ORDER : Ali Mohammad Magrey, J. This is an intra Court appeal filed by the Appellant-Government of Jammu and Kashmir challenging the Judgment dated 27th of August, 2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in SWP No. 2161/2016, whereby the Petition filed by the Writ Petitioner/ Respondent herein stands allowed and the impugned Order therein bearing No. 1279-GAD of 2016 dated 21st of November, 2016, prematurely retiring the Writ Petitioner/ Respondent herein from Government service, quashed. Besides, the Appellants have been directed to reinstate the Writ Petitioner/ Respondent herein and to grant him all consequential benefits. 2. The Respondent/Writ Petitioner filed a Writ Petition bearing SWP No. 2161/2016, wherein he stated that during the entire tenure of his service, he worked with great deal of honesty and dedication at different places of posting and, at the relevant point of time, i.e., the day when the Order dated 21st of November, 2016 was issued, he was holding the post of SMC (RL), Srinagar in the Agriculture Production Department. It was also pleaded that his past service is unblemished and that he has, all along, been given various promotions on the basis of his suitability, merit and excellent service record. In the year 2009, however, a false and frivolous FIR bearing No. 19/2009 is stated to have been lodged by the Vigilance Organization, Kashmir with which the investigation commenced. In the said FIR, it was alleged that the Writ Petitioner/ Respondent herein, as the District Agricultural Officer, Pulwama in the year 2002 purchased ‘Hybrid Sudan Grass’ seeds on highly exorbitant rates and supply orders were placed with one M/s Garnier Seeds Delhi for supply of 30.5 quintals of these seeds. It is also alleged that the Writ Petitioner/ Respondent herein dishonestly released the payment in favour of M/s Farm Seeds. On the basis of the said FIR, the Government/ Appellants herein issued the Order dated 21st of November, 2016, whereby the retirement of the Writ Petitioner/ Respondent herein was ordered under Article 226(2) of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services Regulations.
On the basis of the said FIR, the Government/ Appellants herein issued the Order dated 21st of November, 2016, whereby the retirement of the Writ Petitioner/ Respondent herein was ordered under Article 226(2) of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services Regulations. The Writ Court, after hearing the Counsel for the parties and on consideration of the matter, in terms of the impugned Judgment dated 27th of August, 2018, allowed the Writ Petition and set aside the aforesaid Order dated 21st of November, 2016 with further direction to the Respondents to reinstate the Writ Petitioner/ Respondent herein and to grant him all consequential benefits. This Judgment of the learned Single Judge is challenged by the Government-Appellants herein through the medium of the instant appeal on the grounds projected in the memo of appeal. 3. We heard the learned Counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings on record and have considered the matter. 4. At the very outset, what requires to be stated is that the only basis for directing for the premature retirement of the Writ Petitioner/ Respondent herein was having reference to the registration of FIR bearing No. 19/2009 by the Vigilance Organization, Kashmir and no other service material was examined which formed the basis for such premature retirement of the Writ Petitioner/ Respondent herein. On this issue, this Court, in terms of Judgment dated 27th of April, 2022 passed in LPA No. 166/2018, has already decided a similar issue whereby the Judgment of the learned Single Judge quashing the order of premature retirement of the Petitioner therein was upheld. Paragraph Nos. 23 to 36 of the said Judgment read as under:- “23. In any case, to find an answer to the above question, one would not have to delve too deep into the matter, for the OM No. GAD(Vig)19-Adm/2010 dated 25.10.2010 issued by the Government itself provides that while making any recommendations for premature retirements, the entire service record of an employee, specified inclusively therein, is required to be screened. It hardly needs to be said that entire means entire, without leaving out any element or portion thereof. It has already been mentioned hereinabove that the Committee has not screened the APRs of the respondent, which constitute the most important and substantial record of service of a Government employee.
