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Allahabad High Court · body

2022 DIGILAW 2018 (ALL)

Ulfat v. Additional Commissioner

2022-12-20

AJIT KUMAR

body2022
JUDGMENT : (Ajit Kumar, J.) : Heard Sri Saiful Islam Siddiqui and Ms. Tahira Kazmi, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Arun Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha and Sri Shashank Bhartiya, learned Advocate holding brief of Sri Tarun Agrawal, learned counsel for the caveator-respondent and Sri Ashok Kumar Kushwaha, learned Standing Counsel. 2. Petitioners before this Court are aggrieved against the orders dated 4.1.2011 and 18.4.2012 passed by the Additional Commissioner (Judicial), Moradabad Division, Moradabad, whereby, in the first instance he reviewed his earlier order dated 13.3.2008 and so consequently restored the revision petition of the petitioners and then dismissing the writ petition on merits upholding the order passed by the Collector dated 28.4.2007. 3. Briefly stated facts of the case are that the petitioners claimed to be the valid lease holders of the land in question by virtue of resolution passed by the Land Management Committee dated 12.4.1997 which stood approved by the Sub Divisional Officer vide order dated 13.5.1997. 4. It appears that on the basis of some report submitted by Sub Divisional Officer, Sahabad dated 24.6.2006 a case came to be registered under Section 198(4) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. Notices were stated to have been issued by the lease holders which was seriously objected to, however, the land was held to be covered by Section 132 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and thus, the order cancelling the lease was passed on 28.4.2007. Against the said order the petitioners preferred revision before the Additional Commissioner, Moradabad Division, Moradabad who after perusal of records held that the Collector did not correctly and minutely examined the allotment records as the allotment was made to the petitioners in the category of Bhumidhari with non transferable rights and just because paper No. 57-B got a wrongful transcription of Sirdari rights in respect of lease holders, it would not have affected the rights of the petitioners by way of allotment of bhumidhari rights though non transferable. It was held by the Commissioner that the petitioners/allottees could not be held responsible for such typographical error as there was a resolution for the purposes of bhumidhari lease. The Court held that by efflux of time they have acquired bhumidhari rights also and therefore, at such a belated stage, the lease could not have been cancelled. It was held by the Commissioner that the petitioners/allottees could not be held responsible for such typographical error as there was a resolution for the purposes of bhumidhari lease. The Court held that by efflux of time they have acquired bhumidhari rights also and therefore, at such a belated stage, the lease could not have been cancelled. Thus, the Court sitting in revision allowed the revision application of the petitioner and set aside the order passed by the Additional Collector cancelling the lease. 5. It appears that a review petition came to be filed before the Additional Commissioner (Judicial), Moradabad upon which he reviewed his earlier order dated 23.5.2007 by order dated 4.1.2011 and restored the revision petition for the purposes of its disposal again on merits vide the same order. It is after reviewing the revision petition, the Court ordered at the same time for summoning of lower Court records but no fresh notices were issued to the present petitioners for final hearing in the matter. The Court then finally heard the matter again and this time vide order dated 18.4.2012 dismissed the revision and confirmed the order passed by the Additional Collector, Rampur dated 28.4.2007. 6. Assailing these two orders dated 4.1.2011 and 18.4.2012, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that in the first instance the Additional Commissioner (Judicial) had no power of review. He submits that the power of review lies only with the Board of Revenue under Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 which had been made applicable vide schedule III of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950. He submits that the power of review is a statutory power and unless the statute confers the power upon a particular judicial authority under the Act creating such authority, no Court or Tribunal or the authority exercising quasi judicial power can exercise power of review. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard has relied upon a Full Bench authority of this Court in Shivraji v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, (1997) 0 Supreme (All) 806 and that of the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Ram Sahu (dead) through LRS and others v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and others, 2020 LawSuit (SC) 685. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard has relied upon a Full Bench authority of this Court in Shivraji v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, (1997) 0 Supreme (All) 806 and that of the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Ram Sahu (dead) through LRS and others v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and others, 2020 LawSuit (SC) 685. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied upon a judgment of a coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Indo Gulf Industries Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, 2016(3) ADJ 409 ; and secondly learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the order passed by the authority dated 4.1.2011 and 18.4.2012 are both ex parte orders as no notice or opportunity of hearing provided to the petitioners before reviewing the order or before passing fresh order. 