JUDGMENT : 1. This is a claimant's appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act'), seeking enhancement of compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ th Additional District Judge, Shahjahanpur vide judgment and award dated 26.03.2002 passed in MACP No. 38 of 1999. 2. The claim petition was instituted by the deceased's widow, Smt. Vidyawati with a case that on 31.12.1998 at about 4:30 in the evening hours, Ram Krishna Kushwaha was proceeding on a bicycle from Kanari Bankey after teaching there to the school in Village Thingri, within the local limits of Police Station Alhaganj, District Shahjahanpur. He was a teacher in the primary school at Village Thingri, Tehsil Jalalabad, District Shahjahanpur. He was proceeding on the left hand side of the road. At the fateful moment, a DCM Truck, bearing registration No. DBL-9399, green in colour, approached from the Jalalabad side. It was driven by its driver, Dhain Singh (for short, 'the driver') at a high speed and negligently. The driver proceeded without sounding a horn and struck Ram Krishna’s bicycle, crushing it under its wheels. Ram Krishna was thrown off and fell to the ground, sustaining grievous injuries. He died on the spot. 3. At the time of his demise, Ram Krishna Singh was aged 55 years. His employment as a teacher with the primary school provided him a monthly income of Rs. 6500/-. His exertions in the fields would yield a further income of Rs. 4000/-, making it a sum of Rs.10,500/-per month. The deceased's dependents are his widow, Vidyawati, aged 52 years and two sons, Haripal, aged 29 years and Sripal, aged 27 years. The registered owner of the offending vehicle is one Raj Singh son of Amar Singh, a resident of Shergarhi, P.S. Shastri Nagar, District Meerut (for short, 'the owner'). The offending vehicle was insured with the New India Assurance Company Limited, District Shahjahanpur, which shall hereinafter be called 'the Insurers'. The claim petition was instituted, seeking a total compensation in the sum of Rs.19,50,000/-. 4. A written statement was filed on behalf of the Insurers generally denying the allegations in the claim petition. It was averred that no cause of action arose to the claimants to institute the present petition, which is not signed and verified in accordance with law. The claim petition was instituted, seeking a total compensation in the sum of Rs.19,50,000/-. 4. A written statement was filed on behalf of the Insurers generally denying the allegations in the claim petition. It was averred that no cause of action arose to the claimants to institute the present petition, which is not signed and verified in accordance with law. The petition was barred, according to the Insurers, by Section 64 of the Insurance Act, 1938. It was also pleaded that all necessary parties have not been impleaded, rendering the petition bad for non-joinder. The deceased was not employed and had no source of income. The offending vehicle was not involved in the accident, that led to the victim’s death nor did the accident result in injuries to him. The deceased’s bicycle collided with some unknown vehicle on account of his rashness and negligence and the offending vehicle has been involved deliberately after ascertaining its number in order to institute the present claim petition. 5. On the date of the accident, the offending vehicle did not have a valid Insurance Policy. Upon verification of the Insurance Policy, it has not been found in order and the compensation demanded is beyond the worth of the policy. The compensation is much on the higher side. In order to prove the accident, documentary evidence, such as copies of the First Information Report, Autopsy Report, Release Order of the vehicle and other documents relating to the offending vehicle have not been filed. It is also the Insurers' case that the driver did not possess a valid driving licence. The offending vehicle did not have a fitness certificate or a route permit, where it was operating. The owner and the driver have committed violation of the policy, entitling the Insurers to relief from their liability. There is a collusion between the owner and the claimant, disentitling the claimant to relief. 6. A separate written statement was filed on behalf of the owner, who generally denied the case in the claim petition. It is the owner's case that the claim petition does not comply with the provisions of the Act. It is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. No cause of action arises to the claimant. The compensation demanded is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is the owner's case that the claim petition does not comply with the provisions of the Act. It is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. No cause of action arises to the claimant. The compensation demanded is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is pleaded that on the date of the accident i.e. 31.12.1998, the owner's vehicle, bearing registration No. DBL-9399 had all valid papers to ply, including the Registration Certificate, Insurance Policy, Route Permit, Goods Tax Payment receipt and was driven by a driver, who held a valid and effective driving licence. The offending vehicle is insured with the Insurers vide Cover Note No. 0326, valid from 01.06.1998 to 30.05.1999. The Insurers have been paid the due premium. The driver's driving licence No. T-239/MRT193 was issued on 17.03.1993 by the Licensing Authority at Meerut. It was valid and effective from 15.06.1996 to 25.05.1999. The claimant inherited the deceased's property and is, therefore, not entitled to compensation. The claim petition is barred by limitation. 