It hardly needs to be said that entire means entire, without leaving out any element or portion thereof. It has already been mentioned hereinabove that the Committee has not screened the APRs of the respondent, which constitute the most important and substantial record of service of a Government employee. The Committee has also not taken into account the fact that there was no such material as specified in the OM which could adversely reflect upon the reputation in public of the respondent and on the basis of which the Committee could have opined that he did not enjoy a good reputation in public. Mr. M. A. Chasoo, learned AAG, vehemently argued that in view of the fact that the respondent was accused of preparing fake stock registers and managing fictitious muster rolls, the subjective opinion formed by the Screening Committee on the basis of the two FIRs that the respondent did not enjoy a good reputation in the public and thereby he had outlived his utility to public cannot be questioned or gone into by the Court. In any case, he submitted that there is no bar for the Committee to form the requisite opinion solely on the two FIRs. Mr. Chashoo, learned AAG, sought to buttress his argument by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of J&K v Farid Ahmad Tak (supra) and other judgments mentioned hereinabove. Let the law laid down by the Supreme Court in various judgments cited at the Bar and relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties be examined. 24. The judgment in State of J&K v Farid Ahmad Tak (supra) has been rendered by the Supreme Court in context of the peculiar features attendant to that case which become apparent from paras 16 and 17 of the judgment. Paras 16 and 17 of the judgment are quoted hereunder:- “16. We, however, need not go into the matter as some striking features which emerge from three matters are as under:- (a) In all these three cases the respondent official concerned was never caught red-handed while accepting bribe. However, observations which are identical in all three matters indicate that the Division Bench considered the matters from that premise. The basic foundation was thus incorrect. (b) The matter from the perspective of Clause (iv) of Regulation 226(2) of the Regulations was also not considered.
However, observations which are identical in all three matters indicate that the Division Bench considered the matters from that premise. The basic foundation was thus incorrect. (b) The matter from the perspective of Clause (iv) of Regulation 226(2) of the Regulations was also not considered. The orders of sanction in all these three matters highlight the acts of commission and omission on part of the respondents concerned as a result of which there was wrongful loss to the State and public interest was compromised. 17. The aforesaid two features are common in all these three matters. The basic premise, as indicated hereinabove, on the basis of which the matter was considered by the Division Bench was incorrect and secondly, the matter was also not considered from the perspective of Clause (iv) of Regulation 226(2) as stated above. We, therefore, set aside the judgments and orders under appeal passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in State of J&K v Farid Ahmed Tak, State of J&K v. Mumtaz Hussain Bhat and State of J&K v Girdhari Lal. The matters are remitted to the Division Bench for fresh consideration. These letters patent appeals stand restored to the file of the High Court which may now be dealt with afresh.” 25. Perusal of the above two paras of the judgment reveals that the Supreme Court found that the Division Bench of this Court had proceeded on an incorrect premise specified in sub-para (a) of para 16. Further, it may be mentioned here that Clause (iv) of the instructions under Article 226(2) of the J&K CSRs, referred to in the aforesaid judgment by the Supreme Court, is not applicable in the present case, as already discussed hereinabove. Those instructions are relatable to non-gazetted employees only. The two cases are, therefore, wholly distinguishable on facts. That apart, the said judgment does not expressly or impliedly say that premature retirement can be ordered solely on the basis of FIR(s).
Those instructions are relatable to non-gazetted employees only. The two cases are, therefore, wholly distinguishable on facts. That apart, the said judgment does not expressly or impliedly say that premature retirement can be ordered solely on the basis of FIR(s). Fact is that in para 10 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has quoted para 27 of its earlier judgment in State of Gujarat v. Suryakant Chunilal Shah, (1999) 1 SCC 529 , wherein it has been laid down that involvement of a person in a criminal case does not mean that he is guilty, and that whether mere involvement in a criminal case would constitute relevant material for compulsory retirement or not would depend upon the circumstances of each case and the nature of offence allegedly committed by the employee. The said judgment would be referred to later in this judgment. It is thus clear that the judgment in State of J&K v Farid Ahmad Tak (supra), heavily relied upon by the learned AAG, does not support his argument. 26. The next case relied upon by the learned AAG in support of his arguments is State of U. P. v Bihari Lal, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 593, especially para 4 thereof. It is laid down therein as under:- “...It is now settled law that the entire service record should be considered before taking a decision to compulsorily retire a government servant exercising the power under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules. It is not necessary that adverse remarks should be communicated or every remark, which may sometimes be categorised as adverse, be communicated. It is on an overall assessment of the record, the authority would reach a decision whether the government servant should be compulsorily retired in public interest. In an appropriate case, there may not be tangible material but the reputation of officer built around him could be such that his further continuance would imperil the efficiency of the public service and would breed indiscipline among other public servants. Therefore, the Government could legitimately exercise their power to compulsorily retire a government servant. The court has to see whether before the exercise of the power, the authority has taken into consideration the overall record even including some of the adverse remarks...” (Underlining & Emphasis supplied) 27.
