ORDER : 1. Heard. 2. None has appeared on behalf of the respondents despite service of notice. 3. By this review petition, the petitioner seeks review of order dated 12.02.2019 passed by this Court in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 310/2018. 4. Briefly stated, the petitioner while working as conductor with the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘RSRTC’) was terminated from service during the pendency of another industrial dispute between the parties. An application under Section 33 (2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1947’) filed by the employer before the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur seeking approval, eventually came to be rejected by the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur vide order dated 30.11.2010. 5. Aggrieved by this order, the employer/respondent preferred S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10520/2011, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 27.11.2017. While dismissing the writ petition, learned Single Judge, however, ordered that the workman would be treated to be in service and would be entitled for benefits of intervening period as if the order of dismissal had never been passed. It was further held that the benefits of the intervening period from 04.10.2001 to 30.11.2010 i.e. the date of passing of the order by the Tribunal, shall be calculated notionally and the actual payments shall be released thereafter. The learned Single Judge also held that the period of service shall be counted for the purpose of gratuity, pension etc. 6. Aggrieved by the said order, writ appeals were preferred by the employer as well as workman. Vide common order dated 12.02.2019, the impugned order under review was passed. This Court while upholding the order in so far as rejection of application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947 on the part of the employer is concerned, held that the workman is entitled to half of the back wages by way of actual monetary benefits along with continuity of service for the intervening period from 04.10.2001 to 30.11.2010 with interest @ 9% per annum. The SLP was preferred, which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file a review petition whereafter present review petition has been filed. 7. The SLP was preferred, which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file a review petition whereafter present review petition has been filed. 7. Relying upon two decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation vs. Neethivilangan, Kumbakonam, 2001 (3) LLN 34 and Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. vs. Ram Gopal Sharma and Others, (2002) 2 SCC 244 , it has been contended that once approval under Section 33 (2)(b) of the Act of 1947 is not granted, the order of termination cannot be said to be approved and de jure relationship of employer and employee continues entitling the workman to all the consequential benefits including wages. Therefore, it is contended, the order passed by this Court deserves to be reviewed as the actual benefits have been limited in terms of wages to the extent of 50%. 8. In the case of Managing Director, Tamil Nadu, State Transport Corporation (supra), the statutory scheme of Section 33 (2)(b) of the Act of 1947 considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as below: “16. From the conspectus of the views taken in the decisions referred to above the position is manifest that while the employer has the discretion to initiate a departmental inquiry and pass an order of dismissal or discharge against the workman the order remains in an inchoate state till the employer obtains orders of approval from the Tribunal. By passing the order of discharge or dismissal de facto relationship of employer and employee may be ended but not the de jure relationship for that could happen only when the Tribunal accords its approval. The relationship of employer and employee is not legally terminated till approval of discharge or dismissal is given by the Tribunal. In a case where the Tribunal refuses to accord approval to the action taken by the employer and rejects the petition filed under S.33(2)(b) of the Act on merit the employer is bound to treat the employee as continuing in service and give him all the consequential benefits. If the employer refuses to grant the benefits to the employee the latter is entitled to have his right enforced by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. If the employer refuses to grant the benefits to the employee the latter is entitled to have his right enforced by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. There is no rational basis for holding that even after the order of dismissal or discharge has been rendered invalid on the Tribunal’s rejection of the prayer for approval the workman should suffer the consequences of such invalid order of dismissal or discharge till the matter is decided by the Tribunal again in an industrial dispute. Accepting this contention would render the bar contained in S.33(1) irrelevant. In the present case as noted earlier the Tribunal on consideration of the matter held that the employer had failed to establish a prima facie case for dismissal/discharge of the workman, and therefore, dismissed the application filed by the employer on merit. The inevitable consequence of this would be that the employer was duty bound to treat the employee as continuing in service and pay him his wages for the period, even though he may be subsequently placed under suspension and an enquiry initiated against him.” 9. Subsequently, in another Larger Bench Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd (supra) also it was authoritatively pronounced by their Lordships in the Supreme Court as below: “14. Where an application is made under Section 33(2)(b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement. But on the other hand, if approval is given by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such an approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under Section 33A challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. Section 33A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he can straightaway make a complaint before the very authority where the industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter adjudication. In this view, it is not correct to say that even though where the order of discharge or dismissal is inoperative for contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso or where the approval is refused, a workman should still make a complaint under Section 33A and that the order of dismissal or discharge becomes invalid or void only when it is set aside under Section 33A and that till such time he should suffer misery of unemployment in spite of statutory protection given to him by the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). It is not correct to say that where the order of discharge or dismissal becomes inoperative because of contravention of proviso to Section 33(2)(b), Section 33A would be meaningless and futile. The said Section has a definite purpose to serve, as already stated above, enabling an employee to make a complaint, if aggrieved by the order of the approval granted.” 10. The aforesaid two decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court leave no manner of doubt that if approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. The aforesaid two decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court leave no manner of doubt that if approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it would be that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. The legal consequence flowing from such declaration of law of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that the employee would be entitled to all the benefits, which eventually include wages in respect of the period which is covered by the order of termination, which was never approved by the Tribunal. 11. In view of the above, we partly allow the application to the extent that the review petitioner would be entitled to full wages in respect of the intervening period under the order of termination dated 04.10.2001 i.e. the intervening period from 04.10.2001 to 30.11.2010. 12. Accordingly, the review petition is partly allowed.