JUDGMENT : 1. This is First appeal filed under Section 96 CPC against the judgment and decree dated 09.09.2008 passed by learned Third Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No. 09-A/2008 by which the learned trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff for eviction as the plaintiff is unable to plead and prove that the shop is required bonafidely for the need of grandson of the appellant. 2. Brief facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are that, the plaintiff, who at the time of aged about 85 years has filed Civil suit mainly contending that the plaintiff has constructed ground floor, first floor and second floor in the name and style as “Kiran Lodge Bhavan” situated at Gandhi Chowk, Gandhi Nagar Ward No. 30, Juna, Tahsil and District Bilaspur. He has constructed six commercial shops in the ground floor of premises. He has also constructed store rooms behind the shops and has also provided public utility facilities on the west side of shop no. 4 and 5. The defendant's father Kanhaiya Lal Valecha has taken the said shop on rent which is annexed in Schedule A of the plaint described as Shop no 5, demarcated through A,B,C, D, E, F and G. Kanhaiyalal Valecha has expired and thereafter his son Murlidhar Valecha become the tenant. On 01.01.2004, the rent of the shop was fixed at Rs. 1296/- tenancy is as per English calendar month. It is contended by the plaintiff that the shop was bonafide required for the grandson of the plaintiff, as he has grown up and he intends to start his own business. 3. It is contended that even after expiry period of tenancy on 31.08.2006 the defendant has not vacated the shop and has not given the possession of the suit property. It is further contended that the defendant is in illegal possession of the suit property causing loss and has also not paid rent from 1.10.2005, therefore, plaintiff has filed the suit for eviction of the defendant from the suit property, arrears of rent with 20% of damages which comes to Rs. 84,144/-. It has also been claimed in the plaint that the defendant has caused damages to the suit property as he has broken septic tank, go down situated behind the shop no. 84,144/-. It has also been claimed in the plaint that the defendant has caused damages to the suit property as he has broken septic tank, go down situated behind the shop no. 4 and 5, illegal construction shed and also done illegal boring which has caused loss to the building. As such, damages were also sought by way of relief sought in the plaint. 4. The defendants have filed the written statement denying the allegation made in the plaint contending that other shop is available to the plaintiff; as such it is not bonafide requirement of the plaintiff. It has been specifically contended that grandson cannot be termed as member of the family under the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act. It has also been contended that the plaintiff has various properties situated at Gandhi Chowk in the name of Kiran Lodge Bhavan, Vinay Auto parts, Sindh Auto Store, Rajesh Tyre near Link Road, Bilaspur and five shops near old High Court. As such, various shops at prominent place to start business are available; therefore, it cannot be termed as bonafide requirement of the plaintiff. It is further contended that the suit has been filed to harass the defendants and would pray for dismissal of the suit. 5. Learned trial Court on pleadings of the parties has framed as many as nine issues. 6. The plaintiff to substantiate his stand has examined himself as (PW-1), Munna Soni (PW-2), Vimal Rajput (Ex.P-3), Alok Swarnakar (PW-4), Manoj Kumar (PW-5) and exhibited documents receipts Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-6, Inspection Report (Ex.P-7), Legal notice (Ex.P-8), acknowledgment (Ex.P-9), Acknowledgment receipt (Ex.P-10), Photographs Ex.P-11 to Ex.P 14. Defendants examined Murlidhar Valecha as (DW-1), C. S. L. Nadam (DW-2) and Sunil Kumar Sinha (DW-3) and exhibited documents settlement Ex.D-1, application under section 151 CPC (Ex.D-2), Receipt (Ex.D-3), Receipt (Ex.D-4), Receipt (Ex.D-5), Inspection Report (Ex.D-6). 7. The trial Court extensively examined the witnesses, material on record, has held that as per section 12(1)(f) of the Act, grandson cannot be member of the family under the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Similarly, learned trial Court has also recorded the finding that grandson’s father has received share in the property as per family partition and has given on rent the shop to Dr. Arya and for its ejectment a suit is pending, therefore, it cannot be held that plaintiff has bonafide requirement of the suit premises. Similarly, learned trial Court has also recorded the finding that grandson’s father has received share in the property as per family partition and has given on rent the shop to Dr. Arya and for its ejectment a suit is pending, therefore, it cannot be held that plaintiff has bonafide requirement of the suit premises. As such, defendants cannot be evicted from the suit premises as per section 12(1)(f), 12(1)(e) of Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act 1961 and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff vide its judgment and decree dated 09.09.2008. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree the plaintiff has preferred the instant first appeal before this Court. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that learned trial Court has committed illegality in holding that there is no bonafide requirement of the suit property. He would further submit that with regard to bonafide the defendant cannot dictate, it is for the plaintiff to determine what should be the bonafide requirement, the defendant on this issue of the matter cannot look into the matter he would submit that finding recorded by the learned Court below that grandson is not the member of the family, is incorrect application of law. He would to refer the judgment in the matter of Shri Badrilal vs. Sita Bai and others reported in AIR 2018 MP 181. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the defendant would submit that the finding recorded by the trial Court is perfect, legal, justified and grandson is not member of the family, therefore, accommodation is not required bonafidely by the plaintiff for his grandson, as such findings recorded by the trial Court is perfect, legal does not call for any interference by this Court. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and record of the Court below with utmost satisfaction. 11. Before adverting to the legal submissions made by the appellants and respondents it would be expedient for this Court to extract relevant provisions which are applicable for deciding the present controversy raised in the appeal. 12. The Act defines 'member of the family’ as under :- Section 2(e) member of the family- In case of any person means the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal’s wife or widow, or brother’s son, or unmarried daughter living jointly with or any other relation depend on him. 13. 12. The Act defines 'member of the family’ as under :- Section 2(e) member of the family- In case of any person means the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal’s wife or widow, or brother’s son, or unmarried daughter living jointly with or any other relation depend on him. 13. Section 12 (1) (e) and (f) of the Act provides as under :- “12. Restriction on eviction of tenants – (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely :- (e) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bonafide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned; (f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bonafide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned; 14. Learned Sr. Advocate for the appellant would submit that the grandson will be member of the family and the judgment followed by learned trial Court in its judgment in the matter of Nandkishore vs. Surjadevi 1974 MPLJ 293 wherein the need of landlords, spouse for eviction was not recognized under bonafide requirement of landlord as provided under section 12(1)(f) of the MP Accommodation Control Act has held to be no longer a good law. He would further submit that after passing of judgment of Gurucharan Singh vs. Prema Bai Shrivastava 2001 (1) CGLJ 476 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its subsequent judgment has examined the person dependent on the landlord can be considered bonafide requirement of the landlord. 15. Learned Sr. He would further submit that after passing of judgment of Gurucharan Singh vs. Prema Bai Shrivastava 2001 (1) CGLJ 476 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its subsequent judgment has examined the person dependent on the landlord can be considered bonafide requirement of the landlord. 15. Learned Sr. Advocate would submit that the definition of the member of the family cannot be taken in narrow sense since the plaintiff himself has established that the Abhishek was his grandson and in paragraph 12 of his examination-in-chief, he in clear terms has deposed that his grandson Abhishek Pamnani became major and for his independent business of cement, hardware sanitary shop and godown is bonafide required. He has also stated that no other proper shops and go down are available at Bilaspur for that business. This witness was extensively cross examined and this part of the evidence remained unshaken and in fact it has been reiterated in the cross-examination that shop is bonafide requirement for grandson Abhishek. 16. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant and would submit that the grandson cannot be member of the family and the plaintiff has so many places to run his business, therefore, he can run his business from that places, the findings recorded by learned trial Court that no bonafide requirement of the suit premises has been proved, is legal, justified and does not warrant any interference by this Court. He would further submits that judgment of this court in the case of Gurubachan Singh (supra) is very much applicable and would pray for dismissal of the appeal. 