Therefore, the Government could legitimately exercise their power to compulsorily retire a government servant. The court has to see whether before the exercise of the power, the authority has taken into consideration the overall record even including some of the adverse remarks...” (Underlining & Emphasis supplied) 27. As already mentioned above, the fact is that the Committee has not taken the overall service record, especially the APRs of the respondents into consideration. In fact, it has falsely been said that the APRs are not available when the respondent has placed on record photocopies of several APRs mentioned hereinabove. 28. In State of Orissa v Ram Chandra Das, (1996) 5 SCC 331 , the question related to Rule 71(a) of the Orissa Service Code which provided for power of the Government to compulsorily retire a government servant. Therein the respondent before the Supreme Court, who had been working as Assistant Conservator of Forests, was compulsorily retired from service. He challenged the order before the Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the application on the grounds, including that the entire record and overall consideration thereof was not done and, therefore, the exercise of power of compulsory retirement under Rule 71(a) was not valid in law. The case of the respondent therein was that neither the entire record of service was placed before the Review Committee, nor the Committee had gone into, nor had the advantage of it, and that it considered only the adverse remarks for the years 1980-81 and 1981-82. In short, it was contended for the respondent that adverse entries for two years and pending departmental proceedings would not be sufficient to compulsorily retire the government servant on the premise that after promotion they would become irrelevant and minor penalty was imposed. On behalf of the appellants, it was stated in the rejoinder affidavit filed before Supreme Court that the entire record of service from 1964-65 to 1981-82 and also the pending proceedings in the departmental enquiry against the respondent were placed before the Review Committee and the same were duly considered by it. The Supreme Court found that the adverse remarks had been made after promotion and held as under:- “7. ...The material question is whether the entire record of service was considered or not? It is not for the court/tribunal to see whether the decision of the Government to compulsorily retire the government servant is justified or not.
The Supreme Court found that the adverse remarks had been made after promotion and held as under:- “7. ...The material question is whether the entire record of service was considered or not? It is not for the court/tribunal to see whether the decision of the Government to compulsorily retire the government servant is justified or not. It is for the Government to consider the same and take a proper decision in that behalf. As stated earlier, it is settled law that the Government is required to consider the entire record of service. Merely because a promotion has been given even after adverse entries were made, cannot be a ground to note that compulsory retirement of the government servant could not be ordered. The evidence does not become inadmissible or irrelevant as opined by the Tribunal. What would be relevant is whether upon that state of record as a reasonable prudent man would the Government or competent officer reach that decision. We find that selfsame material after promotion may not be taken into consideration only to deny him further promotion, if any, But that material undoubtedly would be available to the Government to consider the overall expediency or necessity to continue the government servant in service after he attained the required length of service or qualified period of service for pension...”. (Underlining supplied) The aforesaid judgment is again for the proposition that the Government is required to consider the entire record of service. This Court has recorded a finding in that regard hereinabove that the Screening Committee did not consider the entire record of service of the respondent, especially the available APRs. 29. It may also be relevant to mention here that the instructions issued by the Government of Orrisa on premature retirement pursuant to Rule 71(a) of the Orissa Service Code vide No. 30495-2R/1/39/87-GA dated 24.11.1987 under which the respondent in State of Orissa v Ram Chandra Das (supra) was compulsorily retired, in clause 8 thereof stated that the object of the review was to weed out persons of ‘doubtful integrity’ or patent inefficiency from public service. Meaning thereby that a government employee could be prematurely retired merely on the basis of a doubt about his integrity, yet the Supreme Court in the judgment held that the Government is required to consider the entire record of service.
