JUDGMENT : 1. The instant Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of CPC is directed against the judgment and decree dated 21.08.2012, passed by the Additional District Judge, Mahasamund, in Civil Appeal No. 5-A/2012, whereby the plaintiff's/appellant's appeal has been dismissed affirming the judgment and decree dated 13.02.2009, passed by 1st Civil Judge, Class I, Mahasamund, in Civil Suit No. 4-A/2009. The plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration that he is entitled to get the title over the suit land by adverse possession and for grant of permanent injunction restraining the defendants in the suit property. 2. For the sake of convenience, parties hereinafter will be referred as per their status and ranking given in the plaint before the trial Court. 3. Brief facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are that, the plaintiff and defendant No.1 to 5 have properties situated at village Kanpa, P.H. No. 136/83 measuring area about 0.24 hectare. On 05.07.2004, the property was jointly recorded in the revenue record in the name of both the parties. On 04.06.2004, the defendants No.1 to 5 have moved an application for partition in the account before Gram Panchayat thereafter Gram Panchayat has separated the accounts, description has given in paragraph one the plaint which is extract below:- Khasra No. Area Lagan 85/1 0.32 3.90 1115/1 0.45 552/1 0.24 598 0.24 592/5 0.07 Total 5 1.34 3.90 4. It has been contended that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property bearing Khasra No. 376/4 which was changed as Khasra No. 598 area 0.24 hectare, the plaintiff is in possession of the land for the last 23-24 years which was neither opposed by the defendants nor they have filed civil suit before the competent authority. It has also been contended that the plaintiff is well aware of the fact that suit property belonged to defendant No. 1 to 5, as he was cultivating the land and was resident of same village. It has also been contended that the plaintiff is well aware of the fact that suit property belonged to defendant No. 1 to 5, as he was cultivating the land and was resident of same village. The defendants have never objected the possession of plaintiff, as such he acquired title over the suit property, as per the principal of adverse possession and would pray that the plaintiff be declared title holder of suit property situated in village Kanpa, Patwari Halka No. 136/83 now after settlement new khasra No. 376/4 area 0.24 hectare which is again renumbered as khasra No. 598 and the respondent No. 1 to 5 be kindly restrained from interfering in the peaceful possession of the suit property. 5. The defendants have filed their written statements denying the plaint averments contending that Gram Panchayat Kanpa vide its order dated 5/7/2004 had directed for partition against that order, they have preferred the appeal before Sub Divisional Officer which is pending as on 21.01.2008. It has also been contended that the suit property belonged to Sakunat Bee, Nazeer Mohammad and Ale Mohammad and their names have also been recorded in the revenue record which has wrongly been partitioned by the Gram Panchayat. Defendants have been further contended that the plaintiff was never in possession of the suit property as the suit property is ancestral property of defendant No. 1 to 4 and would pray for dismissal of the suit. The defendant No. 5 has filed separate written statement denying the allegation made in the plaint and contending that the suit property is ancestral property of defendant no. 1 to 5 and against division of partition vide order dated 05.07.2004 by the village panchayat Kanpa, he has preferred appeal which is pending before SDO, Mahasamund. 6. The plaintiff to substantiate his stand has examined himself as (PW-1), Bholaram (PW-2), Ramnarayan (PW-3), Shyamu (PW-4) and exhibited documents B-1 Kistbandi Khatouni (Ex.P-1), Khasra Panchsala (Ex.P- 2). Defendants examined Habib Khan as (DW-1). 7. Chintaram has examined himself as (PW-1) in the examination-in-chief by way of affidavit, has reiterated the pleadings which has been made in the plaint. He was extensively cross-examined wherein he has admitted that he has not moved any application for mutation of name in the revenue proceedings as the owner of the land and person who is occupying the land whereas the names of present defendants have been mentioned. He was extensively cross-examined wherein he has admitted that he has not moved any application for mutation of name in the revenue proceedings as the owner of the land and person who is occupying the land whereas the names of present defendants have been mentioned. He has stated that his name has been recorded in the revenue record but no documentary evidence has been produced before the Court. He has also admitted that after acquiring possession of the land he has not taken paddy from the land. He has not paid any taxes regarding water. He has also admitted that rent and water taxes are paid by Habib. He has also admitted that he has not moved any application before the Revenue Officer or Irrigation Department to record his name in the suit property. He has admitted that in Ex.P-1 to (Ex.P-4) name of defendants have already been record. He has also admitted that the suit property recorded in the name of Nazeer Mohammad and Ale Mohammad. He has admitted that he has not raised an objection before the Panchayat regarding mutation stating that he is in possession of the suit property, therefore, partition may not be done.Bholaram (PW-2) and Ramnarayan (PW-3) have reiterated in the same line as deposed by plaintiff. 8. Habib Khan as (DW-1) who has reiterated averment made in the plaint and in the cross-examination has stated that he has given property to Chintaram for crop sharing but no witness was examined in his defence. He has also stated that he has not made any complaint with regard to non-payment of crop share by the plaintiff. Learned trial Court while dismissing the suit has recorded its finding that the plaintiff though pleaded that he is in possession of the suit property for the last 12 years but the plaintiff has not filed any documentary evidence to substantiate his case. Learned trial Court has given due weightage to the evidence adduced by the DW-1 wherein he has stated that Chintaram has earning his livelihood from the property for the last 5 years as per the crop sharing pattern and there was no documentary evidence prior to five years that plaintiff is in possession of the suit property. The plaintiff has not been able to prove that he is in peaceful possession of the suit property last 23-24 years. The plaintiff has not been able to prove that he is in peaceful possession of the suit property last 23-24 years. The trial Court after appreciating the entire evidence adduced before it and considering the material on record has dismissed the suit. Against that order the plaintiff has preferred first appeal before learned first Appellate Court, learned first appellate Court after reiterating the evidence, considering the law on the subject has dismissed the appeal vide its judgment and decree dated 21.08.2012. Being aggrieved with the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, the plaintiff has preferred second appeal before this Court. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the findings recorded by the both the Courts are contrary to the evidence, material on record as the plaintiff has clearly established plea of adverse possession by cogent and reasonable evidence. He would further submit that the Courts below have committed illegality in considering the law with regard to adverse possession as there was no evidence that the plaintiff possession over the suit property has been ever objected by the defendants and would submit that substantial question of law is required to be examined and the appeal deserves to be admitted by this Court. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the records of the Courts below with utmost satisfaction. 11. A careful perusal of evidence adduced by the witnesses of both the parties regarding possession goes to show that it cannot be held that plaintiff was in peaceful possession well within the knowledge of defendant No.1 to 5 or they have never objected the possession of plaintiff or the possession was for 12 years. It is quite vivid that from the evidence, material on record that the appellant was in permissive possession and not on adverse possession as the suit land was given to him by the defendant No. 1 to 5 to cultivate land as per crop sharing basis for every year, which cannot be held that appellant was in peaceful possession of the suit land as an owner without any objection or obstruction by the respondent No.1 to 5. This is vital fact for determining the plea of adverse possession which is absent in the present facts of the case as such it is a permissive possession and not adverse possession. This is vital fact for determining the plea of adverse possession which is absent in the present facts of the case as such it is a permissive possession and not adverse possession. It is settled law, permissive possession for a period how so far long it may be, cannot be termed as adverse possession. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, merely because the plaintiff continued to cultivate the land in question for more than 12 years or any period on crop sharing basis, no decree of declaration of his right by way of adverse possession can be granted in his favour. 12. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Narasamma and others v. A Krishnappa (dead) through Legal representative (2020) 15 SCC 218 has held as under:- 30. We may also note that on the one hand, the appellants herein have sought to take a plea of bar of limitation vis-à-vis the original defendant claiming that possession came to them in 1976, with the suit being filed in 1989. Yet at the same time, it is claimed that the wife had title on the basis of these very documents. The claim of title from 1976 and the plea of adverse possession from 1976 cannot simultaneously hold. On the failure to establish the plea of title, it was necessary to prove as to from which date did the possession of the wife of the defendant amount to a hostile possession in a peaceful, open and continuous manner. We fail to appreciate how, on the one hand the appellants claimed that the wife of the original defendant, appellant 1 herein, had title to the property in 1976 but on their failure to establish title, in the alternative, the plea of adverse possession should be recognized from the very date. 31. We also find that the reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellants in Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors., (1999) 6 SCC 343 is also misplaced. The question which arose for consideration before the three Judge Bench was whether, a suit could be maintained for declaration of title and for permanent injunction seeking protection on a plea of adverse possession, or that it was an instrument of defence in a suit filed against such a person. The question which arose for consideration before the three Judge Bench was whether, a suit could be maintained for declaration of title and for permanent injunction seeking protection on a plea of adverse possession, or that it was an instrument of defence in a suit filed against such a person. In fact, if one may say, there was, for a long time a consistent view of the Court that the plea could only be of shield and not a sword. The judgment changed this legal position by opining that a plea to retain 8(supra) possession could be managed by the ripening of title by way of adverse possession. However, to constitute such adverse possession, the three classic requirements, which need to co-exist were again emphasized, nec vi, i.e., adequate in continuity, nec clam, i.e., adequate in publicity and nec precario, i.e., adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge. 32. The question which confronts us is not the aforesaid, but whether simultaneously a plea can be taken of title and adverse possession, i.e., whether it would amount to taking contradictory pleas. In this behalf, we may refer to the four judgments cited by learned counsel for the respondent herein, which succinctly set forth the legal position. 33. In Karnataka Board of Wakf case, it has been clearly set out that a plaintiff filing a title over the property must specifically plead it. When such a plea of adverse possession is projected, it is inherent in the nature of it that someone else is the owner of the property. In that context, it was observed in para 12 that “….the pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v.Savitkibai Sopan Gujar & Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 722 (supra) former is renounced….” 34. The aforesaid judgment in turn relied upon the judgment in Mohan Lal (Deceased) Thr. LRs. (supra), which observed in para as under: “4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. (1999) 3 SCC 722 (supra) former is renounced….” 34. The aforesaid judgment in turn relied upon the judgment in Mohan Lal (Deceased) Thr. LRs. (supra), which observed in para as under: “4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., upto completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the appellant's claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant.” 35. In order to establish adverse possession an inquiry is required to be made into the starting point of such adverse possession and, thus, when the recorded owner got dispossessed would be crucial. 