JUDGMENT : In S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 2057/2018 :- 1. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the incident is of the year 2005-06 when the prosecutrix was studying in 12th class at Udaipur and she came into contact with the present petitioner. The prosecutrix submitted that she and the present petitioner belonged to the same caste and when she asked the petitioner to marry her, to which he refused, but they continued to live together. As per prosecutrix, the petitioner raped her from 2005-06 to 2017 and in these 11 years, she got pregnant several times, but resorted to choosing to get abortions done. The prosecutrix alleges that she was exploited by the present petitioner, who allegedly had been promising marriage for 12 years. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch.Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335. The relevant part of the above mentioned judgment reads as under :- “105. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”" 3. Learned Public Prosecutor and learned counsel for the respondent oppose the petition, but are unable to refute the aforesaid factual matrix. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. 5. This Court takes into consideration the following judgments as rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court; 6. Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46 , relevant portion of which reads as under: “It, therefore, appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no strait jacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the Courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the Court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them.” 7. Pradeep Kumar Verma vs. State of Bihar & Anr. AIR 2007 SC 3059 , wherein while taking into consideration the decision in Uday vs. State of Karnataka (supra), it was held as under: “On the specific question whether the consent obtained on the basis of promise to marry which was not acted upon, could be regarded as consent for the purpose of Section 375 IPC, was dealt with by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Jayanti Rani Panda v. State of WB (1984 Cr.L.J. 1535). The relevant passage in this case has been cited in several other decisions. This is one of the cases referred to by this Court in Uday's case (supra) approvingly. Without going into the details of that case, the crux of the case can be discerned from the following summary given at para 7: “Here the allegation of the complainant is that the accused used to visit her house and proposed to marry her. She consented to have sexual intercourse with the accused on a belief that the accused would really marry her. But one thing that strikes us is ... why should she keep it a secret from her parents if really she had belief in that promise. She consented to have sexual intercourse with the accused on a belief that the accused would really marry her. But one thing that strikes us is ... why should she keep it a secret from her parents if really she had belief in that promise. Assuming that she had believed the accused when he held out a promise, if he did at all, there is no evidence that at that time the accused had no intention of keeping that promise. It may be that subsequently when the girl conceived the accused might have felt otherwise. But even then the case in the petition of complainant is that the accused did not till then back out. Therefore it cannot be said that till then the accused had no intention of marrying the complainant even if he had held out any promise at all as alleged.” The discussion that follows the above passage is important and is extracted hereunder: “The failure to keep the promise at a future uncertain date due to reasons not very clear on the evidence does not always amount to a misconception of fact at the inception of the act itself. In order to come within the meaning of misconception of fact, the fact must have an immediate relevance. The matter would have been different if the consent was obtained by creating a belief that they were already married. In such a case the consent could be said to result from a misconception of fact. But here the fact alleged is a promise to marry we do not know when. If a full-grown girl consents to the act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and continues to indulge in such activity until she becomes pregnant it is an act of promiscuity on her part and not an act induced by misconception of fact. But here the fact alleged is a promise to marry we do not know when. If a full-grown girl consents to the act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and continues to indulge in such activity until she becomes pregnant it is an act of promiscuity on her part and not an act induced by misconception of fact. Section 90 IPC cannot be called in aid in such a case to pardon the act of the girl and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court can be assured that from the very inception the accused never really intended to marry her.” (Emphasis supplied) The learned Judges referred to the decision of the Chancery Court in Edgington v. Fitzmaurice (1885 (29) Ch.D.459) and observed : “This decision lays down that a misstatement of the intention of the defendant in doing a particular act may be a misstatement of fact, and if the plaintiff was misled by it, an action of deceit may be founded on it. The particular observation at p. 483 runs to the following effect: There must be a misstatement of an existing fact. Therefore, in order to amount to a misstatement of fact the existing state of things and a misstatement as to that becomes relevant. In the absence of such evidence Section 90 cannot be called in aid in support of the contention that the consent of the complainant was obtained on a misconception of fact.” After referring to the case-law on the subject, it was observed in Uday's case (supra) : “It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them.” The first two sentences in the above passage need some explanation. While we reiterate that a promise to marry without anything more will not give rise to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90, it needs to be clarified that a representation deliberately made by the accused with a view to