Meaning thereby that a government employee could be prematurely retired merely on the basis of a doubt about his integrity, yet the Supreme Court in the judgment held that the Government is required to consider the entire record of service. As against the above, in OM dated 25.10.2010, holding the field in the instant case, the words used are ‘with a view to encouraging honest and to weed out the corrupt officers/officials’. The word ‘corrupt’ used herein as adjective implies that the guilt must have been proven – not necessarily in a criminal trial; it could be in a departmental enquiry – which, admittedly is not the case. 30. In Balkuntha Nath Das v Chief District Medical Officer, (1992) 2 SCC 299 , the Supreme Court spelled out the principles emerging from various of its decisions discussed therein in para 34 sub-paras (i) to (v) of the judgment and concluded the paragraph by saying that interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii). In sub-para (iii) it is laid down that while the High Court or ‘this Court’, i.e., the Supreme Court, would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) bona fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary. This Court has already come to the conclusion that the opinion and/or the report made by the Screening Committee were arbitrary having been arrived at without considering the APRs of the respondent and other relevant factors. 31. The next case cited at Bar by the learned AAG is the judgment of the Supreme Court in M. L. Binjolkar v State of M. P., (2005) 6 SCC 224 , especially para 5 thereof. Therein the Supreme Court has held that the order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment and that the employer takes into account various factors emanating from the employee’s past records and takes a view whether it would be in the interest of the employer to continue services of the employee concerned. It can certainly pass an order of compulsory retirement when the employee is considered to be a dead wood. The judgment is distinguishable on facts; therefore, of no help to the appellants. 32.
It can certainly pass an order of compulsory retirement when the employee is considered to be a dead wood. The judgment is distinguishable on facts; therefore, of no help to the appellants. 32. In State of Gujarat v Suryakant Chunilal Shah, (1999) 1 SCC 529 , relied upon by the learned AAG, the respondent before the Supreme Court was appointed as a Clerk in the office of the Food Controller, Ahmedabad. After 24 years of service he was promoted as an Assistant Food Controller (Class II) in the office of the Food Controller, Ahmedabad. In 1983, certain complaints were received against the respondent regarding permits for cement having been issued illegally by him and, therefore, he was placed under suspension and an enquiry by the State CID (Crime and Railway) was ordered into the matter of issuance of bogus cement permits. On receipt of the CID enquiry report, which prima facie made out a case of issuing cement permits to bogus institutions which were not in existence in Ahmedabad, a first information report under various sections of the Indian Penal Code read with the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was filed against the respondent. Another FIR was lodged against him on the same day in respect of offences committed by him by fabricating the rubber stamp of the Government and fabricating bogus permits in favour of equally bogus parties. By order dated 21.07.1988, passed under Rule 161 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959, he was compulsorily retired from service in public interest. The order was challenged by the respondent in a writ petition before the Gujarat High Court which was dismissed by the Single Judge. However, on appeal, the Division Bench allowed his writ petition. The State of Gujarat approached the Supreme Court in SLP against the aforesaid Division Bench judgement dated 11.02.1998. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal so filed by the State. Paras 24 to 28 of judgment are of utmost relevance for the purpose of this appeal and are extracted hereunder:- “24. The performance of a government servant is reflected in the annual character roll entries and, therefore, one of the methods of discerning the efficiency, honesty of integrity of a government servant is to look to his character roll entries for the whole tenure from the inception to the date on which decision for his compulsory retirement is taken.
