JUDGMENT : Manish Pitale, J. 1. Heard Mr. S.P. Bhandarkar, learned counsel with Mr. Ganesh Mate, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Ms. Ketki Joshi, learned Public Prosecutor and Mr. A.S. Fulzele, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State authorities in these two petitions. 2. Both these petitions have come up for consideration for the first time before this Court. Although, the petitions pertain to different factual scenarios, but the question that is raised for consideration in both these petitions is common and therefore, these petitions have been taken up for consideration together. 3. Since, the petitioners in these petitions are seeking to invoke writ jurisdiction of this Court, the respondent-State authorities have raised a preliminary issue pertaining to the very maintainability of the present petitions, in the facts and circumstances of the cases. In fact, this Court also raised the question of maintainability of these petitions at the outset and therefore, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners was called upon to address this Court on the said issue. Initially, a short adjournment was sought to bring to the notice of this Court relevant judgments. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as learned Public Prosecutor and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State authorities have placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in order to buttress their respective stands. 4. Mr. S.P. Bhandarkar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that a perusal of the prayer clauses in these petitions would show that the petitioners are specifically referring to and relying upon and invoking Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in order to seek reliefs from this Court under writ jurisdiction. It is submitted that power under Section 157 of the Cr.P.C. is not to be confused with the power under Section 154 thereof and therefore, reference to Section 156 of the Cr.P.C., particularly sub-section (3) thereof, is wholly irrelevant in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The aforesaid submission is emphatically made on the basis that the petitioners in these petitions cannot be relegated to the concerned Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC. The aforesaid submission is emphatically made on the basis that the petitioners in these petitions cannot be relegated to the concerned Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC. It is the case of the petitioners that the facts and circumstances of the present cases and the specific grievance being raised on their behalf is relatable to and calling upon this Court to interpret the true scope of Section 157 of the Cr.P.C. It is specifically submitted that the factual position in both these petitions is completely covered under Section 157 of the Cr.P.C. and that therefore, the respondent-State authorities cannot be heard to say that applications ought to be filed by the petitioners before the learned Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. for redressal of their grievances. This submission is made without prejudice to the contention of the petitioners that even if there is alternate remedy available under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., the writ Court would not close its doors to the petitioners once grievance is made out that the respondent-State authorities i.e. police officers, have completely failed to perform their duties as expected under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is submitted that the arguments pertaining to alternate remedy available to the petitioners under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. is misplaced in the facts and circumstances of the present cases and therefore, the present petitions deserve to be entertained for further scrutiny and examination by this Court. 5. By referring to to the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari. vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 , it is submitted that, although incidentally, Section 157 of Cr.P.C. did come up for interpretation in the said judgment, a proper appreciation of the law laid down in that context would show that the present writ petitions not only deserve to be entertained, but they deserve to be allowed in terms of the prayers made in these petitions. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners also relied upon a judgment of Kerala High Court in Anil Kumar. vs. Latha Mohan and others, reported in 2021 SCC Online Ker. 514. Insofar as the judgments, upon which the learned Public Prosecutor sought to rely i.e. judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sakiri Vasu. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2008)2 SCC 409 ; and Aleque Padamsee and others. vs. Latha Mohan and others, reported in 2021 SCC Online Ker. 514. Insofar as the judgments, upon which the learned Public Prosecutor sought to rely i.e. judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sakiri Vasu. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2008)2 SCC 409 ; and Aleque Padamsee and others. vs. Union of India and others, reported in (2007) 6 SCC 171 , the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the said judgments were not relevant for the present petitions as they concern the scope and power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., in the context of failure of police authorities to register the first information report under Section 154 of the Cr. P.C. 6. On the other hand, Mrs. Ketki Joshi, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent nos.1 and 2 in Cri.W.P. No. 527/22 and Mr. A.S. Fulzele, the Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent nos.1 and 2 in Cri.W.P. No. 556/22, submitted that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners in both the petitions are unsustainable and they are based on erroneous appreciation of the true scope of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. i.e. Sections 154 to 173 thereof. It is submitted that a bare perusal of the statements made in these writ petitions and the prayers made therein, clearly indicate that the grievance of the petitioners is that although, information pertaining to a cognizable offence was provided by the petitioners to the concerned Police Officers, they failed to take necessary steps in the matter. It was submitted that such a situation was the subject matter of consideration before the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari’s case (supra) and it was specifically laid down that registration of first information report would be mandatory, if the information disclosed commission of cognizable offence. It was submitted that proper interpretation of the relevant paragraphs of the said Constitution Bench judgment would show that first information reports have been recognized in two categories i.e. FIRs under Section 154 Cr.P.C. and FIRs under Section 157 thereof. It was submitted that proper interpretation of the relevant paragraphs of the said Constitution Bench judgment would show that first information reports have been recognized in two categories i.e. FIRs under Section 154 Cr.P.C. and FIRs under Section 157 thereof. It was submitted that applying the said categorization as recognized in the aforesaid Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari’s case (supra), the present petitions are clearly covered under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. and, if that be so, the grievance of the petitioners, if any, as regards failure on the part of police machinery to cause registration of FIR, for investigating the matters, can be raised by a properly framed application before the competent Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. 