JUDGMENT : As a consequence of the enforcement of the project called as “Lakhwar Vyashi Hydro Dam”, which was to be constructed over the Yamuna River, certain surrounding areas of the land adjoining to the Dam and the Barrage, were acquired which was initiated at the behest of respondent No.2 herein, who had launched the project, for laying down the Dam, as referred above the land of villagers, likely to be effected by the project, was acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends, that the State of Uttarakhand under the Policy, which has been framed by virtue of a Notification, being Notification No. 1229/1(2)/2013/05/104/2005 T.C.-1 dated 28th June 2013, to be read with a Policy, which was called as “Rehabilitation and reconstruction for Hydro Project Policy 2013” had laid down certain parameters for acquisition of land. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends, that as many as 311 posts of Junior Engineer (Civil, Mechanical & Electrical) were advertised to be filled in, out of which, 38 posts of Civil Engineer and 15 posts of Electrical and Mechanical engineers, who were to be given appointments, were amongst from those candidates, whose land was acquired as a consequence of enforcement of the said project. 4. For the purposes of enforcement of the Notification entailing the aspect of grant of appointment to those as a consequence of an acquisition, a Committee was constituted for laying down the parameters as to how the Regulations were to be made for the purposes of offering an appointment to the prospective candidates, whose land has been acquired, depending upon the percentage or area of land acquired for the purposes of the project. 5. As a consequence of laying down the policy under the chairmanship of the Chief Minister dated 2nd June 2015, it was observed, that all those land holders, whose land have been acquired of more than 60%, of their holding they would only be entitled and covered by the Notification for extension of grant of an appointment as a consequence of an acquisition of their land. 6. 6. As a result thereto, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that a recruitment process was carried by the respondents for appointment on various other posts, including 23 posts of junior engineers (E & M), and 56 posts of junior engineers (Civil), inviting applications from the eligible candidates of the land affected families. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends, that after conclusion of process, respondent No. 2, had prepared the select list in accordance with the preferential categories in respect to the respective trades of civil, mechanical and electrical, and it was found that four candidates, who belonged to the same family, they were considered for appointment, but, however, the petitioner contends, that since he was lower in the merit of category 3, of appointments, his name could not find placed in the select list, and therefore, he was kept in the waiting list. 8. He submits, that later on two candidates, namely Neeraj Tomar and Rishika Tomar, who had been otherwise placed at Sl. No. 17 and 18 in the select list of junior engineers (Electrical & Mechanical), they have given their affidavits to the effect, that they do not want to pursue their candidatures any further for the purposes of appointment, as their brothers have already been selected as Junior Engineers (Civil), and based on the aforesaid withdrawal of names by the aforesaid two persons, appearing at Sl. No. 17 & 18 respectively, the petitioner contends, that since he was kept in the wait list, he would be entitled to be considered to be appointed, as against the post, which was held to be made available to those family members, whose land was acquired for the said project and had later renounced their claims, hence petitioner will fall in the zone of consideration. Hence, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition, praying for a writ of mandamus for his appointment, and for quashing the appointment of the respondent No. 5, namely Naveen Chauhan, who was appointed against the reserved post of Scheduled Tribe, for the post of Electrical & Mechanical Engineer, and with a prayer for including the name of the petitioner by issuing a fresh select list. 9. 9. There are multi-faceted arguments, which has been extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, but as far as the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned, the appointment on public posts would always falls to be within the State list of Schedule VII of the Constitution of India, where the statutory body exercise their exclusive domain of undertaking the process of appointment as per the rules and the prevalent law. 10. To consider the candidatures of all the candidates commonly, who were otherwise qualified and eligible to participate in the process of selection, this Court is of the view, that by virtue of an executive decision or the notification issued by the State, that cannot be permitted to qualify and override the statutory mandate of giving a preferential appointment to the family members of the family, whose land has been acquired for the project, for the reason being, that a policy decision to gave an appointment to one family member, whose land has been acquired, will be in violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, because as a consequence of an acquisition, the family has already been adequately remunerated with the payment of an adequate compensation, qua the ratio of the land, which has been acquired by the respondents, they cannot be given an additional benefit and that too, at the cost of the benefit, which would otherwise accrue to the other citizens of the country to be considered for appointment, as against the vacant posts available with the respondents. The petitioner cannot claim a parity, that merely because some other candidates have been given benefit of appointment under the Policy, the petitioner would too be entitled to be considered, as soon as the other two candidates had withdrawn their names to be considered for appointment under the Notification issued by the respondents. 