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2022 DIGILAW 20 (ALL)

Co-Operative Co. Ltd. v. State Of U. P.

2022-01-05

JAYANT BANERJI

body2022
JUDGMENT : Jayant Banerji, J. 1. Heard Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Namit Srivastava and Sri Manoj Kumar Ahuja, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri Avinash Chandra Tripathi and Sri Jagdish Mishra, learned Standing Counsel, appearing for the respondents. 2. The facts, as appearing from the writ petition are, that the petitioner, which was initially registered on 08.09.1910 as a Joint Stock Company, was allotted Corporate Identity Number U51226DL1910PL299886 and altered the provisions of its Memorandum of Association. The order of the Regional Director, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, confirming the alteration was registered under Section 13(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 on 17.05.2016. The petitioner has, as one of its main objects, preparation and manufacture of liquor, ethanol, etc., and to carry on trade in the aforesaid product. Under the provisions of United Provinces Excise Act, 19101 the petitioner was granted a licence to distil liquor which was renewed by the Excise Commissioner, the respondent no. 3, by means of its order dated 15.5.2018 and PD-2 licence was issued for the Excise Year 2018-19, 2019-20, that is, from 1.4.2018 to 31.3.2020. The PD-2 licence of the petitioner was further renewed for the Excise Year 2020-21 and 2021-22 and by an order dated 12.3.2020, the respondent no.3 also issued Act 1910 a licence to manufacture Extra Neutral Alcohol (ENA) for a period of two years. The petitioner also has a bottling plant of Indian Made Foreign Liqour (IMFL) in the company premises, for which a separate licence in Form FL-3(A) was issued by the Excise Commissioner, U.P. for the Excise Year 2019-20 and 2020-21. The petitioner has also obtained a licence for storage of IMFL in Form FL-1. 3. A raid was conducted on the petitioner’s premises on 3.3.2021 and a show cause notice-cum-order of suspension of licence PD-2 dated 6.3.2021 was issued by respondent no.3 to the petitioner to submit a reply with regard to the inspection done by a joint team of Excise officials and a Special Task Force. Reference was made in the notice to a Truck No. UP-11-B.T.0935 which was intercepted and which was carrying 1500 boxes of country made liqour. It was also stated in the notice that the inspection was carried out in the petitioner’s distillery and glaring irregularities were found. Reference was made in the notice to a Truck No. UP-11-B.T.0935 which was intercepted and which was carrying 1500 boxes of country made liqour. It was also stated in the notice that the inspection was carried out in the petitioner’s distillery and glaring irregularities were found. The allegation was that the forged/duplicate bar codes were being used by the petitioner on the liqour bottles and it was also transporting illegal liquor twice on one gate pass from the distillery. A reply dated 10.3.2021 was submitted by the petitioner to the aforesaid show cause notice denying all the allegations made in the show cause notice-cum-suspension order. It was specifically stated in the reply that it was not possible to comment on the so-called irregularities because no copy of the inspection report, which formed the basis of the show-cause notice, was given to the representative of the petitioner nor was the same enclosed with the notice. However, by means of the impugned order dated 01.04.2021, the Excise Commissioner, respondent no.3, cancelled the license PD-2 of the petitioner. The revision petition filed by the petitioner under Section 11 of the Act 1910 was also dismissed by an order of the respondent no.2 on 25.08.2021. 4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondents have failed to recover any evidence from the premises of the petitioner pertaining to the forged/duplicate bar code or illegal production of ENA/spirit. It is contended that by means of an order dated 1.4.2021, the respondent no.3, without giving any opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner, passed an order cancelling PD-2 licence of the petitioner with a further direction forfeiting all amounts deposited by the petitioner towards the PD-2 license, with no compensation or refund. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that merely on the basis of an FIR lodged on 3.3.2021, the show cause notice dated 6.3.2021 was issued to the petitioner and the respondent no. 3 has proceeded to cancel the licence on the grounds mentioned in the FIR. It is also contended that in the order of cancellation, the respondent no. 3 refers to an inspection report made by the joint team which was never supplied to the petitioner. 3 has proceeded to cancel the licence on the grounds mentioned in the FIR. It is also contended that in the order of cancellation, the respondent no. 3 refers to an inspection report made by the joint team which was never supplied to the petitioner. It is contended that non-furnishing of the inspection report, has caused grave prejudice to the petitioner and violated his rights by declining opportunity to answer the material relied upon by the respondents. It is contended that though the show cause notice dated 6.3.2021, refers to an inspection report but does not disclose relevant material, if any, that may find place in the inspection report. 