JUDGMENT : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. The Executive Engineer, Electricity Distribution Division, Uttarakhand Power Corporation, Ramnagar, District Nainital, in the present Appeal from Order, which has been preferred under Section 30 of the Workmen Compensation Act, has put a challenge to the impugned award of 28th December, 2010, passed by the Workmen Compensation Commissioner/ Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kumaon Region Haldwani, District Nainital, in Workmen Compensation Application No. 27 of 2005, Smt. Nirmala Devi and others Vs. Executive Engineer, Electricity Distribution Division and another, whereby, the Workmen Compensation Commissioner has held that the claimants would be entitled for being awarded with an amount of compensation of Rs. 2,59,975/- with interest payable on it at the rate of 8% i.e. Rs. 1,24,788/- and hence, the total amount, which has been determined to be made payable has been assessed as to be Rs.3,84,763/-. 2. The brief facts of the case, as it has been observed in the impugned order is, that the deceased workman Raghuvir Singh and three others, they were engaged with the respondents for the purposes of repair of the high tension electric lines, and in an accident, which has chanced on 10th December, 2004, when late Mr. Raghuvir Singh was, as usual, discharging his official duties assigned to him, after his initial engagement made as back as on 2002, and was working near Uttari Khatayari Roadways Bus Station, just behind Indra Colony, and while he was working on a pole, he was electrocuted, due to which, he fell down and later on, when he was taken up to hospital, he was declared to have died. 3. The claimants have contended, that ever since the initial appointment which was made in 2002, late Mr. Raghuveer Singh, has been consistently working with the respondents discharging full responsibilities of his office, and as such, they would be entitled for the payment of the compensation on account of sad demise of late Mr. Raghuvir Singh. 4. 3. The claimants have contended, that ever since the initial appointment which was made in 2002, late Mr. Raghuveer Singh, has been consistently working with the respondents discharging full responsibilities of his office, and as such, they would be entitled for the payment of the compensation on account of sad demise of late Mr. Raghuvir Singh. 4. The respondents submitted, that they would not be liable to pay the compensation for the reason, that according to their contention, Raghuvir Singh, in fact, was a contractual employee, who was working under the terms of contract, which was executed between the deceased employee and the contractor i.e. respondent No. 5, and hence, the liability of payment compensation has to be shouldered by the contractor, whom the appellant had contended, that he would be treated as to be an actual employer of the deceased. 5. Another defence, which was taken by the appellant, herein, is that as a consequence of the accident resulting to the death of late Mr. Raghuvir Singh, as per the relevant policy, applicable with the respondents Cooperation, they have already remitted an amount of Rs.25,000/- as a compensation by depositing the same into the accounts of the claimants, standing in Kashipur Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd.. 6. While, on the contrary, the claimants have submitted that the deceased was 30 years of age and was engaged on a regular basis with the Corporation and was having an income of Rs.3,200/- per month, and hence, contended that since there existed a relationship of master and servant and since he has met with the sad demise on account of injuries suffered by him, which has caused upon the person of the deceased, while discharging his official duties, the claimants claimed that they may be paid compensation of Rs. 6 lacs. 7. 6 lacs. 7. In order to deny the claimants’ plea taken in their Claim Petition, if the written statement, is taken into consideration, as preferred by the present appellant in the proceedings before the Court below, in fact, it was very vague and evasive reply, which was given by the respondents in the written statement filed on 6th September, 2005, to the claim petition, and primarily, the only ground, which has been pressed upon by the appellant, herein, was that there didn’t existed a continued master-servant relationship, between the appellant and the deceased and since there was no master-servant relationship, they could not be liable to pay any claim. 8. At this stage itself, this Court deems it to be fit and necessary to observe, that in the entire written statement it lacks the plea, that the employment of the deceased was under a contract, except for that a very evasive reply has been given by the appellant denying the relationship of master-servant, in their written statement filed before the Workman Compensation Commissioner. 