The performance of a government servant is reflected in the annual character roll entries and, therefore, one of the methods of discerning the efficiency, honesty of integrity of a government servant is to look to his character roll entries for the whole tenure from the inception to the date on which decision for his compulsory retirement is taken. It is obvious that if the character roll is studded with adverse entries or the overall categorization of the employee is poor and there is material also to cast doubts upon his integrity, such a government servant cannot be said to be efficient. Efficiency is a bundle of sticks of personal assets, thickest of which is the stick of ‘Integrity’. If this is missing, the whole bundle would disperse. A government servant has, therefore, to keep his belt tight. 25. Purpose of adverse entries is primarily to forewarn the government servant to mend his ways and to improve his performance. That is why, it is required to communicate the adverse entries so that the government servant, to whom the adverse entry is given, may have either opportunity to explain his conduct so as to show that the adverse entry was wholly uncalled for, or to silently brood over the matter and on being convinced that his previous conduct justified such an entry, to improve his performance. 26. ...In fact, there was hardly any material on the basis of which a bona fide opinion could have been formed that it would be in public interest to retire the respondent from service compulsorily. The material which was placed before the Review Committee has already been mentioned above. To repeat, respondent was promoted in 1981; the character roll entries for the next two years were not available or record; there were no adverse entries in the respondent’s character roll about his integrity; he was involved in two criminal cases, in one of which a final report was submitted while in the other a charge sheet was filed. Although there was no entry in his character roll that the respondent’s integrity was doubtful, the Review Committee, on its own, probably on the basis of the FIRs lodged against the respondent, formed the opinion that the respondent was a person of doubtful integrity.
Although there was no entry in his character roll that the respondent’s integrity was doubtful, the Review Committee, on its own, probably on the basis of the FIRs lodged against the respondent, formed the opinion that the respondent was a person of doubtful integrity. The review Committee was constituted to assess the merits of the respondent on the basis of the character roll entries and other relevant material and to recommend whether it would be in public interest to compulsorily retire him from service or not. The Review Committee, after taking into consideration the character roll entries and noticing that there were no adverse entries and his integrity was, at no stage, doubted, proceeded, in excess of its jurisdiction, to form its own opinion with regard to respondent’s integrity merely on the basis of the FIRs lodged against him. Whether the integrity of an employee is doubtful or not, whether he is efficient and honest, is the function of the Appointing Authority or the immediate superior of that employee to consider and assess. It is not the function of the Review Committee to brand, and that too, off hand, an employee as a person of doubtful integrity... 27. The whole exercise described above would, therefore, indicate that although there was no material on the basis of which a reasonable opinion could be formed that the respondent had outlived his utility as a Govt. Servant or that he had lost his efficiency and had become a dead wood, he was compulsorily retired merely because of his involvement in two criminal case pertaining to the grant of permits in favour of take and bogus institutions. The involvement of a person in a criminal case does not mean that he is guilty. He is still to be tried in a court of law and the truth has to be found out ultimately by the court where the prosecution is ultimately conducted. But before that stage is reached, it would be highly improper to deprive a person of his livelihood merely on the basis of his involvement. We may, however, hasten to add that mere involvement in a criminal case would constitute relevant material for compulsory retirement or not would depend upon the circumstances of each case and the nature of offence allegedly committed by the employee. 28.
We may, however, hasten to add that mere involvement in a criminal case would constitute relevant material for compulsory retirement or not would depend upon the circumstances of each case and the nature of offence allegedly committed by the employee. 28. There being no material before the Review Committee, in as much as there were no adverse remarks in the character roll entries, the integrity was not doubted at any time, the character roll entries subsequent to the respondent’s promotion to the post of Assistant Food Controller (Class II) were not available, it could not come to the conclusion that the respondent was a man of doubtful integrity nor could have anyone else come to the conclusion that the respondent was a fit person to be retired compulsorily from service. The order, in the circumstances of the case, was punitive having been passed for the collateral purpose of his immediate removal, rather than in public interest. The Division Bench, in our opinion, was justified in setting aside the order passed by the Single Judge and directing reinstatement of the respondent.” The aforesaid judgment clearly lays down that efficiency and honesty are to be assessed on the basis of material on record of which confidential reports are an important input, and that involvement of a person in a criminal case does not mean that he is guilty; he is still to be tried in a court of law and the truth has to be found out ultimately by the court where the prosecution is conducted, but before that stage is reached, it would be highly improper to deprive a person of his livelihood merely on the basis of his involvement. In view of the facts narrated hereinabove, the above judgment squarely covers and governs the instant case. Herein, the APRs of the respondent, which throughout described him as an honest and efficient officer, have not been considered and taken into consideration. Therefore, the judgment, relied upon by the learned AAG, in fact, removes the earth underneath his stand; it rather advances the case of the respondent. 33. Now, coming to the judgments cited and relied upon by Mr. M. A. Qayoom, learned counsel for the respondent, we have already noted and discussed the Supreme Court judgment in State of J&K v Farid Ahmad Tak (supra).