7. It is submitted by the learned Public Prosecutors that although it cannot be said that writ jurisdiction of this Court can never be invoked, but the Hon’ble Supreme Court itself has sounded a note of caution in this context in the aforementioned judgments in Sakiri Vasu (supra) and Aleque Padamsee and others (supra), to the effect that when the remedy of approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is available, the aggrieved persons ought not to be permitted to rush to the High Court by invoking writ jurisdiction. By relying upon the said judgments, it is submitted that the present petitions deserve to be dismissed. 8. We have considered the rival contentions in the backdrop of the material placed on record and the judgments brought to our notice. 9. We are proceeding on the basis of the statements made in these two writ petitions and the nature of the grievance that can be culled out. We are of the opinion that the real grievance of the petitioners is that when information pertaining to a cognizable offence was disclosed before the police officers, according to them, necessary steps were not taken by such officers and that the petitioners seek remedy in that regard. 10. We are of the opinion that merely referring to Section 157 of Cr.P.C. in the petitions would not necessarily cover the case of the petitioners under the said provision. 10. We are of the opinion that merely referring to Section 157 of Cr.P.C. in the petitions would not necessarily cover the case of the petitioners under the said provision. We observe that when the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra) has referred to Sections 154, 156 and 157 of the Cr.P.C. and reached specific conclusions regarding two types of FIRs, it has to be first examined at the outset as to under which type of FIR the grievance sought to be projected on behalf of the aggrieved persons, is covered. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant portion of the Constitution Bench judgment in Lalita Kumari’s case (supra), which reads thus : “96. The underpinnings of compulsory registration of FIR is not only to ensure transparency in the criminal justice - delivery system but also to ensure ‘judicial oversight’. Section 157(1) deploys the word ‘forthwith’. Thus, any information received under Section 154(1) or otherwise has to be duly informed in the form of a report to the Magistrate. Thus, the commission of a cognizable offence is not only brought to the knowledge of the investigating agency but also to the subordinate judiciary. 97. The Code contemplates two kinds of FIRs : The duly signed FIR under Section 154(1) is by the informant to the officer concerned at the police station. The second kind of FIR could be which is registered by the police itself on any information received or other than by way of an informant [Section 157(1)] and even this information has to be duly recorded and the copy should be sent to the Magistrate forthwith. The registration of FIR either on the basis of the information furnished by the informant under Section 154(1) of the Code or otherwise under Section 157(1) of the Code is obligatory. The obligation to register FIR has inherent advantages” 11. The aforesaid observations have been made by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court while stating that the only question for consideration before the said Bench related to interpretation of Section 154 of Cr.P.C. and incidentally to consider Sections 156 and 157 also. It is relevant that after having held, as quoted above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed in the said judgment as follows : “111. It is relevant that after having held, as quoted above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed in the said judgment as follows : “111. Besides, the Code gives power to the police to close a matter both before and after investigation. A police officer can foreclose an FIR before an investigation under Section 157 of the Code, if it appears to him that there is no sufficient ground to investigate the same. The Section itself states that a police officer can start investigation when he has a ‘reason to suspect the commission of an offence’. Therefore, the requirements of launching an investigation under Section 157 of the Code are higher than the requirement under Section 154 of the Code. The police officer can also, in a given case, investigate the matter and then file a final report under Section 173 of the Code seeking closure of the matter. Therefore, the police is not liable to launch an investigation in every FIR which is mandatorily registered on receiving information relating to commission of a cognizable offence.” 12. Thus, we find that as per the law laid down in the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari’s case (supra), when information, as sought to be placed by the petitioners before the police officers in these cases, is considered and the nature of grievances sought to be raised on their behalf is analyzed, it is found that the grievance of the petitioners pertains to failure on the part of the police machinery to register FIR, as contemplated under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. The real crux of the grievance of the petitioners appears to be failure on the part of the police officers to follow the mandate of the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, wherein, inter alia, it is laid down that registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of Cr.P.C., if an information discloses commission of a cognizable offence. Once, we have reached the aforesaid conclusion, the contentions sought to be raised on behalf of the petitioners and framing of prayer clauses in the petitions referring to Section 157 of Cr.P.C., would be of no assistance to the petitioners to successfully invoke writ jurisdiction of this Court. Once, we have reached the aforesaid conclusion, the contentions sought to be raised on behalf of the petitioners and framing of prayer clauses in the petitions referring to Section 157 of Cr.P.C., would be of no assistance to the petitioners to successfully invoke writ jurisdiction of this Court. Even otherwise, we find that placement of Section 157 after Sections 154, 155 and 156 and followed by Sections 158 and 159, demonstrates a scheme, which has to be logically consrued and the mandate of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has to be followed to the hilt. 13. We are of the opinion that applying the said position of law to the facts of the present cases, reference to Section 157 of Cr.P.C. in the body of the writ petitions and in prayer clauses thereof, is only an attempt on the part of the petitioners to invoke writ jurisdiction, inter alia, on the ground that no remedy is available to the petitioners as contemplated under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. We are not in agreement with the petitioners on that score. 