7. A separate written statement was filed by the driver, denying the allegations in the claim petition. It is averred that the driver held a valid driving licence, bearing No. T-239/MRT193, issued on 17.03.1993 by the Regional Transport Officer's Office at Meerut. It was valid up to 24.05.1999. The accident described in the claim petition happened on account of the deceased's negligence. The claimant is not entitled to any compensation, which in any case is not payable by the driver. Whatever liability may be ascertained on account of the accident, the same ought to fall on the owner's or the Insurers' shoulders. 8. On the pleadings of parties, the following issues were framed: “1. Whether Ram Krishan Singh died in the accident on 31.12.98 on account of rash and negligent driving by the driver of vehicle No. DBL-9399 in the manner alleged in the petition? 2. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? 3. Whether the driver of the offending vehicle was holding a valid driving licence or not on the alleged date and time? In either case, its effect? 4. Relief?” 9. The Tribunal answered Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in favour of the claimant and against the Insurers, owner and the driver. There is no cavil about the findings on Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3. In either case, its effect? 4. Relief?” 9. The Tribunal answered Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in favour of the claimant and against the Insurers, owner and the driver. There is no cavil about the findings on Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The cause in this appeal is limited to the quantum of compensation, to which the claimant or the other two dependents of the deceased, his sons, are entitled. 10. It must be recorded that pending this appeal, the claimant, Smt. Vidyawati passed away and so did Haripal Singh, one of the two sons of the deceased. The other son, Sripal Singh, who was arrayed as respondent No.5 to the appeal, was transposed as appellant No. 1/3, after the claimant's demise. The interest of Haripal Singh and that of the claimant, is also represented by Utkarsh Singh son of late Haripal Singh, a minor represented through his next friend, Sripal Singh and Smt. Reeta Singh wife of Brahm Singh, daughter of Haripal Singh. Utkarsh Singh, Smt. Reeta Singh and Sripal Singh now figure in the array of the appellants as appellants Nos.1/1, 1/2 and 1/3, due to developments pending appeal. All of them together shall also be referred to as the claimant (unless the context requires an individual reference). 11. Heard Mr. Rishi Bhushan Jauhari, learned Counsel for the claimant and Mr. Arvind Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the Insurers. No one appears on behalf of the owner and the driver. 12. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the claimant that the compensation awarded is grossly inadequate, inasmuch as a wrong multiplier has been applied and nothing has been awarded towards future prospects. It is also argued that the claimant is also entitled to compensation under the conventional heads in accordance with the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi and others, (2017) 16 SCC 680 . 13. The learned Counsel for the Insurers has supported the the impugned award and says that it is a just award, which does not call for any interference. 14. The basis to work out the dependency is the deceased's monthly income. 13. The learned Counsel for the Insurers has supported the the impugned award and says that it is a just award, which does not call for any interference. 14. The basis to work out the dependency is the deceased's monthly income. A perusal of the record and the findings of the Tribunal, that are not in issue, show that the deceased Ram Krishna was a Headmaster in the primary school, where his basic salary, last drawn on 31.12.1998, was Rs. 1600/-with a D.A. of Rs. 2822/-. He was in receipt of interim relief in the figures of Rs. 100/-, 166/-and 166/-per month, leading to a total monthly emoluments of Rs. 4914/-. It is the aforesaid monthly income of the deceased, on the basis of which the claimant's dependency has to be worked out. The income from agriculture, claimed as the other source on behalf of the claimant, has not been accepted by the Tribunal, though there is not much discussion about it. This Court also, on going through the evidence on record, is not inclined to accept any income for the deceased, claimed to accrue from his agricultural exploits. There is not much convincing evidence about it. The annual income of the deceased, worked out on a monthly salary of Rs.4914/-, would be a figure of Rs.58,968/-. 15. The deceased left behind three dependents. Going by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , the Tribunal is, therefore, right in deducting one-third towards personal expenses of the deceased. 