8. It is argued that once bhumidhari rights got created in favour of the petitioners, petitioners could not have been treated to be a mere lease holders so as to attract the provisions contained under Section 198(4) of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950. Yet another argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners is that there being no finding of fraud returned against the petitioners, in the absence of such forgery or fraud being pleaded, the suo motu exercise of power by the respondent revenue authorities to initiate proceedings under Section 198(4) was absolutely beyond time and hence not maintainable. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a judgment of this Court in Sakuntla and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2019 (5) AWC 5007 and Babulal v. State of U.P. and others, 2012(12) ADJ 37. 9. It is further argued that the Additional Collector while setting aside the leases, has simply relied upon the report of Tehsil authorities and not much finding of fact has returned as to how the land was at the time of allotment a land falling under Section 132 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. 10. Per contra it is argued by learned Standing Counsel for State Sri Kushwaha as well as Sri Arun Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha that the land covered under Section 132 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act could not have been allotted by way of bhumidhari lease and therefore, such a power could have been exercised under Section 198(4). 11. 11. Learned Advocates appearing for the State as well as Gaon Sabha contended that the orders passed by the Additional Collector as well as by the Commissioner subsequently are final orders passed on sound reasoning and if the land itself could not have been subject-matter of lease, lease rendered void and merely because Commissioner does not have power of review, the law would even otherwise not recognize the rights of the petitioners upon the land. He therefore, submits that it may be left open for the contesting respondents to re-agitate the matter at the stage of Additional Commissioner in the event Court quashes the order of review dated 4.1.2011 and the consequential order dated 18.4.2012. 12. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and their arguments raised across the bar and the pleadings raised in the writ petition as well as the orders impugned, I find that the basic legal question that is involved in the present petition would be as to once Additional Commissioner (Judicial) once has come to pass an order on merit allowing the revision petition of the petitioners against the order passed by Additional Collector cancelling the leases, could have reviewed the order. The initial order passed by the Additional Commissioner is of 13.3.2008 and the order of review was passed on 4.1.2011. The only note that is recorded regarding service upon the respondents is that despite service of summons the opposite parties. lease holders have not appeared and then the Court has proceeded to review its order on the ground that the land was falling in the category of Section 132 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The sole ground on which the review has been allowed was the contention so advanced by the State that the land fell in the category of Section 132 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, but not even prima facie satisfaction had been recorded that land did fall in to that category. The Additional Commissioner (Judicial) reviewing his order dated 13.3.2008 has categorically recorded that land fell in the category under Section 117 and merely because sirdari got transcribed in paper No. 57-B, it would not give any bhumidhari lease color to an Assami lease. This finding was required to be reversed in the first instance, if the order was to be reviewed but this I find to be quite wanting in the order of review dated 4.1.2011. This finding was required to be reversed in the first instance, if the order was to be reviewed but this I find to be quite wanting in the order of review dated 4.1.2011. However, while on merits this order could not have survived, but I find the arguments raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that the power of review did not lie with the Additional Commissioner (Judicial) appears to be more appealing. The U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act vide its second schedule makes applicable provisions of U.P. Land Revenue Act which provides for review contained under Section 220 of U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. The provision runs as under: ''220. Power of Board to review and alter its order and decrees.-(1) The Board may review, and may rescind, alter or confirm any order made by itself or by any of its members in the course of [business connected with settlement. (2) No decree or order passed judicially by it or by any of its members shall be so reviewed except on the application of a party to the case made within a period of ninety days from the passing of tire decree or order, or made after such period if tire applicant satisfies tire Board that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. (3) Members not empowered to alter each other's orders.-A single member vested with all or any of the powers of tire Board shall not have power to alter or reverse a decree or order passed by tire Board or by any member other than himself.'' 13. Thus, the power of review as per the above quoted provisions would lie with the Board of Revenue only. The schedule that prescribes for judicial proceedings is schedule (1) which does not provide for any forum of review. So the forum of review is only the Board of Revenue. 14. This being the above legal position, it can be safely concluded that the Additional Commissioner (Judicial) is not vested with the Board of Revenue. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Shivraji (supra) considering the power of review, if any vested with the consolidation authorities who exercise judicial function while adjudicating the dispute and title cases under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 vide paragraph Nos. 33 and 34 the Court held thus: ''33. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Shivraji (supra) considering the power of review, if any vested with the consolidation authorities who exercise judicial function while adjudicating the dispute and title cases under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 vide paragraph Nos. 33 and 34 the Court held thus: ''33. The aforementioned decisions of this Court, as we read them, do not support the proposition of law that any tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power, which is not vested with power of review under the statute expressly or by necessary implication, has an inherent power of review of its previous order in any circumstances. In our view the decisions only lay down the proposition that a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power has the inherent power to correct a clerical mistake or arithmetical error in its order and has the power to review an order which has been obtained by practising fraud on the Court, provided that injustice has been perpetrated on a party by such order. There fore, these decisions should not be construed as laying down any proposition of law contrary to the well-settled principle of law that any order delivered and signed by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority attains finality subject to appeal or revision as provided under the Act and if the authority passing the order is not specifically vested with power of review under the statute, it cannot re-open the proceeding and review/revise its previous order. 34. Coming to the provisions of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, it is our considered view that the consolidation authorities, particularly the Deputy Director of Consolidation while deciding a revision petition exercises judicial or quasi judicial power and, therefore, his order is final subject to any power of appeal or revision vested in superior authority under the Act. The consolidation authorities, particularly the Deputy Director of Consolidation, is not vested with any power of review of his order and, therefore, cannot re-open any proceeding and cannot review or revise his earlier order. However, as a judicial or quasi judicial authority he has the power to correct any clerical mistake/arithmetical error manifest error in his order in exercise of his inherent power as a tribunal.'' 15. However, as a judicial or quasi judicial authority he has the power to correct any clerical mistake/arithmetical error manifest error in his order in exercise of his inherent power as a tribunal.'' 15. Court considering the power of review of the Board of Revenue and on the point of drawing any power for consolidation authorities by implication, vide paragraph Nos. 36, 37 and 39 the Court has held thus: ''36. The question that remains to be considered relates to vesting of power of review in the Deputy Director of Consolidation by application of Section 220 of the U.P Land Revenue Act, 1901. Sri Radhey Shyam, learned counsel for the contesting respondents, strenuously urged that in view of the provisions of Section 41 of the Consolidation Act Page: 691 and Section 220 of the U.P Land Revenue Act it should be held that power of review is vested in the Deputy Director of Consolidation who is the final revisional authority under the Consolidation Act. No doubt Section 41 of the Consolidation Act makes provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U.P Land Revenue Act applicable to all proceedings, including appeals and applications under the former Act, Section 220, which is a part of Chapter X, vests power of review in the Board of Revenue subject to certain conditions/restrictions specified in the section. The question is, in the absence of any specific provision of review in the Consolidation Act, can it be said that the power of review vested in the Board of Revenue can be exercised by the consolidation authorities, particularly the Deputy Director of Consolidation? In our considered view, the question has to be answered in the negative. There is no provision in Section 41 or in any other section of the Consolidation Act which empowers modification of any provision of the Land Revenue Act for the purpose of application to consolidation proceedings. Further Section 41, as we read it, merely provides that the procedures prescribed under Chapter IX and X of the Land Revenue Act will be applicable to all proceedings including appeals and applications under the Consolidation Act. Substantive provisions in the aforementioned Chapters of the Land Revenue Act, which have no pari materia provisions in the Consolidation Act, cannot have any application to proceedings under the said Act. Substantive provisions in the aforementioned Chapters of the Land Revenue Act, which have no pari materia provisions in the Consolidation Act, cannot have any application to proceedings under the said Act. If a proceeding cannot be initiated under the Consolidation Act, the question of application of the provisions of Chapters IX and X of the Land Revenue Act to such a proceeding does not arise. In the absence of any specific provision vesting power of review in the authorities under the Consolidation Act, such a proceeding cannot be initiated at all. Therefore, Section 220 of the Land Revenue Act is of no assistance for the purposes of the proceedings under the Consolidation Act. Alternatively, assuming that Section 220 applies to consolidation proceedings and an analogy is drawn between the proceedings under the two Acts, it is the Director of Consolidation, being the highest authority under