33. Now, coming to the judgments cited and relied upon by Mr. M. A. Qayoom, learned counsel for the respondent, we have already noted and discussed the Supreme Court judgment in State of J&K v Farid Ahmad Tak (supra). Next, in High Court of Judicature at Patna v. Ajay Kumar Srivastava (supra), the respondent therein, a member of higher judicial service, had been compulsorily retired on allegations of misconduct. The Supreme Court held that the officer who is to be retired on grounds of misconduct is entitled to claim that due process of law be followed. The judgment, obviously, is not relevant in face of the facts of the present case. The next judgment cited is the Division Bench judgment of this Court in State of J&K v Shamim Ahmad Laharwal, 2017 (II) SLJ 597, wherein it has been held that the Committee of officers should not have ignored the entire service record of the petitioner, more particularly APRs. In State of J&K v Abdul Majid Wani, 2017 (II) SLJ 706, the Division Bench of this Court has held that any decision taken in derogation of Article 226(2) of the CSR would be vitiated on account of non-application of mind and that mere registration of FIR is not a proof of guilt which can only be established in a full-fledged trial to be held in a criminal court. In another Division Bench decision of this Court cited and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent viz. State of J&K v Kamal Mahendru, 2018 (2) JKLT 211, it has been held that merely because a person is shown to have been involved in a criminal case would not per se mean that he was guilty of having committed that offence. Guilt would necessarily have to be established in trial, and before that stage is reached, it was held improper to deprive a person of his livelihood merely on the basis of his involvement. Hearsay reputation or casual statements questioning integrity of a person ought not to be considered, for the same may be baseless or attributed for mala fide purposes. 34. It is seen that the crux of the decisions has been culled out by the Supreme Court in its decision in Balkuntha Nath Das v Chief District Medical Officer (supra) in the following manner:- “34.
34. It is seen that the crux of the decisions has been culled out by the Supreme Court in its decision in Balkuntha Nath Das v Chief District Medical Officer (supra) in the following manner:- “34. The following principles emerge from the above discussion:- (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary - in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be perverse order. (iv) The government or the Review Committee, as the case may be, shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter - of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority.” Two of the aforesaid fundamental principles are that the order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government and that the government shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter. It hardly needs to be stated that subjective satisfaction is not to be arrived on the basis of imagination, but should be reached at on the basis of material which satisfies a rational mind. The material, as mentioned in the OM No.GAD(Vig)19-Admn/2010 dated 25.10.2010, has to be the entire service record, especially the APRs.
