JUDGMENT : 1. This civil second appeal arises out of a civil Suit for eviction and possession bearing Civil Suit No.513/64 titled as Smt. Gopali @ Shanti Devi Vs. Sh. Chothmal & Anr. led way back on 09-12-1964, decreed vide judgment dated 30.07.1994 in favour of plaintiff-respondent No.1 and against the legal representatives of deceased defendant No.1. The legal representatives of defendant No.1, preferred First Appeal No.14/1994, wherein the judgment and decree dated 30.07.1994 has been affirmed vide judgment dated 03-10-1996 passed by the Court of Additional District Judge No.7, Jaipur City, Jaipur. This second appeal has been preferred by two legal representatives of deceased defendant No.1- Chothmal and his other legal representatives have been impleaded as respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4 as proforma respondents. The civil suit has been decreed in favour of respondent No.1-plaintiff and against legal representatives of deceased defendant No.1 (appellants and respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4) in following manner:- ^^nkok okfnuh fo:) izfroknhx.k 1@1 yxk;r 1@5 ls oknxzLr lEifr ,Qth,p ls dCtk izkfIr djus ckcr 50-20: olwy djus lfgr e; [kpkZ fMdzh fd;k tkrk gSA nk;jh nkok fnukad 09-12-1964 ls rk izkfIr dCtk oknxzLr edku okfnuh dks mijksDr izfr oknhx.k ls 5@& : ekfld dh nj ls gtkZ bLrseky fnyk;k tkrk gSA okdbZ dCtk laHkykus gsrq izfroknhx.k dks nks ekg dk le; fn;k tkrk gSA [kpkZ fMØh fu;ekuqlkj cuk;k tkosA^^ 2. Heard counsel for both parties and perused the record as a whole. 3. The co-ordinate bench of this Court vide order dated 14.05.1997, framed substantial questions of law for consideration in the instant second appeal. It appears that while formulating the substantial questions of law, some inadvertent error occurred in mentioning the reference of status of parties in the present appeal with context to their status before the trial court, therefore, the substantial questions of law are being narrated with the correction as required:- “(I) Whether the findings recorded by the trial court on the question of title to suit property in its judgment and decree dated 30th July, 1994 which is based on the decision of the Civil Court, Jaipur decided on 21st February, 1905 in the suit title Gagnabux Vs. Exhibit A-8 is open to challenged in the present appeal by the defendant-appellant on the plea of adverse possession? Exhibit A-8 is open to challenged in the present appeal by the defendant-appellant on the plea of adverse possession? (II) Whether it is open to the Appellant to challenge the impugned order dated 3rd October, 1996 of the First Appellate Court, particularly when the question with regard to the title to suit property having been derived by the plaintiffs-respondents (inadvertently referred as defendants-respondents) on the basis of duly executed gift deed in favour of the said plaintiff (inadvertently referred as defendant) vide Exhibit A-2 has though dealt with by the trial court in its order dated 30th July,1994, has not been dealt with at all by the First appellate Court in its impugned order under challenge? (III) Whether the findings recorded by the trial court on the question of gift deed which is the basis on which the plaintiff-respondent (inadvertently referred as defendant-respondent) is claiming title over the suit property can be said to be perverse and without any evidence in its support, particularly when the First Appellate court has not dealt with the said question at all in its impugned order under challenge? (IV) Whether the defendant-appellant (inadvertently referred as plaintiff-appellant) can be said it to have derived his title over the suit property on the plea of adverse possession as against plaintiff-respondent o(inadvertently referred as defendant-respondent) who has established his right, title and interest over the said property by virtue Exhibit A-2 which is gift deed? (V) Whether the findings recorded by the court below on the question of adverse possession of the appellant can be said to be perverse?” 3. Before dealing with the substantial questions of law, the checkered history of the present case as per material available on record may be recapitulated as under:- Back History of Case (I) Initially, respondent No.1 plaintiff instituted civil suit No.513/1964 on 09.12.1964 for eviction on the ground of default and denial of title, in alternative, pleadings and prayer for possession and mesne profits, based on title, were also made. The contesting party, who is defendant No.1 denied his possession in suit property in the capacity of tenant but claimed his possession as owner. The suit initially dismissed on merits vide judgment dated 16.09.1969. On filing first appeal, the suit for possession based on title was decreed against defendant No.1 vide judgment and decree dated 03.11.1980. The contesting party, who is defendant No.1 denied his possession in suit property in the capacity of tenant but claimed his possession as owner. The suit initially dismissed on merits vide judgment dated 16.09.1969. On filing first appeal, the suit for possession based on title was decreed against defendant No.1 vide judgment and decree dated 03.11.1980. The legal representatives of defendant No.1, preferred second appeal No.61/1981 and at the stage of second appeal, an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment in the written statement was filed on 26.07.1990. By way of amendment, the legal representatives of defendant No.1 sought to add the plea of acquiring title of suit property by way of adverse possession. The High Court, while deciding the second appeal vide its judgment dated 13.12.1990, observed that since the factum of oral tenancy of defendant No.1 in the suit property is not proved, the real question of controversy between parties, is regarding adverse possession. The High Court granted the application for amendment and allowed to add the plea of adverse possession, claimed by defendant. Consequentially, the decree for possession dated 03.11.1980 was set aside and after allowing the amendment in written statement, the Civil Suit No.513/1964 was remanded to the trial court (Munsif West), Jaipur City, Jaipur with direction that the trial court will frame additional issues as might arise on account of amended written statement and then would allow the parties to adduced additional evidence on the additional issues, and thereafter, the trial court would decide the original Civil Suit No.513/64 afresh, in accordance with law. (II) After the remand, the trial court framed additional issues No.7A and 7B relating to plea of defendant No.1 to acquire title of suit property by way of adverse possession, as per the amendments made in the written statement and allowed parties to adduce their respective evidence. Thereafter, the trial court, while deciding the suit afresh, decided the issue No.4, relating to ownership of suit property in plaintiff’s favour. The additional issues No.7A and 7B, regarding claiming of adverse possession by the legal representatives of defendant No.1, have been decided against them and finally the decree for possession along with mesne profits has been passed in favour of respondent-plaintiff vide judgment dated 30.07.1994. (III) The legal representatives of defendant No.1, filed first appeal. The additional issues No.7A and 7B, regarding claiming of adverse possession by the legal representatives of defendant No.1, have been decided against them and finally the decree for possession along with mesne profits has been passed in favour of respondent-plaintiff vide judgment dated 30.07.1994. (III) The legal representatives of defendant No.1, filed first appeal. The first appeal has been dismissed on merits vide judgment dated 03.10.1996, affirming the decree for possession and mesne profits. The first appellate court too declined to accept the plea of adverse possession claimed by the legal representatives of defendant No.1. Hence this second appeal has been preferred, wherein the aforementioned substantial