JUDGMENT : MANISH CHOUDHURY, J. 1. In this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has assailed an order dated 15.12.2019 passed by the District Magistrate, Dibrugarh, whereby, the arms license bearing no. 10544/III issued to the petitioner earlier, has been cancelled. A perusal of the order dated 15.12.2019 goes to show that the District Magistrate, Dibrugarh has passed the said order of cancellation of the arms licence in exercise of the powers conferred upon him under the provisions of the Arms Act, 1959 and the Arms Rules, 2016. 2. I have heard Mr. P. Talukdar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. K. Goswami, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam for the State respondents. 3. Mr. Talukdar, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the arms licence of the petitioner was cancelled by the impugned order and in the impugned order dated 15.12.2019, a reference has been made to a case registered on the basis of a First Information Report (FIR) lodged by one Sri Sunil Das. The said FIR was registered as Moran Police Station Case No. 190/2019 under Sections 325/153A/427/500/506, Indian Penal Code (IPC) r/w Sections 25(1A), Arms Act, 1959 r/w Section 3(1)(X) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Mr. Talukdar has contended that after investigation, the Investigating Officer of the case has submitted a final report being Final Report No. 69/2021 dated 21.10.2021. In the impugned order, the District Magistrate has made a reference of two other crime cases, that is, Moran Police Station Case No. 110/2015 under Section 506, IPC r/w Section 25(1A), Arms Act, 1959 and Moran Police Station Case no. 80/2016 under Section 307, IPC r/w Section 27(1), Arms Act, 1959 whereas in the show cause notice dated 25.10.2019, there was no reference to the said two crime cases. Mr. Talukdar has further submitted that subsequent to the cancellation of the arms licence there are certain other developments, which are in favour of the petitioner. 4. The submission of Mr. Goswami, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate is to the effect that the writ petition is misconceived as there is an alternative, efficacious and adequate remedy in the form of statutory appeal. He has submitted that the petitioner can raise and agitate all grounds including issues which need determination of facts before the appellate authority. 5. In response, Mr. Goswami, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate is to the effect that the writ petition is misconceived as there is an alternative, efficacious and adequate remedy in the form of statutory appeal. He has submitted that the petitioner can raise and agitate all grounds including issues which need determination of facts before the appellate authority. 5. In response, Mr. Talukdar has submitted that the petitioner is pursuing the writ petition with diligence for the last about one year. The provisions of the Arms Act, 1959 and the Arms Rules, 2016 have provided for a limitation period for filing an appeal. If the petitioner prefers an appeal now the same would be beyond the period of limitation. 6. The power and authority has been vested in the licensing authority under Section 17 of the Arms Act, 1959 to vary, suspend and/or revoke an arms license. Sub-Section (3) thereof has specifically provided for the grounds under which the licensing authority can suspend or revoke a license. The relevant provisions of Section 17 of the Arms Act, 1959 read as under: “17. Variation, suspension and revocation of licences: (1) *** *** *** (2) *** *** *** (3) The licensing authority may by order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence: (a) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act. (b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence. (c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his behalf at the time of applying for it. (d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened. (e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under sub-section (1) requiring him to deliver-up the licence. (d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened. (e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under sub-section (1) requiring him to deliver-up the licence. (4) *** *** *** (5) Where the licensing authority makes an order varying a licence under sub-section (1) or an order suspending or revoking a licence under sub-section (3), it shall record in writing the reasons therefor and furnish to the holder of the licence on demand a brief statement of the same unless in any case the licensing authority is of the opinion that it will not be in the public interest to furnish such statement. (6) *** *** *** (7) *** *** *** (8) *** *** *** (9) *** *** *** (10) On the suspension or revocation of a licence under this section the holder thereof shall without delay surrender the licence to the authority by whom it has been suspended or revoked or to such other authority as may be specified in this behalf in the order of suspension or revocation.” 7. The impugned order dated 15.12.2019 is an order passed by the District Magistrate as the licensing authority in exercise of the powers vested in him under Section 17 of the Arms Act, 1959. 8. Section 18 of the Arms Act, 1959 has provided for the remedy of an appeal if a licensee is aggrieved by the order of the licensing authority revoking the arms licence. 