14. If the position of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sakiri Vasu (supra) and Aleque Padamsee and others (supra), is appreciated in the correct perspective, we find that it would be inappropriate on our part to invoke writ jurisdiction in the facts, as are available, and on the basis of the statements made in the present writ petitions. We are conscious of the fact that the doors of the writ Court cannot be shut out, but equally it is significant that writ jurisdiction, in such a situation, can be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances. 15. In the case of Sakiri Vasu (supra), while commenting upon the scope of Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows : “15. Section 156(3) provides for a check by the Magistrate on the police performing its duties under Chapter XII Cr.P.C. In cases where the Magistrate finds that the police has not done its duty of investigating the case at all, or has not done it satisfactorily, he can issue a direction to the police to do the investigation properly, and can monitor the same. 16. 16. The power in the Magistrate to order further investigation under Section 156(3) is an independent power, and does not affect the power of the investigating officer to further investigate the case even after submission of his report vide Section 173(8). Hence the Magistrate can order re-opening of the investigation even after the police submits the final report, vide State of Bihar vs. J.A.C. Saldanna AIR 1980 SC 326 (para 19). 17. In our opinion Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include all such powers in a Magistrate which are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation, and it includes the power to order registration of an F.I.R. and of ordering a proper investigation if the Magistrate is satisfied that a proper investigation has not been done, or is not being done by the police. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., though briefly worded, in our opinion, is very wide and it will include all such incidental powers as are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation. 18. It is well-settled that when a power is given to an authority to do something it includes such incidental or implied powers which would ensure the proper doing of that thing. In other words, when any power is expressly granted by the statute, there is impliedly included in the grant, even without special mention, every power and every control the denial of which would render the grant itself ineffective. Thus where an Act confers jurisdiction it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employ such means as are essentially necessary for its execution” xxxxxxx “24. In view of the abovementioned legal position, we are of the view that although Section 156(3) is very briefly worded, there is an implied power in the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to order registration of a criminal offence and /or to direct the officer in charge of the police station concerned to hold a proper investigation and take all such necessary steps that may be necessary for ensuring a proper investigation including monitoring the same. Even though these powers have not been expressly mentioned in Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., we are of the opinion that they are implied in the above provision. 25. Even though these powers have not been expressly mentioned in Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., we are of the opinion that they are implied in the above provision. 25. We have elaborated on the above matter because we often find that when someone has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered at the police station and/or a proper investigation is not being done by the police, he rushes to the High Court to file a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. We are of the opinion that the High Court should not encourage this practice and should ordinarily refuse to interfere in such matters, and relegate the petitioner to his alternating remedy, firstly under Section 154(3) and Section 36 Cr.P.C. before the police officers concerned, and if that is of no avail, by approaching the Magistrate concerned under Section 156(3). 26. If a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police station his first remedy is to approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) Cr.P.C. or other police officer referred to in Section 36 Cr.P.C. If despite approaching the Superintendent of Police or the officer referred to in Section 36 his grievance still persists, then he can approach a Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. instead of rushing to the High Court by way of a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Moreover he has a further remedy of filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. Why then should writ petitions or Section 482 petitions be entertained when there are so many alternative remedies? 27. As we have already observed above, the Magistrate has very wide powers to direct registration of an FIR and to ensure a proper investigation, and for this purpose he can monitor the investigation to ensure that the investigation is done properly (though he cannot investigate himself). The High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petition or petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. simply because a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or after being registered, proper investigation has not been done by the police. The High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petition or petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. simply because a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or after being registered, proper investigation has not been done by the police. For this grievance, the remedy lies under Sections 36 and 154(3) before the police officers concerned, and if that is of no avail, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate or by filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and not by filing a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 28. It is true that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to a writ petition, but it is equally well settled that if there is an alternative remedy the High Court should not ordinarily interfere.” 