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Meghalaya High Court · body

2022 DIGILAW 215 (MEG)

Samlang Robert Sohkhlet v. Sameul Khongbuh Massar

2022-08-12

W.DIENGDOH

body2022
JUDGMENT 1. This is an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C preferred by the petitioner with a prayer to quash the Complaint Case No. 12 of 2019 under Section 191 and 193 IPC pending before the Court of the learned Magistrate First Class, District Council Court, Shillong. 2. The petitioner herein has preferred a writ petition before this Court being WP(C) No. 283 of 2019 which was since disposed of. In the said petition, the petitioner while swearing the affidavit has given his personal particulars as required and has stated that he is a resident of Siatbakon village, East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya. 3. The respondents taking exception to the fact that the petitioner has filed the said petition before the High Court affirming that he is a resident of Siatbakon village, which according to them he is not, but is actually a resident of Urksew-Wahpathaw, has accordingly filed the said complaint aforementioned against which the petitioner has then approached this Court in the present proceedings. 4. Heard Mr. R. Majaw, learned counsel for the petitioner who has submitted that in the complaint petition, the contention of the complainant/ respondents herein is that the petitioner cannot claim to be a permanent resident of Siatbakon village since his name appears in the Electoral Roll of 27-Pynursla under Urksew-Wahpathaw polling station, his ration card as well as his job card under NREGS and finally his Contractor Registration Certificate all has his residential address as Urksew-Wahpathaw and not Siatbakon village. 5. Mr. Majaw has however submitted that though it is a fact that he was a permanent resident of Urksew-Wahpathaw as that is his place of birth, however, since his marriage in the year 2002, he went and cohabited with his wife at Siatbakon village since she is from that village as can be seen from her EPIC card at Annexure-10 of this petition. That the petitioner being a permanent resident of Siatbakon village was also affirmed by the Headman of Saitbakon village who has issued a Residential Certificate in favour of the petitioner herein on 14.12.2012 (Annexure 9). 6. Referring to the affidavit filed by the respondents to bring on record certain documents, particularly pertaining to the fact that the petitioner is a resident of Urksew-Wahpathaw, Mr. 6. Referring to the affidavit filed by the respondents to bring on record certain documents, particularly pertaining to the fact that the petitioner is a resident of Urksew-Wahpathaw, Mr. Majaw has submitted that the annexures annexed to the said affidavit wherein at Annexure-1, a correspondent dated 01.09.2007 was issued upon one owner of a limestone burning unit by the petitioner in his capacity as the Headman Urksew-Wahpathaw and at Annexure-2 of the same, a letter was sent by the Secretary, Pdeng Raid, Raid Shabong to the headmen of four villages, which includes the name of the petitioner as the Headman of Urksew-Wahpathaw, the same is not denied by the petitioner, however, it is submitted that Pdeng Raid, Raid Shabong consists of four villages, namely; Rangthylliang, Pynursla, Urksew-Wahpathaw and Siatbakon. In these four villages, only members of the three clans, that is, Khongmaloh, Khongthaw and Sohkhlet can become the headman, which is why the petitioner is the headman of Urksew-Wahpathaw. 7. In support of his case, the petitioner has cited the following cases: i) Bhagwan Dass & Anr v. Kamal Abrol & Ors.: (2005) 11 SCC 66 , Paras 6, 7 & 8; ii) Smt. Jeewanti Pandey v. Kishan Chandra Pandey: (1981) 4 SCC 517 , Para 12; iii) Nabin Kumar Sahu v. Indian Oil Corporation & Ors.: (2018) 14 SCC 478 , para 13; iv) In Re: Suo Motu Proceedings Against R. Karuppan, Advocate: (2001) 5 SCC 289 , para 16; v) Shri. Ngon Khongmawloh v. Shri. Phron Khongjawar. Appeal in WP(C) No. 112 (SH) 99. 8. Per contra, Mr. S. M. Suna, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the main grievance of the respondents against the petitioner is that in the said writ petition filed before this Court, which petition has since been disposed of, the petitioner, in the affidavit of the said case, has mentioned that he is a resident of Siatbakon village, when he is not a permanent resident of Siatbakon village at that point of time which has therefore compelled the respondents to file the said complaint for making a false statement before the court. 9. 9. Another point raised is that the name of petitioner in the Electoral Roll for Pynursla Constituency, the name of the petitioner is shown at serial number 721 under Urksew-Wahpathaw polling station, whereas if he is a permanent resident of Siatbakon village, his name would have appeared in the Electoral Roll of Siatbakon village. 10. Again, it is submitted that the petitioner has obtained a ration card from Urksew-Wahpathaw village for which he could have availed of the same from Siatbakon village if he is actually a permanent resident of that village as claimed by him that he has resided permanently at Siatbakon village since his marriage. 11. As to the Residential Certificate said to have been issued by the then headman of Siatbakon village in the year 2012, certifying that the petitioner is a permanent resident of the village, the learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that interestingly, at that particular point of time, he was the headman of Urksew-Wahpathaw. Under the relevant laws of the District Council, a person cannot become a headman of one village and be a resident of another village. 