questions of law have been framed for consideration. Facts of Case (A) The present civil suit was led by respondent No.1-plaintiff namely, Smt. Gopali Devi against the defendant No.1 Chouthmal (now deceased and represented through appellants and respondents No.2, 3 and 4) and defendant No.2 Sh. Prabhu Narain, who happens to be father of plaintiff. Plaintiff came out with a case that her father, Prabhu Narain, defendant No.2 was owner of the house property comprising haveli of two chowks situated at Rasta Raja Shyodas Ji, Purani Basti, Jaipur marked as A.B.C.D. in yellow and pink colour in the site plan appended with plaint. It was alleged that part of the house property, comprising back chowk, Taj, gokha, Khamghar and tin shed kitchen with khamchabutari marked as E.F.G.H. and shown with yellow colour, were gifted by her father Prabhu Narain to the plaintiff by way of gift deed dated 19.01.1964 registered on 04.02.1964. It was alleged that at that point of time, defendant No.1 Chothmal was in possession of house property marked as F.G.H. as tenant of defendant No.2, therefore, symbolic possession of tenanted portion and actual possession of remaining portion was handed over to the plaintiff. NOTE- In the present suit, the suit property comprises only part of haveli marked as F.G.H. including Khamghar, tin shed kitchen and Khamchabutari along with back chowk, taj and gokha, which was in possession of the defendant No.1 Chothmal. Other parts of the haveli are not included in suit property. (B) Plaintiff averred in the plaint that Chothmal, defendant No.1 was tenant of her father Prabhu Narain, defendant No.2 in the house portion marked as F.G.H. on a monthly rent of Rs.15/- per month w.e.f 02.03.1958 and he paid rent only up to 01.12.1963. Other parts of the haveli are not included in suit property. (B) Plaintiff averred in the plaint that Chothmal, defendant No.1 was tenant of her father Prabhu Narain, defendant No.2 in the house portion marked as F.G.H. on a monthly rent of Rs.15/- per month w.e.f 02.03.1958 and he paid rent only up to 01.12.1963. His tenancy was an oral tenancy and the defendant No.1 was intimated orally about the gift deed made by defendant No.2 in favour of plaintiff and as such by operation of law, defendant No.1 became tenant of plaintiff. (C) Plaintiff sought eviction of defendant No.1, alleging him as tenant in the suit property, on the ground of default in payment of rent and denial of title. (D) It is important to note that in alternative to the prayer for eviction on the ground of default and denial of title, the plaintiff prayed for possession of the suit property on the basis of title, in case the tenancy of defendant No.1 is held not proved. (E) In relation to the alternative case for possession based on title of the suit property, it was stated in the plaint that ancestors of defendant No.2 Prabhu narain, were the owners of the whole property, comprising two chowks and marked as A.B.C.D., which includes the suit property marked as F.G.H. of Khamghar, tin shed kitchen with khamchabutari along with back chowk, taj and gokha. There had been a prior litigation between Gangabakhs, father of defendant No.2 and one Chander son of Dalu. This previous litigation claiming absolute right over the property, was decided in favour of Gangabaksh and against Chander vide judgment and decree dated 01.07.1908 and through this judgment and decree dated 01.07.1908, a declaratory decree in favour of Gangabaksh, was passed conferring ownership and title of the property into Gangabaksh. It was pleaded that thereafter, there was a compromise between Gangabaksh and Chander, and latter executed a rent note in favour of Gangabaksh on Miti Ashad Budi 5 Samvat-1967. After death of Chander, his widow Mst. Gaura remained in possession of suit property as tenant and she executed a rent note on 02.03.1943 in favour of defendant No.2. As per plaint, Mst. Gaura vacated the suit property in the year 1954 and thereafter, defendant No.2 Prabhu Narain let out the suit property to defendant No.1, Chothmal on monthly rent of Rs.5/- w.e.f 02.03.1958. Gaura remained in possession of suit property as tenant and she executed a rent note on 02.03.1943 in favour of defendant No.2. As per plaint, Mst. Gaura vacated the suit property in the year 1954 and thereafter, defendant No.2 Prabhu Narain let out the suit property to defendant No.1, Chothmal on monthly rent of Rs.5/- w.e.f 02.03.1958. The defendant No.1 Chothmal did not pay rent after 01.12.1963 and hence committed default. Further, the defendant No.1 denied his status as tenant in the suit property but claimed ownership qua the defendant No.2 as well as the plaintiff, hence a prayer for eviction on the ground of default and denial of title has been made. Alternative, in case oral tenancy of defendant No.1 is not proved, plaintiff pleaded and prayed for decree of possession against defendant No.1 on the basis of his title. (F) The defendant No.1 Chothmal submitted his written statement on 16.04.1965. Defendant No.1 Chothmal admitted his possession over the suit property but categorically denied that he was/is a tenant in the suit property marked as F.G.H. On the contrary, defendant No.1 asserted his own ownership since time of his ancestors. It is worthy to notice that in his written statement submitted on 16.04.1965, defendant No.1 has nowhere disclosed and detailed out as to how and on what basis he claims the ownership of the suit property. It is further important to notice that the defendant No.1 moved an application dated 26.07.1990 under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, to amend the written statement at the stage of second appeal. In the amendment application, the defendant No.1 sought to amend and add the facts that his father namely, Laddu was adopted by Chander and Mst. Gaura and according to that pedigree table, the defendant No.1 is grandson of Chander and Mst. Gaura. The defendant No.1 also prayed to add the plea of adverse possession qua the plaintiff. The High Court, while deciding the second appeal vide judgment dated 13.12.1990, observed that in backdrop of facts where it is not established that suit property was let out to defendant No.1 on 02.03.1958 but plaintiff's predecessors were declared owner by virtue of the previous judgment dated 01.07.1908, the claim of the defendant No.1 to acquire the title by way of adverse possession assumes importance. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the amendment application and permitted defendant No.1 to amend his written statement. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the amendment application and permitted defendant No.1 to amend his written statement. Consequentially, the suit was remanded back to the trial court for deciding afresh after framing additional issues and allowing parties to adduce evidence on the amended pleadings relating to the claim of defendant No.1 to acquire title by way of adverse possession. (G) The defendant No.2 namely, Prabhu Narain submitted his written statement in support of plaintiff’s case. (H) Learned trial court, as per rival pleadings of plaintiff and defendant No.1 settled issues. Issue No.1 pertains to execution of gift deed dated 29.01.1964 by defendant No.2 in favour of plaintiff and regarding relationship of landlord and tenant of plaintiff and defendant No.1. Issue No.2 is regarding default. Issue No.3 is regarding claiming eviction decree on the ground of denial of title. Issue No.4 is regarding ownership of plaintiff of the suit property and consequentially whether plaintiff is entitled for the decree of possession against defendant No.1. Issue No.5 is for claim of mesne profits. Issue No.6 relates to valuation of the suit property and court fee. Issue No.7A, additionally framed after allowing the amendment in written statement, is regarding the plea of defendant to claim that they have acquired the title over the suit property by way of adverse possession having continuous possession for 12 years prior to institution of