5. Learned counsel has referred to Section 34 of the Act to contend that none of the five conditions prescribed for suspension or cancellation of licence exist, that would vest the authority with the mandate to suspend or cancel the licence PD-2. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to judgment of this Court in the matter of Smt. Raj Kumari Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2011 (3) ADJ 638 (DB), Jagdish Narian Mishra Vs. State of U.P. and others, Civil Misc.Writ Petition No. 28051 of 2008 decided on 30.10.2009 and a judgment of the Supreme Court in Natwar Singh Vs. Director of Enforcement and another, (2010) 13 SCC 255 . 6. The cited judgements of Smt. Raj Kumari and Jagdish Narain Mishra are to substantiate that mere lodging of an FIR cannot form the basis of action against the petitioner for canceling the licence. With regard to non-supply of inspection report being in violation of principles of natural justice and causing prejudice to the petitioner, the case of Natwar Singh has been relied upon. 7. Sri Avinash Chandra Tripathi, learned standing counsel, spearheading the arguments on behalf of the respondent, has stated that the State has got power to prohibit anyone from dealing in any form of intoxicants and that there is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants. In this regard the learned counsel has referred to the judgement of the Supreme Court in Har Shankar and others v. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner and others, AIR 1975 SC 1121 . The learned counsel has referred to the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act 1910, particularly Sections 17, 18, 24 and 24A. In this regard the learned counsel has referred to the judgement of the Supreme Court in Har Shankar and others v. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner and others, AIR 1975 SC 1121 . The learned counsel has referred to the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act 1910, particularly Sections 17, 18, 24 and 24A. Learned counsel has further referred to Chapter VI of the Act, particularly Section 31 and 34 that deal with the form and conditions of licences, and, the power to cancel or suspend licences, respectively. While referring to Rule 702(4) of Chapter IX of the U.P. Excise Manual (Distilleries Rules), learned counsel has stated that an opportunity of hearing is to be afforded to the licensee in proceedings for cancellation of licence only if he so desires. Learned counsel has drawn the attention of the Court to the show cause notice that has been appended as Annexure No.11 to the writ petition and has referred to contents of the gate pass quoted in the show cause notice to contend that the irregularities reflected in that clause of the show cause notice are those that are distinct from the other irregularities like the non-functioning of the CCTV camera in the factory premises. Learned counsel has referred to the various clauses of the show cause notice to attempt to demonstrate that the seriousness of the allegations against the petitioner necessitated cancellation of the PD-2 licence. It is stated that on the basis of inspection done by the joint team, the FIR was lodged against the petitioner/its agent and the show cause notice, which is based on the FIR, is valid in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case. 8. It is stated that on the basis of inspection done by the joint team, the FIR was lodged against the petitioner/its agent and the show cause notice, which is based on the FIR, is valid in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case. 8. It is contended that the power and duties of an officer of the department are specified in Chapter IX of the Act 1910 and under Section 48, power is given to enter and inspect, at any time by day or by night any place in which the licensed manufacturer carries on the manufacture of or stores any intoxicant and my enter and inspect at any time within the hours during which sale is permitted, and at any other time during which the same may be open, any place in which any intoxicant is kept for sale by any licensed person, and may examine, test, measure or weigh any materials, stills, utensils, implements, apparatus, or intoxicant found in such place: and may seize any measures, weights or testing instruments which he has reason to believe to be false. It is stated that show cause notice reveals various violations of conditions of licence PD-2 and the impugned cancellation order has taken into account the violation of conditions of the licence and is passed in accordance with law and as such, no interference is deserved. 9. In rejoinder, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has stated that the order impugned, passed by the respondent no.3 reflects non-application of mind, and is merely based on an FIR and a so-called inspection report which has never been made available to the petitioner. The contention is that though the learned Standing Counsel is placing reliance on the provisions of Section 34(1)(b) of the Act 1910, being the alleged breach for suspending or cancellation of licence, that provision will not apply in the case where an FIR is lodged. Further contention is that the show cause notice could have been confined to address Clause (b) of Section 34(1) of the Act 1910. It is his contention that the FIR can only be relied upon with regard to clause (c) of Section 34(1) of the Act 1910 where conviction has actually taken place. It is stated that there is no statement in the show cause notice regarding violation of clause (b) of Section 34(1) of the Act 1910. It