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2022 DIGILAW 208 (GAU)

Herot Chang v. State of Nagaland

2022-03-01

DEVASHIS BARUAH

body2022
JUDGMENT : DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. 1. Heard Mr. Sarif Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner; Mr. Moa Imchen, learned Senior Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State Respondents and Mr. Yangerwati, learned CGC, appearing on behalf of the Central Government. 2. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to quash and set aside the Detention Order passed by the Commissioner of Police and District Magistrate, Dimapur, bearing No. CP/DMR/CB- 19/2021-22/2132 dated Dimapur, 27.09.2021; the Approval Order passed by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland bearing No. CON/NSA/16/2021/111 dated 06.10.2021 and the Confirmation Order dated CON/NSA/16/2021/188 dated 24.11.2021. 3. The petitioner’s case is that on 17.09.2021 the petitioner along with another were picked up by the 5th Assam Rifle in Chekiye Village, Dimapur. Thereafter, they were taken to the 5th Assam Rifle’s Camp and brutally assaulted and threatened them to admit the seized items belonged to them. The petitioner along with another were handed over to the Diphupar P.S. Dimapur, Nagaland and an FIR was lodged by one RFM S.K. Laxana of the 5th Assam Rifle and on the basis thereof the Officer-in-charge registered a Diphupar P.S. Case No. 0063/2021 u/s 25(1B)(a) Arms Act read with Section 384 of the IPC read with 7/8 of the Nagaland Security Regulation (NSR). The petitioner was, thereafter, produced before the Magistrate on 18.09.2021 with a prayer for 72 (seventy-two) hours Police remand which the Magisterial Court granted and directed the Investigating Officer to produce the petitioner along with another before the Court on 21.09.2021. Thereupon, on 21.09.2021 when the petitioner along with another were produced before the Magisterial Court, the said Court sent the petitioner on judicial remand to the Central Jail, Dimapur and the petitioner still continues to be under judicial custody. 4. While the petitioner was in the judicial custody an order of detention was passed by the Commissioner of Police and District Magistrate, Nagaland (the Respondent No. 3 herein) on 27.09.2021 (The said Order dated 27.09.2021 is hereinafter referred to as ‘the Detention Order’) purportedly in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (Hereinafter referred to as the Act). It is the further case of the petitioner that certain papers were served upon the petitioner on 01.10.2021, which were: (i) letter bearing No. CP/DMR/CB-19/2021-22/2132 dated 27.09.2021 (order of detention) addressed to the Special Secretary, Home, Nagaland, Kohima, by the Commissioner of Police and District Magistrate, Dimapur, Nagaland, seeking approval for the detention order dated 27.09.2021 and the grounds of detention. (ii) forwarding letter bearing No. CP/DMR/CB-19/2021-22/2131, dated 27.09.2021 for approval by the State Government. (iii) letter bearing No. CP/DMR/CB-19/2021-22/2133, dated 27.09.2021 addressed to the detenue informing him of the right to make a representation to the authority as prescribed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. It is the case of the petitioner that apart from the above documents no other documents were furnished to the petitioner. 5. As stated herein above the petitioner contends that on 01.10.2021, the said documents were furnished; however, the petitioner, who admittedly does not know how to read or write the English language, was not explained as regards the above mentioned said documents while handing over to the petitioner. It was only on 05.10.2021 when the petitioner’s advocate visited the jail that the petitioner could realize that he was booked under The Act and the following papers were handed to him: (i) the Forwarding Letter dated 27.09.2021, for approval of his detention. (ii) Detention Order dated 27.09.2021 stating the grounds of detention. (iii) a Schedule. (iv) information for grounds of detention and the petitioner’s right to file representation to the appropriate authority. (v) an unfilled Acknowledgement Certificate. The petitioner thereupon submitted his representations to the various authorities i.e. the Commissioner of Police and District Magistrate; the Special Secretary, Government of Nagaland, Department of Home (Political Branch), Nagaland and the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi on 11.10.2021, through the Superintendent, Central Jail, Dimapur, Nagaland, who is the Respondent No. 4 herein. 6. In the meantime, on 06.10.2021, the order was passed by the Government of Nagaland, Home Department (Political Branch) approving the Detention Order dated 27.09.2021 passed by the Commissioner of Police and District Magistrate, Nagaland, till 26.12.2021 (The said Order dated 06.10.2021 is hereinafter referred to as the Approval Order). It is the petitioner’s case that on 11.10.2021, the petitioner was served with the Approval Order dated 06.10.2021 along with the Detention Order and other documents, the details of which can be seen from Annexure-4 (Series). It is the petitioner’s case that on 11.10.2021, the petitioner was served with the Approval Order dated 06.10.2021 along with the Detention Order and other documents, the details of which can be seen from Annexure-4 (Series). The said additional documents so served were: (i) the communication issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Police Zone 1, Dimapur, to the Commissioner of Police, Dimapur, Nagaland, dated 27.09.2021 - proposal for detention of the accused u/s 3(1) and (2) of the Act. (ii) the communication dated 27.09.2021 issued by the Investigating Officer of the Diphupar Police Station, Dimapur, to the Commissioner of Police, Dimapur - prayer for proposal for NSA detention. (iii) the First Information Report registered as Diphupar Police Case No. 0063/2021. (iv) Seizure Memo dated 17.09.2021. (v) Handing/Taking Over Certificate of Arrested Person. (vi) Crime Details Form. (vii) Property Search and Seizure Form. (viii) Arrest/Court Surrender Form. (ix) Revised Format for Joint Interrogation of the petitioner. (x) Statement of the petitioner dated 20.09.2021. 