the Consolidation Act, who can inferentially be said to have a power of review as provided in Section 220 of the Land Revenue Act and not the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who is one of the revisional authorities under the Consolidation Act. This question was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Badam Singh and another v. Ganga Saran and Ram Saran, 1960 (58) ALJ 836, in which this Court, construing Section 41 of the Consolidation Act, made the following observation: ''Chapter X of the Land Revenue Act includes Section 220 which confers upon the Board of Revenue the power to review its own orders in certain circumstances, and it is contended that in applying this section to proceeding under the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act a power of review must be deemed to be conferred upon the Deputy Director of Consolidation who corresponds to the Board of Revenue in so far as he is the final Court of Revision. In our opinion this argument is not well founded, for Section 41 makes no provision for the modification, alteration or adaptation of any of the sections in Chapters IX and X of the Land Revenue Act in their application to proceedings under the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act. In our opinion this argument is not well founded, for Section 41 makes no provision for the modification, alteration or adaptation of any of the sections in Chapters IX and X of the Land Revenue Act in their application to proceedings under the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act. Section 220 specifically confers the power to review is own decision on the Board of Revenue and on no other authority, and it is not possible for this Court to hold that under that section read with Section 41 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act a power to review its own decision is conferred upon all Deputy Directors of Consolidation.'' 37. Another Division Bench of this Court considered the same question in the case of Ram Pyare v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1973 RD 79. The Court observed:- ''In our opinion Section 41 of the Act only makes applicable the provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U.P Land Revenue Act to proceedings initiated under the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act, including proceedings of appeal and revision. Once the proceedings are initiated under this Act, the procedure laid down in Chapters IX and X shall apply. Section 41, however, does not authorise the initiation of proceedings not contemplated or authorised by the Act. The power of review has to be specifically conferred and unless there is a provision in the Act permitting initiation of such proceedings the question of applicability of procedure laid down in Chapters IX and X of the U.P Land Revenue Act does not arise. In the case of Qadam Singh v. Ganga Saran, 1960 RD 347 , this Court had taken the view that no review lies. We are also of the same view.'' 39. On the discussions in the foregoing paragraphs it is our considered view that it is not open for the consolidation authorities to review/recall their final orders passed in proceedings under the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act in exercise of inherent powers. Thus, the question formulated earlier is answered in the negative. The writ petition will be placed before the appropriate Bench for disposal in the light of this judgment.'' 16. A coordinate bench of this Court in Indo Gulf (supra) was dealing with the power of review, if any vested with the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. vide paragraph 19 the Court held thus: ''19. The writ petition will be placed before the appropriate Bench for disposal in the light of this judgment.'' 16. A coordinate bench of this Court in Indo Gulf (supra) was dealing with the power of review, if any vested with the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. vide paragraph 19 the Court held thus: ''19. There is no dispute that under the Act the prescribed authority has no power to review its order which means substantive review on merits. Thus, in the absence of any statutory power to review, the prescribed authority has no authority of law to substantively review any of its order passed earlier in the proceedings. In this view of the matter the prescribed authority has no jurisdiction to touch its earlier orders on merits.'' 17. In the above decision, the Court further proceeded to distinguish the subject of review and recall and in this regard referred two judgments of Supreme Court in the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1981 SC 606 and Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union v. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd., 2005 (13) SCC 777 in its paragraph Nos. 23 and 24 which run as under: ''23. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. it was held that the application for setting aside ex parte order was maintainable in spite of the fact that there was no provision to that effect under the Act. The Supreme Court further held that a Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is competent to set aside to its ex parte award if it is satisfied that the party aggrieved was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause. Such setting aside of ex parte award would be in nature of procedural review and not a review on merits. The Tribunal despite becoming functus officio after the pronouncement of award can entertain such an application and they have ancillary or incidental powers to consider recall of an award if ex parte. 24. Such setting aside of ex parte award would be in nature of procedural review and not a review on merits. The Tribunal despite becoming functus officio after the pronouncement of award can entertain such an application and they have ancillary or incidental powers to consider recall of an award if ex parte. 