8.1. Section 18 of the Arms Act, 1959 has provided as under: “18. Appeals: (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the licensing authority refusing to grant a licence or varying the conditions of a licence or by an order of the licensing authority or the authority to whom the licensing authority is subordinate, suspending or revoking a licence may prefer an appeal against that order to such authority (hereinafter referred to as the appellate authority) and within such period as may be prescribed: Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order made by, or under the direction of the Government. (2) No appeal shall be admitted if it is preferred after the expiry of the period prescribed therefore: Provided that an appeal may be admitted after the expiry of the period prescribed therefor if the appellant satisfies the appellate authority that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period. (3) The period prescribed for an appeal shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), with respect to the computation of periods of limitation thereunder. (4) Every appeal under this section shall be made by a petition in writing and shall be accompanied by a brief statement of the reasons for the order appealed against where such statement has been furnished to the appellant and by such fee as may be prescribed. (5) In disposing of an appeal the appellate authority shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed: Provided that no appeal shall be disposed of unless the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (6) The order appealed against shall, unless the appellate authority conditionally or unconditionally directs otherwise, be in force pending the disposal of the appeal against such order. (7) Every order of the appellate authority confirming, modifying or reversing the order appealed against shall be final.” 8.2. Rule 105 of the Arms Rules, 2016 has provided for the appellate authorities in case of the appeals preferred under the Arms Act, 1959. For ready reference, Rule 105 of the Arms Rules, 2016 is extracted hereunder: “105. Appellate authorities: (1) The appellate authority to whom an appeal shall lie against an order of the licensing or other authority specified in column (1) of the table below, shall be that specified in the corresponding entry in column (2) thereof: Authority Appellate Authority (1) (2) (a) District Magistrate Commissioner of the Division or any other equivalent post or in any State in which there is no post of Commissioner of a Division, the State Government. (b) Commissioner of Police State Government (c) Officer empowered by the Central Government in a Union Territory Administrator/Lt. Governor of the Union Territory (d) Head of Indian Mission Central Government (e) Other specially empowered officer Authority that empowered (2) *** *** *** (3) All licensing authorities shall work under the direction and control of their respective appellate authorities.” 8.3. (b) Commissioner of Police State Government (c) Officer empowered by the Central Government in a Union Territory Administrator/Lt. Governor of the Union Territory (d) Head of Indian Mission Central Government (e) Other specially empowered officer Authority that empowered (2) *** *** *** (3) All licensing authorities shall work under the direction and control of their respective appellate authorities.” 8.3. Thus from the provisions of Section 18 of the Arms Act, 1959 and Rule 105 of the Arms Rules, 2016 it is evident that in case of an order of the licensing authority revoking an arms licence granted to a person, the person if he is aggrieved, has the option of preferring a statutory appeal. 8.4. Rule 108 of the Arms Rules, 2016 has laid down the procedure to be followed by the appellate authority. 9. In a case where there is a specific remedy for appeal provided under the statute whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be entertained or not, the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Thansingh Nathmal vs. Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri and Others, AIR 1964 SC 1419 , has observed as under: “7........The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy which, without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be by-passed and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.” 10. As the statutory remedy of appeal has already been provided for under the provisions of the Arms Act, 1959 r/w the provisions of the Arms Rules, 2016, quoted above, and in the light of the observations made by the Constitutional Bench in Thansingh Nathmal (supra), I am of the considered view instead of entertaining this writ petition against an order of cancellation passed by the licensing authority cancelling the arms licence in respect of the petitioner, the petitioner shall approach the appellate authority under Section 18 of the Arms Act, 1959. 11. It is noticed that after passing of the order dated 15.12.2019 by the licensing authority, the petitioner had approached this Court by instituting the writ petition on 06.01.2020. 