7. The petitioner was thereafter served in the Central Jail, Dimapur, on 28.10.2021 with an Order No. CON/NSA/16/2021/128 dated 25.10.2021 passed by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland by which the representation submitted by the petitioner to the State Government was rejected. Subsequent thereto, on 29.11.2021, the petitioner was served with a copy of the Confirmation Order bearing No. CON/NSA/15/2021/188 dated 24.11.2021 (This Order dated 24.11.2021 for our convenience is hereinafter referred as ‘The Confirmation Order’) whereby the State Government had confirmed the Detention Order in respect of the petitioner and further ordered that he was to be detained for a further period of three months from 27.12.2021 till 26.03.2022 within which period his detention will be reviewed under the provisions of The Act. It is against the said detention under the NSA Act and the orders passed under the said Act, the petitioner has approached this Court seeking a writ of habeas corpus for quashing the Orders - reference to which this Court has already made herein above. 8. An Affidavit-in-Opposition was filed on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 by one Shri Abhijit Sinha, who is serving as the Home Commissioner in the Department of Home, Government of Nagaland, Kohima. He states in his affidavit that he is familiar with the facts and circumstances of the case and has been authorized to swear the affidavit on behalf of the Respondents. 1, 2 and 4 by one Shri Abhijit Sinha, who is serving as the Home Commissioner in the Department of Home, Government of Nagaland, Kohima. He states in his affidavit that he is familiar with the facts and circumstances of the case and has been authorized to swear the affidavit on behalf of the Respondents. Admittedly, the said Shri Abhijit Sinha is neither the detaining authority nor the authority who has approved the Detention Order. A perusal of the records also shows that the deponent of the said affidavit was the Principal Secretary, Home, at that relevant point of time who had only placed the Detention Order under NSA before the Chief Secretary for approval. He had also placed the representation before the Chief Secretary for rejection of the representation, and also placed the proposal before the Chief Secretary for approval of the extension of the detention. However, the records show that the Detention Order was passed by the Respondent No. 3 and the approval of the said Detention Order, the rejection of the representation of the petitioner, as well as the extension of the Detention Order were approved, rejected and passed respectively, by the Chief Secretary, upon his subjective satisfaction and on account thereof the Detention Order was approved, the representation of the petitioner was rejected and the period of detention was extended. The deponent of the Affidavit-in-Opposition thereof, do not have the personal knowledge as regards the subjective satisfaction which prevailed upon the said Authorities which led to the detention, approval of the Detention Order, the rejection of the representation and the extension of the detention. 9. Be that as it may, in the said Affidavit-in-Opposition, it has been mentioned that as per the official records the Detention Order along with all enclosures were served upon the detenue on 29.09.2021 in compliance with Section 8(1) of The Act. An acknowledgment receipt where the detenue had appended his signature that proved the receipt of the same in the presence of witnesses was enclosed to the said Affidavit-in-Opposition as Annexure-I. Further, the Approval Order for detention dated 06.10.2021 along with all relevant documents were also served to the detenue on 10.10.2021 and the acknowledgement in that regard was enclosed as Annexure-II to the said Affidavit-in-Opposition. It is relevant, however, to take note that the perusal of the said acknowledgement certificates clearly goes to show that the contents have been explained to the petitioner in Nagamese meaning thereby that the petitioner could not understand the English language in which the Detention Order, the grounds of detention, the Approval Order, as well as the enclosures therein were written, which in fact vindicates the stand taken by the petitioner that he came to know only on 05.10.2021 as regards the fact that he has been detained under the provision of The Act. A further perusal of the said Affidavit-in-Opposition would go to show that as per deponent of the said affidavit, the Respondent No. 3 who had passed the Detention Order had duly applied his mind in accordance with established procedure of law and the detaining authority was competent enough to arrive at such a conclusion after stating the case records. At this stage it is relevant to take note that sans an affidavit of the detaining authority, on the basis of whose subjective satisfaction, the Order of detention was passed and as the deponent of the Affidavit-in-Opposition, had nothing to do as regards the Detention Order, explaining that the detaining authority had applied its mind in accordance with established procedure of law does not inspire this Court. 10. In the Writ Petition a specific plea was taken that the petitioner was neither informed of the grounds of detention, nor informed that he had the right to have an assistance of a friend while appearing before the Advisory Board. To the said averments it was mentioned that there is no provision under The Act whereby a detenue has the right of assistance of a friend at the time of appearing before the Advisory Board. It was also mentioned that the detenue having not made any request through the concerned Jail authorities to the State Government, the petitioner cannot raise the question of violation of any of the rights and privileges as alleged. Further to that, it was mentioned in the Affidavit-in-Opposition that as per the record, the detenue submitted a representation dated 11.10.2021 to the detaining authority through the Jail authorities. Further to that, it was mentioned in the Affidavit-in-Opposition that as per the record, the detenue submitted a representation dated 11.10.2021 to the detaining authority through the Jail authorities. By that time the State Government had approved the Detention Order by the Order dated 06.10.2021, and as such the question of disposing the representation by the detaining authority after the Detention Order was approved by the State Government did not arise. It, further, appears from the said Affidavit that the representation dated 11.10.2021 was received by the Home Department on 20.10.2021 via India Post which was put up for consideration of the State Government. It has also been mentioned that the State Government authority after going through points