24. In Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union the Three Judges of the Supreme Court considered the distinction between the review and the recall applications and held though the Act do not grant any power of review either expressly or by necessary implication but the procedural power belongs to a different category and if the party is able to establish that the procedure followed by the forum is vitiated and therefore, the order requires to the recalled it has ample power to do so.'' 18. Thus, the coordinate bench in its ultimate view held that power of substantive review is to be exercised by any Court or Tribunal or authority if such a power is specifically conferred upon it under the relevant statute but the power of procedural review which can be held to be a recall in a sense, could be exercised. vide para 25 the Court has held thus: ''25. In view of the above discussion, it is crystal clear that the power of substantive review is not exercisable by any Court, tribunal or authority unless the same is specifically conferred upon it under the relevant statute whereas the power of procedural review is inherent in every Court tribunal or authority and could be exercised even if no such power is given to them under the Act but for the exercise of the same the party applying has to establish that he was not served with the notice or that he was prevent for sufficient good reason from attending the proceedings or that the procedure followed by the forum stood vitiated as it was violative of the principles of natural justice.'' 19. In the present case, the Court while passing the order of review dated 4.1.2011 does not refer to any procedural flaw that occurred in passing the earlier order dated 13.3.2018 so as to enable the State respondents to maintain a review application. Instead I find that the Court substantively reviewed its order on merit which was certainly not available to it. 20. Instead I find that the Court substantively reviewed its order on merit which was certainly not available to it. 20. Here I would like to mention that after the order of review was passed and the lower Court records were summoned by the Additional Commissioner (Judicial) under his order dated 4.1.2011, he ought to have issued notices to the respondents to contest the matter but the order dated 4.1.2011 is absolutely silent on this aspect and therefore, the consequential order also becomes bad for this very reason. 21. Coming to the other aspect advanced regarding action under Section 198(4) to be barred by time, in the case of Shakuntla (supra) this Court has extensively dealt with Section 198(6) for the purpose of limitation and relying upon an earlier judgment of Supreme Court vide paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 and has held thus: ''21. The last question is to be considered whether no limitation is applicable where the allegations of fraud exists. I have already held in foregoing paras that the allegations of fraud were not existent. However, even if the allegations of fraud are existent the question to be considered is whether any limitation period is applicable or not. The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the said question in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and another v. D. Narsing Rao and others, (2015) 3 SCC 695 and held as under: ''25. The legal position is fairly well-settled by a long line of decisions of this Court which have laid down that even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for the exercise of any power, revisional or otherwise, such power must be exercised within a reasonable period. This is so even in cases where allegations of fraud have necessitated the exercise of any corrective power. We may briefly refer to some of the decisions only to bring home the point that the absence of a stipulated period of limitation makes little or no difference in so far as the exercise of the power is concerned which ought to be permissible only when the power is invoked within a reasonable period. 31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. 31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority. 32. In the case at hand, while the entry sought to be corrected is described as fraudulent, there is nothing in the notice impugned before the High Court as to when was the alleged fraud discovered by the State. A specific statement in that regard was essential for it was a jurisdictional fact, which ought to be clearly asserted in the notice issued to the respondents. The attempt of the appellant-State to demonstrate that the notice was issued within a reasonable period of the discovery of the alleged fraud is, therefore, futile. At any rate, when the Government allowed the land in question for housing sites to be given to Government employees in the year 1991, it must be presumed to have known about the record and the revenue entries concerning the parcel of land made in the ordinary course of official business. In as much as, the notice was issued as late as on 31st December, 2004, it was delayed by nearly 13 years. No explanation has been offered even for this delay assuming that the same ought to be counted only from the year 1991. Judged from any angle the notice seeking to reverse the entries made half a century ago, was clearly beyond reasonable time and was rightly quashed.'' 22. No explanation has been offered even for this delay assuming that the same ought to be counted only from the year 1991. Judged from any angle the notice seeking to reverse the entries made half a century ago, was clearly beyond reasonable time and was rightly quashed.'' 