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2022 DIGILAW 2142 (MAD)

M. Dhanalakshmi v. The Tahsildar, Tenacy Records Officer, Tiruppur

2022-07-15

R.SUBRAMANIAN

body2022
JUDGMENT : (Prayer: Writ Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records from the file of the 1st respondent leading to impugned order dated 24.07.2012 passed in T.R.No.19 of 1998 and the consequential order dated 22.03.2016 passed in Na.Ka.No.4919/2014/A-3 and quash the same and consequently direct the 1st respondent to conduct an enquiry afresh after hearing the petitioner.) 1. The challenge in this writ petition is to the order of the Record Officer made in TR.No.19 of 1998 dated 24.07.2012 and the consequential order dated 22.03.2016 recording the name of the 4th respondent as tenant of the property. 2. The 4th respondent filed an application seeking to record his name as tenant in respect of certain property in TR.No.19 of 1998 before the 1st respondent. The petitioner who had purchased the said property during the pendency of the said application filed I.A.No.1 of 2005 seeking to implead herself in the said tenancy record proceeding. The said application in I.A.No.1 of 2005 was allowed by the record officer on 16.08.2005. As against the said order, the 4th respondent preferred an appeal before the Revenue Court which was numbered as A.P.No.1 of 2006. The said appeal was dismissed for default on 28.12.2010. Subsequently without notice to the party impleaded, the original petition came to be disposed of on 24.07.2012, exparte, recording the name of the 4th respondent as tenant. The appeal against the order impleading the petitioner which was dismissed for default was restored to file on 10.01.2011. Even during the pendency of the appeal as stated above, the original petition was disposed of without notice to the impleaded party. The appellate Authority viz., Revenue Court, Trichy noted the fact that the original petition has been disposed of and therefore nothing survives in the appeal against the order impleading the petitioner and on the said finding the appeal was closed as there were nothing to be decided in the appeal. This is the first point of injustice or irregular conduct by the officer in this case. 3. Once a person has been impleaded and the appeal against the order is pending before the Appellate Authority the Appellate Authority can stay the proceedings before the original authority. In the case on hand the appellate authority has stayed the operation of the order impleading the petitioner. 3. Once a person has been impleaded and the appeal against the order is pending before the Appellate Authority the Appellate Authority can stay the proceedings before the original authority. In the case on hand the appellate authority has stayed the operation of the order impleading the petitioner. The appellant allows the appeal to be dismissed for default, gets it restored, and persuades the original authority to pass an order in the absence of the person impleaded by projecting the stay order granted by the appellate authority. He thereafter gets the appeal against the order of impleading disposed of as if it has become infrucutous. Very clever but crooked legal brains have worked wonders in this case. 4. In the interregnum the petitioner has filed a suit in O.S.No.485 of 2008 seeking a decree for injunction against the 4th respondent and two others. The said suit came to be decreed on 20.08.2019. The trial Court framed a particular issue relating to the status of the 4th respondent and held that the 4th respondent is not a tenant. As against the said judgment the 4th respondent had preferred an appeal in A.S.No.28 of 2019. The said appeal has been dismissed for default on 30.03.2021. I am unable to fathom the design behind allowing the appeal to be dismissed for default. The same may be another trick of the 4th respondent to leave the appeal to be dismissed for default and getting some other orders from some authority as he had done in the original proceeding. 5. Therefore, as of today there is a judgment of the civil Court which holds that the 4th respondent is not a tenant. The competence of the civil Court to go into the question of tenancy is no longer resintegra. 6. In Periathambi Goundan Vs. The District Revenue Officer, Coimbatore and others reported in 93 LW 169, a Full Bench of this Court had dealt with the scope of Section 16A of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Act. The Full Bench has very clearly held that the Record Officer had jurisdiction to decide the name and address of the tenant cultivating the land and it will not debar the civil Court from going into the question of tenancy. The Full Bench has very clearly held that the Record Officer had jurisdiction to decide the name and address of the tenant cultivating the land and it will not debar the civil Court from going into the question of tenancy. While doing so, the Full Bench had observed as follows:- If, on the other hand, the decision of the controversy is that the land has not been let for cultivation by a tenant there is no question of there being any tenancy rights in respect of the said land and consequently, there is no question of the Record Officer ascertaining or determining any further particulars in this behalf. Therefore, if such controversy arises, that controversy cannot be said to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act, and any determination of that controversy by the authorities can be said to be only incidental to the assumption of jurisdiction by the authorities under the Act Subject to this qualification it can be held that once the Record Officer or any other authority functioning under the Act has come to the conclusion that the land has been let for cultivation by a tenant, the matters provided for in S. 3(2) have to be determined by the Record Officer, or other authority functioning under the Act, and to that extent the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under S.16-A of the Act. 37. With particular reference to the facts of this case, as the Record Officer bad jurisdiction to decide the name and address of the tenant cultivating the land, if there are competing claims by two persons that they are cultivating tenants he had necessarily to decide that question. In all matters which may arise incidental to the determination of the matters mentioned in Sec. 3 (2), the Record Officer or the appellate or revisional authority cannot be said to have exclusive jurisdiction and with reference to those matters, the Jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be said to have been barred or ousted under S. 16-Aof the Act. 7. In Ramalingam Vs. The District Revenue Officer, Thanjavur reported in 1992 (2) LW 114 , a Division Bench of this Court had held that the finding of the Civil Court regarding tenancy would be binding on the officer functioning under the Act 10 of 1969. 8. In Avudaithangammal Vs. 7. In Ramalingam Vs. The District Revenue Officer, Thanjavur reported in 1992 (2) LW 114 , a Division Bench of this Court had held that the finding of the Civil Court regarding tenancy would be binding on the officer functioning under the Act 10 of 1969. 8. In Avudaithangammal Vs. Subramania Thevar and Murugaiah Thevar and others reported in 1994 (1) LW 82 , Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rathnam, as he then was, had held that entries made in the register under the Record of Tenancy Rights Act will not confer rights on the cultivating tenants and any finding of the Civil Court will definitely be binding on the authorities functioning under the Act. 9. In view of the above judicial pronouncements, it is clear that merely because the 4th respondent's name is recorded as a tenant in the order by the Record Officer the same will not confer a indefeasible right on him. The civil Court has rendered a finding that he is not a cultivating tenant therefore the order of the Record Officer dated 24.07.2012 allowing TR.No.19 of 1998 exparte behind the back of the petitioner is set aside and the consequential order dated 22.03.2016 recording the 4th respondent as tenant pursuant to the orders obtained in the writ petition, by suppressing the facts is also set aside. This case is a classic example of misuse of appellate powers. The appellate authority was so gullible that it did not see the evil design behind the unusual prayer for stay i.e. Stay of operation of the order impleading a third party to the original proceeding. The original authority also was led in to the trap by the evil designs of the 4th respondent and disposed of the original proceeding without notice to the petitioner, who was held to be a necessary party to the proceeding by itself. Not stopping with the authorities the 4th respondent continued his legal gimmicks in this court also by filing a writ petition on this court suppressing the pendency of the suit and obtained a direction to record his name as a tenant even without impleading the petitioner to that writ petition. These kind of sharp practices, that too, before this court should be put down with a iron hand. It is with this object in mind I have this day initiated suomoto contempt proceedings against the 4th respondent. 10. These kind of sharp practices, that too, before this court should be put down with a iron hand. It is with this object in mind I have this day initiated suomoto contempt proceedings against the 4th respondent. 10. Accordingly, the writ petition will stand allowed. No costs. Consequently, the connected writ miscellaneous petitions are closed.