raised in the representation turned it down as it found no merits and this aspect was informed to the petitioner on 25.10.2021. It further appears from the Affidavit-in-Opposition that the Approval Order of detention along with all relevant documents were forwarded to the Central Government on 06.10.2021 and the grounds of detention as well as the report of the Commissioner of Police, Dimapur and the representation of the detenue were forwarded to the NSA Advisory Board on 13.10.2021 as per Section 10 of The Act. 11. The Respondent No. 5 also filed an Affidavit-in-Opposition through an Under Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. The deponent of the said Affidavit stated that in his official capacity, he is well conversant with the facts of the case from the official records maintained. In the said Affidavit-in-Opposition, it has been mentioned that the representation of the petitioner dated 11.10.2021 was received by the concerned Section of the Ministry of Home Affairs on 27.10.2021. On 28.10.2021, the representation of the petitioner was put up to the Deputy Secretary (Security). 30.10.2021 and 31.10.2021 were Saturday and Sunday. Thereafter, the Deputy Secretary (Security) examined the representation and the said Deputy Secretary (Security) forwarded the file to the Joint Secretary (Internal Security-II) on 02.11.2021. The Joint Secretary (Internal Security-II) after examining the case forwarded the file to the Union Home Secretary on 02.11.2021. The Union Home Secretary rejected the said representation and sent the file back to the Joint Secretary (Internal Security-II) on 03.11.2021. The Joint Secretary (Internal Security-II) after examining the case forwarded the file to the Union Home Secretary on 02.11.2021. The Union Home Secretary rejected the said representation and sent the file back to the Joint Secretary (Internal Security-II) on 03.11.2021. 04.11.2021 being Diwali, the file reached the concerned Section on 05.11.2021 and the petitioner and the authorities concerned were informed vide wireless message about the rejection of representation on 05.11.2021 itself. The said wireless message has been enclosed as Annexure-R1 to the said Affidavit-in-Opposition. 12. Mr. Sarif Ahmed, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has made the following contentions: (i) The Detention Order was passed on 27.09.2021. It is the mandate of Section 3(5) that the State Government within 7 (seven) days report the said fact to the Central Government alongwith, the grounds on which the Order has been made and such other particulars as in the information of the State Government, having a bearing on the necessity for the Order. The learned counsel submits that the Order was passed on 27.09.2021 and, admittedly, from the Affidavit filed by the Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4, it was only on 06.10.2021 the Order of detention was informed to the Central Government. He submits that the mandate of law in terms with Section 3(5) makes it clear that any order is made or approved by the State Government and under Section 3, the Central Government has to be informed within seven days and having not complied with the mandate of Section 3(5), the Detention Order is in violation to the said Section. (ii) The learned counsel, further submits, that the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed by the Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 is filed by a person who is neither the Detaining Authority, nor is the authority who had approved the detention or the authority who had rejected the representation of the petitioner or the authority who had extended the period of detention. In that regard the learned counsel submits that the authorities concerned have not explained on what basis the subjective satisfaction was arrived at by the Detaining Authority or the Approving Authority in passing the Orders impugned in the instant proceedings. In that regard the learned counsel submits that the authorities concerned have not explained on what basis the subjective satisfaction was arrived at by the Detaining Authority or the Approving Authority in passing the Orders impugned in the instant proceedings. In that regard the learned counsel relies upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Adam Ali @ Adil Ali vs. Union of India and Others, (2021) 3 GLT 564 to draw support to his contention that such affidavit filed by another person, save and except the person who passed the Detention Order, is not an explanation of subjective satisfaction. He further submits that in the instant case, the Respondent No. 3, who is the original Detaining Authority, had not even cared to file an affidavit before this Court. (iii) The learned counsel further submits that the petitioner is in custody since his arrest and in the judicial custody w.e.f. 21.09.2021. But there is no mention either in the Detention Order nor the Approval Order or even the Order by which the detention was confirmed; that the petitioner’s detention under The Act is required as he is likely to be released on bail along with such reasons or basis or materials from which the authority draws its conclusion, must also be stated in the Order itself. In this regard the learned counsel relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh vs. State of Manipur and Others, (2012) 7 SCC 181 as well as the judgment of this Court in the case of Pangsha Yingle vs. State of Nagaland, (2021) 4 GLT 103. (iv) He further submits that a detenue has rights under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. First, to be informed as soon as may be, the grounds on which the Order of Detention is passed, i.e. the grounds which led to the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority; and second, to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the Order of Detention. These twin rights are available to a detenue where they are provided for arrest in the Preventive Detention Laws. These twin rights are available to a detenue where they are provided for arrest in the Preventive Detention Laws. In that regard the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel vs. Union of India and Others, (1995) 4 SCC 517 as well as the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Konsam Brojen Singh vs. State of Manipur and Others, (2006) 1 GLT 375. Drawing the support from the said judgments, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits, that on 27.09.2021, the Detention Order was passed. As per the