11. Cutting short the controversy, this Court is of the view, that the writ remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is only available for the enforcement of a right, which has been created under law. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court, in a judgment reported in 2005 (1) UPLBEC 118 , Ravindra Kumar Vs. 11. Cutting short the controversy, this Court is of the view, that the writ remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is only available for the enforcement of a right, which has been created under law. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court, in a judgment reported in 2005 (1) UPLBEC 118 , Ravindra Kumar Vs. District Magistrate, Agra and others, in fact, has considered this aspect, in its findings, which has been recorded in its paras 9 to 25 of the said judgment, which are extracted hereunder:- “9. It is not denied that the petitioner has received full compensation as provided under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act which means an amount equal to full market value of the land with interest as well as solatium under Section 23(2) which is equal to 30% of the market value. That being so we cannot understand under which law a person can get a job in addition to this compensation. 10. The Land Acquisition Act takes care of the difficulties of a person whose land has been acquired by granting 30% solatium under Section 23(2) in addition to the market value of the land which has been acquired. Thus, if the market value of the land acquired is Rs. 1 Lac, the owner will get not only Rs. 1 Lac but an additional Rs. 30,000/- i.e. he will get Rs. 1.30 Lac with interest at 12% from the date of the notification under Section 4 to the date of the award or the date of taking possession whichever is earlier, vide Section 23(1 -A). ' : 11. This grant of solatium in addition to the full market value of the land has obviously been made to cater to the difficulties of the person whose land has been acquired. There is no provision in the Land Acquisition Act to grant a job in addition to the amounts specified in Section 23. Hence any Government Order for providing a job in addition to that is in our opinion violative of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, for such a Government Order will amount to amendment of Section 23, which will be illegal. 12. Hence any Government Order for providing a job in addition to that is in our opinion violative of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, for such a Government Order will amount to amendment of Section 23, which will be illegal. 12. In Writ Petition No. 27690 of 1991, Dau Dayal v. Agra Development Authority and others, decided on 23.3.1995 Hon'ble G.P. Mathur, J. held that as there is no provision for granting a job in addition to the compensation provided for in Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, no such job can be granted. 13. We fully agree with the view taken by Hon'ble G.P. Mathur, J. in the aforesaid decision. It is well known that there is already surplus staff in most Government Departments and Public Sector Undertakings, and further jobs cannot be given in this manner as that would only be putting a greater burden on the tax payers, and there would be violation of Article 16 of the Constitution. 14. In Butu Prasad Kumbhar and Ors. v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others, JT 1995(3) SC 428. it was held that there is no requirement under Article 21 of the Constitution to provide employment to a member of the family displaced by the acquisition of land. In Director, Mandi Pahshad v. Sohan Lal, 2003 ALJ 540, a Division Bench of this Court held that when the petitioner has received compensation under the Land Acquisition Act he cannot claim appointment in addition. The Government Order not being issued under a statutory provisions cannot have any statutory force. In Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh and others, AIR 1977 SC 2149 (vide paragraph 15) the Supreme Court observed : "In order that mandamus may be issued to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance." 15. In the present case, we have not been shown any statutory provision requiring a job to be given to one member of the family of the person whose land has been acquired. In Ravindra Kumar v. District Magistrate, Agra, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29679 of 1999, decided on 21.7.1999 one. of us (M. Katju,.J.) has taken a similar view. 16. In Ravindra Kumar v. District Magistrate, Agra, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29679 of 1999, decided on 21.7.1999 one. of us (M. Katju,.J.) has taken a similar view. 16. Learned Counsel for the respondents in this Appeal has relied on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court (Hon'ble R.A, Sharma. J) in Umesh Chandra Srivastava v. District Magistrate, Gorakhpur, Civil Misc. Writ . Petition No. 28795 of 1992. decided on 14.2.1994. In that decision it was observed by the learned Single Judge :- "Land is the source of livelihood of vast population of this country and if if .is acquired by the Government, its owner is. definitely deprived of the source of livelihood and grant of compensation under the Act, though may give him some solace cannot be a substitute of the land, which has been acquired. It is on this ground that the .Government, which runs a Welfare State and is responsible for the well being of the people, has laid down the policy by the above G.O. providing for employment against inferior post to at least one person of the family, whose, land has been acquired. The decision of the Government is fully in consonance with the concept of the Welfare State and the provisions of the Constitution. Such a decision is liable to be respected by the Department or the Authority for whose benefit the land is acquired by the Government." 