17. From the facts and evidence brought on record, it is quite vivid that learned trial Court has committed illegality in not considering the grandson to be member of the family as he is dependent on the grandfather. The learned trial Court has examined the dependent of grandfather to be member of the family in a narrow campus which is not the object of inserting the words in section 2(e) member of the family under the Act of 1961. The learned trial Court has examined the dependent of grandfather to be member of the family in a narrow campus which is not the object of inserting the words in section 2(e) member of the family under the Act of 1961. From the definition clause it is quite vivid that any relation dependent on landlord will become member of the family to fall within the ambit of member of the family only two conditions have to be established by the landlord (i) that the person is in relation with the landlord (ii) that he is dependent. These twin conditions have been proved in the present case as Abhishek is grandson of landlord which was not disputed by the defendant and dependency has also been proved by the plaintiff, therefore, learned trial Court should have allowed the suit. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is against the judgment of Hon’ble Full Bench of Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case Shri Badrilal (supra) wherein in paragraph 28 to 30 it has been held as under:- 28. The submission of the counsel for the appellant referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Pallawi Resources Limited vs. Protos Engineering Company Private Limited reported in 2010(5) SCC 196 and in the matter of State vs. Parmeshwaram Subramani, reported in 2009 (9) SCC 729 golden rule of construction is the grammatical construction without addition or omission of any words and the legislative intent is to be gathered primarily from the language of the statute, is also of no help to him since while interpreting section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Act we have neither added nor omitted any words and have kept in mind the legislative intent. 29. 29. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of D.N. Sanghavi (supra) in support of his submission that question referred to this Full Bench is concluded by that judgment but such a submission cannot be accepted because in that judgment the Supreme Court was dealing with the issue of need of the accommodation for partnership business, where the landlord had not even brought on record that in terms of partnership he was entitled to manage the partnership business and the possibility of other partners, being his brothers, setting up their separate business in suit accommodation was not ruled out. The Supreme Court in that judgment had specifically observed that if the deed of partnership had excluded him expressly or impliedly from the management of firm's business and had made him a sleeping partner, it could not be held that the accommodation was needed directly and substantially for his occupation by way of business. The Supreme Court in that judgment did not held that the need of a family member covered under section 2(e) of the M. P. Act on whom the landlord is closely dependent or who is closely dependent on the landlord, will not be covered under section 12(1)(f) of the M. P. Act. The said aspect was not in issue before the Supreme Court and was not examined. Interpretation of the phrase "his business" given by us does not run counter to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of D. N. Sanghavi (supra). It is also worth noting that even after taking into account the provisions contained under section 39(2) of the M. P. Act, the interpretation of section 12(1)(f) of the M. P. Act given above remains unaffected. 30. Thus in view of above interpretation of section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Act, we hold that the earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court in the matter of Nandkishore (supra) laying down that right of eviction in respect of non-residential accommodation under section 12(1)(f) of the M. P. Act is restricted to the landlord for his own business and there is no scope for a liberal interpretation of the phrase "his business " so as to include the business of spouse, is no longer a good law. 18. 18. From the evidence and material on record, it is quite clear that learned trial Court has not appreciated the evidence, material on record and on perverse finding has held that plaintiff is not required suit premises bonafidely is perverse, contrary to the law which deserves to be set aside by this court. It is well settled position that on the bonafide requirement the tenant cannot dictate the plaintiff bonafide requirements of the tenancy land. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Prativa Devi (Smt) vs. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 has held as under :- “2. The proven facts are that the appellant who is a widow, since the demise of her husband late Shiv Nath Mukherjee, has been staying as a guest with Shri N. C. Chatterjee who was a family friend of her late husband, at B-4/20, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi. There is nothing to show that she has any kind of right whatever to stay in the house of Shri Chatterjee. On the other hand, she is there merely by sufferance. The reason given by the High Court that the appellant is an old lady aged about 70 years and has no one to look after her and therefore she should continue to live with Shri Chatterjee, was hardly a ground sufficient for interference. The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. The High Court is rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thinks that because of her age she needs to be looked after. Now, that is a lookout of the appellant and not of the High Court. We fail to appreciate the High Court giving such a gratuitous advice which was uncalled for. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property. We accordingly reverse the finding reached by the High Court and restore that of the Rent Controller that the appellant had established her bona fide requirement of the demised premises for her personal use and occupation, which finding was based on a proper appreciation of the evidence in the light of the surrounding circumstances. 3. We accordingly reverse the finding reached by the High Court and restore that of the Rent Controller that the appellant had established her bona fide requirement of the demised premises for her personal use and occupation, which finding was based on a proper appreciation of the evidence in the light of the surrounding circumstances. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant however relies on the following observations made by a learned Single Judge (T.P.S. Chawla, J.) supposed to be based on the decision of this Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant N. Patel [ (1974) 1 SCC 661 : (1974) 3 SCR 267 ] to the effect "I think, the true test is whether, on an overall and reasonable view, it can be said that the landlord has suitable accommodation available for his use. In deciding this question one should certainly have regard to the fact that the landlord has no legal right to the other accommodation, but that is only a factor and not the end of the matter." These observations proceed on a misunderstanding of the ratio of the decision of this Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai case [ (1974) 1 SCC 661 : (1974) 3 SCR 267 ]. The High Court was in error in laying down that the test is availability of alternative accommodation and not the legal right to such occupation in adjudging the bona fides of the claim of the landlord under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. The decision of this Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai case [ (1974) 1 SCC 661 : (1974) 3 SCR 267 ] does not lay down any such proposition. On the contrary, this Court reversed the judgment of the Bombay High Court which proceeded upon that basis. In that case, the first floor was in occupation of the mother of the appellant as a tenant and the question was as to the availability of the Truth Bungalow which was given on leave and licence to one Dr. Bharucha. The High Court came to the conclusion that the requirement of the appellant for the ground floor of the demised premises was not reasonable and bona fide since the appellant was in juridical possession of the Truth Bungalow. Bharucha. The High Court came to the conclusion that the requirement of the appellant for the ground floor of the demised premises was not reasonable and bona fide since the appellant was in juridical possession of the Truth Bungalow. This Court in allowing the appeal observed : (SCC p. 668, para 8) "Now, it is true that when premises are given on leave and licence, the licensor continues, from a juridical point of view, to be in possession of the premises and the licensee is merely given occupation and therefore, strictly speaking the High Court was right in observing that the Truth Bungalow, which was given on leave and licence to Dr. Bharucha, was in the possession of the appellant." The Court then pointed out : (SCC p. 668, para 8) "But for the purpose of determining whether the requirement of the appellant for the ground floor premises was reasonable and bona fide, what is necessary to be considered is not whether the appellant was juridically in possession of the Truth Bungalow, but whether the Truth Bungalow was available to the appellant for occupation so that he could not be said to need the ground floor premises. If the Truth Bungalow was in occupation of Dr. Bharucha on leave and licence, it was obviously not available to the appellant for occupation and it could not be taken into account for negativing the need of the appellant for the ground floor premises." We accordingly overrule the decision of the Delhi High Court in Sat Pal v. Nand Kishore [ILR 1983 Del 73] as not laying down good law. 4. In the premises, the judgment of the High Court disallowing the appellants claim cannot be supported. In considering the availability of alternative accommodation, the Court has to consider not merely whether such accommodation is available but also whether the landlord has a legal right to such accommodation. The appellant had established her bona fide personal requirement of the demised premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and her claim could not be disallowed merely on the ground that she was staying as a guest with a family friend by force of circumstances.” 