the suit. Issue No.7B pertains to the prove of pedigree of defendant No.1 being cognates and agnates of late Chander and Mst. Gaura, as claimed by way of amendment in the written statement. Issue No.7 is of relief. (I) Learned trial court, decided issue No.1, 2 and 3 against plaintiff holding that it is not proved that the suit property was let out by defendant No.2 orally on 02.03.1958 to defendant No.1, as pleaded in the plaint. The trial court while deciding issue No.1 has held that the execution of the gift deed dated 29.01.1964 by defendant No.2 in favour of plaintiff is proved. It may be noted that the gift deed has not been questioned by the defendant nor has been challenged. Issue No.4 has been held in favour of plaintiff and the plaintiff has been held to be owner of the suit property, fundamentally on the basis of declaratory decree dated 01.07.1908, passed in favour of predecessors of plaintiff Sh. Gangabaksh. It may be noted that the gift deed has not been questioned by the defendant nor has been challenged. Issue No.4 has been held in favour of plaintiff and the plaintiff has been held to be owner of the suit property, fundamentally on the basis of declaratory decree dated 01.07.1908, passed in favour of predecessors of plaintiff Sh. Gangabaksh. The claim of ownership by defendant No.1 in rebuttal of issue No.4, has been disbelieved/declined. While deciding Issue No.7Aand 7B, the trial court has observed that defendant No.1 could not proved the pedigrees to show his status as grand-son of Chander and Mst. Gaura. The theory of adoption of Sh. Laddu father of defendant No.1, to Chander and Mst. Gaura was held to be afterthought, which was added by way of amendment in the written statement after 25 years and there was not evidence to prove adoption, hence, not proved. The possession of defendant No.1 is in continuity to the possession of Chander and Mst. Gaura. The trial court found that defendant No.1 came in possession of suit property after death of Mst. Gaura in the year 1956, hence his claim to have independent possession for continuous 12 years prior to institution of the suit in the year 1964, is not proved and accordingly, the plea of defendant to claim acquiring of the title by virtue of adverse possession, was declined. The issues No.7A & 7B decided against the defendant No.1. Issues No.5 & 6 were decided in plaintiff’s favour. Finally, the learned trial court decreed the respondent No.1-plaintiff’s suit for possession along with mesne profits vide judgment and decree dated 30.07.1994. (J) The legal representatives of deceased defendant No.1 challenged the judgment and decree for possession and mesne profits dated 30.07.1994, by way of filing first appeal. The first appellate court has re-heard and re-considered the whole matter and observed that as far as issues relating to relationship of landlord and tenant, are concerned they have been adjudicated against the plaintiff in previous judgments dated 16.09.1969 & 03.11.1980 and the High Court, while remanding the suit after allowing the amendment in the written statement vide judgment dated 13.12.1980, has not disturbed the findings of issues No.1, 2 and 3. However, after remand, the trial court has again decided the issue No.1 to 3 on merits against plaintiff and passed decree for possession on the basis of title. However, after remand, the trial court has again decided the issue No.1 to 3 on merits against plaintiff and passed decree for possession on the basis of title. This decree is under challenge in the first appeal, therefore, the issues fall for consideration are confined to the findings passed by the trial court in relation to the issues No.4, 7A and 7B. The first appellate court too declined to accept the plea of adverse title of the defendant-appellant and treating the plaintiff as owner of the suit property on the basis of previous judgment dated 01.07.1908, affirmed the decree for possession and mesne profits and dismissed the first appeal on merits vide judgment dated 03.10.1996. (K) It may be relevant to note here that the suit property marked as F.G.H., is part of the house property (haveli) marked as A.B.C.D. in the site map appended with the plaint. The predecessor of plaintiff, Gangabaksh was declared as owner of the whole house property and the suit property F.G.H. is only a part. It has come on record that in the portion of house property comprising front chowk, one person namely, Chuthan Lal was tenant, against whom suit was filed and same was decreed (Ex.A3) has vacated and handed over the possession to the father of plaintiff. The suit property in the present suit is the part of the house property (haveli) including chowk of back portion. 4. With the backdrop of aforementioned facts, it stands clear that the impugned decree for possession and mesne profits has been passed in favour of respondent No.1-plaintiff, based on the ownership of predecessors of plaintiff namely Gangabaksh and the plea of legal representatives of defendant No.1 to acquire the title of suit property by way of adverse possession has not been accepted. Therefore, in the present case the substantial questions of law are required to be examined in the backdrop of such factual matrix. Objection about passing decree for possession in eviction suit 5. Counsel for appellants apart from making his submissions on substantial questions of law framed in the present appeal, has raised an additional argument that respondent No.1-plaintiff filed suit for eviction and arrears of rent and therein an alternative prayer for possession and mesne profit based on title of plaintiff was made. Counsel for appellants apart from making his submissions on substantial questions of law framed in the present appeal, has raised an additional argument that respondent No.1-plaintiff filed suit for eviction and arrears of rent and therein an alternative prayer for possession and mesne profit based on title of plaintiff was made. He submits that in the civil suit for eviction and arrears of rent, the decree for possession based on title could not be passed. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on judgments passed in case of Rajendra Tiwary Vs. Basudeo Prasad [ (2002) 1 SCC 90 ] and Tribhuvanshaker Vs. Amrutlal [ (2014) 2 SCC 788 ]. 6. In order to deal with such an additional argument raised first time during final arguments at the stage of second appeal, at the outset it may be observed that such arguments does not arise out of pleadings of both parties nor any such objection was raised either before the trial Court or before the first Appellate Court. Even at the time of admission of this second appeal for hearing, no such substantial question of law has been framed. This is an admitted fact that in pleadings of plaint that plaintiff has pleaded and prayed for passing the decree for possession and mesne profit based on title of plaintiff, in case, defendant No.1 is not proved to be his tenant in the suit property. There is an averment in pleadings of plaint to show how the title of suit property vests in plaintiff. The plaintiff had disclosed in the plaint that his predecessor namely Gangabaksh was owner of the property and reference of the judgment and decree dated 01.07.1908 passed in favour of Gangabaksh was given in the plaint. Gangabaksh happened to be grandfather of plaintiff. It was pleaded that plaintiff’s father has gifted the portion of property to plaintiff through gift deed dated 29.01.1964 registered on 04.02.1964. In the written statement, defendant No.1 claimed his own ownership over the suit property and denied his status as tenant of plaintiff. Gangabaksh happened to be grandfather of plaintiff. It was pleaded that plaintiff’s father has gifted the portion of property to plaintiff through gift deed dated 29.01.1964 registered on 04.02.1964. In the written statement, defendant No.1 claimed his own ownership over the suit property and denied his status as tenant of plaintiff. In the first written statement filed by defendant No.1 on 16.04.1965, defendant