12. Even while referring to the affidavit filed by the respondents in this case, the learned counsel has submitted that the all the documents annexed thereto has clearly indicated that the petitioner was the headman of Urksew- Wahpathaw and was also nominated to be a representative of Urksew-Wahpathaw village before the Pdeng Raid, Raid Shabong at the relevant point of time. 13. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of Mst. Jagir Kaur & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh: AIR 1963 SC 1521 , para 9 and the case of K. Mohan v. Balakanta Lakshmi: 1983 CRI. L. J. 1316, paras 7 & 9. 14. Lastly, the learned counsel has submitted that the Trial Court before taking cognizance of the complaint have examined all the materials placed before it and on being satisfied, have accordingly taken cognizance of the same and as such, it would be too premature to interfere with the said proceedings at this stage but rather the same should be allowed to reach to its conclusion. 15. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties, this Court has given due consideration to the same. 15. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties, this Court has given due consideration to the same. What has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no materials to link him to the allegations made in the complaint, inasmuch as he is accused of swearing a false affidavit before this Court in the writ petition filed by him as mentioned above by citing his place of residence as Siatbakon village when he is actually a permanent resident of Urksew-Wahpathaw village. 16. The petitioner went on to say that though he was born and brought up at Urksew-Wahpathaw village, yet he is now a permanent resident of Siatbakon village by virtue of being married to his wife who is a resident of Siatbakon village and that after his marriage in the year 2002, he is permanently residing at Siatbakon village. 17. Both sides have produced documents as annexures in this petition as well as in the affidavit filed by the respondents to bring on record certain documents said to be relevant to the case to prove that the petitioner is a permanent resident of Urksew-Wahpathaw village, while the petitioner has asserted that his place of permanent residence can only be Siatbakon village. 18. This Court is of the opinion that at this stage, it is not necessary to consider the said documents since that would amount to touching the merits of the case between the parties. However, for this Court to interfere with the proceedings before the Trial Court, exercise of its inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C is to be resorted to. Section 482 Cr.P.C reads as follows: '482. Saving of inherent power of High Court.- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.' 19. Inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C include power to quash FIR, investigation or any criminal proceedings pending before any Courts subordinate to the High Court. Inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C include power to quash FIR, investigation or any criminal proceedings pending before any Courts subordinate to the High Court. Such power can be exercised to secure ends of justice, prevent abuse of the process of any Court and to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code of Criminal Procedure, depending upon the facts of a given case. However, such inherent power are to be exercised with circumspection and due caution. 20. In the landmark case State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors.: 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has considered the provisions of section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Supreme Court in the case has laid down certain guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint: 1. Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 21. Tested on the basis of the abovementioned guidelines, the first test is to see whether the allegations made in the complaint prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused/petitioner herein. 22. The allegation against the petitioner is that he had sworn an affidavit giving false information or statement as far as his status as a permanent resident of Siatbakon village is concerned. The respondents as complainants had accordingly filed the complaint primarily alleging that an offence under Section 191 IPC was committed by the petitioner. Section 191 reads as follows:- '191. Giving false evidence.-Whoever, being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence.' 23. Before this Court, the petitioner has sought to justify even by documentary evidence that his place of permanent residence is at Siatbakon village while the respondents would maintain that he is a permanent resident of Urksew-Wahpathaw village. 24. It appears that the issue as to what or where is the permanent residence of the petitioner has to be decided, to determine as to whether he has committed an offence under Section 191 IPC and that this issue has only to be decided by the Trial Court. 25. 24. It appears that the issue as to what or where is the permanent residence of the petitioner has to be decided, to determine as to whether he has committed an offence under Section 191 IPC and that this issue has only to be decided by the Trial Court. 25. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that this petition is too premature and cannot be allowed at this juncture, a prima facie case having been made out against the petitioner, this Court is restrained from exercising its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC. 26. The judgments cited by the parties relates mainly to the question and issue as regard resident/residence and as such, need not be discussed by this Court as it involves an issue of facts to be determined by the Trial Court. 27. In view of the above, this petition is dismissed as devoid of merits.