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2022 DIGILAW 217 (ORI)

Siba Mahakur v. Member, Board of Revenue, Odisha, Cuttack

2022-06-20

R.K.PATTANAIK, S.MURALIDHAR

body2022
JUDGMENT : R.K. Pattanaik, J. 1. The Petitioner filed the instant writ petition invoking writ jurisdiction under Article(s) 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 assailing the correctness of the impugned order (Annexure-1) dated 17th August, 2009 passed in OEA Revision Case No.67 of 1984 under Section 38-B of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as ‘OEA Act’) whereby settlement of the schedule lands by the Tahasildar, Sonepur (OP No.3) was set aside with a direction to correct the record of rights in favour of the deity, namely, OP No.6 without providing any opportunity of hearing to him and therefore, it is not sustainable in law and thus, liable to be interfered with. 2. Pursuant to the above direction under Annexure-1, OP No.3 passed order dated 19th September, 2009 (Annexure-2) and accordingly, corrected the RORs in favour of OP No.6 deleting the names of the Petitioner and others therefrom. As per the Petitioner, OP No.1, who passed the order (Annexure-1) under challenge, fell into serious error to hold that the Petitioner and others do not have any rights vis-à-vis the schedule lands without properly appreciating the relevant facts on record. Thus, according to the Petitioner, the record of rights have been corrected erroneously by the order under Annexure-1 and that too without offering opportunity of hearing to him, which, therefore, deserves to be set aside. 3. Heard Mr. S. Sourav, learned counsel for the Petitioner; Mr. D.K. Mohanty, learned AGA and Mr. S.P. Mohanty, learned counsel for OPs. 4. The case of the Petitioner is that previous to the 1st settlement operation, the concerned village was a non-gountia village under the Barpalli Zamidar, who had the absolute right to settle lands in favour of persons rendering services in different capacities and one of such settlement was kuladebata maufi, which was for providing service to a deity, namely, Pattakhanda Devi, in the name of one Ganga Dehuri, the common ancestor, who was rendering seva puja to such private deity of the Zamindar. It is claimed that the Petitioner acquired the interest from his maternal side and finally vide OEA Case No.516 of 1976, the lands were settled in favour of the respective parties and since share of his mother fell to him, it was so recorded vide Annexure-3. It is claimed that the Petitioner acquired the interest from his maternal side and finally vide OEA Case No.516 of 1976, the lands were settled in favour of the respective parties and since share of his mother fell to him, it was so recorded vide Annexure-3. It is the contention of the Petitioner that OP No.6 was established only about 40 years back but the case lands were settled with their common ancestor much prior thereto and thus, are in no way connected with the performance of seva puja of the deity nor it ever belonged to the deity, however, by the order under Annexure-1, OP No.1 directed correction of record of rights fully ignoring the above facts and also overriding a decree of the civil court, which was obtained by the Proforma OPs. 5. In fact, as per the claim of the Petitioner, rayati lands have been taken over by the impugned order under Annexue-1 by misreading the facts on record with a conclusion that the deity to be the ex-intermediary and not the parties, who were in possession of the schedule lands. It is contended by the Petitioner that OP No.1 committed illegality in concluding that devatwa maufi has been loosely used for debottar maufi. It is further contended that the Barpalli Zamindar allowed their common ancestor to possess the said schedule land as Maufidars which is included in the definition of ‘intermediary’ as per Section 2(h) of the OEA Act and it was in connection with rendering seva puja to a private deity, the fact which was completely lost sight of by OP No.1, who held it as debottar maufi. Apart from the merits of the case, the Petitioner contends that the matter should be remanded for a de novo hearing since he was not provided any opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order under Annexure-1. 6. OP No.6 filed counter affidavit and justified the decision of OP No.1 and contended that the predecessor-in-interest of the family to which the Petitioner belongs was not an intermediary, rather, the deity was and the interest was held as a sebayat to manage puja which, when not properly discharged, a complaint had been lodged by the villagers. 