is his contention that the FIR can only be relied upon with regard to clause (c) of Section 34(1) of the Act 1910 where conviction has actually taken place. It is stated that there is no statement in the show cause notice regarding violation of clause (b) of Section 34(1) of the Act 1910. It is stated that the power conferred upon the Government in the revision, enjoined the Government to deal with all the grounds raised in the memorandum of revision, but, in the revisional order neither were any ground raised by the petitioner were discussed nor was there any application of mind. It is stated that the FIR does not incorporate the inspection report, but is only purports to be based on the inspection report and as such, supply of inspection report was necessary and non-supply thereof has caused prejudice to the petitioner. 10. I have considered the rival contentions of the respective counsel for the parties and perused the record. At the outset, the judgement cited by learned counsel for the respondent in Har Shankar may be considered. The main controversy before the Constitution Bench was the power of the Government to levy and realize large license fees either through the medium of auctions or on scales fixed under the rules. Therefore, the controversy was entirely different. The observation of the Supreme Court that has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents that there is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants, is almost axiomatic, in view of the law on the issue, and need not tarry me. 11. As far as reliance placed by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner on the aforesaid two judgements cited by him in the matter of Smt. Raj Kumari and Jagdish Narain Mishra to submit that there can be no cancellation of licence on the basis of an FIR, it is pertinent to mention here that in the case of Jagdish Narain Mishra, the authority cancelled the petitioner’s fair price shop license on two grounds, namely, that there were complaints of irregularities regarding distribution of scheduled commodities by the petitioner and, secondly, the petitioner was involved in a criminal case under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. The observations of the Court made in Jagdish Narain Mishra, which are important for purpose of analysing the present case, are as follows: “The law is settled that a fair price shop agreement cannot be cancelled merely on the basis of allegations made against a dealer unless the licensing authority on the basis of evidence on record is satisfied that such allegations stand proved. Hence the cancellation of petitioner's agreement by the licensing authority only the ground of there being serious allegations against him without recording any finding that the allegations/complaints against the petitioner were proved by evidence on record, can not be sustained at all. The order of the licensing authority further reveals that even the written explanation submitted by the petitioner before the Licensing Authority to the charge sheet has not been considered in accordance with law. The Licensing Authority brushed aside the petitioner's explanation by just mentioning in the impugned order that the matter was examined and the explanation was not found to be satisfactory. No reason has been given by the Licensing Authority for not finding the explanation submitted by the petitioner to be satisfactory. Such a consideration of the explanation, in my opinion no consideration in the eye of law. Despite advancing lengthy arguments, learned standing counsel has failed to bring to the notice of the Court any provision either under the Essential Commodities Distribution Order, 2004 or under any other Government Order issued either under the 2004 order or 1990 order empowering the Licensing Authority to cancel a fair price shop agreement merely on account of a dealer being involved in a criminal case. Hence the cancellation of the petitioner's agreement on the ground of his involvement in aforesaid criminal case under the Essential Commodities Act is also unsustainable”. 12. In the case of Smt. Raj Kumari (supra), the fair price shop dealership of the petitioner therein was cancelled on the ground that an FIR under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act was lodged against the petitioner. The Division Bench of this Court, relying upon the aforesaid judgement of Jagdish Narain Mishra held as follows:- “5.Nothing has been brought to our attention that the said judgment has been overruled. The Division Bench of this Court, relying upon the aforesaid judgement of Jagdish Narain Mishra held as follows:- “5.Nothing has been brought to our attention that the said judgment has been overruled. Even otherwise, we are of the opinion that the said conclusion cannot be faulted for the reason that mere filing of a F.I.R. cannot result in holding a fair price shop owner guilty of the offences charged. If there be a conviction, then it is possible to proceed, based on the conviction and not otherwise. In case if the F.I.R. is lodged, it is still open to the respondents to proceed by leading independent evidence and statements of the persons recorded. …...... 7. Considering what we have set out earlier and the Judgment of this Court in Jagdish Narain Mishra (supra), which we approve, the cancellation of the licence of the petitioner is without authority of law. 8. Even otherwise we may point out that a reading of the order dated 10.8.2010 discloses total non application of mind. The said order purports to cancel the license merely on the ground of lodging of an F.I.R. and that suspension is going on for a long time thereby causing inconvenience in distribution of essential commodities to the card holders. The said reasons cannot be justified in law to cancel the dealership”. 