petitioner, only on 01.10.2021 the said Detention Order, the Forwarding Letter, as well as the Letter dated 27.09.2021 addressed to the petitioner, informing him of his rights to make a representation, were furnished to the petitioner. No other documents which formed the basis of the Detention Order were however served upon the petitioner on 01.10.2021. (v) He further submits that a perusal of Annexure-I and II to the Affidavit-in-Opposition would show that the documents were explained to the petitioner in Nagamese, meaning thereby, that the petitioner could not understand the contents of the said documents by himself. As per the counsel for the petitioner, it was only on 05.10.2021 the petitioner would come to learn the contents of the said documents furnished on 01.10.2021; thereafter, it was only on 11.10.2021 the petitioner submitted his representations through the Respondent No. 4. In the meantime on 06.10.2021 the Detention Order was approved by the State Government and the same was furnished on 11.10.2021 to the petitioner on the date on which the petitioner submitted the representation. It was only on that date the additional documents on the basis of which the Detention Order was passed was furnished to the petitioner. The learned counsel further submits that it also appears from the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed by the State Respondents that, though on 11.10.2021 the petitioner had submitted the representation through Respondent No. 4, it reached the State Government only on 20.10.2021 which is almost 9(nine) days from the date on which the petitioner had submitted the representation. The learned counsel further submits that it also appears from the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed by the State Respondents that, though on 11.10.2021 the petitioner had submitted the representation through Respondent No. 4, it reached the State Government only on 20.10.2021 which is almost 9(nine) days from the date on which the petitioner had submitted the representation. He further submits that on one hand the petitioner could only come to learn about the contents of the Detention Order on 05.10.2021 and on 06.10.2021 the Detention Order had already been approved and, therefore, the submission of the representation by the petitioner on 11.10.2021 before the Detaining Authority had become infructuous as could be seen from the Affidavit of the State Respondents themselves wherein it has been mentioned that the question of disposing of the representation of the petitioner did not arise as the Detention Order had already been approved by the State Government on 06.10.2021. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Detention Order and the other documents so furnished on 01.10.2021 should have been in the language which the petitioner could have understood. He submits that had the petitioner realized the contents of the said documents served upon him, he could have immediately taken certain steps to submit his representation. In that regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner refers to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Adam Ali (Supra). He further submits that in effect it was only on 11.10.2021, the Detention Order can be said to have been served upon the petitioner as it was only on that date, the petitioner was supplied with the documents on the basis of which the Detention Order was passed and consequently, there was a delay of around 14 (fourteen) days for which the petitioner’s right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India was violated. 13. On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State Government, Mr. Moa Imchen, had made the following contentions: (i) The documents enclosed as Annexure-I and II to the Affidavit-in-Opposition clearly go to show that on 29.09.2021 and on 10.10.2021 the petitioner was duly served and acknowledgment was also duly taken. Under such circumstances, the petitioner cannot contend that he was not given the earliest opportunity to submit his representation. Moa Imchen, had made the following contentions: (i) The documents enclosed as Annexure-I and II to the Affidavit-in-Opposition clearly go to show that on 29.09.2021 and on 10.10.2021 the petitioner was duly served and acknowledgment was also duly taken. Under such circumstances, the petitioner cannot contend that he was not given the earliest opportunity to submit his representation. (ii) He further submits that taking into consideration the antecedents of the detenue, his release from the custody would be detrimental to the peace and security of the State as the detenue being a member of an armed organization such criminal acts and activities are a threat to public security and adversely affect the economic development of the State and detrimental to the tranquility and maintenance of law and order in the State. It is under such circumstances that the Order of Detention has been passed. The learned counsel further submits in reply to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner as regards the delay of the State Government in reporting the Detention Order or the Approval Order made under Section 3 to the Central Government to be totally misconceived, in as much, as the Order dated 06.10.2021 was duly informed on the same date itself. The learned counsel further submits that the Respondent Authorities have duly taken all care so that the right conferred upon the petitioner under Article 22(5) is not infringed upon. 14. The learned counsel for the Respondent No. 5 submitted that he has nothing much to say except what has been stated in the Affidavit-in-Opposition by the Respondent No. 5. It has been mentioned that the Central Government upon receipt of the representation dated 11.10.2021, on 27.10.2021, had with utmost care and promptitude, disposed of the said representation on 03.11.2021 and the same was intimated to the detenue on 05.11.2021. 15. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have perused the materials on record as well as the records produced by the learned Senior Government Advocate. From the contention so raised by the parties it appears that the following issues arises for consideration: (i) Whether there was a delay on the part of the State Government in reporting the fact relating to the Order of Detention to the Central Government in terms with Section 3(5) of The Act? From the contention so raised by the parties it appears that the following issues arises for consideration: (i) Whether there was a delay on the part of the State Government in reporting the fact relating to the Order of Detention to the Central Government in terms with Section 3(5) of The Act? (ii) Whether the Detention Order, the Approval Order and the subsequent Confirmation Order without taking into consideration that the petitioner is already in judicial custody is bad in law? (iii) Whether the Respondent Authorities have complied with the dual obligation in terms with Article 22(5) of the Constitution after passing the order of Detention? (iv) Whether the Detention Order as well as the grounds of detention were communicated to the detenue in the language in which the detenue understands as visualized under Article 22(5) of the Constitution? 16. Let this Court first take into consideration the first issue as to whether there was compliance to Section 3(5) of The Act. Section 3(5) of The Act being relevant is quoted herein-below: “3(5) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Government shall, within seven days, report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in the opinion of the State Government, have a bearing on the necessity of the order.” 17. A perusal of the said Section would show that when an order is made or approved by the State Government under Section 3, the State Government shall within seven days report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government having a bearing on the necessity for the order. The record shows that on 27.09.2021, the Order of Detention was passed. There is no whisper in the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed by Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 as to when the said Order of Detention was communicated to the Central Government along with the grounds on which the Order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government have a bearing on the necessity for the Order. The Affidavit-in-Opposition, more particularly in paragraph no. 1, 2 and 4 as to when the said Order of Detention was communicated to the Central Government along with the grounds on which the Order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government have a bearing on the necessity for the Order. The Affidavit-in-Opposition, more particularly in paragraph no. 18 shows that only the Approval Order of detention dated 06.10.2021 along with relevant documents were forwarded to the Central Government on 06.10.2021. In absence of any materials placed before this Court, it appears that the Detention Order dated 27.09.2021 was not communicated to the Central Government within the period of seven days as is required under Section 3(5) of The Act. Accordingly, the said Detention Order on the face of it, violates the mandate of Section 3(5) of The Act. 18. The second issue which arises is as to whether the Detention Order, the Approval Order as well as the Confirmation Order take into consideration that the petitioner is in judicial custody and in spite thereof, there is a requirement to pass such orders. For dealing with the said issue, it would be relevant to take note of two judgments: First is the judgment rendered in the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh vs. State of Manipur and Others, (2012) 7 SCC 181 as well as the judgment of this Court in the case of Pangsha Yingle vs. State of Nagaland, (2021) 4 GLT 103. The Supreme Court had in the case of Huidrom Singh (Supra) had dealt with the question as to whether a person who is in jail can be detained under the detention laws. The Supreme Court referred to various earlier judgments and observed in paragraph no. 9 that there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order in respect of a person who is already in custody in respect of a criminal case. The Supreme Court referred to various earlier judgments and observed in paragraph no. 9 that there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order in respect of a person who is already in custody in respect of a criminal case. However, it was observed that if the detention order is challenged, the detaining authority has to satisfy the Court that the authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenue was already in custody; that there were reliable material before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there was a real possibility of his release on bail and further on being released he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order for which the authority felt it necessary to prevent him from indulging in such activities and therefore the detention order was made. It was further observed that in case either of the facts does not exist the detention order would stand vitiated. Paragraph no. 9 and paragraph no. 15 of the said judgment being relevant is quoted herein-below: “9. In view of the above, it can be held that there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order in respect of a person who is already in custody in respect of criminal case. However, if the detention order is challenged the detaining authority has to satisfy the Court the following facts: (1) The authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was actually in custody. (2) There was reliable material before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there was real possibility of his release on bail and further on being released he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order. (3) In view of the above, the authority felt it necessary to prevent him from indulging in such activities and therefore, detention order was necessary. 