JUDGMENT : MANISH CHOUDHURY, J. 1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the writ petitioner seeking inter-alia a direction, in the nature of mandamus, to the respondent authorities to return the land acquired earlier from the family of the petitioner as the same is seen to be unutilized by the respondent authorities for about a decade after its acquisition. 2. The case projected by the petitioner, in brief, is that the grandfather of the petitioner, Late Nazar Uddin owned and possessed a plot of land measuring 2 Bighas 1 Katha 8 Lessas (02B-01K-08L) located in Village - Thakuranbari, Mankachar Revenue Circle in the present district of South Salmara - Mankachar (‘the subject-plot’ for short). The subject-plot which stood in the name of Late Nazar Uddin, is covered by Dag No. 251 and Patta No. 176. The subject-plot was agricultural land and periodic lease was issued in the name of Late Nazar Uddin. 3. By a Notification No. RLA-182/2000 dated 03.08.2001, a land acquisition proceeding was drawn up under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (since repealed) and accordingly, a land acquisition case being L.A. Case No. 07/1995-1996, was initiated. A number of plots of land including the subject-plot, came to be acquired for the public purpose of establishing a regulated market at Mankachar. Areas of 5 Bighas 2 Kathas 5 Lessas, in total, were acquired during the process. A market value for the proposed acquired land was fixed at Rs. 19,900/- per Bigha on the basis of the registered sale deeds. The total award estimated by the District Collector for the said areas of land measuring 5 Bighas 2 Kathas 5 Lessas was Rs. 1,54,000/-. Out of that amount, an amount of Rs. 62,450.18 was assessed in favour of the petitioner’s grandfather, Late Nazar Uddin. 4. The possession of the acquired land was taken in the year 2004. The State Government in the Revenue Department accorded its approval to the Award under L.A. Case no. 07/1995-1996 on 12.01.2005 vide its letter bearing No. RLA/182/2000/35. After approval of the award, the petitioner’s grandfather was paid an amount of Rs. 62,450.18 on 19.12.2008 against the subject-plot. The possession of the entire acquired areas of land were taken over by the acquiring authority and thereafter, the possession was handed over to the Dhubri District Regulated Market Committee. 5. 07/1995-1996 on 12.01.2005 vide its letter bearing No. RLA/182/2000/35. After approval of the award, the petitioner’s grandfather was paid an amount of Rs. 62,450.18 on 19.12.2008 against the subject-plot. The possession of the entire acquired areas of land were taken over by the acquiring authority and thereafter, the possession was handed over to the Dhubri District Regulated Market Committee. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that it has been noticed by him that though possession of the entire areas of land for construction of Dhubri District Regulated Market were taken over in the year 2004, the requiring authority did not utilize the entire acquired areas of land for construction of the market. As a result, a part of the acquired plot of land has been lying unutilized for a considerable length of time. The petitioner has noticed that the aforesaid unutilized part of the acquired land is being gradually encroached by some other people. The petitioner has contended that after having seen that part of the acquired land unutilized, he submitted representations before the Deputy Commissioner, South Salmara - Mankachar district, on 10.02.2015 and 20.09.2016 with a prayer to return the petitioner family’s acquired land. 6. I have heard Mr. D.P. Chaliha, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. M. Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner; Mr. P.S. Deka, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent no. 1; and Ms. S. Sarma, learned Junior Government Advocate, Assam for the respondent nos. 2, 3 and 4. None has appeared for the respondent nos. 5 and 6 despite call, though they got themselves impleaded as party-respondents in the writ petition. 7. Mr. Chaliha, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been replaced by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Re-Settlement Act, 2013 (‘the Act 2013’ or ‘the 2013 Act’ for short). In the Act, 2013, there is a provision contained in Section 101 for return of the unutilized land. It has been submitted by him that when any land acquired earlier remains unutilized for a period of 5 (five) years from the date of taking over the possession, the same shall be returned to the original owner or owners or their legal heirs, on preferential basis. It has been submitted by him that when any land acquired earlier remains unutilized for a period of 5 (five) years from the date of taking over the possession, the same shall be returned to the original owner or owners or their legal heirs, on preferential basis. Since the subject-plot has remained unutilized for about a decade since taking over possession of the subject-plot, a direction be given to the respondent authorities to return the subject-plot to the family of the petitioner as they have become landless due to such acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 8. Mr. Deka, learned Standing Counsel, Revenue Department has submitted that there is no provision for return of any land or any part of the land, as the case may be, acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as after acquisition, it gets vested absolutely in the Government. A recourse to the provisions of Section 101 of the 2013 Act is also not available to the petitioner to claim return of the subject-plot measuring 02B-01K-08L as Section 101 of the 2013 Act is restricted only to the land acquired under the Act of 2013 and the provision of Section 101 cannot be extended for land acquisitioned under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (since repealed). The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and Others, (2020) 8 SCC 129 has already dealt on the matter. 9. Ms. Sarma has adopted the submissions of Mr. Deka by making similar submissions. Mr. Sarma by referring to the averments made in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent no. 4, has submitted that the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, Late Nazar Uddin had already received the compensation against the acquired subject-plot and as such, the petitioner’s request to reverse the process of acquisition cannot be considered as everything had attained finality. Thus, it is not open for the petitioners to revive a stale matter after a decade. 10. I have duly considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (since repealed) and the Act, 2013. 11. Thus, it is not open for the petitioners to revive a stale matter after a decade. 10. I have duly considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (since repealed) and the Act, 2013. 