36. In the facts of the present case, this fact has not at all been proved. The possession of Smt. Narasamma, the wife of the defendant, is stated (supra) P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy & Ors. (supra) to be on account of consideration paid. Assuming that the transaction did not fructify into a sale deed for whatever reason, still the date when such possession becomes adverse would have to be set out. Thus, the plea of adverse possession is lacking in all material particulars. 13. Applying the ratio of law laid down by the Supreme Court in above referred case to the facts of present case and also considering other attending facts, in the considered opinion of this court, both the courts below have not committed any illegality, while appreciating the evidence adduced for the trial Court. Thus, both the Courts below have not committed any error of law while appreciating the pleadings and evidence brought on record to negative the claim of the plaintiff on the basis of adverse possession. 14. Upon perusal of entire evidence, there is no substantial question of law requiring to be formulated for hearing of this second appeal. Thus, both the Courts below have not committed any error of law while appreciating the pleadings and evidence brought on record to negative the claim of the plaintiff on the basis of adverse possession. 14. Upon perusal of entire evidence, there is no substantial question of law requiring to be formulated for hearing of this second appeal. There is concurrent findings of fact with regard to possession of the suit property on the basis of crop sharing basis is finding of fact which is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. As such also no question of law requires to be determined by this Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of C.Doddanarayana Reddy (Dead) by Lrs and others vs. C. Jayarama Reddy (dead) by Lrs and others reported in 2020 (4) SCC 659 at paragraph 25 to 28 has held as under:- 25. The question as to whether a substantial question of law arises, has been a subject matter of inter pretation by this Court. In the judgment reported as Karnataka Board of Wakf. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris- Un-Niswan, it was held that findings of the fact could not have been interfered within the second appeal. This Court held as under: “12. This Court had repeatedly held that the power of the High Court to interfere in second appeal under Section 100 CPC is limited solely to decide a substantial question of law, if at all the same arises in the case. It has deprecated the practice of the High Court routinely interfering in pure findings of fact reached by the courts below without coming to the conclusion that the said finding of fact is either perverse or not based on material on record. 13. In Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu ( 1996 3 SCC 392 ), this Court held: "It is now well settled that concurrent findings of fact of trial court and first appellate court cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its 8 (1999) 6 SCC 343 jurisdiction under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. The Single Judge of the High Court totally misconceived his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code in the way he did." 14. The Single Judge of the High Court totally misconceived his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code in the way he did." 14. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty (1996 (6) SCC166), this Court held : "Interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower courts. … Even assuming that another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material." 15. And again in Secy. Taliparamba Education Society v. Moothedath Mallisseri Illath M.N. ( 1997 4 SCC 484 ), this Court held: (SCC p. 486, para 5)". The High Court was grossly in error in trenching upon the appreciation of evidence under Section 100 CPC and recording reverse finding of fact which is impermissible." 26. In a judgment reported as Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v.Savitkibai Sopan Gujar & Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 722 , this Court held that from a given set of circumstances if two inferences are possible then the one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court. In the said case, the First Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the trial court. It was held that the High Court can interfere if the conclusion drawn by the lower court was erroneous being contrary to mandatory provisions of law applicable or if it is a settled position on the basis of a pronouncement made by the court or based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. This Court held as under: “5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. This Court held as under: “5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court had given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the tower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable of its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the apex Court, or was based upon in inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. 27. In another judgment reported as Santosh Hazari v.Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3SCC 179, this Court held as under: “14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be substantial, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.” 28. Recently in another judgment reported as State of Rajasthan v.Shiv Dayal, it was held that a concurrent finding of the fact is binding, unless it is pointed out that it was recorded de hors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or based on misreading of the material on records and documents. The Court held as under: “When any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or it was based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. (see observation made by learned Judge Vivian Bose, J. as His Lordship then was a Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar & Ors. vs. Dashrath Narayan Chilwelkar & Ors., AIR 1943 Nagpur 117 Para 43).” 15. This court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without there being any substantial question of law involved in the appeal. Existence of substantial question of law is the sine-qua-non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended Section 100 of the Code. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant failed to point out any substantial question of law which may arise for determination in the case. 16. In view of above, since no substantial question of law arises for determination in the instant case, this is not a fit case for admission. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed at motion stage itself under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 11 read with Order 42 Rule 1 of CPC. No order as to costs. 17. A decree be drawn up accordingly.