13. On perusal of the aforesaid two judgements, it is evident that lodging of the FIR was a ground for cancellation of licence of the dealer. In Jagdish Narain Mishra, no findings were recorded by the authorities that the allegation/complaint against the petitioner was proved by evidence on record. The dealer's explanation in Jagdish Narain Mishra was cursorily brushed aside by the authorities without assigning any reason only by stating that the explanation submitted by the petitioner was not found to be satisfactory. In the case of Smt. Raj Kumari, merely an FIR under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act was lodged against the fair price shop dealer and the Court held that the petitioner cannot be held guilty of the offences charged on the ground of lodging of an FIR. It was further observed that if there be a conviction, then it is possible to proceed, based on the conviction and not otherwise. It was further noticed by the Court that the order cancelling licence disclosed total non-application of mind. 14. It was further observed that if there be a conviction, then it is possible to proceed, based on the conviction and not otherwise. It was further noticed by the Court that the order cancelling licence disclosed total non-application of mind. 14. In the present case, the fact situation is different. The petitioner, who is a distiller, was served with a show cause notice-cum-order purportedly on the basis of material discovered during a raid conducted in the premises of the petitioner by a team of officials, the details of which are stated to find place in the FIR. The show cause notice-cum-order mentions alleged violations of conditions of the licence and of the Act and Rules, and, suspends the licence PD-2 of the petitioner. Under the facts and circumstances, though consequent to the FIR the show cause notice-cum-order was issued, however, the discovery of alleged irregularities and recovery of items during the raid conducted at the petitioner’s premises was the basis on which the FIR was lodged. Moreover, after consideration of the reply of the petitioner to the show cause notice-cum-order, the detailed impugned order was passed by the respondent no.3 on 01.04.2021 cancelling the license PD-2 of the petitioner. The power to cancel or suspend licenses is provided in section 34 of the Act 1910. Therefore, under the circumstances, the cancellation of licence after issuance of show cause notice-cum-order based on the FIR and inspection, cannot be faulted. This observation, however, is not to be taken as a finding on merits of the validity of the cancellation order dated 01.04.2021 of the license PD-2 of the petitioner. 15. The other points, which are being considered in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, are:- (i) Whether any opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner-company or its authorized representative was required to be given prior to canceling the PD-2 license, and if so, would the order dated 1.4.2021 passed by the Excise Commissioner canceling the license of the petitioner stand vitiated? (ii) Whether non-furnishing of the inspection report caused serious prejudice to the petitioner thereby vitiating the impugned order dated 1.4.2021? 16. (ii) Whether non-furnishing of the inspection report caused serious prejudice to the petitioner thereby vitiating the impugned order dated 1.4.2021? 16. As far as the opportunity of personal hearing being granted to the petitioner is concerned, the learned standing counsel for the respondent referred to sub-rule (4) of Rule 702 of Chapter IX of Part 2 of the Excise Rules in the U.P. Excise Manual to contend that there is no right of privilege for grant of license for the manufactures of spirit and the license granted is liable to be revoked or withdrawn at any time, in public interest, after giving the holder of a license a notice to show cause against such action and after hearing him, if he so desires. It is the contention that there is no provision in the Act or the Rules that mandates grant of personal hearing to the petitioner. It is stated that a show cause notice-cum-order, as per the aforesaid rule, was given to the petitioner and the reply not having been found satisfactory, the Excise Commissioner proceeded to cancel the license, which is justified given the scale of the tax evasion and irregularities. The Special Secretary, Department of Excise, respondent no. 2, in its order of 25.8.2021 on the revision filed by the petitioner, states that though an objection regarding not granting prior opportunity of hearing before cancellation of license was raised by the petitioner, however, the petitioner had not been able to specify that under which rule the same is mandatory. The respondent no. 2 proceeded to hold that there is want of any rule which provides for mandatory opportunity of hearing to a distiller and as such the order dated 01.04.2021, canceling the license under Section 34 of the Act of 1910, was passed after considering the reply to the show cause notice-cum-order. It is pertinent to mention here that in paragraph 16 of the counter affidavit, in reply to the contents of the paragraph 26 of the writ petition, there is no specific denial to the averment that the order cancelling the PD-2 license of the petitioner was passed by the respondent no. 3 without giving any opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner or its authorized representative. 