9. Apart from it, the another argument, which has been extended by the learned counsel for the appellant, in order to renounce their liability to pay the compensation, is on the ground that the prescribed compensation had already stood paid by the contractor to the claimants and hence, they would not be liable to pay any further amount, which is a substantial question as framed in the Memorandum of Appeal under Section 30 of the Act, which is extracted hereunder:- “(a) Whether the appellant be held liable to pay compensation under Workmen Compensation Act, when the legal heir of deceased not proved that the deceased workman was under employment with appellant ? (b) Whether the claim petition for compensation under Workmen Compensation Act, is maintainable by the dependant of workman where the deceased workman was employee of a private person and the employer of deceased stated that the workman died in out course of his employment? (c) Whether the claim petition for compensation under Workman Compensation Act is maintainable where in earlier award the compensation passed against the contractor who is employer of deceased and thereafter without any evidence the award passed against appellant ?” 10. (c) Whether the claim petition for compensation under Workman Compensation Act is maintainable where in earlier award the compensation passed against the contractor who is employer of deceased and thereafter without any evidence the award passed against appellant ?” 10. Secondly, it has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, that the impugned award suffered from an apparent error due to non framing of a proper issue, which was required to be framed by the Workmen Compensation Commissioner under Rule 28 of the Workmen’s Compensation Rules, as framed under Section 32 of the Act. 11. In order to answer the second question raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, the intention of the Legislature under Rule 28, is required to be enumerated hereunder, in order to deal with the argument extended by the learned counsel for the appellant. Rule 28 is extracted hereunder :- “28. Framing of issues. - (1) After considering any written statement and the result of any examination of the parties, the Commissioner shall ascertain upon what material propositions of fact or of law the parties are at variance and shall thereupon proceed to frame and record the issues upon which the right decision of the case appears to him to depend. (2) In recording the issues, the Commissioner shall distinguish between those issues which in his opinion concern points of facts and those which concern points of law.” 12. On its simplicitor reading, this Court is of the view, that though the responsibilities of framing of an issue has been exclusively vested on the Commissioner, dealing with workmen compensation claim, but the framing of an issue in any proceedings for that matter, it has to be confined to be modulated on the basis of the written statement and the claim raised by the claimants. 13. Hence, there are two reasons for not to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant from the perspective of impact of Rule 28, of the Rules :- (i) Firstly, there is no such plea which was ever raised by them in the written statement pertaining to the effect of contract and the contractual engagement of the deceased. Hence, there are two reasons for not to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant from the perspective of impact of Rule 28, of the Rules :- (i) Firstly, there is no such plea which was ever raised by them in the written statement pertaining to the effect of contract and the contractual engagement of the deceased. In that eventuality, in the absence of there being any specific pleading, which was pressed, the Workmen Compensation Commissioner, was not under an obligation and bound to frame an issue beyond the pleadings which has been raised by the appellant in their written statement. (ii) The second reason for not accepting the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is, that the learned Workmen Compensation Commissioner, has not at all erred at law by not framing proper issue, which was mandated under Rule 28, and that it was exclusively falling within his domain to frame an appropriate issue is yet again not acceptable by this Court, because as per the opinion of this Court, if the basic purpose of Rule 28 is taken into consideration, it only enable the parties to assist the Commissioner to frame a proper issue so that a civil right of a payment of compensation could be decided effectively by the Workmen Compensation Commissioner. It nowhere restricts any party to the proceedings to not get proper issues framed based on rival pleadings. 