17. With profound respect to the learned Single Judge we arc not in agreement With the view he has taken, The learned Single Judge has adopted an approach which is more emotional rather than legal. A writ is issued for violation of law or enforcement of some legal duty, and not on such vague and general considerations that since the Government is a Welfare State it has to provide a job to a person whose land is acquired. As already stated above, the person whose land is acquired is not only given full market value with interest from the date of the Notification under Section 4, but is also given 30% solatium on top of that. If the Legislature intended that apart from the above, the affected person should also be provided a job to a member of his family then such a provision would have been made in the . Land Acquisition Act. 18. If the Legislature intended that apart from the above, the affected person should also be provided a job to a member of his family then such a provision would have been made in the . Land Acquisition Act. 18. Learned Counsel for the, respondents has relied on the Supreme Court decisions in, Calcutta Port Trust v. Deba Prosad Bag, AIR 1994 SC 2137 and Banwasi Seva Ashram v. State of U.P., AIR 1992 SC 920 . 19. In our opinion, the aforesaid decisions do not lay down any principle of ' law that on acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act apart from giving them compensation under the Act a job has also to be provided. It is well settled that a mere direction in a judgment without laying down any principle of law is not a precedent vide Delhi Administration v. Manohar Lal, AIR 2002 SC 3088 , Indian Council of Agricultural Research v. Raja Balwant Singh College, 2003 (1) ESC 424 etc. Hence the aforesaid decisions are not precedents, 20. It is a general rule that appointments in the public services should be made by inviting applications through open advertisement and strictly on merit so that every citizen should get equal opportunity in the matter of appointment. This rule should be adhered to in the matter of any public employment or appointment. Neither the State Government nor its instrumentality nor any public authority can deviate from this common rule of appointment and if any other procedure or mode is adopted, it would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India which ensures and guarantees equal opportunity to all citizens in the matter of appointment to any office or of any other employment under the State. However, some exceptions to the general rule for public employment or appointment is also recognized which is commonly known as appointment on compassionate ground which is evolved purely on humanitarian ground and in the interest of justice. This rule was made to meet certain contingencies and to give appointment to a dependant of an employee dying-in-harness to prevent his family from destitution. 21. The Land Acquisition Act is a self-contained Code and provides the procedure to be followed for acquisition as well as for assessment of the valuation and payment of fair and just compensation as per market value of the person whose land is acquired. 21. The Land Acquisition Act is a self-contained Code and provides the procedure to be followed for acquisition as well as for assessment of the valuation and payment of fair and just compensation as per market value of the person whose land is acquired. In addition to that market value of the land interest @ 12% is also given from the date of publication of the Notification vide Section 23(1-A). Besides that, a sum of 30% on such market value is also paid as solatium for distress and for inconvenience or difficulties caused to the person on account of compulsory acquisition of the land vide Section 23(2) of the Act. Therefore, a person whose land is acquired not only gets adequate compensation as per market value of the land but also gets interest on the amount of compensation (a) 12% from the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act as well as an amount of solatium, which is 30% of the amount of compensation. Neither the Land Acquisition Act nor the regulations provides that in the event of acquisition of the land one of the family members of the landholder shall be given employment in addition to the amount of compensation. Therefore, in the absence of any statutory provision or any promise, the petitioner respondent cannot claim appointment as a matter of right nor can the respondent make such appointment. 22. There is no provision under the Land Acquisition Act under which the Circular dated 28.12.1974 could be issued. Whatever compensation has to be given for acquisition of the land is provided under the Land Acquisition Act itself which is a self-contained Code. Any G.O. providing for any further benefit not mentioned in the Land Acquisition Act would be inconsistent with the intention of Parliament as contained in the Land Acquisition Act. Hence any such GO. would be violative of the Land Acquisition Act and would hence be invalid. Such a G.O. will also violate Article 16 of the Constitution as already mentioned above. 