22. Thus even the Supreme Court has held that even in the cases of fraud the action should be taken within a reasonable time. In the present case, the action has been taken after a period of 12 years which cannot be termed as reasonable time and thus I hold that even in the cases of fraud action has to be taken within the period of limitation. Thus, I summarize the findings in response to the questions framed as under: ''(A) A show-cause notice proposing cancellation of the lease on the ground of material irregularity while granting the lease cannot be issued beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 198(6) of the Act. (B) The Revisional Court in exercise of its powers under Section 333 of the Act cannot record findings of fact that too without taking any evidence on record at the revisional stage. (C) The leases without observing the statutory provisions prescribed for grant of lease cannot be termed as fraudulent and (D) Even if fraud is alleged the recourse for cancellation should be taken within a reasonable time.'' 22. Again in recent judgment of Babulal (supra) relying upon Chhidda and others v. State of U.P. and others; 2019(8) ADJ 122 , the Court considered various aspects of the matter in relation to the power of Collector under Section 198(4) of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950 and the limitations prescribed under Section 198(6) of U.P.Z.A. &L.R. Act, 1950, and vide paragraph 15 has held thus: ''15. The said argument does not merits acceptance for the sole reason that the land in question has to be set apart for public purposes under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. In the present case there is specific argument and document on record to establish that the consolidation of holdings proceedings pertaining to the land in question were never finalized and were dropped mid away and thus, it cannot be held that any bar as provided under Section 132 of the Act was triggered relating to the land in question. In the present case there is specific argument and document on record to establish that the consolidation of holdings proceedings pertaining to the land in question were never finalized and were dropped mid away and thus, it cannot be held that any bar as provided under Section 132 of the Act was triggered relating to the land in question. I am also not impressed with the arguments that in the cases which are covered by Section 132 of the Act, no limitation would apply. In this regard, it is relevant to mention that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that where no limitation is prescribed action should be taken within a reasonable time, in the present case the proceedings were initiated after about 16 years which can never be termed as a reasonable period. The relevant observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and another v. D. Narsing Rao and others, (2015) 3 SCC 695 and held as under: ''25. The legal position is fairly well-settled by a long line of decisions of this Court which have laid down that even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for the exercise of any power, revisional or otherwise, such power must be exercised within a reasonable period. This is so even in cases where allegations of fraud have necessitated the exercise of any corrective power. We may briefly refer to some of the decisions only to bring home the point that the absence of a stipulated period of limitation makes little or no difference in so far as the exercise of the power is concerned which ought to be permissible only when the power is invoked within a reasonable period. 31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority. 32. In the case at hand, while the entry sought to be corrected is described as fraudulent, there is nothing in the notice impugned before the High Court as to when was the alleged fraud discovered by the State. A specific statement in that regard was essential for it was a jurisdictional fact, which ought to be clearly asserted in the notice issued to the respondents. The attempt of the appellant-State to demonstrate that the notice was issued within a reasonable period of the discovery of the alleged fraud is, therefore, futile. At any rate, when the Government allowed the land in question for housing sites to be given to Government employees in the year 1991, it must be presumed to have known about the record and the revenue entries concerning the parcel of land made in the ordinary course of official business. In as much as, the notice was issued as late as on 31st December, 2004, it was delayed by nearly 13 years. No explanation has been offered even for this delay assuming that the same ought to be counted only from the year 1991. Judged from any angle the notice seeking to reverse the entries made half a century ago, was clearly beyond reasonable time and was rightly quashed.'' (emphasis added)'' 23. In such above view of the matter, therefore, the order of review passed by the Additional Commissioner (Judicial) dated 4.1.2011 is unsustainable in law and therefore, deserves to be set aside. Once I proceed to set aside the order of review dated 4.1.2011, the consequential order to it dated 18.4.2012 could also needed to be set aside. If these two orders are set aside as I propose to do in this petition, I need not go to other questions with regard to validity of lease etc. Once I proceed to set aside the order of review dated 4.1.2011, the consequential order to it dated 18.4.2012 could also needed to be set aside. If these two orders are set aside as I propose to do in this petition, I need not go to other questions with regard to validity of lease etc. as the same in my considered view cannot be permitted to be reopened after a lapse of so many years. Thus the order passed by the Additional Commissioner (Judicial) dated 4.1.2011 allowing the review application of the State respondents and the consequential order dated 18.4.2012 are hereby set aside. 24. In view of the above, this petition stands allowed. Orders dated 4.1.2011 and 18.4.2012 passed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively are hereby set aside.