No.1 asserted his own ownership over the suit property since time of his ancestors but no details were given and later on by way of an application for amendment dated 26.07.1990, the defendant No.1 has prayed to amend the written statement by seeking to add additional facts that he has acquired title of suit property by virtue of adverse possession and simultaneously claimed his possession through Late Chander and Mst. Gaura with the background that the father of defendant No.1 namely Laddulal was adopted by Chander and Mst. Gaura, therefore, the defendant No.1 claimed himself to be grandson of Mst. Gaura. The amendment application was moved by appellants at the stage of their previous second appeal No.61/1981 before the High Court. The High Court, while hearing the application for seeking amendment in written statement along with second appeal itself observed in its final order dated 13.12.1990 that since it is not established that the suit property was let out to defendant No.1 orally on 02.03.1958 and ownership of suit property vests with the predecessors of plaintiff Gangabaksh, therefore, the proposed amendment of defendants for taking a plea of acquiring the adverse possession assumes importance. Accordingly, the High Court vide its judgment dated 13.12.1990, allowed the application for amendment and permitted the appellant-defendant No.1 to amend his written statement taking a plea of acquiring title by way of adverse possession and remanded the suit back to the trial Court for deciding afresh after framing additional issues and after allowing parties to adduce additional evidence on the amended pleadings. 7. Therefore, after the remand, the present suit was virtually remained as a suit for possession with mesne profit and in defense the plea of the defendant No.1 to acquire the title by way of adverse possession was to be decided. In such circumstances, the present suit was not confined within the scope of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950 on the ground of default and denial of title. 8. In such circumstances, the present suit was not confined within the scope of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950 on the ground of default and denial of title. 8. Appellants-defendants right from beginning is well aware that the present suit is a suit for possession and mesne profit based on title and they have taken their defense in the written statement accordingly. As per rival pleadings of both parties specific issue No.4 was framed as under:- “Whether plaintiff is owner of F.G.H. property and in case tenancy of defendant is not proved, plaintiff is entitled for the decree for possession of houses F.G.H. on the basis of her title?” 9. Thereafter, in the amended written statement, the defendant No.1 has added pleadings claiming to acquire the title by way of adverse possession and accordingly the issue No.7-A was additionally framed which reads as under:- “Whether the predecessor of defendants namely Mst. Gaura has been in possession of the suit property since prior to 1951 and the defendants were in continuous possession from 12 years before filing of the suit, therefore, the title of defendants has become absolute over the suit by virtue of adverse possession?” 10. Appellants-defendants have adduced their evidence to show their ownership and to prove their plea to acquire the ownership of suit property by way of adverse possession. Thereafter, the trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court has appreciated the evidence of both parties on the issue of ownership of the suit property and issue No.4 has been adjudicated in favour of plaintiff and issue No.7-A has been decided against defendants. It may be noticed that although after the remand of suit by the High Court vide judgment dated 13.12.1990, when issues related to tenancy have already been decided against the plaintiff by both Courts in their previous judgments dated 16.09.1969 and 03.11.1980 and the High Court did not upset findings of those issues and remanded the matter, mainly due to allowing the amendment in the written statement, permitting the defendant to take the plea of adverse possession, the trial Court was not required to decide the issues No.1 to 3 relating to grounds of eviction afresh. Be that as it may, if after the remand the trial Court decided these issues No.1 to 3 afresh in the judgment dated 30.07.1994, the first Appellate Court has clarified this situation in its judgment dated 03.10.1996. Be that as it may, if after the remand the trial Court decided these issues No.1 to 3 afresh in the judgment dated 30.07.1994, the first Appellate Court has clarified this situation in its judgment dated 03.10.1996. The first Appellate Court, placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Mohan Lal Vs. Anandibai [ AIR 1971 SC 2177 ] has observed that findings of both Court on issues No.1 and 2 relating to relationship of landlord and tenant were not set aside by the High Court while remanding the suit, therefore, those findings have attained finality. Therefore, in the backdrop of such factual matrix, the present suit may not be treated as a suit for eviction within the scope of Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950 only. 11. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in case of Rajendra Tiwary (supra) is referred in the subsequent judgment of Tribhuvanshankar (supra) relied upon by counsel for appellants and proposition of law has been set-forth as under:- "On a seemly analysis of the principle stated in the aforesaid authorities, it is quite vivid that there is a difference in exercise of jurisdiction when the civil court deals with a lis relating to eviction brought before it under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and under any special enactment pertaining to eviction on specified grounds. Needless to say, this court has cautiously added that if alternative relief is permissible within the ambit of the Act, the position would be different. That apart, the Court can decide the issue of title if a tenant disputes the same and the only purpose is to see whether the denial of title of the landlord by the tenant is bona fide in the circumstances of the case. We respectfully concur with the aforesaid view and we have no hesitation in holding that the dictum laid down in Bhagwati Prasad (supra) and Bishwanath Agarwalla (supra) are distinguishable, for in the said cases the suits were filed under the Transfer of Property Act where the equitable relief under Order VII Rule 7 could be granted." 12. It may be noted that eviction suit under the provisions of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction), Act, 1950 are filed before the civil court and there is no embargo to plead and pray an alternative prayer for possession based on title. It may be noted that eviction suit under the provisions of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction), Act, 1950 are filed before the civil court and there is no embargo to plead and pray an alternative prayer for possession based on title. The Full Bench of Rajasthan High Court, in case of Smt. Pushpa Sharma Vs. Gopal Lal Rawat [AIR 1986 Rajasthan 187] considered this aspect that in the eviction suit preferred on the ground of set forth under Section 13 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950, a decree for possession can be granted in favour of plaintiff on the basis of his title. Following two issues were referred to be adjudicated by the Full Bench:- "(i) Whether in a suit based on the relationship between the landlord and tenant, making prayer for eviction on the grounds set forth under Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction), Act, 1955, a decree for possession can be granted in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of his title?, (ii) Whether when the present issue is framed mentioning the allegations of the title of the plaintiff also, the defendant asserts his own title and denied the plaintiff's and both the parties led evidence, can it be said that no prejudice is caused to the defendant if the decree for possession is based on proof of the title of the plaintiff?" After discussing the scheme of Act of 1950 and the scope of pleadings of parties, both questions were answered as under:- "Our answer therefore to the questions referred is: (1) In a suit based on the relationship between the landlord and tenant, making prayer for eviction on the grounds set forth under S.13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, a decree for possession can be granted in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of his title. (2) When any issue is framed on the basis of allegation of title of the plaintiff and the defendant asserts his own title and denies the plaintiff's title and both the parties lead evidence without raising any objection, question of prejudice caused to the defendant may be seen if decree for possession is to be granted on proof of title of plaintiff." 