elicit the assent of the victim without having the intention or inclination to marry her, will vitiate the consent. If on the facts it is established that at the very inception of the making of promise, the accused did not really entertain the intention of marrying her and the promise to marry held out by him was a mere hoax, the consent ostensibly given by the victim will be of no avail to the accused to exculpate him from the ambit of Section 375 clause second. This is what in fact was stressed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Jayanti Rani Panda's case (supra) which was approvingly referred to in Uday's case (supra). The Calcutta High Court rightly qualified the proposition which it stated earlier by adding the qualification at the end -unless the court can be assured that from the very inception the accused never really intended to marry her. (emphasis supplied). The Calcutta High Court rightly qualified the proposition which it stated earlier by adding the qualification at the end -unless the court can be assured that from the very inception the accused never really intended to marry her. (emphasis supplied). In the next para, the High Court referred to the vintage decision of the Chancery Court which laid down that a misstatement of the intention of the defendant in doing a particular act would tantamount to a misstatement of fact and an action of deceit can be founded on it. This is also the view taken by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Jaladu case (vide passage quoted supra). By making the solitary observation that a false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code, it cannot be said that this Court has laid down the law differently. The observations following the aforesaid sentence are also equally important. The Court was cautious enough to add a qualification that no straitjacket formula could be evolved for determining whether the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Reading the judgment in Uday's case as a whole, we do not understand the Court laying down a broad proposition that a promise to marry could never amount to a misconception of fact. That is not, in our understanding, the ratio of the decision. In fact, there was a specific finding in that case that initially the accused's intention to marry cannot be ruled out.” Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana AIR 2013 SC 2071 , wherein while considering the question whether the action of developing physical relation while making promise to marry and later on not fulfilling the said promise would amount to rape or not, it was held as under: From all the above material available on record, it is clear that there is no iota of evidence available on record to suggest that the petitioner had no intention to marry respondent No.2 since beginning and made a false promise of marrying her only with the intention to satisfy his lust. If the petitioner had no intention to marry with the respondent No.2 since beginning, there was no occasion for him to bring her to his house for Christmas's preparation and to ask his parents to visit residents of parents of respondent No.2 at Jaipur to fix his marriage with respondent No.2. If the petitioner had no intention to marry with the respondent No.2 since beginning, there was no occasion for him to bring her to his house for Christmas's preparation and to ask his parents to visit residents of parents of respondent No.2 at Jaipur to fix his marriage with respondent No.2. As stated earlier, respondent No.2, her brother, parents and other relatives have stated in their statements before the police that the petitioner and his parents did visit their house to fix the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent No.2 and date for their marriage was also fixed. 26.Admittedly, the respondent No.2 had never raised any grievance before any person at any stage and for the first time filed the complaint against the petitioner in September, 2014 i.e. after 17 months when the petitioner had refused the marry her in April, 2013. It is also to be noticed that the respondent No.2 has not informed her parents and brother about her pregnancy, which was terminated in the month of October, 2012. In their statements recorded under section 161 CrPC, the parents and brother of the respondent No.2 have not mentioned that respondent no.2 has ever informed them about her pregnancy in October, 2012. 27. In the light of the above facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that the petitioner had no intention to marry the respondent No.2 from beginning or the petitioner had any intention to deceive her from very beginning. The respondent No.2 was 26 years of age at the time of incident. She was in love with the petitioner and both of them promised to marry each other. Even the respondent No.2 has informed her brother and parents that she is in love with the petitioner and wants to marry him. Looking from all these angles, it cannot be said that the petitioner had no intention to marry the respondent No.2 since beginning and developed physical relation with her while making a false promise of marriage only with intention to satisfy his lust. 28. It appears that the petitioner and the respondent No.2 were in deep love, and their love translated into physical relation. 28. It appears that the petitioner and the respondent No.2 were in deep love, and their love translated into physical relation. Their parents agreed to the marriage of them but later on, due to some disputes between the petitioner, his mother and respondent No.2, the marriage could not be materialized and then the petitioner decided to marry with some another girl in September, 2014. When the respondent No.2 came to know about the same, she filed the criminal complaint against the petitioner out of vengeance. Looking to overall facts and circumstances as noted above, I have no hesitation in holding that no offence under section 376 IPC is made out against the petitioner. So far as offence punishable under section 420 IPC is concerned, when this Court has already come to the conclusion that the petitioner did not make any false promise to marry the respondent No.2, no case of cheating is made out against the petitioner. Prashant Bharti Vs. State of NCT of Delhi, reported in AIR 2013 SC 2753 , relevant portion of which reads as under:- “The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code of Criminal Procedure") has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar and Ors. v. Madan Lal Kapoor (Criminal Appeal No... of 2013, arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4883 of 2008, decided on 23.1.2013) wherein this Court inter alia held as under: “22. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution's/complainant's case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution's/complainant's case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 23 Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: (i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? (ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. (iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? (iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal-proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” Anup K. Paul Vs. State of Rajathan & Anr., reported in 2016(1) RCC (Raj.) 5, relevant portion of which reads as under: “There is no doubt that the Court should be very careful while exercising the powers under section 482 CrPC particularly in the matters of quashing of criminal complaints. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in plethora of judgments has laid down the guidelines with regard to exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under section 482 CrPC. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has listed the categories of cases when the power under section 482 CrPC can be exercised by the High Courts. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra) has later on followed in various decisions. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has listed the categories of cases when the power under section 482 CrPC can be exercised by the High Courts. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra) has later on followed in various decisions. To mention a few — Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 ; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995) 6 SCC 194 ; Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd (1996) 5 SCC 591 ; State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla (1996) 8 SCC 164 , Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, (1999) 3 SCC 259 ; Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd (2000) 3 SCC 269 Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 168 , M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh (2001) 8 SCC 645 and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque (2005) 1 SCC 122 . The principles relevant are as under: "(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out : (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.” 2.3 Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. reported in (2019) 3 SCC (Cri.) 903, relevant portion of which reads as under: - “The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate that the promise by the appellant was false, or that the complainant engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise. There is no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. The appellant’s failure in 2016 to fulfil his promise made in 2008 cannot be construed to mean the promise itself was false. The allegations in the FIR indicate that the complainant was aware that there existed obstacles to marrying the appellant since 2008, and that she and the appellant continued to engage in sexual relations long after their getting married had become a disputed matter. The allegations in the FIR indicate that the complainant was aware that there existed obstacles to marrying the appellant since 2008, and that she and the appellant continued to engage in sexual relations long after their getting married had become a disputed matter. Even thereafter, the complainant travelled to visit and reside with the appellant at his postings and allowed him to spend his weekends at her residence. The allegations in the FIR belie the case that she was deceived by the appellant’s promise of marriage. Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainant’s statements are accepted in totality, no offence under Section 375 of the IPC has occurred”. 8. This Court also keeps into consideration the following judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Court in; Baldev Gora v. State of Rajasthan (CRLMP 1106/2016 decided by this Court on 06-09-2017), the relevant part of the judgment reads as under: After hearing the learned counsel for the parties as well as perusing the record of the case alongwith the precedent laws cited at the Bar, this Court is of the opinion that on a bare reading of the FIR, it is clear that the petitioner and the complainant were in a relationship, which was consensual in nature, and the said consent could not have been given in fear or injury or misconception, as long time has elapsed since such relationship began. The birth of the son, namely, Tejas out of the relationship admittedly in the year 2013 also reflects continuance of the relationship between the parties. It is also clear from the record shown that the complainant was aware of the earlier marriage of the petitioner, and had accepted the relationship as it was, and therefore, the long term relationship resulted into the dispute when the petitioner refused to give his name in the Obituary of the mother of the complainant, as husband of the complainant. The case law discussed in the case of Prashant Bharti Vs. State of NCT of Delhi (supra) and Anup K. Paul Vs. State of Rajathan & Anr. (supra) is absolutely applicable in the present case and the arguments raised by learned counsel for the respondent regarding Section 114A of the Evidence Act as well as Section 376 IPC are met in the later judgment-A 18. State of NCT of Delhi (supra) and Anup K. Paul Vs. State of Rajathan & Anr. (supra) is absolutely applicable in the present case and the arguments raised by learned counsel for the respondent regarding Section 114A of the Evidence Act as well as Section 376 IPC are met in the later judgment-A 18. The continuance of the consensual relationship for more than nine years and a son being born out of the same reflect that no offence like the one under Section 376 IPC could have been constituted. It is