19. The appellant had established her bona fide personal requirement of the demised premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and her claim could not be disallowed merely on the ground that she was staying as a guest with a family friend by force of circumstances.” 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 231-232 of 2021 (Balwant Singh @ Bant Singh and Anr vs. Sudarshan Kumar and Anr) decided on 27.01.2021 has held that adequacy or otherwise of the space available with the landlord for the business in mind is not for the tenant to dictate. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 11 and 12 of the judgment held as under:- “11. On the above aspect, it is not for the tenant to dictate how much space is adequate for the proposed business venture or to suggest that the available space with the landlord will be adequate. Insofar as the earlier eviction proceeding, the concerned vacant shops under possession of the landlords were duly disclosed, but the case of the landlord is that the premises/space under their possession is insufficient for the proposed furniture business. On the age aspect, it is seen that the respondents are also senior citizens but that has not affected their desire to continue their business in the tenanted premises. Therefore, age cannot be factored against the landlords in their proposed business. 12. The Rent Controller in denying right to contest to the tenants and ordering handover of vacant possession to the landlord had noted that the landlord had returned to India and required the premises for his bona fide need and accordingly, the summary proceedings under Section 13B for recovery of possession of the entire building was found to be justified. It was also adverted that the present proceedings under Section 13B is the first one filed by the landlord to secure eviction and the earlier proceedings was under Section 13 of the Act. Moreover, there is no bar for a Non-resident Indian to get a building of choice vacated, under Section 13B of the Act.” 20. It was also adverted that the present proceedings under Section 13B is the first one filed by the landlord to secure eviction and the earlier proceedings was under Section 13 of the Act. Moreover, there is no bar for a Non-resident Indian to get a building of choice vacated, under Section 13B of the Act.” 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Harish Kumar (since dead) vs. Pankaj Kumar Garg 2022 live law SC 239 decided on 07.01.2022 has held as under:- It is quite clear that afore stated provision seeking release of the premises on the ground of bonafide requirement does not strictly require the landlord to be “unemployed” to maintain an action. All that the provision contemplates is that the requirement so pleaded by the landlord must be bona fide. It is to be noted that the instant premises have been in the occupation of the tenant for more than 30 years and are situated in Jawalapur near Haridwar. The facts on record indicate that the appellant had suffered an accident and he genuinely wanted his son to be settled in 5 business. It may be that the son of the appellant was have some income but that by itself would not disentitle him for claiming release of the premises on the ground of bona fide need. The need pleaded by the appellant was found to be genuine and was accepted by the appellant authority which is the final fact finding authority. The issue with regard to comparative hardship was also answered in favour of the appellant. 21. From appreciating the evidence, material placed on record and law on the subject it is quite vivid that the tenant cannot dictate the term of landlord with regard to its bonafide requirement. Learned trial Court has not appreciated the evidence, material on record and given perverse finding that no bonafide requirement of suit premises is proved, therefore, the finding that no case for ejectment of defendant is made out under Section 12(1) (e) and (f) of the Act, is erroneous and deserves to be set aside by this Court. Accordingly it is held that the plaintiff has made out case for ejectment of defendant/tenant as per provisions of Section 12 (1)(e) and (f) of the Act. Accordingly it is held that the plaintiff has made out case for ejectment of defendant/tenant as per provisions of Section 12 (1)(e) and (f) of the Act. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court dated 09.09.2008 in Civil Suit No. 9-A/2008 in the case of Ramandas Pamnani vs. Murlidhar Valecha (dead) deserves to be and is accordingly set aside. 22. The appeal is allowed and it is held that appellant/plaintiff is entitled to get ejectment of decree against the defendants as per the provisions of Section 12(1) (e) and (f) of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Act, 1961. The defendants shall vacate the suit premises before 01.11.2022 and will also pay the arrears of rent which has been left unpaid, within two months from today and continue to pay the rent till they vacate the suit premises. 23. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. 24. A decree be drawn up accordingly. 25. No order as to the cost.