13. Thus, after the aforesaid discussion, the first argument raised by appellants seems to be preposterous and does not give rise to any substantial question of law in the present second appeal. Discussion on Substantial questions of law 14. Substantial questions of law No.I and V:- (I) Whether the findings recorded by the trial court on the question of title to suit property in its judgment and decree dated 30th July, 1994 which is based on the decision of the Civil Court, Jaipur decided on 21st February, 1905 in the suit title Gagnabux Vs. Exhibit A-8 is open to challenged in the present appeal by the defendant-appellant on the plea of adverse possession? (V) Whether the findings recorded by the court below on the question of adverse possession of the appellant can be said to be perverse?” 15. The substantial questions of law No.I and V are interlinked and can be dealt with simultaneously. In order to answer these questions of law, the very basis of appellants-defendants to claim acquiring of his ownership over the suit property by virtue of adverse possession has to be seen. Plaintiff in the plaint has pleaded that property, (Haveli) marked as A.B.C.D. is of possession and ownership of her father-defendant No.2 Prabhu Narain who gifted the suit property, houses E.F.G.H. along with outer chowk, Taj and Gokha to her through gift deed dated 29.01.1964 registered on 04.02.1964. It was further pleaded that Gangabaksh who was father of defendant No.2 has succeeded in the civil suit claiming his right and ownership over the properties against one Chander Son of Dalu and the suit was decreed vide judgment dated 01.07.1908. The judgment and decree dated 01.07.1908 has been tendered in evidence and available on record as Ex.A2. The first Appellate Court has clearly observed that this judgment is declaratory decree affirming the ownership of the property to plaintiff's predecessor namely Gangabaksh. Defendants have not disputed passing of this judgment and decree. This judgment and decree was passed against Chander son of Dalu. It has come on record that Mst. Gaura was wife of Chander. The contention of defendants is that since his father Laddulal went in adoption to Chander and Mst. Gaura, he becomes their grandson and as such by virtue of their long possession, the possession has become adverse to the plaintiff. It has come on record that Mst. Gaura was wife of Chander. The contention of defendants is that since his father Laddulal went in adoption to Chander and Mst. Gaura, he becomes their grandson and as such by virtue of their long possession, the possession has become adverse to the plaintiff. Thus, the defendant No.1 claims to acquire the ownership of the suit property by virtue of his long possession since time of his grandfather and grandmother Chander and Mst. Gaura. Therefore, while making such contention, the defendant No.1 has not disputed the ownership of the property in favour of plaintiff's predecessor Gangabaksh through judgment and decree dated 01.07.1908. The issue falls for consideration is whether the possession of defendant No.1 has become adverse to plaintiff. 16. In this regard, counsel for respondents has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in case of Brijesh Kumar Vs. Shardabai [ (2019) 9 SCC 369 ] to show the law regarding adverse possession. Para 13 of the judgment reads as under:- "13. Adverse possession is hostile possession by assertion of a hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner as held in M.Venkatesh (supra). The respondent had failed to establish peaceful, open and continuous possession demonstrating a wrongful ouster of the rightful owner. It thus involved question of facts and law. The onus lay on the respondent to establish when and how he came into possession, the nature of his possession, the factum of possession known and hostile to the other parties, continuous possession over 12 years which was open and undisturbed. The respondent was seeking to deny the rights of the true owner. The onus therefore lay upon the respondent to establish possession as a fact coupled with that it was open, hostile and continuous to the knowledge of the true owner. The respondent-plaintiff failed to discharge the onus. Reference may also be made to Chatti Konati Rao & Ors. vs. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, on adverse possession observing as follows: "15. Animus possidendi as it well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. Mere possession does not ripen into possessory title until the possessor holds the property adverse to the title of the true owner for the said purpose. vs. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, on adverse possession observing as follows: "15. Animus possidendi as it well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. Mere possession does not ripen into possessory title until the possessor holds the property adverse to the title of the true owner for the said purpose. The person who claims adverse possession is required to establish the date on which he came in possession, nature of possession, the factum of possession, knowledge to the true owner, duration of possession and that possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in hi favour as he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner and, hence, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession. The courts always take unkind view towards statutes of limitation overriding property rights. The plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law by a blended one of fact and law." 17. The conception of adverse possession fundamentally contemplates a hostile possession by which there is a denial of title of true owner. By virtue of remaining in possession, the possessor takes an adverse instance to the title of true owner. In fact, he disputes the same. Therefore, when defendants have taken resort to the defense of acquiring the title of suit property by way of adverse possession, they cannot dispute the ownership of plaintiff and plaintiff's predecessor Gangabaksh but it is incumbent for defendants to show that their possession had become adverse to the ownership of plaintiff. 18. In this regard, defendant No.1 could not prove his relationship, nexus or continuity of possession over the suit property since time of Chander and Mst. Gaura. It appears from record that initially when first written statement was filed by defendant No.1 on 16.04.1965, defendant No.1 did not take the plea of adverse possession rather asserted his ownership over the suit property since time of his predecessors. Even in rebuttal to the issue No.4, defendant No.1 produced documents of Khasra settlement (Ex.A8), map settlement (Ex.A9) and one witness DW14 to prove his own exclusive ownership but these documents do not confer any title of the suit property and the trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court declined to accept the title of defendants. The title suit property was found to be vested with the plaintiff. The title suit property was found to be vested with the plaintiff. Firstly, on the basis of judgment and decree dated 01.07.1908 passed in favour of plaintiff's predecessor Gangabaksh and further on the basis of registered gift deed dated 29.01.1964 (Ex.1) made in favour of plaintiff by her father. 