16. In the case of Aleque Padamsee (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after referring to Sections 154 and 156 of the Cr.P.C., observed as follows : “6. “4. When the information is laid with the police, but no action in that behalf is taken, the complainant (can under Section 190 read with Section 200 of the Code lay) the complaint before the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and the Magistrate is required to enquire into the complaint as provided in Chapter XV of the Code. In case the Magistrate, after recording evidence, finds a prima facie case, instead of issuing process to the accused, he is empowered to direct the police concerned to investigate into offence under Chapter XII of the Code and to submit a report. If he finds that the complaint does not disclose any offence to take further action, he is empowered to dismiss the complaint under Section 203 of the Code. In case he finds that the complaint/evidence recorded prima facie discloses an offence, he is empowered to take cognizance of the offence and) could issue process to the accused.) These aspects have been highlighted by this Court in All India Institute of Medical Sciences Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India [ (1996) 11 SCC 582 ] para 4. It was specifically observed that a writ petition in such cases is not to be entertained. It was specifically observed that a writ petition in such cases is not to be entertained. The above position was again highlighted in Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra [ (2004) 7 SCC 768 ], Minu Kumari and Another v. State of Bihar and Others [ (2006) 4 SCC 359 ] and Hari Singh v. State of U.P. ( 2006 (5) SCC 733 ). 7. Whenever any information is received by the police about the alleged commission of offence which is a cognizable one there is a duty to register the FIR. There can be no dispute on that score. The only question is whether a writ can be issued to the police authorities to register the same. The basic question is as to what course is to be adopted if the police does not do it. As was held in All India Institute of Medical Sciences's case (supra) and re-iterated in Gangadhar's case (supra) the remedy available is as set out above by filing a complaint before the Magistrate. Though it was faintly suggested that there was conflict in the views in All India Institute of Medical Sciences's case (supra), Gangadhar's case (supra), Hari Singh's case (supra), Minu Kumari's case (supra) and Ramesh Kumari's case (supra), we find that the view expressed in Ramesh Kumari's case (supra) related to the action required to be taken by the police when any cognizable offence is brought to its notice. In Ramesh Kumari's case (supra) the basic issue did not relate to the methodology to be adopted which was expressly dealt with in All India Institute of Medical Sciences's case (supra), Gangadhar's case (supra), Minu Kumari's case (supra) and Hari Singh's case (supra). The view expressed in Ramesh Kumari's case (supra) was reiterated in Lallan Chaudhary and Ors. V. State of Bihar ( AIR 2006 SC 3376 ). The course available, when the police does not carry out the statutory requirements under Section 154 was directly in issue in All India Institute of Medical Sciences's case (supra), Gangadhar's case (supra), Hari Singh's case (supra) and Minu Kumari's case (supra). The correct position in law, therefore, is that the police officials ought to register the FIR whenever facts brought to its notice show that cognizable offence has been made out. The correct position in law, therefore, is that the police officials ought to register the FIR whenever facts brought to its notice show that cognizable offence has been made out. In case the police officials fail to do so, the modalities to be adopted are as set out in Sections 190 read with Section 200 of the Code. It appears that in the present case initially the case was tagged by order dated 24.2.2003 with WP(C) No.530/2002 and WP (C) No.221/2002. Subsequently, these writ petitions were de-linked from the aforesaid writ petitions.” 17. It is relevant that in the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court specifically directed that if any person is aggrieved by inaction on the part of the police official in registering FIR, the modalities contained in Section 190 read with Section 200 of Cr.P.C. are to be adopted and observed. 18. The aforesaid position of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgments, sufficiently indicates that when there is grievance on the part of a person that the police authorities have failed in their duty, remedy of approaching a Magistrate under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. or invoking Sections 190 and 200 thereof, is certainly available. As noted above, despite these remedies being available, the writ Court can, in a given set of circumstances, entertain a writ petition, when the facts brought to the notice of the Court are extraordinary in nature. The observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sakiri Vasu’s case (supra) and Aleque Padamsee’s case (supra), that when the aggrieved person can approach a Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr. P.C., why should writ petitions or petitions under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. be entertained, is a question that arises in these two petitions also. If the petitions of this nature are entertained routinely by the writ Court, the apprehension expressed in the aforesaid judgment by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that it would lead to such persons rushing to the High Courts by filing such petitions, would indeed come true. 19. We are also of the opinion that reliance placed on behalf of the petitioners on the judgment of the Kerala High Court in the case of Anil Kumar (supra), is also misplaced. 19. We are also of the opinion that reliance placed on behalf of the petitioners on the judgment of the Kerala High Court in the case of Anil Kumar (supra), is also misplaced. A perusal of the facts giving rise to the said case would show that FIR was registered on an order of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. The observations made by the Kerala High Court in the said judgment concerning sections 154 to 173 of the Cr.P.C. have been read out of context by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. 20. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that at the outset, we are not satisfied that a case for invoking writ jurisdiction is made out by the petitioners in these petitions. Therefore, the writ petitions are dismissed. 21. Needless to say, as indicated above, the petitioners would be at liberty to invoke the remedies available under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. for satisfaction of their respective grievances.