15. In the instant case, admittedly, the said bail orders do not relate to the co-accused in the same case. The accused released in those cases on bail had no concern with the present case. Merely, because somebody else in similar cases had been granted bail, there could be no presumption that in the instant case had the detenu applied for bail could have been released on bail. The accused released in those cases on bail had no concern with the present case. Merely, because somebody else in similar cases had been granted bail, there could be no presumption that in the instant case had the detenu applied for bail could have been released on bail. Thus, as the detenu in the instant case has not moved the bail application and no other co-accused, if any, had been enlarged on bail, resorting to the provisions of the Act was not permissible. Therefore, the impugned order of detention is based on mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention and cannot be sustained in the eye of the law.” 19. This Court had also in the case of Pangsha Yingle (Supra) was called upon to decide a similar question and this Court having seen that there was failure on the part of the Detaining Authority to satisfy the Court in terms with the principles laid down in the case of Huidrom Singh (Supra) had declared that the detention order was illegal and quashed the same. Paragraph No. 8 of the said judgment being relevant is quoted herein-below: “8. From the contents of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court given above, it can be concluded that the principle of law regarding detention of a person who is already under judicial custody has been settled that is; when an authority seeks to detain a person who is already in custody - that fact must be first acknowledged in the detention order, and secondly that, his detention under the NSA is required as he is likely to be released on bail along with such reasons or basis or material from which the authority draws its conclusion must also be stated in the order itself. Failure to do so would make the detention order vitiated and therefore illegal. By going through the record placed by the learned Sr. Government Advocate and the order passed by the District Magistrate Kohima dated 24.9.2020 and the order of the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland dated 1.9.2020 approving the said order and the order dated 15.10.2020 of the same Chief Secretary confirming the detention order of the detenue for the period upto 23.8.2021 are against the settled principle of law, hence they are illegal and as such, are quashed and set aside. Accordingly it is hereby ordered that the detenue be released forthwith if he is not required to be in custody in connection with any case or any order passed by any Court.” 20. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court take into consideration the Detention Order passed, the Approval Order, the Confirmation Order, as well as the affidavit filed by State Respondent Authorities, as admittedly the petitioner is in judicial custody. A perusal of the Detention Order dated 27.09.2021 though acknowledged that a criminal case vide Diphupar P.S. Case No. 0063/2021 u/s 25(1B)(a) Arms Act read with 384 of the IPC read with 7/8 of the Nagaland Security Regulation (NSR) was registered but does not take into consideration that the petitioner has been in judicial custody since 21.09.2021. Even in the Grounds of detention as well as the Schedule enclosed as Annexure-C, there is no mention whatsoever, that the authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenue was actually in custody and there was reliable material before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there was a real possibility of the petitioner being released on bail and further on release he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order. In the Approval Order dated 06.10.2021, there is no mention whatsoever that the authority concerned have taken into consideration that the petitioner was in judicial custody and there was a real possibility that the petitioner would be released on bail. Same is in the case of the Order dated 25.10.2021 whereby the State Government had rejected the representation. The Confirmation Order dated 24.11.2021, is also absolutely silent on that said aspect. In the backdrop of the above if this Court further looks into the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed by the Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4, there is no mention whatsoever as regards the requirement as laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgment of Huidrom Singh (Supra). 21. The Confirmation Order dated 24.11.2021, is also absolutely silent on that said aspect. In the backdrop of the above if this Court further looks into the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed by the Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4, there is no mention whatsoever as regards the requirement as laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgment of Huidrom Singh (Supra). 21. In the view of the matter the impugned Detention Order having been passed without considering that the petitioner is in custody and subjective satisfaction being reached without taking into consideration there were reliable materials before the authority on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there was a real possibility of the petitioner’s release on bail and further on being released he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order, is in violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India as it seems that the impugned Detention Order was passed on mere ipse dixit statements on the grounds of detention and cannot be sustained in law. Same would also be seen from a perusal of the Approval Order as well as the Confirmation Order for which the said Orders are also liable to be interfered with. 22. The next question which arises is as to whether the Detaining Authority had complied with its dual obligation imposed upon it under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, in the instant case. Article 22(5) imposes a dual obligation on the authority making the order of preventive detention. The said obligations are: i) to communicate to the person detained as soon as may be the grounds on which the order of detention has been made; and ii) to afford the person detained, the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. Article 22(5) thus proceeds on the basis that the person detained has the right to make a representation against the order of detention and the aforementioned two obligations are imposed on the authority making the order of detention with a view to ensure that the right of the person detained to make a representation is a real right and he is able to take steps for redress of a wrong which he thinks has been committed. Article 22(5) does not, however, indicate the authority to whom the report is to be made. Article 22(5) does not, however, indicate the authority to whom the report is to be made. Since the object and the purpose of the representation that is to be made by the person detained is to enable him to obtain the relief at the earliest opportunity the said representation has to be made to the authority which can grant such relief i.e. the authority which can revoke the order of detention and set him at liberty. It is no longer res integra that the authority which made the Order of Detention has the authority also to revoke it. 23. At this stage another aspect also needs to be taken into consideration that preventive detention is an extremely harsh order which deprives a person of his liberty and as such the law of preventive detention have to be very carefully used after following due procedure established by law. One of the important aspects of which is the communication of the grounds of detention to the detenue between five to ten days, and the communication would mean communicating the grounds in a language which the detenue understand. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Adam Ali (Supra) had taken into consideration the said aspect of the matter relating to furnishing of grounds of arrest to the detenue in the language in which the detenue understands and held at paragraph nos. 19 to 21 as here in under: “19. As early as in 1961-62, a Constitutional Bench of Apex Court in Harikisan vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, AIR 1962 SC 911 held that if grounds of detention are communicated to the detenue in any other language than the language he understands that would not amount to communication of the grounds of detention as visualized under clause 5 of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. In the said case, the Hon’ble Apex Court was dealing with the detention of a person who was detained under the then Preventive Detention Act, 1950 and the admitted position was the he was detained in Nagpur and the grounds of detention were supplied to him in English and the case of the State was that this was because that the language of the District (i.e. Nagpur) was English and moreover, the police officer had translated the grounds of detention in the mother tongue of the detenue. In paragraphs 8, 9, the Constitutional Bench held as under: “(8) We do not agree with the High Court in its conclusion that in every case communication of the grounds of detention in English, so long as it continues to be the official language of the State, is enough compliance with the requirements of the Constitution. If the detained person is conversant with the English language, he will naturally be in a position to understand the gravamen of the charge against him and the facts and circumstances on which the order of detention is based. But to a person who is not so conversant with the English language, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution, the detenue must be given the grounds in a language which he can understand, and in a script which he can read, if he is a literate person. (9) The Constitution has guaranteed freedom of movement throughout the territory of India and has laid down detailed rules as to arrest and detention. It has also, by way of limitations upon the freedom of personal liberty, recognized the right of the State to legislate for preventive detention, subject to certain safeguards in favour of the detained person, as laid down in clause (4) and (5) of Article 22. One of those safeguards is that the detained person has the right to be communicated the grounds on which the order of detention has been made against him, in order that he may be able to make his representation against the order of detention. In our opinion, in the circumstances of this case it has not been shown that the appellant had the opportunity, which the law contemplates in his favour, of making an effective representation against his detention. On this ground alone we declare his detention illegal, and set aside the Order of the High Court and the Order of Detention passed against him.” 20. This was again followed in Chaju Ram vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1971 SC 263 . In this case, the detenue (Chaju Ram) was detained under Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964 and the ground of detention was supplied to him in English, again a language which the detenue did not understand. The Hon’ble Apex Court held in paragraph 9 as under: “9. Of Course Mr. In this case, the detenue (Chaju Ram) was detained under Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964 and the ground of detention was supplied to him in English, again a language which the detenue did not understand. The Hon’ble Apex Court held in paragraph 9 as under: “9. Of Course Mr. Sachethey ingeniously suggests that this may be a case of erroneous typing necessitating the correction; but this corrections comes at a significant spot after the detenu has sworn an affidavit that the was not explained the grounds of the detention in the language which he understood, and further the original document which is produced does not seem to bear authenticity because of the changes of ink. In these circumstances and regard being had to the fact that on the previous occasion in the affidavit there was no mention of having read over the grounds to him in the language he understood, we are constrained to hold that we should not go by the affidavit of the Under-Secretary, but in preference accept the affidavit to the detenu.....” 21. Furnishing ground of arrest to the detenue in the language which the detenue understand is absolutely essential and non-supply of grounds in any other language has been held to be violative of clause 5 of the Article 22 of the Constitution of India and the Hon’ble Apex Court has been following this principle in Nainmal Petap Mal Shah vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1980 SC 2129 , Kubic Darusz vs. Union of India and Others, (1990) 1 SCC 568 and Nandoli Mohamed Rafeeq vs. Union of India and Others, (2004) 12 SCC 218 .” 