19. When defendant No.1 miserably failed to show his title over the suit property in counter to plaintiff's ownership, it appears that then after expiry of near about 25 years, the defendant No.1 sought to add the defense of acquiring the title by way of adverse possession in his written statement by way of moving an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC on 26.07.1990. By way of amendment, defendant No.1 tried to show his nexus and relationship with Late Chander and Mst. Gaura and took a plea that his father Laddulal was adopted to Chander and Mst. Gaura. Such plea of adoption, added in the written statement after 25 years is without any details and even no specific date of adoption nor any evidence of ceremony of adoption. Both Courts have observed that there is no evidence at all on record to prove adoption of Laddulal, the father of defendant No.1 to Chander and Mst. Gaura. In absence of proof of adoption, the defendant No.1 has failed to show his possession over the suit property in continuity to the possession of Chander and Mst. Gaura being their grandson. The possession of defendant No.1 over the suit property has been treated as independent and he came in possession after death of Mst. Gaura. It has come on record, though not very specifically, that Mst. Gaura died in the year 1956. Thereafter, the defendant No.1 came in possession over the suit property. Accordingly, the possession of defendant No.1 over the suit property from 1956, does not complete the 12 years at the time of institution of the present suit on 09.12.1964 and therefore, the plea of defendant No.1 to acquire title of suit property by adverse possession has rightly been not accepted by both Courts. 20. Counsel for appellants has argued that plaintiff's father Prabhu Narayan defendant No.2 instituted a civil suit for eviction against Mst. Gaura which was dismissed with liberty to file a suit for possession based on title vide judgment (Ex.A10) but no suit for possession was filed. 20. Counsel for appellants has argued that plaintiff's father Prabhu Narayan defendant No.2 instituted a civil suit for eviction against Mst. Gaura which was dismissed with liberty to file a suit for possession based on title vide judgment (Ex.A10) but no suit for possession was filed. Learned counsel argued that plaintiff could not prove that Chander executed rent note in favour of Gangabaksh and Mst. Gaura written any rent note in favour of Prabhu Narayan. Mst. Gaura was in possession of the suit property prior to 1951. Hence, the suit instituted on 09.12.1964 has become barred by limitation for the possession. Such arguments is of no help and advantage to appellants in absence of showing any nexus or his relationship as successor of Mst. Gaura. The possession of defendant No.1 over the suit property is independent and separate. Defendant No.1 cannot be allowed to take advantage to claim continuity of his possession, linking the same with Mst. Gaura and Chander, on the basis of an absurd plea of adoption of his father Laddulal to Chander and Mst. Gaura. More so when theory of adoption was added in written statement by way of amendment after 25 years and neither there is any details of adoption nor any evidence on record. Both Courts below have rightly declined to accept the plea of adverse possession of defendant No.1 on this aspect and has decided issue No.7A and 7B against defendant. 21. Such factual matrix on record clearly goes to show that plea of claiming the acquiring of title by way of adverse possession by defendant No.1 has rightly been declined by both Courts. Findings of issues No.4, 7A and 7B are concurrent and based on appreciation of evidence by both Courts below. Neither there is any perversity in such fact findings nor some are based on misreading/non-reading of evidence. Therefore, when the defendant No.1 miserably failed to prove his plea of adverse possession, qua the plaintiff, two Court below have not committed any illegality in passing the decree for possession in favour of plaintiff on the basis of his title. Accordingly, both substantial questions of law No.1 and 5 are answered in negative and against appellant. 22. Therefore, when the defendant No.1 miserably failed to prove his plea of adverse possession, qua the plaintiff, two Court below have not committed any illegality in passing the decree for possession in favour of plaintiff on the basis of his title. Accordingly, both substantial questions of law No.1 and 5 are answered in negative and against appellant. 22. Substantial questions of law No. II, III and IV:- (II) Whether it is open to the Appellant to challenge the impugned order dated 3rd October, 1996 of the First Appellate Court, particularly when the question with regard to the title to suit property having been derived by the plaintiffs-respondents (inadvertently referred as defendants-respondents) on the basis of duly executed gift deed in favour of the said plaintiff (inadvertently referred as defendant) vide Exhibit A-2 has though dealt with by the trial court in its order dated 30th July,1994, has not been dealt with at all by the First appellate Court in its impugned order under challenge? (III) Whether the findings recorded by the trial court on the question of gift deed which is the basis on which the plaintiff-respondent (inadvertently referred as defendant-respondent) is claiming title over the suit property can be said to be perverse and without any evidence in its support, particularly when the First Appellate court has not dealt with the said question at all in its impugned order under challenge? (IV) Whether the defendant-appellant (inadvertently referred as plaintiff-appellant) can be said it to have derived his title over the suit property on the plea of adverse possession as against plaintiff-respondent o(inadvertently referred as defendant-respondent) who has established his right, title and interest over the said property by virtue Exhibit A-2 which is gift deed? 23. Substantial questions of law No.II, III and IV are related to findings with regard to the gift deed of suit property executed and registered in favour of plaintiff and its effect qua defendant No.1. Hence, are being considered jointly. 24. It may be noticed that plaintiff has pleaded in the plaint that her father Prabhu Narayan gifted the property marked as E.F.G.H. with outer chowk, Taj and gokha through gift deed dated 29.01.1964 registered on 04.02.1964. It has already been discussed hereinabove that plaintiff's grandfather i.e. father of defendant No.2 namely Gangabaksh was the owner of entire Haveli marked as A.B.C.D. on the basis of judgment and decree dated 01.07.1908. It has already been discussed hereinabove that plaintiff's grandfather i.e. father of defendant No.2 namely Gangabaksh was the owner of entire Haveli marked as A.B.C.D. on the basis of judgment and decree dated 01.07.1908. The gift deed executed by plaintiff's father has been produced as Ex.1. The defendant No.1 has neither questioned the execution of gift deed nor challenge the same. Plaintiff by his own evidence and evidence of his witnesses has proved the execution of gift deed in his favour. The trial Court in its judgment dated 30.07.1994, while deciding the issue No.1 has categorically recorded the finding in relation to gift deed in favour of plaintiff. The relevant portion of judgment dated 30.07.1994 of the trial Court reads as under:- ^^tgka rd cD'khukek ,fct&1 dk iz'u gS og izHkq ukjk;.k }kjk viuh iq=h okfnuh ds gd es fd;k tkuk lk{; ls c[kwch izekf.kr gS vkSj mls izfroknh dh vkSj ls lk{; es ;k vU;Fkk xaHkhj :i ls vk{ksfir Hkh ugha fd;k x;k gSA vr% vykok cD'kh'kukek 'ks"k rudh okfnuh ds fo:) fu.khZr dh tkrh gSA^^ 25. Such findings passed by the trial Court in its judgment dated 30.07.1994 have not