, the question survives whether the purchaser Tayab Ali could derive any benefit out of the said tainted transaction. It is, of course, true that pending the writ petition there was already a stay order of the High Court of Bombay by which the order of forfeiture of the said property had remained stayed. But it was not an absolute order. It was conditional on the purchaser's vendor Tahira Sultana, the writ petitioner, not transferring or alienating the said property pending the proceedings. The said injunction of the High Court reflected by the undertaking of Tahira Sultana made the said property inalienable pending the writ petition proceedings moved by the purchaser's vendor before the High Court. It was conditional on the purchaser's vendor Tahira Sultana, the writ petitioner, not transferring or alienating the said property pending the proceedings. The said injunction of the High Court reflected by the undertaking of Tahira Sultana made the said property inalienable pending the writ petition proceedings moved by the purchaser's vendor before the High Court. Under these circumstances even though Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, strictly speaking, may not apply as the lis was not registered in Bombay as informed to us, the prohibition against alienation of this property, by way of undertaking of the purchaser's own predecessor-in-title before the High Court had its full sway and operation. Therefore, if ultimately the writ petition was dismissed the transfer effected by the writ petitioner in breach of the prohibition and the undertaking would not give any benefit to the purchaser. It would be too much for him to contend that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The High Court in the impugned judgment has noted that the said plea does not appear to be probable. It is true, as pointed out by learned Senior Counsel, Shri Nariman for the appellants, that for coming to this finding the High Court had wrongly assumed that the purchaser Tayab Ali had immediately filed a writ petition after purchasing the property as he had filed his writ petition only on 13-12-1982 when he had received information on 5-11-1982 that the flat in question was already forfeited by the Government. That may be so. However, the ultimate finding of the High Court in this connection cannot be faulted on the touchstone of probabilities. The reason is obvious. The COFEPOSA detenu Talab Haji Hussein was a smuggler. When the purchaser purchased the said flat standing in the name of the wife of the said smuggler, in usual course of conduct the said purchaser must have been put on enquiry as to how COFEPOSA detenu's wife Tahira Sultana became the owner of this property and what had happened to this property in the proceedings under SAFEMA and whether title of the said flat was clear or not. No such enquiry seems to have been made and it is not the case of the purchaser that any such enquiry was made by him at the relevant time when he entered into the said transaction pending the writ petition in the Bombay High Court. Thus on broad probabilities of the case it must be held that the purchaser willingly and with open eyes played with fire and purchased litigation and it is too tall a claim on his part to submit that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Such stand does not bear scrutiny on the touchstone of probabilities. But even that apart once the writ petition filed by Tahira Sultana challenging forfeiture order of 12-10-1977 got dismissed by the Bombay High Court and once that order became final the original order of forfeiture of this property dated 12-10-1977 operated in full swing and the result was that as per Section 7 sub-section (3) of SAFEMA the said property stood forfeited to the Central Government free from all encumbrances. Therefore, it must be held that by 12-10-1977 the property in dispute had ceased to belong to the purchaser's vendor Tahira Sultana and had vested in the Central Government. Consequently when she purported to sell this property on 30-7-1981 to the purchaser Tayab Ali she can be said to have sold the property which had already ceased to belong to her and she could not pass any valid title in favour of Tayab Ali in connection with the said property which no longer belonged to her since 1977. It is, of course, true that when she sold the said property the order of forfeiture had been stayed by the High Court, as seen earlier, it was a limited stay subject to the condition of inalienability of the property by Tahira Sultana and breach of such undertaking, which was a substitute for an injunction, would make that transaction voidable and its efficacy had to be seen in the light of the final result of the writ petition and once the final result was against Tahira Sultana, whatever she did in the meantime became an exercise in futility. In this connection we may usefully refer to Section 11 of SAFEMA which reads as under: “11. In this connection we may usefully refer to Section 11 of SAFEMA which reads as under: “11. Certain transfers to be null and void.