17. It is evident that sub-rule (4) of the aforesaid Rule 702 of the Excise Manual provides for opportunity of hearing to a noticee provided it is so desired. 3 without giving any opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner or its authorized representative. 17. It is evident that sub-rule (4) of the aforesaid Rule 702 of the Excise Manual provides for opportunity of hearing to a noticee provided it is so desired. By cancellation of the license PD-2, the petitioner has been visited with severe civil consequences. The cancellation of license has resulted in closure of the business of the petitioner which has affected the livelihood of several people employed in the petitioner-company. In various decisions of the Supreme Court, it has been held that even if a statute is silent and there are no positive words in the Act or the Rules made thereunder, there would be nothing wrong in spelling out the need to hear the parties whose rights and interest are likely to be affected by the orders that may be passed, and in making it a requirement to follow a fair procedure before taking a decision, unless the statute provides otherwise. The principles of natural justice must be read into the unoccupied interstices of the statute, unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. It has been further held that where the statute is silent about the observance about the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to employ compliance with the principles of natural justice where substantial rights of parties are considerably affected. The application of natural justice becomes presumptive unless, found excluded by express words of statute or necessary intendment. Reference may be had to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mangilal Vs. State of M.P., (2004) 2 SCC 447 , Suresh Chandra Nanhorya Vs. Rajendra Rajak, (2006) 7 SCC 800 . Institute of Chartered Accountants of India Vs. L.K. Ratna, (1986) 4 SCC 537 . Further, the Supreme Court, in the case of Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. CCE, (2015) 8 SCC 519 observed as follows:- “28. It is on the aforesaid jurisprudential premise that the fundamental principles of natural justice, including audi alteram partem, have developed. It is for this reason that the courts have consistently insisted that such procedural fairness has to be adhered to before a decision is made and infraction thereof has led to the quashing of decisions taken. It is on the aforesaid jurisprudential premise that the fundamental principles of natural justice, including audi alteram partem, have developed. It is for this reason that the courts have consistently insisted that such procedural fairness has to be adhered to before a decision is made and infraction thereof has led to the quashing of decisions taken. In many statutes, provisions are made ensuring that a notice is given to a person against whom an order is likely to be passed before a decision is made, but there may be instances where though an authority is vested with the powers to pass such orders, which affect the liberty or property of an individual but the statute may not contain a provision for prior hearing. But what is important to be noted is that the applicability of principles of natural justice is not dependent upon any statutory provision. The principle has to be mandatorily applied irrespective of the fact as to whether there is any such statutory provision or not.” 18. However, it was further observed in Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. that every violation of a facet of natural justice may not lead to the conclusion that the order passed is always null and void. The validity of the order has to be decided on the touchstone of “prejudice”. 19. The visiting of civil consequences on the petitioner is prejudicial to its interest. The Rule 702 (4) aforesaid provides for an opportunity of hearing where it is so desired. Therefore, it is held that opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner, under the facts and circumstances of the case, was required to be given, and that having not been done, the impugned order dated 1.4.2021 passed by the Excise Commissioner is vitiated. 20. As far as the averment made in paragraph no. 28 of the writ petition that no inspection report, as alleged in the show cause notice dated 6.3.2021 was made available to the petitioner and as such the petitioner could not submit its detailed reply, in paragraph no. 17 of the counter affidavit there is no categorical denial with regard to non-furnishing of the inspection report to the petitioner. In the counter affidavit, the existence of the inspection report has not been denied, but the inspection report has not been enclosed. 