apparent that the complainant herself was maintaining the relationship with the present petitioner. The ingredients of Section 375 IPC, which defines the term ‘Rape’ reads as under : - “[375. Rape. --A man is said to commit "rape" if he— (a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions: -- First. --Against her will. Secondly. --Without her consent. Thirdly. --With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt, Fourthly. --With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly. --With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly. --With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly. --With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age. Seventhly. --When she is unable to communicate consent. Explanation 1. --For the purposes of this section, "vagina" shall also include labia majora. Explanation 2. --Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act: Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. Exception 1. --A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape. Exception 2. --Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.” The afore-quoted definition does not constitute any such offence in the present case, as the relationship with consent of the parties does not fall within the ambit of the seven conditions reflected in the aforesaid definition of the term ‘Rape’. Radhakrishan Meena v. State of Rajasthan CRLMP 4952/2020 decided on 23-02-2022. the relevant part of the above-mentioned judgment reads as under: - 18……… “In the considered view of this court, a breach of promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his words at the time of giving it. The consent of a woman under Section 375 of IPC can be held vitiated only on the ground of misconception of fact where such misconception was the basis of her surrender for establishing physical relationship. Likewise, prima facie there is no evidence to substantiate the allegations regarding the offence under Sections 418 and 506 IPC in view of observations made herein above”. Likewise, prima facie there is no evidence to substantiate the allegations regarding the offence under Sections 418 and 506 IPC in view of observations made herein above”. The Hon'ble Apex court has dealt with the proposition of law pertaining to quashing of FIR/complaint/all criminal proceedings initiated against an accused by High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in catena of judgments. Particularly, in the case of Prashant Bharti v. State of NCT of Delhi, reported in AIR 2013 SC 2753 , Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under: 23. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: (i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? (ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. (iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/ complainant? (iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal-proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused. In view of overall discussions and observations made herein above and guided by the principles laid down in Prashant Bharti v. State of NCT of Delhi (supra) and State of Haryana and Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors. (supra), I am of this firm view that the present is a fit case which falls within the parameters laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Therefore, this court deems it appropriate to allow the criminal misc. petitions and to quash the proceedings that arose out of the FIR impugned. 9. The proposition of law thus is a settled position, and has been retierated an umpteen number of times by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of judgments, as above mentioned, the most recent one being Mandar Deepak Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. Criminal Appeal no. 442/2022, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that there is a distinction between a false promise to marriage and a breach of promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled; the same has also been consistently followed by this Hon’ble Court after taking into due consideration of the overall facts and circumstances of each case. 10. Now adverting to the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court finds that the allegation is that from 2005-06 to 2017 on the pretext of promise to marry, the sexual exploitation of prosecutrix was done and nothing on record to show any kind of brutality or any kind of mal-intention on the part of the present petitioner. The prolonged physical relationship, multiple pregnancies, multiple abortions without any protest indicate the reality of the case, which is nothing more than a domestic relationship akin to matrimony deviating after 12 years between the partners. The precedent law cited by learned counsel for the petitioner applies in the present case. 11. This Court is of the firm opinion that the precedent law of State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. The precedent law cited by learned counsel for the petitioner applies in the present case. 11. This Court is of the firm opinion that the precedent law of State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) empowers the Court to quash FIR / complaint / all criminal proceedings under Section 482 of C.P.C. when on the face of it no offence is made out. 12. In the present case in hand, where on the face of it, no offence is made out except for and the factual matrix is only of a prolonged consensual domestic relationship, this Court deems it appropriate to allow the criminal misc. petition and to quash the proceedings that arose out of the FIR impugned. 13. With the aforesaid observations, the present misc. petition is allowed and the FIR No.129/2018 lodged at Police Station Kherwara (Udaipur), along with entire proceedings pursuant thereto qua the petitioner is hereby quashed. 14. All pending applications also stand disposed of accordingly. In S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 2608/2018 : 15. In view of the disposal of the aforesaid misc. petition bearing no.2057/2018, the present misc. petition filed by the petitioner-complainant seeking fair and impartial investigation in the FIR in question is also disposed of in the same terms. 16. All pending applications also stand disposed of accordingly.