-Where after the issue of a notice under Section 6 or under Section 10, any property referred to in the said notice is transferred by any mode whatsoever such transfer shall, for the purposes of the proceedings under this Act, be ignored and if such property is subsequently forfeited to the Central Government under Section 7, then, the transfer of such property shall be deemed to be null and void.” It is no doubt true that on the express language of the said section transfer of any property pending the proceedings under Section 6 or 10 of the said Act and prior to the order of forfeiture shall be treated to be null and void. The purchaser's transaction is after the order of forfeiture of the said property. Still the consequence of the said transaction being null and void could not be avoided by the purchaser on the plea that this transaction was subsequent to the original order of forfeiture. The original order of forfeiture was stayed at the time of the purchase. It got confirmed by the Bombay High Court ultimately when the Miscellaneous Petition No. 1680 of 1977 moved by Tahira Sultana was disposed of and the subsequent Writ Petition No. 1527 of 1995 was dismissed by the High Court and the SLP filed by her in this Court was also dismissed. We may also note that as the Miscellaneous Petition No. 1680 of 1977 was withdrawn on 19-6-1995 and ultimately the forfeiture order came to be confirmed in the subsequent Writ Petition No. 1527 of 1995 on 21-8-1995, the transaction of transfer in favour of Tayab Ali would be said to have been effected after the notice under Section 6, issued to Tahira Sultana, and before the order of forfeiture ultimately got confirmed by the High Court and by this Court and which had back effect of confirming the same from 1977. It must, therefore, be held that the transaction of purchase by the appellants' predecessor Tayab Ali was also hit by Section 11 of SAFEMA. Consequently in 1981 when the purchaser purchased this property from Tahira Sultana she had no interest in the said flat which she could convey to the appellants' predecessor. It must, therefore, be held that the transaction of purchase by the appellants' predecessor Tayab Ali was also hit by Section 11 of SAFEMA. Consequently in 1981 when the purchaser purchased this property from Tahira Sultana she had no interest in the said flat which she could convey to the appellants' predecessor. In substance it amounted to selling of Central Government's property by a total stranger in favour of the purchaser. No title, therefore, in the said property passed to the appellants' predecessor. The appellants' predecessor, therefore, had no legal defence against the claim of the authorities in calling upon the appellants as heirs of the original purchaser to vacate and hand over the possession of the property to the Central Government as full owner thereof. Both the points for determination, therefore, are answered against the appellants and in favour of the respondents.” 15. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners were bona fide purchasers in the year 1994 and they were not aware about the forfeiture proceedings when the property was purchased by them. It was further submitted that the notice under Section 6(1) of the Act was issued in the year 1980 and the forfeiture order was passed only in the year 1998 after 18 years and by then, the petitioners have become the owners of the subject property. Such an inordinate delay ought to be considered by this Court to interfere with the forfeiture proceedings. It will be relevant to take note of the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Gulshan Ahuja and Others, referred supra and the relevant portions are extracted hereunder: “40. In so far as the purchasers of Part B are concerned who have purchased from the mother of Shri H.K. Sarin, the additional plea raised is of the lack of notice under Section 6 of SAFEMA. The requirement under Section 6 is mandatory and this has been so noticed by the learned Single Judge in Kamla Bai's case (supra). However, in the present case, the recorded owner Smt. Suhagwanti passed away almost nine years prior to the initiation of proceedings under SAFEMA. The name of the legal heirs were hot brought on record nor did the legal heirs take any steps. However, in the present case, the recorded owner Smt. Suhagwanti passed away almost nine years prior to the initiation of proceedings under SAFEMA. The name of the legal heirs were hot brought on record nor did the legal heirs take any steps. Shri H.K. Sarin took the plea that he was in occupation of the property and the property was his specially in view of a bequeath made by Smt. Suhagwanti in terms of the Will dated 25.10.1970. There is no doubt that the Will was not probated and the NOCs from other legal heirs were not obtained. There was, however, no reason for the competent court to doubt the plea of Shri H.K. Sarin when the other legal heirs themselves had taken no steps to get their names recorded. In fact, it is only in 1996, 25 years after the passing away of Smt. Suhagwanti that Shri S.K. Sarin got the property mutated in his name on the basis of NOCs of other legal heirs. In view thereof, in the given facts of the case, I find no infirmity with the procedure followed by the respondents. 41. The plea of bona fide purchaser by itself would be of not much assistance to the petitioners in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Aamenabai Tayebaly & Ors. case (supra) and the reading of the provisions of Section 6, 7 and 11 of SAFEMA. 