12. As noticed from above, sub-section (2) of Section 18 has prescribed that no appeal shall be admitted if it is preferred after the expiry of the period prescribed therefrom. The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18 has provided that an appeal may be admitted after the expiry of the period prescribed therefor if the appellant satisfies the appellate authority that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period. Rule 107 of the Arms Rule, 2016 has prescribed the period of limitation for preferring an appeal against an order of the licensing authority revoking a licence. Rule 107 of the Arms Rule, 2016 has prescribed the period of limitation for preferring an appeal against an order of the licensing authority revoking a licence. The person aggrieved by such order of revocation has to prefer the statutory appeal against such order of revoking a license to the concerned appellate authority within 30 (thirty) days from the date of issue of the order of revocation. 13. Though the petitioner did not approach the appellate authority at first point of time and instead, has approached this Court invoking the extra-ordinary and discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, he had approached this Court within a period of 30 (thirty) days from the order of revocation. 14. Sub-Section (3) of Section 18 of the Arms Act, 1959 has provided that the period prescribed for an appeal shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act, with respect to the computation of period of limitation thereunder. It is, thus, discernible that the provisions of the Limitation Act have been made applicable to an appeal under Section 18 of the Arms Act, 1959. It may be apposite to refer to the provision contained in sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides for exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in a Court without jurisdiction. For ready reference, the said provision is quoted hereunder: “14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction: (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.” 15. The petitioner instead of resorting to the statutory remedy of appeal, has assailed the impugned order dated 15.12.2019 before this Court in its writ jurisdiction. The writ petition is not entertained in view of availability of the provision for preferring statutory appeal. The petitioner instead of resorting to the statutory remedy of appeal, has assailed the impugned order dated 15.12.2019 before this Court in its writ jurisdiction. The writ petition is not entertained in view of availability of the provision for preferring statutory appeal. The true purport of the words ‘other cause of like nature’ appearing in Section 14 of the Limitation Act, came to be considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Union of India vs. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. (2004) 3 SCC 458 . It has been held therein to the effect that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide in its application, inasmuch as it is not confined in its applicability only to cases of defect of jurisdiction but it is applicable also to cases where the prior proceedings have failed on account of other causes of like nature. In Roshanlal Kuthalia vs. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberoi, (1975) 4 SCC 628 , it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India while considering the words ‘other causes of like nature’ to the effect that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide enough to cover such cases where defects are not merely jurisdictional strictly so called but others more or less neighbours to such deficiencies. Any circumstance, legal or factual, which inhibits entertainment or consideration by the Court of the dispute on merits comes within the scope of Section 14 and a liberal approach is to be adopted in interpreting the provision of Section 14 of the Limitation Act so as not to deprive the person aggrieved to avail the remedy if he has a right. In a three-judge Bench decision in Rameshwarlal vs. Municipal Council, Tonk, (1996) 6 SCC 100 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the import and purport of the words ‘other causes of a like nature’ appearing in Section 14 of the Limitation Act, has held that if the High Court has declined to grant relief relegating the petitioner to a suit in the civil court, the petitioner cannot be left remediless. Accordingly, the time taken in prosecuting before the High Court, if pursued diligently and bona fide, needs to be excluded. Accordingly, the time taken in prosecuting before the High Court, if pursued diligently and bona fide, needs to be excluded. In Shakti Tubes Limited vs. State of Bihar and Others, (2009) 1 SCC 786 , it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the provision of Section 14 of the Limitation Act should be construed liberally. 16. In view of the discussion made above, this writ petition is therefore, not entertained, reserving the liberty to the petitioner to seek the statutory remedy of appeal as provided under the Arms Act, 1959 r/w the Arms Rules, 2016. In the event the petitioner prefers any appeal before the appellate authority under the provisions of the Arms Act, 1959 r/w the Arms Rules, 1959, it is observed that the appellate authority shall consider the issue of limitation liberally in the light of the observations made hereinabove with regard to the provisions contained in Section 14 of the Limitation Act, if any delay has occasioned in preferring the statutory appeal and thereafter, shall proceed to consider the statutory appeal on merits and in accordance with law. There shall, however, be no order as to cost.