11. It is an admitted case of the petitioner that the subject-plot measuring 02B-01K-08L belonging to the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Nazar Uddin was acquired for the public purpose of establishment of a regulated market vide L.A. Case No. 07/1995-1996. After acquisition, the requiring authority has already constructed a market in some portion of the acquired areas of land. The respondent no. 4 by filing a counter affidavit has categorically asserted that the subject-plot, after acquisition, has been utilized for construction of Mankachar Regulated Market as per the requirements and the Mankachar Regulated Market is running its business with all infrastructures in the said acquired areas of land and they have left some open place to support the business in different ways such as storage, loading, un-loading of goods by the trucks and parking of vehicles, etc. 12. It is not in dispute that the subject-plot measuring 02B-01K-08L was acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 stood repealed by virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 114 of the Act, 2013. Sub-section (2) of Section 114 of the 2013 Act has provided that the repeal under sub-section (1), save as otherwise provided under the 2013 Act, shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 with regard to the effect of repeal. 13. In the above conspectus of factual backdrop, the main issue that has arisen for consideration in this writ petition is whether after acquisition of the subject-plot under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (since repealed) and after receipt of due compensation against such acquired land by the original landowner, whether the original landowner and/or his successor-in-interest like the petitioner, can get back the acquired subject-plot on the ground that the acquired subject-plot has remained unutilized for the construction of the Mankachar Regulated Market Complex, the purpose for which it was acquired. The other issue that has arisen is whether the subject-plot can be returned to the petitioner as the successor-in-interest of the original landowner by virtue of the provision contained in Section 101 of the 2013 Act. 14. The said issues arising in this writ petition are no longer res integra in view of specific provisions contained in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (since repealed) the Act, 2013 and also in view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on the specific issues. 15. Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (since repealed) laid down that when the Collector had made an award under Section 11 of the said Act, he can take possession of the land and thereafter, the land vested absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (since repealed) contained a provision granting liberty to the Government to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession was not taken. 16. In V. Chandrasekaran and Another vs. Administrative Officer and Others, (2012) 12 SCC 133 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had considered the issue as to whether the plot of land can be divested, once the same is vested in the Government after acquisition, under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (since repealed). Dealing with the issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had observed as under: “25. It is settled legal proposition, that once the land is vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested and proceedings under the Act would not lapse, even if an award is not made within the statutorily stipulated period [Vide: Awadh Bihari Yadav vs. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31 , U.P. Jal Nigam vs. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (1996) 3 SCC 1 24 , Allahabad Development Authority vs. Nasiruzzaman, (1996) 6 SCC 424 , M. Ramalinga Thevar vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2000) 4 SCC 322 and Government of A.P. vs. Syed Akbar, (2005) 1 SCC 558 ]. 26. The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored to the tenure-holders/persons interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it was so acquired, or for any other purpose either. 26. The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored to the tenure-holders/persons interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it was so acquired, or for any other purpose either. The proceedings cannot be withdrawn/abandoned under the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, or under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, once the possession of the land had been taken and the land vests in the State, free from all encumbrances. [Vide: State of M.P. vs. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, AIR 1966 SC 1593 , Lt. Governor of H.P. vs. Avinash Sharma, (1970) 2 SCC 149 , Satendra Prasad Jain vs. State of U.P. (1993) 4 SCC 369 , Rajasthan Housing Board vs. Shri Kishan, (1993) 2 SCC 84 and Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India vs. Subodh Singh, (2011) 11 SCC 100 ]. 27. The meaning of the word ‘vesting’ has been considered by this Court time and again. In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union vs. Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344 , this Court held that the meaning of the word ‘vesting’ varies as per the context of the statute, under which the property vests. So far as the vesting under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act is concerned, the Court held as under: 19......In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes the property of the Government without any condition or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration. 28. In Gulam Mustafa vs. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 800 , in a similar situation, this Court held as under: “5......once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the......declaration.” 29. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the......declaration.” 29. Similarly, in State of Kerala vs. M. Bhaskaran Pillai, (1997) 5 SCC 432 , this Court held as under: “4......It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution.” [See: also C. Padma vs. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, (1997) 2 SCC 627 , Bhagat Singh vs. State of U.P. (1999) 2 SCC 384 , Niladri Narayan Chandradhurja vs. State of West Bengal, (2002) 9 SCC 682 , Northern Indian Glass Industries vs. Jaswant Singh, (2003) 1 SCC 335 and Leelawanti vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 66 ] 30. In Government of A.P. vs. Syed Akbar, (2005) 1 SCC 558 , this Court considered this very issue and held that, once the land has vested in the State, it can neither be divested, by virtue of Section 48 of the Act, nor can it be reconveyed to the personsinterested/ tenure-holders, and that therefore, the question of restitution of possession to the tenure-holder, does not arise. [See: also Pratap vs. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 3 SCC 1 , Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil vs. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 6 SCC 405 , State of Kerala vs. M. Bhaskaran Pillai, (1997) 5 SCC 432 , Printers (Mysore) Ltd. vs. M.A. Rasheed, (2004) 4 SCC 460 , Bangalore Development Authority vs. R. Hanumaiah, (2005) 12 SCC 508 and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. vs. State of U.P. (2011) 9 SCC 354 ]. 31. In view of the above, the law can be crystallized to mean, that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free from all encumbrances, it is not the concern of the landowner, whether the land is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other purpose. 31. In view of the above, the law can be crystallized to mean, that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free from all encumbrances, it is not the concern of the landowner, whether the land is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other purpose. He becomes persona non grata once the land vests in the State. He has a right to only receive compensation for the same, unless the acquisition proceeding is itself challenged. The State neither has the requisite power to reconvey the land to the person interested nor can such person claim any right of restitution on any ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutory amendment to this effect.” 17. Thus, from the above authoritative pronouncements on the law, it is settled that once the land is acquired and the mandatory requirements are complied with, the land vests in the State Government in absolute terms and free from all encumbrances. Even if some portion of acquired land remains unutilized for the public purpose for which it was acquired, it cannot be reconvened to the erstwhile landowner by invoking any provision of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. By virtue of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the acquired land upon making an Award, absolutely vests thereupon in the Government free from all encumbrances. Under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Government could withdraw from the process of acquisition of land only when the possession of the land was not taken. 18. In the case in hand, the provisions of Section 48 is found not applicable as the original landowner was paid due compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (since repealed) and possession was duly taken of the acquired areas of land including the subject-plot. As on date, the subject-plot remains within the boundary of Mankachar Regulated Market which has been constructed after the acquisition of the land vide L.A. Case No. 07/1995-1996. It is also settled that if the land was acquired for a public purpose and after the public purpose was achieved and some part of the acquired land remained unutilised, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. It is also settled that if the land was acquired for a public purpose and after the public purpose was achieved and some part of the acquired land remained unutilised, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. It has been also held that in case there is no other public purpose for which the land was needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile landowner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction should be utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution of India. 19. The plea of the petitioners on the premise of the provisions contained in Section 101 of the Act, 2013 is also not found sustainable in law. In this regard also, the law has been settled by the Constitutional Bench in Indore Development Authority (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India by dealing with the provision of Section 101 of the 2013 Act together with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (since repealed) has observed as under: “Return of Unutilised Land under the 2013 Act 363. It was submitted that Section 101 provides for return of unutilized land under the 2013 Act. Section 101 provides that in case land is not utilised for five years from the date of taking over the possession, the same shall be returned to the original owner or owners or their legal heirs, as the case may be, or to the Land Bank of the appropriate Government by reversion in the manner as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government. Section 101 reads as under: “101. Return of unutilized land - When any land, acquired under this Act remains unutilised for a period of five years from the date of taking over the possession, the same shall be returned to the original owner or owners or their legal heirs, as the case may be, or to the Land Bank of the appropriate Government by reversion in the manner as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government. Explanation - For the purpose of this section, “Land Bank” means a governmental entity that focuses on the conversion of Government-owned vacant, abandoned, unutilised acquired lands and tax-delinquent properties into productive use.” 364. Section 24 deals with lapse of acquisition. Explanation - For the purpose of this section, “Land Bank” means a governmental entity that focuses on the conversion of Government-owned vacant, abandoned, unutilised acquired lands and tax-delinquent properties into productive use.” 364. Section 24 deals with lapse of acquisition. Section 101 deals with the return of unutilised land. Section 101 cannot be said to be applicable to an acquisition made under the 1894 Act. The provision of lapse has to be considered on its own strength and not by virtue of Section 101 though the spirit is to give back the land to the original owner or owners or the legal heirs or to the Land Bank. Return of lands is with respect to all lands acquired under the 2013 Act as the expression used in the opening part is “When any land, acquired under this Act remains unutilized.” Lapse, on the other hand, occurs when the State does not take steps in terms of Section 24(2). The provisions of Section 101 cannot be applied to the acquisitions made under the 1894 Act. Thus, no such sustenance can be drawn from the provisions contained in Section 101 of the 2013 Act. Five years' logic has been carried into effect for the purpose of lapse and not for the purpose of returning the land remaining unutilized under Section 24(2). Conclusions of the Court 366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/ memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).” 20. In the light of the aforesaid settled position of law, there is no right vested in the petitioner to claim return of the acquired land even on the ground that the same has remained unutilized for about a decade after acquisition. In such view of the matter, this writ petition lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to cost.