been challenged by defendant No.1 in the first appeal. In absence of any challenge to findings on gift deed or in absence of questioning the gift deed by defendant No.1, there was no occasion in the first appeal to give any findings with regard to gift deed. Yet the first Appellate Court has observed that it is proved on record that plaintiff became the owner of the suit property and concurred with findings of the trial Court. Thus, it may not be said that first appellate court did not consider the gift deed of plaintiff. It may be noticed that here the appellant-defendant No.1 claiming title over the suit property by way of adverse possession, hence, the factum of execution of gift deed of the suit property to plaintiff by her father through registered gift deed is not in question at all. In fact the defendant No.1 to prove his plea of acquiring the title of suit property by way of adverse possession by adducing his own and independent evidence but he remained miserably failed to prove the same. 26. In fact the defendant No.1 to prove his plea of acquiring the title of suit property by way of adverse possession by adducing his own and independent evidence but he remained miserably failed to prove the same. 26. Counsel for appellants-defendants in his argument has not raised any doubt about the execution of gift deed in favour of plaintiff but has vehemently argued that to Court below have passed self contradictory finding as if defendant No.1 was not treated as grandson of Chander and Mst. Gaura, the judgment and decree dated 01.07.1908 passed against Chander and in favour of Gangabaksh could not have been held binding upon the defendant No.1 to treat the plaintiff's predecessor Gangabaksh as owner on the basis of this judgment. In support of his arguments, counsel for appellants has resorted to Sections 40, 41 & 42 of the Evidence Act to contend that since defendant No.1 or his predecessor was not party in the judgment and decree dated 01.07.1908, the same have no effect of res judicata upon defendant No.1. Reliance has also been placed upon judgment passed in case of State of Bihar Vs. Sri Radha Krishna Singh [ AIR 1983 SC 684 , Gopalkrishna Gupthan Vs. Ammalu Ammal [AIR 1972 Kerala 196] and Maharaja Sir Kesho Prasad Singh Bahadur Vs. Bahuria Mt. Bhagjogna Kuer [AIR 1937 Privy Council 69]. 27. The proposition of law set forth in aforementioned judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, Kerala High Court and Privy Council in context to Section 40, 41, 42 and 43 of the Evidence Act is not at all in dispute. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Radha Krishna Singh (Supra) in para 122 and 133 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- "122. It is also well settled that a judgment in rem like judgments passed in probate, insolvency, matrimonial or guardianship or other similar proceedings, is admissible in all cases whether such judgments are inter partes or not. In the instant case, however, all the documents consisting of judgments filed are not judgments in rem and therefore, the question of their admissibility on that basis does not arise. As mentioned earlier, the judgments filed as Exhibits in the instant case, are judgments in personam and, therefore, they do not fulfil the conditions mentioned in S.41 of the Evidence Act. 133. As mentioned earlier, the judgments filed as Exhibits in the instant case, are judgments in personam and, therefore, they do not fulfil the conditions mentioned in S.41 of the Evidence Act. 133. The cumulative effect of the decisions cited above on this point clearly is that under the Evidence Act a judgment which is not inter partes is inadmissible in evidence except for the limited purpose of proving as to who the parties were and what was the decree passed and the properties which were the subject matter of the suit. In these circumstances, therefore, it is not open to the plaintiffs-respondents to derive any support from some of the judgments which they have filed in order to support their title and relationship in which neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants were parties. Indeed, if the judgments are used for the limited purpose mentioned above, they do not take us anywhere so as to prove the plaintiff's case." 28. The proposition of law nowhere in dispute and there cannot be any disagreement or dissent opinion to such proposition of law. The issue is whether appellants are entitled to take resort to such proposition of law in the present case. The judgment dated 01.07.1908, certainly is not judgment in rem but it is judgment in personam and further same does not relates to the matter of public nature but it is in relation to the dispute of the private property between the private persons. Thus, obviously judgments is out of the scope of Section 41 and 42 of the Evidence Act, however, same is covered under Section 40 or at least under Section 43 of the Evidence Act and is admissible against appellants-defendants. It is undisputed that judgment dated 01.07.1908 was passed in the litigation between plaintiff's predecessor Gangabaksh and one Sh. Chander. It is also not disputed that judgment is in relation to the property in question including the suit property and title was conferred to Gangabaksh by way of passing a declaratory decree. It is not in dispute that the judgment dated 01.07.1908 was passed in favour of Gangabaksh, who is grandfather of plaintiff and against one Chander. It is the case of defendant No.1 himself that he is successor and grandson of Chander and Mst. Gaura and the father of defendant No.1 Laddulal went in adoption to Chander and Mst. Gaura. It is not in dispute that the judgment dated 01.07.1908 was passed in favour of Gangabaksh, who is grandfather of plaintiff and against one Chander. It is the case of defendant No.1 himself that he is successor and grandson of Chander and Mst. Gaura and the father of defendant No.1 Laddulal went in adoption to Chander and Mst. Gaura. Defendant No.1, after seeking amendment in the written statement specifically deriving his title and possession over the suit property, connecting himself in the pe degree of Sh. Chander and Mst. Gaura. The defendant No.1 cannot allow to approbate and reprobate as once he himself claims his right and possession over the suit property through Chander alleging himself to be his descendant and grandson, it is not permissible for him to contend that the judgment dated 01.07.1908 passed against Chander cannot be held applicable and binding upon him. Defendant No.1 is estopped by his own admission in this reference. It is a different thing that in evidence, defendant No.1 could not prove the factum of adoption of his father Laddulal to Sh. Chander and Mst. Gaura, therefore, he remained fail to prove the claim of his adverse possession, in continuity and being descendant of Sh. Chander and Mst. Gaura. Similar arguments and same judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, Kerala High Court and Privy Council were referred by counsel for appellant-defendant No.1 before the courts below also. Both Courts below have not accepted his argument and rightly observed that in view of admission of defendant No.1, claiming his right over suit property through Chander, he is bound by the judgment dated 01.07.1908 passed against Chander and in favour of Gangabaksh. Further defendant No.1 although tried to establish his own ownership over the suit property by producing documents Ex.A8 and A9 (Khasra settlement and Map) but through these documents he could not establish his ownership and issue No.4 was decided in favour of plaintiff. Thereafter, defendant No.1 has sought amendment in the written statement taking a plea of adverse possession after 25 years at the stage of his previous second appeal. Meaning thereby, defendant No.1 does not dispute the title of plaintiff over the suit property rather claims to acquire his title by way of having adverse possession for more than 12 years over the suit property qua the plaintiff. Meaning thereby, defendant No.1 does not dispute the title of plaintiff over the suit property rather claims to acquire his title by way of having adverse possession for more than 12 years over the suit property qua the plaintiff. Thus, once defendant has taken a plea of adverse possession, he cannot argue vice versa just to bring the title of plaintiff over the suit property under clouds. Moreover, when the title of plaintiff finds support with the judgment dated 01.07.1908 passed in favour of predecessor of plaintiff Gangabaksh. In this manner, arguments advanced by counsel for appellants taking pretext of Section 40 to 43 with support of judgments referred hereinabove is of no consequence and does not stand for any benefit of appellants. It may also be noticed that Courts below have also relied upon the fact that in another portion of the property (Haveli including front Chowk), plaintiff's father Prabhu Narain had filed suit against one another person namely Chuttan Lal which was decided in his favour vide judgment dated 31.01.1961 (Ex.A3). In this judgment also, plaintiff's father was treated as owner of the property. 