24. From a perusal of the said judgment, it is clear that furnishing grounds of arrest to the detenue in the language which the detenue understands is absolutely essential and non-supply of the grounds in any other language is violative of clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution. In the said judgment, the Division Bench of this Court took into consideration the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Harikisan vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, AIR 1962 SC 911 . It is very pertinent to note that the Supreme Court, in the said case was dealing with the detention of a person who was detained under the then Preventive Detention Act, 1950. It is very pertinent to note that the Supreme Court, in the said case was dealing with the detention of a person who was detained under the then Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The detention was done in Nagpur and the Grounds of Detention were supplied to him in English. The police officer had translated the grounds of detention in the mother tongue of the detenue. The Supreme Court held that a person who is not conversant with the English language, in order to satisfy the requirement of the Constitution, the detenue must be given the grounds in a language which he can understand and in a script which he can read, if he is a literate person. In the instant case, the Detention Order is in English, as well as the Grounds of Detention were in English. A perusal of Annexure-I and II of the Affidavit-in-Opposition shows that the grounds have been explained in Nagamese to the petitioner meaning thereby that the petitioner is not so conversant with the English language. A specific plea was also taken in the representation dated 11.10.2021 that on 05.10.2021, the petitioner, for the first time, came to learn about the contents of the Detention Order as well as the grounds of detention when his lawyer had explained it to the petitioner. 25. In the backdrop of the above, it would, therefore, be relevant to take note of the prejudice which has been caused to the petitioner. It was on 05.10.2021 that the petitioner could learn the contents of the Detention Order and the Grounds of Detention. It also appears from the contents of the Writ Petition that the documents which led to the formation of the opinion were only supplied on 11.10.2021 when the petitioner submitted the representation. Be that as it may, it is also relevant to take note that in paragraph no. 12 of the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed by the State Respondents it had been categorically mentioned that as the petitioner’s representation was submitted on 11.10.2021 after the Approval Order dated 06.102021, the question of disposing of the representation by the Detaining Authority after the Detention Order was approved by the State Government did not arise. 12 of the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed by the State Respondents it had been categorically mentioned that as the petitioner’s representation was submitted on 11.10.2021 after the Approval Order dated 06.102021, the question of disposing of the representation by the Detaining Authority after the Detention Order was approved by the State Government did not arise. This right of the petitioner for consideration of the petitioner’s representation by the Detaining Authority was taken away in view of the fact that the Detention Order as well as the grounds of detention were not in the language in which the petitioner could understand. Further, that it is to be noted herein, that without furnishing the documents on the basis of which the subjective satisfaction was arrived at, the petitioner could not have filed an effective representation and, it was almost after fourteen days of the Detention Order that the petitioner was granted an effective opportunity to submit a representation. This violates the dual obligation cast upon the Detaining Authority under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. 26. The Affidavit of the State Respondents, more particularly, paragraph no. 12, shows that the representation dated 11.10.2021 was received by the Home Department on 20.10.2021 via India Post. When the mandate of the law is that the detenue should be granted the earliest opportunity to submit the representation before the authority who can revoke it, it also means that the Authorities to whom the representation has been submitted takes up the said representation with equal promptitude. Admittedly, the representation dated 11.10.2021 was submitted through Respondent No. 4 and it is rather strange that the Home Department only received the representation on 20.10.2021. We are presently at an age where communications are issued and acted upon on the basis of electronic means and sufficient protection is given to the said mode by the Information Technology Act, 2000. Under such circumstances, it is not at all conceivable why a representation from Dimapur Central Jail took nine days to reach the State Government at Kohima. We are dealing with a person’s liberty which is one of the harshest forms of order depriving a person of his liberty and under such circumstances each day delay beyond explanation infringes on the person’s rights under Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution. We are dealing with a person’s liberty which is one of the harshest forms of order depriving a person of his liberty and under such circumstances each day delay beyond explanation infringes on the person’s rights under Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution. Same is also the case when we see that the representation of the petitioner reaching the Central Government only on 27.10.2021 i.e. almost after sixteen days. In fact a perusal of Annexure-R1 to the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed by the Respondent No. 5 shows that the communication of rejection of the representations was sent forthwith through electronic means. If that could have been done, then this Court finds it difficult to comprehend why the petitioner’s representation could not be sent by electronic mode as such mode is permissible in terms of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The hard copy of the representation could have followed suit by usual process. The communication of the representation submitted has to be made in the fastest possible means and as such this Court is of the opinion that not sending the representations to the authorities who could revoke the Order of Detention, by the Respondent No. 4 herein, through fastest mode permissible under law interferes with the rights of the petitioner under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. If the State Authorities could have taken the matter seriously, the said representation could have been taken up for consideration by the Home Department as well as the Central Government and other authorities at an early date. The above discussion, therefore, decides the issues (iii) and (iv). 27. Accordingly, it is the opinion of this Court that the rights of the petitioner under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and consequently, the Detention Order, the Approval Order, as well as the Confirmation Order of the detention of the petitioner are set aside and quashed. 28. The Writ Petition stands disposed. 29. Return the records of the Home Department through Mr. Moa Imchen, the learned Senior Government Advocate.