23. That apart, in our opinion, the aforesaid G.O. is wholly unworkable. The record shows mat the petitioner had only 12 biswas and ten biswansi land in his share which was acquired. Thus only about half a bigha of the petitioner's land was acquired in the present case. 23. That apart, in our opinion, the aforesaid G.O. is wholly unworkable. The record shows mat the petitioner had only 12 biswas and ten biswansi land in his share which was acquired. Thus only about half a bigha of the petitioner's land was acquired in the present case. If the Circular dated 28.12.1974 is given a literal interpretation it would mean that if even one square yard land of a person is acquired one of his family members would have to be given employment. This would be wholly unreasonable and arbitrary. 24. The number of jobs available in this country is very limited and jobs cannot be given in this manner violating Article 16 of the Constitution. 25. In view of the above we answer the questions referred to us as follows : 1. The Government Orders/Circulars providing employment to one member of a family of a person whose land has been acquired (over and above the compensation awarded under the law) are invalid. 2. The acquiring body for whose benefit the land is acquired are not bound by such Government Order/Circular. 3. No writ can be issued directing the acquiring body to consider the claim in accordance with the aforesaid Order/Government Circular. 12. In fact, the Court has observed that after having received the full compensation as per the implications of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, the appointment as contemplated to be extended to one of the family members, whose land has been acquired, in fact, the Government Orders, contemplating the said provision will not have a statutory force in the eyes of law, because merely of there being an executive direction, they cannot override the statutory provisions, regulating the appointments to be made by the State and the Statutory Corporation as against the posts available to the general public, for public appointments. 13. 13. In fact, in para 15, it was laid down that the statutory provisions requiring a job to be given to one family member, whose land has been acquired, is contrary to the provisions contained under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, because according to the Full Bench judgment, the General Rule of appointment against a public service should always be by way of an open selection process, by inviting applications by way of an open advertisement strictly on merits, so that every citizen should be given an equal opportunity to participate in the matters of appointment, and this rule was required to be adhered to in all the Government and Statutory Corporations, who are the instrumentality of the State, including any Public Authority, and there cannot be any deviation, as such, from the regular process of appointment, because it would be violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Hence, in para 22 of the said judgment of the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court has specifically observed that any Government Order, providing for any further benefit, not mentioned in the Land Acquisition Act, or its beyond the ambit of statute, will be inconsistent with the intention of legislation, as contained under the Land Acquisition Act hence no Government Order could be issued for appointment because the same would be violative of Article 16 of the Constitution of India and would be overriding a statute, governing the field of public appointment. 14. In fact, in yet another judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as reported in 1995 Supp (2) SCC 225, Butu Prasad Kumbhar and others Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others, it had observed, that no writ petition for getting an appointment, as a consequence of the acquisition of land, for setting up a steel plant, by the displaced persons by filing a writ petition would be maintainable, being contrary to the very purpose of objection of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The relevant observations have been made in paragraph 5 and 6 of the said judgment, which are extracted hereunder:- “5. What stands admitted is that the land was acquired in 1953-54 and the steel plant was set up in 1959. The relevant observations have been made in paragraph 5 and 6 of the said judgment, which are extracted hereunder:- “5. What stands admitted is that the land was acquired in 1953-54 and the steel plant was set up in 1959. Yet these petitioners many of whom, we are informed, are already in employment of the respondents and that was vehemently urged by the learned Solicitor General as a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition, approached this Court in 1992 for enforcement of their rights. That a petition on incorrect facts and after such an inordinate delay which has resulted in a generation gap normally is sufficient for refusal to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction. However, considering the nature of the problem and respondents' decision even in 1988 in relation to giving employment to displaced persons it did not appear expedient to dismiss the petition on ground of delay or the conduct of some of the petitioners in joining those who have not been given employment. There is no satisfactory answer to the averment in the counter affidavit that the respondent company having provided employment to 4557 displaced persons when only 2901 families were affected by the land acquisition and the assurance given was to employ only one person of each family there does not appear much substance in the grievance made by the petitioners. Further no details have been furnished by the petitioners in respect of the persons whose list has been appended with the writ petition as to whether any member of their family was given appointment by the Steel Plant or not. There is no reason, therefore, to doubt that one person of every displaced family whose land was acquired has been given employment and, therefore, the letter and spirit of the scheme to accommodate the displaced persons stood satisfied. 