16. In order to determine the total loss of dependency, the Tribunal has applied a multiplier of 8'. The deceased on the date of his death was aged fifty-seven and a half years. In accordance with the law laid down in Paragraph No. 40 of the report in Sarla Verma for the age group 56-60 years, the applicable multiplier is 9'. It is not 8'. The Tribunal has, therefore, adopted a lower multiplier than that applicable. 17. The Tribunal has not awarded anything towards future prospects. The deceased was a salaried man. And, future prospects for salaried men are conventionally regarded in our country as the highest. It is not 8'. The Tribunal has, therefore, adopted a lower multiplier than that applicable. 17. The Tribunal has not awarded anything towards future prospects. The deceased was a salaried man. And, future prospects for salaried men are conventionally regarded in our country as the highest. It must be remarked that it is the other classes of persons, may be earning much more in their avocations or business, who have traditionally been suspect about their future prospects; but, never the venerable class of servicemen. In Pranay Sethi (supra), which firmly established that the self-employed too had future prospects, may be a little lesser than the service class, provides for future prospects for those employed on salaries in the following terms: “58. The controversy does not end here. The question still remains whether there should be no addition where the age of the deceased is more than 50 years. Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] thinks it appropriate not to add any amount and the same has been approved in Reshma Kumari [Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 826]. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that salary does not remain the same. When a person is in a permanent job, there is always an enhancement due to one reason or the other. To lay down as a thumb rule that there will be no addition after 50 years will be an unacceptable concept. We are disposed to think, there should be an addition of 15% if the deceased is between the age of 50 to 60 years and there should be no addition thereafter. Similarly, in case of self-employed or person on fixed salary, the addition should be 10% between the age of 50 to 60 years. The aforesaid yardstick has been fixed so that there can be consistency in the approach by the tribunals and the courts.” 18. The next issue that arises for consideration is whether future prospects to which the claimant is entitled would be governed by the law laid down in Pranay Sethi or Rule 220-A (3) of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for short, the Rules of 1998). The next issue that arises for consideration is whether future prospects to which the claimant is entitled would be governed by the law laid down in Pranay Sethi or Rule 220-A (3) of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for short, the Rules of 1998). This issue fell for consideration of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822, where it has been observed: “9. It is to be noted that the validity of the Rules was not, in any way, questioned in the instant matter and thus the only question that we are called upon to consider is whether in its application, sub-Rule 3(iii) of Rule 220A of the Rules must be given restricted scope or it must be allowed to operate fully. 10.T he discussion on the point in Pranay Sethiwas from the standpoint of arriving at “just compensation” in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 11. If an indicia is made available in the form of a statutory instrument which affords a favourable treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken to have limited the operation of such statutory provision specially when the validity of the Rules was not put under any challenge. The prescription of 15% in cases where the deceased was in the age bracket of 50 60 years as stated in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing principle available in the statutory regime, it was only in the form of an indication. If a statutory instrument has devised a formula which affords better or greater benefit, such statutory instrument must be allowed to operate unless the statutory instrument is otherwise found to be invalid. 12. We, therefore, reject the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant and affirm the view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court and dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs.” 19. It is, thus, settled that the future prospects in the State of Uttar Pradesh have to be determined in accordance Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998 and not the decision in Pranay Sethi. 20. It is, thus, settled that the future prospects in the State of Uttar Pradesh have to be determined in accordance Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998 and not the decision in Pranay Sethi. 