17 of the counter affidavit there is no categorical denial with regard to non-furnishing of the inspection report to the petitioner. In the counter affidavit, the existence of the inspection report has not been denied, but the inspection report has not been enclosed. In the show cause notice-cum-order, serious irregularities are stated to have been found in the working of the distiller at the time of the inspection. However, though the irregularities and violations have been briefly narrated in the show-cause notice-cum-order, the details of the irregularities have not been mentioned. This assumes significance as in its reply to the show-cause notice-cum-order, the petitioner has questioned the allegation of recovery of country made liquor and the allegation of duplicate bar codes on the ground that the same are not reflected in the FIR. 21. In the case of Natwar Singh (supra), the Supreme Court was considering whether a noticee served with a show cause notice under Rule 4(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management (Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal) Rules, 2000 (Rules of 2000) is entitled to demand to furnish all the documents in possession of the adjudicating authority including those documents upon which no reliance had been placed to issue a notice requiring him to show cause why an inquiry should not be held against him. The Supreme Court considered the provisions of section 16 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, that provides for holding an inquiry by the adjudicating authority in the manner prescribed after giving the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Also considered was Rule 4 of the Rules of 2000, which provides for issuance of notice by the adjudicating authority to the person concerned requiring him to show cause, the show cause notice indicating the nature of contravention alleged to have been committed. In the context it was observed by the Supreme Court as follows:- “30. The right to fair hearing is a guaranteed right. Every person before an authority exercising the adjudicatory powers has a right to know the evidence to be used against him. This principle is firmly established and recognised by this Court in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT [ AIR 1955 SC 65 : (1955) 1 SCR 941 ]. However, disclosure not necessarily involves supply of the material. A person may be allowed to inspect the file and take notes. This principle is firmly established and recognised by this Court in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT [ AIR 1955 SC 65 : (1955) 1 SCR 941 ]. However, disclosure not necessarily involves supply of the material. A person may be allowed to inspect the file and take notes. Whatever mode is used, the fundamental principle remains that nothing should be used against the person which has not been brought to his notice. If relevant material is not disclosed to a party, there is prima facie unfairness irrespective of whether the material in question arose before, during or after the hearing. The law is fairly well settled if prejudicial allegations are to be made against a person, he must be given particulars of that before hearing so that he can prepare his defence. However, there are various exceptions to this general rule where disclosure of evidential material might inflict serious harm on the person directly concerned or other persons or where disclosure would be breach of confidence or might be injurious to the public interest because it would involve the revelation of official secrets, inhibit frankness of comment and the detection of crime, might make it impossible to obtain certain clauses of essential information at all in the future (see R. v. Secy. of State for Home Deptt., ex p H [1995 QB 43 : (1994) 3 WLR 1110 : (1995) 1 All ER 479 (CA)]).” 22. It is pertinent to note here that a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of City Corner Vs. P.A. to Collector & ADM, (1976) 1 SCC 124 has held that it is not always necessary that the documents asked for should themselves be furnished provided the substance of those documents is furnished, always provided, however, that the summary is not misleading. The Supreme Court held that such was not the case there, but when the appellant asked for the original documents, he could at least have been told that he had already been given a summary of documents which was sufficient to enable him to make his representation and he could make his fuller representation as he had promised in his earlier so called interim reply. 23. 23. In view of the facts and circumstances appearing in the present case, for want of the inspection report before this Court, it cannot be presumed that the substance of the inspection report or the summary of the documents was furnished and that the summary was not misleading. It is also a matter of conjecture whether the relevant facts contained in the inspection report necessary to file an appropriate reply by the petitioner, were declared in the show-cause notice-cum-order. Therefore, it is held that non-furnishing of the inspection report resulted in denial of opportunity to the petitioner to submit a proper reply to the show cause notice, and has consequently caused serious prejudice to it, and as such has vitiated the order impugned dated 1.4.2021 passed by the respondent no. 3. 24. Therefore, the order impugned dated 1.4.2021 passed by the respondent no. 3, Excise Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh (Annexure No. 13 to the writ petition) and the order dated 25.8.2021 passed by the respondent no. 2, Special Secretary, Department of Excise in Revision No. 29 of 2021 (Annexure No. 18 to the writ petition) cannot be sustained and are hereby quashed. 25. It is, however, open to the respondents to proceed in light of the observations made above and take appropriate steps, in accordance with the law, further to the reply dated 10.3.2021 furnished by the petitioner to the show cause notice-cum-order dated 6.3.2021. 26. Subject to the aforesaid observations, this writ petition is allowed.