14. Since Rule 28 does not specifically created any bar against the appellant from requesting the Workmen Compensation Commissioner to formulate an issue, based on their pleading raised in the written statement, the exclusive burden of framing an issue cannot be shifted upon the Workmen Compensation Commissioner in the absence of their being any legal and procedural bar, and hence, the second question as argued, though not formulated in the Memorandum of Appeal, is answered against the appellant. 15. Reverting back to the first question, which has been pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant about the maintainability on the ground, that the compensation has already been paid by the contractor, who was the actual employer of the deceased, in fact, no such plea was yet again was ever raised in the written statement, the substantial question of law, which has been attempted to be formulated in the present Appeal from Order, will not arise for consideration before this Court. 16. 16. In order to meet up that augment, the learned counsel for the appellant has drawn the attention of this Court to the finding, which has been recorded by the Workmen Compensation Commissioner, and particularly, he has drawn the attention of this Court to the finding recorded in internal page 4 of the judgment in the paragraph commencing from ^^fnukad 9@1@2008 dks izfroknh la[;k 1 }kjk nks vfHkys[k ¼11½ i`"Bks esa izLrqr fd;s rFkk fnukad 29@1@2008 dks izfroknh la[;k 1 dh vkSj ls Jh jes'k pUnz 'kekZ mi[k.M vf/kdkjh mŸkjk[k.M ikWoj dkiksZjs'ku fyŒ fo|qr forj.k [k.M jkeuxj ftyk uSuhrky lk{; gsrq mifLFkr gq, muds }kjk c;ku fn;s fd eSa fo|qr forj.k [k.M jkeuxj ftyk uSuhrky esa mDr in ij rSukr gwW vkSj es nq?kZVuk dh frfFk 10@12@2004 dks mDr [k.M esa Hkh dk;Zjr Fkk j?kqchj flag gekjs foHkkx esa dHkh Hkh dk;Zjr ugh Fkk j?kqchj flag Bsdsnkj Jh f'ko izlkn ds ek/;e ls dk;Zjr Fkk ftl dkj.k vxj dksbZ e`rd dks eqvkotk laca/kh ftEesnkjh curh gS rks og Hkh f'ko izlkn Bsdsnkj dh gSA eS foHkkx vkSj f'ko izlkn ds chp gqvk ,xzhesaV i=koyh es is'k dj jgk gwW ftlds ist la[;k 2 ij f'ko izlkn Bsdsnkj ds gLrk{kj gSA ,xzhesaV dh 'krZ ds vuqlkj Hkh fdlh Hkh nq?kZVuk ds fy;s Bsdsnkj ftEesnkj gS tks ,xzhesaV ds iSjk 13 ij mfYyf[kr gSA eS vuqqie dqekj fo|qr fujh{kd mŸkjkapy 'kklu dh fjiksVZ nkf[ky dj jgk gww j?kqchj dks f'ko izlkn Bsdsnkj dk gh deZpkjh crk;k x;k gS esjh tkudkjh esa ;g rF; Hkh gS fd e`rd j?kqchj flag Bsdsnkj f'ko izlkn ds ;gkW nSfud osru Hkksxh ds :i dk;Zjr Fkk ge e`rd ds fu;ksDrk ugh gS ;fn ;knhx.k fdlh izdkj dh {kfriwfrZ /kujkf'k ikus ds vf/kdkjh gS rks mlds Hkqxrku gsrq izfroknh la[;k 2 f'ko izlkn Bsdsnkj ftEesnkj gSA oknh vf/koDrk }kjk ftjg fd;s tkus ij izfroknh xokg us dFku fd;k fd geus f'ko izlkn Bsdsnkj dks dk;Z ds fy;s Bsdk fn;k Fkk gekjs o f'ko izlkn ds chp es fof/kor le>kSrk gqvk Fkk tks gekjs }kjk okn i=koyh esa nkf[ky fd;k x;k gSA bl le>kSrs ds Øe la[;k 13 ds vuqlkj fdlh izdkj dh nq?kZVuk dh fLFkfr esa iw.kZ ftEesnkjh Bsdsnkj dh gSA ;g dguk xyr gS fd eSa xyr c;kuh dj jgk gwW rFkk e`rd ds ifjokj dks {kfriwfrZ nsus dk vf/kdkj foHkkx dk gksA^^ 17. In fact, if the entire paragraph is taken into consideration, with all due reverence at my command, I am of the view, that this is not a reasoning, which has been assigned by the Court, but rather it is a case, which was projected by the appellant in contravention to the pleadings taken by him in the written statements. 18. Hence, this plea, which has been sought to be argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, in the light of the observation made in the aforesaid paragraph is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 19. There is another reason not to interfere in the matter, is that this Court is of the view that the welfare legislation has to be liberally construed, and particularly, in the light of the facts of the present case, when it is not a disputed fact, that the deceased was engaged by respondent ever since 2002, maybe through respondent No. 5 (though there is no evidence in this regard as such on record). But since, he has consistently worked and discharged the duties attached to the office of the appellant, in fact, he would be treated to have been working with the respondents regularly owing to the work exigency, which was available with them and hence, they would be liable for the payment of compensation as determined by the learned Workmen Compensation Commissioner. 20. Hence, the substantial question of law as framed by the learned counsel for the appellant, since being contrary to their own case and pleadings and the very foundation of the written statement, does not involve at all for consideration before this Court. Hence, the Appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.