It hardly needs to be stated that subjective satisfaction is not to be arrived on the basis of imagination, but should be reached at on the basis of material which satisfies a rational mind. The material, as mentioned in the OM No.GAD(Vig)19-Admn/2010 dated 25.10.2010, has to be the entire service record, especially the APRs. The OM also enjoins to take into account other factors mentioned therein like details of any promotions given in favour of the employee in the last three to five years; the number and nature of complaints, if any, received; enquiries, if any, conducted by the State Vigilance Organization or by the Department concerned and the outcome thereof; cases, if any registered/investigated by the State Vigilance Organization, nature of the allegation and the outcome of the investigation; adverse reports, if any, received by the CID about the reputation of the official and the gist of such reports supported by evidence; gist of irregularities committed by the employee, like in the matter of appointments; brief mention about failure, if any, in achieving the targets set out for him by the Government/Department with supportive details; warning and censures issued to the employee. If there are no complaints received, no enquiries conducted, no adverse reports received from the CID about the reputation of the official, no irregularities committed by the employee in the matter of appointments, no failures reported in achieving fixed targets, no warnings and censures earned, then these would constitute factors relevant to be taken into account alongwith the APRs of the employee while forming the opinion in terms of Article 226(2) of the CSRs. It is to be borne in mind that OM No.GAD(Vig)19-Adm/2010 dated 25.10.2010 was not only meant to screen the undesirable employees, but its express object was also to encourage the honest employees; meaning thereby that the above factors would and could be used positively or negatively in favour or against an employee. In that sense, these factors in favour of the respondent had to be taken into account by the Screening Committee, but that has not been. This Court has already recorded a finding that the Screening Committee has not taken into account the APRs of the respondents. It is not only the finding of the Court, but is admitted by the appellants without mincing any words.
This Court has already recorded a finding that the Screening Committee has not taken into account the APRs of the respondents. It is not only the finding of the Court, but is admitted by the appellants without mincing any words. Once the Screening Committee has omitted to take into account the tangible evidence in the shape of APRs, it cannot be expected of them to have taken into account the aforesaid intangible but crucial factors. The Court has no option, therefore, available to it but to come to the conclusion that the report/opinion of the Screening Committee suffers from vice of non-application of mind and is, accordingly, rendered unreasonable and arbitrary. Consequentially, the Government order No.857-GAD of 2015 dated 30.06.2015 is equally rendered arbitrary. 35. For all that has been narrated and discussed above, we hold that respondent could not be prematurely retired solely by reason of the fact of registration of the two FIRs in which he is one of the accused. Resultantly, we do not find any irregularity or illegality committed by the learned Single Judge in passing the impugned judgment. We are of the opinion that there is no merit in the present LPA. It, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 36. This LPA is, accordingly, dismissed and the judgment impugned is upheld, of course, for the additional reasons discussed by us in this judgment.” 5. Perusal of the aforesaid Judgment brings it to the fore that the same applies to the instant case in all the fours inasmuch as the controversy involved therein also related to passing of Judgment by the learned Single Judge in a premature retirement case setting aside the impugned Order and same being upheld by this Court in appeal. 6.
Perusal of the aforesaid Judgment brings it to the fore that the same applies to the instant case in all the fours inasmuch as the controversy involved therein also related to passing of Judgment by the learned Single Judge in a premature retirement case setting aside the impugned Order and same being upheld by this Court in appeal. 6. Apart from the above, the Writ Petitioner/ Respondent herein, in terms of Judgment dated 31st of May, 2021 passed by the Court of learned Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (Additional District & Sessions Judge), Pulwama, stands acquitted of all the charges levelled against him in the criminal case bearing FIR No. 19/2009 registered in Police Station, Vigilance Organization, Kashmir for the commission of offences punishable under Section 5(1) (d) read with Section 5 (2) of the Jammu and Kashmir Prevention of Corruption Act, Samvat 2006 and Sections 409, 468, 471, 120-B of the RPC which was made the basis for the issuance of the Order dated 21st of November, 2016 prematurely retiring the Writ Petitioner/ Respondent herein. A copy of the said Judgment passed by the learned trial Court has been produced by the learned Senior Counsel for the Writ Petitioner/Respondent herein which is taken on record. 7. Given the above position, we cannot take a view other than the one taken in the aforesaid Judgment passed by us on the subject, as such, the instant appeal shall stand dismissed, accordingly, on the same lines. Interim direction(s), if any subsisting as on date, shall stand vacated. 8. At this stage, the learned Senior Counsel for the Writ Petitioner/ Respondent herein submitted that the Writ Petitioner/Respondent has since retired from service upon attaining the age of superannuation. Needless to mention that the Writ Petitioner/ Respondent shall be entitled to all post-retiral benefits in tune with the Judgment passed by the learned Single Judge.