42. In the present case, however, an important aspect to be considered is the 18 years' delay in passing the order between the date of issuance of the notice under Section 6 and the passing of the order under Section 7 of SAFEMA. The Appellate Tribunal in certain cases referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner has found such delays fatal. In my considered view, if the properties had continued to vest with the original owners, even this inordinate delay of 18 years could not have influenced the decision to be arrived at in the matter. However, the material fact in the present case is that the properties have been purchased through Regd. documents by bona fide purchasers when the Department itself had delayed the proceedings for 18 years. This delay has occurred despite the fact that Shri H.K. Sarin had responded to the notice in 1981 and there was no interdict by any competent court in passing the order. documents by bona fide purchasers when the Department itself had delayed the proceedings for 18 years. This delay has occurred despite the fact that Shri H.K. Sarin had responded to the notice in 1981 and there was no interdict by any competent court in passing the order. Even if more than one property was involved, a delay of such magnitude cannot be expected. 43. I am not in agreement with the findings arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal that the purchasers had to do anything more than what they had done. Any enquiry from the Registry would have served no purpose since no intimation is sent to the Registrar's office. Thus, a bona fide purchaser was required to look into the previous title and see whether any doubts were cast on the property. There was no manner by which petitioners could have known of the notice under Section 6 of SAFEMA.” 16. The Delhi High Court not only took into consideration the delay in passing the forfeiture order but also of the fact that the conveyance to the subsequent purchaser was made by the Government of India. This material fact swayed the case in favour of the petitioners therein. The ratio in a case must be understood on the facts of that particular case and the issues that actually arise for consideration. In the case of the petitioners, one portion of the above judgment is in their favour viz., the delay of 18 years in passing the forfeiture order. 17. At this juncture, two factors weigh in the mind of the Court. The first factor is a delay of 18 years in passing the forfeiture order and the second factor is the petitioners being bona fide purchasers for value and that they had no occasion to become aware of the proceedings under SAFEMA. Keeping this in mind, this Court has to see if the interest of both the sides can be balanced. Ultimately, even if the forfeiture proceedings are upheld, the property will be put on auction sale and the amount will go to Central Government. What has been forfeited in the present case is 75 % of the land that was purchased by the petitioners. The petitioners have spent money in demolishing the old structure and for putting up a new structure, after getting necessary sanction. 18. What has been forfeited in the present case is 75 % of the land that was purchased by the petitioners. The petitioners have spent money in demolishing the old structure and for putting up a new structure, after getting necessary sanction. 18. The Appellate Tribunal itself has encountered cases where the vacant site alone was forfeited as per the order of the competent authority and the construction made thereon was not the subject matter of forfeiture. In those cases, the Tribunal had exercised the power conferred under Rule 20 of the Forfeited Property (Procedure) Rules, 1986 and directed the value of the forfeited site to be ascertained and on payment of the market value of the same, to release the property from the clutches of SAFEMA. 19. The above procedure could have been adopted by the 2nd respondent on the facts of the present case so that the value of the property that was attached could have been ascertained and the petitioners could have been made to pay the same to the Central Government. 20. In view of the above discussion, this Court is inclined to remand the matter back to the file of the 2nd respondent for the limited purpose of exercising its jurisdiction under Rule 20 of the Forfeited Property (Procedure) Rules, 1986 in order to enable the 2nd respondent to determine the amount and direct the petitioners to pay the same to the Central Government within the stipulated period. On the petitioners making such payment of the amount determined by the 2nd respondent, the property can be released from forfeiture. If the amount is not paid, the order of forfeiture can be confirmed and further action can be taken under the provisions of SAFEMA. The 2nd respondent shall pass appropriate orders in this regard within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this Order. 21. The impugned order of the 2nd respondent dated 9.1.2001 stands modified in the above terms and the Writ Petitions are disposed of accordingly. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.