6. The constitutional challenge based on Article 21 does not appear to have any substance. In Olga Tellis (supra) it was observed by this Court that the concept of right of life conferred was wide and far-reaching and the deprivation of the right to livelihood without following the procedure established by law was violative of the fundamental guarantee to a citizen. Needless to say that petitioners or their ancestors were not deprived of their land without following the procedure established in law. Their land was taken under the Land Acquisition Act. They were paid compensation for it. Needless to say that petitioners or their ancestors were not deprived of their land without following the procedure established in law. Their land was taken under the Land Acquisition Act. They were paid compensation for it. Therefore, the challenge raised on violation of Article 21 is devoid of any merit. Even otherwise the obligation of the State to ensure that no citizen is deprived of his livelihood does not extend to provide employment to every member of each family displaced in consequence of acquisition of land. Rourkela Plant was established for the growth of the country. It is one of the prestigious steel plants, It is established in public sector. The Government has paid market value for the land acquired. Even if the Government or the steel plant would not have offered any employment to any person it would not have, resulted in violation of any fundamental right yet considering the poverty of the persons who were displaced both the Central and the State Government took steps to ensure that each family was protected by giving employment to at least one member in the Plant. We fail to appreciate how such a step by the Government is violative of Article 21. The claim of the petitioners that unless each adult member is given employment or the future generation is ensured of a preferential claim it would be arbitrary or contrary with the constitutional guarantee is indeed stretching Article 21 without any regard to its scope and ambit as explained by this Court. Truly speaking it is just the otherwise. Acceptance of such a demand would be against Article 14.” 15. Particularly, if the observations which were made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in para 6, are taken into consideration, it has observed that the petitioner or the ancestors, who have been deprived with their land without following due procedure of established law, they can only be paid with the compensation as per the law of acquisition, but no citizen could be deprived of his livelihood who doesn't stand the test to provide an employment, to every member of each family displaced as a consequence of acquisition as per law, for the establishment of Rourkela Steel Plant. In fact, this was widely based upon the principles of Articles 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 16. In fact, this was widely based upon the principles of Articles 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 16. The Allahabad High Court, in yet another judgment as reported in 2016 (6) ALL LJ 664, Kamlesh Chandra Tiwari Vs. State of U.P. and others. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court had considered a case from the prospective that where the land was acquired for the U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation, in village Lawain Khurd, Tehsil Karchhana, District Allahabad, where in pursuance to the acquisition, certain nominees were to be considered as members of the families, who were to be considered, for appointment as a consequence of acquisition of their land. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, based upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and that of the Full Bench Court, as observed in its para 5 to 7 of the judgment has deprecated the action taken by the respondent for providing an appointment as a consequence of acquisition of land for laying down of the public projects being in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Para 5 to 7 of the aforesaid judgment are extracted hereunder:- “5. The basic principle of law which has been enunciated in the judgment of the Full Bench in Ravindra Kumar (supra) is that public employment must follow norms of equality of opportunity, failing which there would be a violation of Articles 14 and 16. Certain exceptions are permissible as in the case of compassionate appointment. Where the land has been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1894, the landholder who is deprived of his land shall be entitled to the payment of compensation and in the absence of a statutory provision, appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Hence, any government order or circular providing employment to one member of a family whose land has been acquired would be invalid. The Full Bench has laid down the following principles: "20. It is a general rule that appointments in the public services should be made by inviting applications through open advertisement and strictly on merit so that every citizen should get equal opportunity in the matter of appointment. This rule should be adhered to in the matter of any public employment or appointment. It is a general rule that appointments in the public services should be made by inviting applications through open advertisement and strictly on merit so that every citizen should get equal opportunity in the matter of appointment. This rule should be adhered to in the matter of any public employment or appointment. Neither the State Government nor its instrumentality nor any public authority can deviate from this common rule of appointment and if any other procedure or mode is adopted, it would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India which ensures and guarantees equal opportunity to all citizens in the matter of appointment to any office or of any other employment under the State. However, some exceptions to the general rule for public employment or appointment is also recognized which is commonly known as appointment on compassionate ground which is evolved purely on humanitarian ground and in the interest of justice. This rule was made to meet certain contingencies and to give appointment to a dependant of an employee dying-in-harness to prevent his family from destitution ... Neither the Land Acquisition Act nor the regulations provides that in the event of acquisition of the land one of the family members of the landholder shall be given employment in addition to the amount of compensation. Therefore, in the absence of any statutory provision or any promise, the petitioner respondent cannot claim appointment as a matter of right nor can the respondent make such appointment." 