29. Therefore, judgment and decree passed by Courts below are infallible and appellants-defendants can succeed in this second appeal only on proving his plea of acquiring the title by way of adverse possession. As has been discussed in foregoing paragraphs that the possession of defendant No.1 is an independent and separate possession and he came in possession over the suit property after death of Mst. Gaura in 1956, therefore, his claim for adverse possession over the suit property does not become absolute as the suit for possession has been instituted on 09.12.1964 before the completion of period of 12 years from the date of possession of defendant No.1. The outcome of the discussion is that the substantial questions of law No.2, 3 and 4 are liable to be answered in negative and against appellants and same is accordingly answered. 30. Counsel for appellants has submitted the written submissions apart from making his oral submissions. No other arguments except dealt with hereinabove have been raised and further no other substantial questions of law except discussed hereinabove have been raised and proposed. 31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Umerkhan Vs. Bismillabi Shaikh & Ors. 30. Counsel for appellants has submitted the written submissions apart from making his oral submissions. No other arguments except dealt with hereinabove have been raised and further no other substantial questions of law except discussed hereinabove have been raised and proposed. 31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Umerkhan Vs. Bismillabi Shaikh & Ors. [ (2011) 9 SCC 684 ] has observed that if a second appeal is admitted on substantial questions of law, while hearing the second appeal finally, the court can re-frame the substantial question of law or can frame new substantial question of law or even can hold that the question of law as already framed do not fall within the purview of substantial question of law but the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under section 100 CPC, without formation/involvement of substantial question of law. 32. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in umpteen number of cases has discussed the scope of High Court for interference in concurrent findings of the trial Court and first Appellate Court under Section 100 of CPC. 33. The Supreme Court recently in case of Thulasidhara Vs. Narayanappa [ (2019) 6 SCC 409 ] has held as under:- "The jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain second appeal under Section 100 CPC after the 1976 Amendment, is confined only with the second appeal involving a substantial question of law. The existence of "a substantial question of law" is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. The question framed by the High Court in this case cannot be said to be a substantial question of law at all. In the present case the trial Court as well as the first appellate court, gave cogent reasons on appreciation of evidence on record, including the partition deed and sale deeds and thereafter held that the plaintiff is not entitled to the declaration that he has become the owner of the land. While interfering with the judgment and decree passed by both the courts below, the High Court has again reappreciated the entire evidence on record, which in exercise of powers under Section 100 CPC, not permissible. Under the circumstances, the High Court has committed a grave/manifest error in quashing and setting aside the findings recorded by both the courts below, which were on appreciation of evidence on record. Under the circumstances, the High Court has committed a grave/manifest error in quashing and setting aside the findings recorded by both the courts below, which were on appreciation of evidence on record. The High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction while exercising the powers under Section 100 CPC. Even otherwise, on merits also, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court allowing the appeal and consequently decreeing the suit, is not sustainable." 34. In another judgment of Gurnam Singh Vs. Lehna Singh [ (2019) 7 SCC 641 ] has held as under:- "Before parting with the present judgment, we remind the High Courts that the jurisdiction of the High Court, in an appeal under Section 100 CPC, is strictly confined to the case involving substantial question of law and while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 CPC, it is not permissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence on record and interfere with the findings recorded by the Courts below and/or the First Appellate Court and if the First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in Second Appeal. We have noticed and even as repeatedly observed by this Court and even in the case of Narayanan Rajendran v. Lekshmy Sarojini, (2009) 5 SCC 264 , despite the catena of decisions of this Court and even the mandate under Section 100 CPC, the High Courts under Section 100 CPC are disturbing the concurrent findings of facts and/or even the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court, either without formulating the substantial question of law or on framing erroneous substantial question of law." 35. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.Doddanarayana Reddy Vs. C.Jayarama Reddy [ (2020) 4 SCC 659 ], while discussing the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the finding of fact under Section 100 CPC has held that though the High Court could have taken different view acting as the trial Court but once, two Courts below have returned finding which is not based upon any misreading of material documents, nor against any provision of law neither could it be said that any judge acting judicially and reasonably could have reach such a findings, then, the Court cannot be said to have erred. Relying upon the previous judgment the Supreme Court has held as under:- "Recently in another judgment reported as State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal, it was held that a concurrent finding of the fact is binding, unless it is pointed out that it was recorded dehors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or based on misreading of the material on records and documents. The Court held as under: “16. When any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or it was based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. (see observation made by learned Judge Vivian Bose, J. as His Lordship then was a Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar & Ors. vs. Dashrath Narayan Chilwelkar & Ors., AIR 1943 Nagpur 117 Para 43).” 36. The upshot of discussion is that the instant second appeal is not liable to succeed and same deserves to be dismissed and hereby dismissed. There is no order as to costs. 37. All pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 38. Record of both Courts below be sent back forthwith.