20. The other issue which arises for consideration is: whether Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998, that was introduced by Notification No. 777/XXX-4-2011-4(3)-2010 dated 26 September, 2011 i.e. The Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2011, would apply retrospectively to an accident that took place much before the amendment? This question was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Sushil Kumar and others v. M/s. Sampark Lojastic Private Limited and others, 2017 (35) LCD 1311, where it has been held : “31. Rule 220-A was inserted in the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 in view of the various decisions of the law courts for providing benefit on account of future prospects of the injured/deceased. It provides for addition of certain percentage of the income of the injured/deceased in his actual income depending upon the age of the injured/deceased for the purposes of determination of the compensation. The aforesaid Rule came into effect on 26.09.2011 after the decision of the claim petition but before filing of the appeal though the accident took place on 08.05.2010 much before the enforcement of the above Rule. 32. It is in view of the above that an argument is being raised that Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident which had taken place on 08.05.2010. 33. In Ram Sarup Vs. Munshi AIR 1963 SC 553 it was laid down that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the rights of the parties. 34. The view expressed above was followed by the Supreme Court in Mula Vs. Godhu AIR 1971 SC 89 . 35. In Dayawati Vs. Inderjit AIR 1966 SC 1423 the court had observed as under:-If the new law speaks in language, which expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the court of trial as well as the court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the court of first instance. 36. In Amarjit Kaur Vs. 36. In Amarjit Kaur Vs. Pritam Singh AIR 1974 SC 2068 effect was given to the change in law during the pendency of an appeal as the hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of this country is in the nature of rehearing of the suit by superior court. 37. It was in the light of the above decisions that in Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others Vs. Niranjan Modak AIR 1985 SC 111 it was held that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the right of the parties. 38. The aforesaid decision was followed by a Division Bench of this court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Smt. Madhu Sharma and others, 2003 (4) AWC 2620 which was a case in relation to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and it was observed that it is apparent that the change in law during the pendency of the original proceedings has to be taken into account so as to cover the rights of the parties. 39. In view of above decision the view expressed by the Division Bench of this court in ICICI Lombard (Supra) is not of good law as it does not takes into account the decisions referred to above in holding that the Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident that took place prior to the said date only for the reason that the Rule was not specifically stated to be retrospective in nature.” 21. As per the law laid down by the Division Bench in Sushil Kumar (supra), which apparently binds this Court, the award of future prospects is to be made in accordance with Rule 220- A(3) of the Rules of 1998, notwithstanding the fact that accident happened prior to the amendment. Now, going by Rule 220- A(3), considering the age of the deceased, which is more than 50 years, 20% is to be added to his income towards future prospects. 22. Still another matter which requires consideration is that about the claimant’s entitlement under the conventional heads. Here again, the principle in Pranay Sethi is relevant, where it has been held: “48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. 22. Still another matter which requires consideration is that about the claimant’s entitlement under the conventional heads. Here again, the principle in Pranay Sethi is relevant, where it has been held: “48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. The said Schedule has been found to be defective as stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ]. Recently, in [Puttamma v.K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574] it has been reiterated by stating : (SCC p. 80, para 54) “54. … we hold that the Second Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now become redundant, irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy.” 49. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also provides for general damages in case of death. It is as follows: “3. General damages (in case of death): The following general damages shall be payable in addition to compensation outlined above: T-A-B-L-E- (i) Funeral expenses Rs 2000 (ii) Loss of consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse Rs 5000 (iii) Loss of estate Rs 2500 (iv) Medical expenses — actual expenses incurred before death supported bybills/vouchers but not exceeding Rs 15,000” 50. On a perusal of various decisions of this Court, it is manifest that the Second Schedule has not been followed starting from the decision in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v.Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ] and there has been no amendment to the same. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs 1,00,000 was granted towards consortium in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] . The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs 1,00,000 was granted towards consortium in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] . The justification for grant of consortium, as we find from Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] , is founded on the observation as we have reproduced hereinbefore. 51. On the aforesaid basis, the Court has revisited the practice of awarding compensation under conventional heads. 52. As far as the conventional heads are concerned, we find it difficult to agree with the view expressed in Rajesh[Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. It has granted Rs 25,000 towards funeral expenses, Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. ThoughRajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167] , it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads, needless to say, cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the tribunals and courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs 15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000 respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact- centric or quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in respect of those heads.” (emphasis by Court) 23. So far as entitlement to compensation for the loss of parental consortium to the children of the deceased is concerned, there is a distinction to be made between children who are minors and those adults. I dealt with the question in Jiuti Devi and others v. Manoj, 2022 SCC OnLine All 46 and held: “39. Loss of consortium, that includes parental consortium, unlike dependency, is not some tangible economic loss. It is an emotional loss to the next of kin of the deceased-victim of a motor accident. In case of parental loss, it causes a particular deprivation to minors and young children, about whom it is said by the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur alias Satwinder Kaur, to borrow the words of their Lordships, “Parental Consortium is awarded to the children who lose the care and protection of their parents in motor vehicle accidents”. 40. To the understanding of this Court, the impact of loss of parental consortium upon the deceased's children, in the very nature of that loss, is dependent upon the children's age. 40. To the understanding of this Court, the impact of loss of parental consortium upon the deceased's children, in the very nature of that loss, is dependent upon the children's age. The loss of parent is a disheartening and emotional event for the child at any age of his maturity, but by the nature of the principle governing award of compensation under the head of parental consortium, the deprivation, that is suffered by a child or a minor, appears to be the determinative and entitling fact. A child, who has advanced into matured adulthood, is married or otherwise in the mainstream of life, would not be entitled to compensation under that head.” 24. In the present case, both the children being adults, compensation for the loss of parental consortium would not be payable. The claimant would, however, be entitled to compensation for the loss of spousal consortium. 25. However, so far as the loss of estate and financial expenses are concerned, that has to be awarded in one set, according to the rule in Pranay Sethi. Thus, the awarded compensation under the conventional heads, as determined by the Tribunal, is erroneous and the same too has to be modified. 26. In view of the principles applicable for the determination of compensation payable to the claimant and the other dependents, this Court proceeds to work out the same as follows : (i) Monthly Income (of the deceased) 4914/- (ii) Monthly Income+Future Prospects (monthly income x 20%) = 4914+983 5897/- (iii) Annual Income (of the deceased) = 5897x12 70,764/- (iv) Annual Dependency = Annual Income – one-third deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased = 70764-23588 47,176/- (v) Total Dependency = Annual Dependency x Applied Multiplier = 47,176x9 4,24,584/- (vi) Claimants’ entitlement towards conventional heads = Loss of Estate + Funeral Expenses + dependents’ Consortium =15000+15000+40000 70,000/- The total compensation would therefore, work out to a figure of Rs. 4,24,584+ Rs. 70,000 5,74,584/- 27. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The impugned award passed by the Tribunal is modified and the compensation awarded enhanced to Rs. 5,74,584/-. The aforesaid sum of money shall carry simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realization. 4,24,584+ Rs. 70,000 5,74,584/- 27. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The impugned award passed by the Tribunal is modified and the compensation awarded enhanced to Rs. 5,74,584/-. The aforesaid sum of money shall carry simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realization. Any sum of money already deposited with the Tribunal by the Insurers, pursuant to the impugned award or the interim orders passed by this Court, shall be adjusted against the award. The other directions of the Tribunal in the award shall remain intact. Costs easy.