6. The conclusion of the Full Bench was in the following terms: "1. The Government Orders/Circulars providing employment to one member of a family of a person whose land has been acquired (over and above the compensation awarded under the law) are invalid. 2. The acquiring body for whose benefit the land is acquired are not bound by such Government Order/Circular. 3. No writ can be issued directing the acquiring body to consider the claim in accordance with the aforesaid Order/Government Circular." 7. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Butu Prasad Kumbhar Vs Steel Authority of India Ltd holds thus: "...Needless to say that petitioners or their ancestors were not deprived of their land without following the procedure established in law. Their land was taken under the Land Acquisition Act. They were paid compensation for it. Therefore, the challenge raised on violation of Article 21 is devoid of any merit. Their land was taken under the Land Acquisition Act. They were paid compensation for it. Therefore, the challenge raised on violation of Article 21 is devoid of any merit. Even otherwise the obligation of the State to ensure that no citizen is deprived of his livelihood does not extend to provide employment to every member of each family displaced in consequence of acquisition of land. Rourkela Plant was established for the growth of the country. It is one of the prestigious steel plants. It is established in public sector. The Government has paid market value for the land acquired. Even if the Government or the steel plant would not have offered any employment to any person it would not have resulted in violation of any fundamental right. Yet considering the poverty of the persons who were displaced both the Central and the State Government took steps to ensure that each family was protected by giving employment to at least one member in the plant. We fail to appreciate how such a step by the Government is violative of Article 21. The claim of the petitioners that unless each adult member is given employment or the future generation is ensured of a preferential claim it would be arbitrary or contrary with the constitutional guarantee is indeed stretching Article 21 without any regard to its scope and ambit as explained by this Court. Truly speaking it is just the other way. Acceptance of such a demand would be against Article 14." 17. Truly speaking it is just the other way. Acceptance of such a demand would be against Article 14." 17. Hence, in view of the above settled principles, and the proposition of law, this Court is of the considered view, that the conditions of acquisition, if it is preceded by a condition of appointment provided under Notification, for appointment to the members of the families, whose land has been acquired, since being against the very intention of constitutional mandate, provided under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, which has to be stressed to be extended to be applied in the context of Article 21(2), no statutory right, as such, which could be enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would be created in favour of the persons, who have been deprived of to be appointed under a Policy decision of the State, because the Policy of the State, to grant appointment to the land losers or the dependents would be in contravention to the principles laid down by the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court, as well as Butu Prasad (Supra), this Court is of the view, that no negative parity could be extended to the petitioner, merely on the pretext, that under the Notification issued by the respondents, if some other persons have been granted appointment, the petitioner cannot claim that any discrimination has been meted out to him by normal extension of the benefit of Notification dated 20th June 2013 to few, for providing an opportunity under the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for Hydro Project Policy of 2013. 18. Since the very genesis of the claim of the petitioner, coupled with the fact, that since the petitioner’s name found placed in the waitlist, that in itself will not grant him a right to be considered for appointment and be appointed in view of the ratios laid down by the judgments, already dealt with above. Hence, in case, if the petitioner has been placed in the waitlist, and even if the two vacancies have been created due to renouncement of the right of appointment by Mr. Hence, in case, if the petitioner has been placed in the waitlist, and even if the two vacancies have been created due to renouncement of the right of appointment by Mr. Neeraj Tomar and Rishika Tomar, and even if the petitioner’s name find place in the waiting list, then too, he will not get an indefeasible enforceable right under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that too, in violation of a constitutional mandate of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. Hence, the writ petition fails, and the same is accordingly dismissed.