6. OP No.6 filed counter affidavit and justified the decision of OP No.1 and contended that the predecessor-in-interest of the family to which the Petitioner belongs was not an intermediary, rather, the deity was and the interest was held as a sebayat to manage puja which, when not properly discharged, a complaint had been lodged by the villagers. According to OP No.6, the Zamindari Maufi register of Sonepur State covering the period from 1st April, 1934 to 31st March, 1949 shows that a land to the extent of Ac.24.11 decimals was granted as Debottar maufi and one Damana Dehuri was looking after the seva puja of the village deity Maheswari Devi and while claiming so referred to a copy of the relevant entry of the register which is at Annexure-A. In so far as the complaint is concerned, Annexure-B is relied upon by OP No.6 to suggest that since one Sahadev Dehuri, the successor of Damana Dehuri stopped managing seva puja of the deity, notice dated 17th September, 1976 was issued by OP No.3. OP No.6 further alleges that without impleading the deity, Sahadev Dehuri and Khedu Dehuri, the predecessor of the Petitioner filed OEA Case Nos.5 and 6 of 1976 and managed to obtain the orders of settlement under Annexure-C series which was finally set aside by OP No.1. It has been claimed by OP No.6 that as sebayat, the land was possessed by the predecessors of the Petitioner which was subsequently allowed to be illegally settled in their favour prejudicial to the interest of the deity. 7. The case has a chequered career, inasmuch as, against the order of settlement in the year 1976, an appeal was preferred but it was dismissed on the ground of limitation, where after, at the instance of OP No.6, a suo motu revision was entertained by OP No.1, which finally resulted in passing of order dated 17th January, 1987 in OEA Revision Case No.67 of 1984. Against the aforesaid order, some sebayats filed O.J.C. No.3071 of 1987 and it was disposed of by a judgment dated 10th March, 1992 setting aside the revisional order on the ground that OP No.1 has no jurisdiction to initiate such a proceeding as the original settlement was made on the basis of lease principle. Against the aforesaid order, some sebayats filed O.J.C. No.3071 of 1987 and it was disposed of by a judgment dated 10th March, 1992 setting aside the revisional order on the ground that OP No.1 has no jurisdiction to initiate such a proceeding as the original settlement was made on the basis of lease principle. Thereafter, challenging the said judgment, OP No.6 approached the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.5160 of 1992, which was allowed and the matter was remanded to this Court for a fresh hearing. According to OP No.6 such remand was directed with an observation that the original settlement of the year 1977 is to be treated as one under the OEA Act. Then, the writ petition, after a fresh hearing, was disposed of by order dated 29th October, 2002 and the case was further remanded for a decision by OP No.1 with certain directions and enquiry to be conducted through OP No.3. Finally, OP No.1 considering the report of OP No.3 passed the impugned order under Annexure-1. At this juncture, OP No.6 alleges that when the Proforma OPs could not be successful in obtaining any interim relief after filing W.P.(C) No.14813 of 2009 managed to set up the Petitioner and filed the present writ petition suppressing the material facts by taking a plea that he was not made a party. 8. The contention of OP No.6 supported by State is that the predecessors were not the intermediaries but inducted as sebayats to manage the seva puja of the public deity, which has been so declared by the orders of the endowment authority which was not challenged by the Petitioner and Proforma OPs. Being the sebayats, as per the contention of OP No.6, the predecessors of the Petitioner and others could not have obtained settlement vis-à-vis the scheduled lands under Section 7 of the OEA Act. 9. The challenge of the Petitioner is only on the ground that there was no opportunity of hearing provided to him. In fact, the Proforma OPs were before OP No.1 and participated in the revision proceeding, which was disposed of on merit. 9. The challenge of the Petitioner is only on the ground that there was no opportunity of hearing provided to him. In fact, the Proforma OPs were before OP No.1 and participated in the revision proceeding, which was disposed of on merit. OP No.1 held that the record of rights of the respective schedule land published prior to the abolition of the State of Sonepur were under the provisions of the Sonepur Bhumibidhi, wherein, there has been no status of the land by name devatwa maufi or deheri maufi and it was mistakenly so recorded in place of debottar maufi by referring to Section 13 of the Sonepur State Code Vol. I of the Bhumibidhi. So, it was concluded that the deity was the intermediary and not the predecessors of the Petitioner and the contention of having acquired the schedule lands from Barpalli Zamindar to render seva puja to the latter’s private deity was rejected. It means the interest of the Petitioner’s predecessors was dependent on, whether, they were the intermediaries, the claim which was negatived by OP No.1 referring to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th settlements of 1907, 1919, 1933 and 1963 respectively. It was, thus, held that after vesting of the State of Sonepur, the schedule land was wrongly recorded with the sebayats, the predecessors of the Petitioner and Proforma OPs under Section 7 of the OEA Act posing themselves as the intermediaries, which was finally corrected under Annexure-1. 10. The Petitioner belongs to the branch of Damana Dehuri succeeded by one Parikhit Dehuri, whose name was not mentioned in the ROR, which was corrected including Sahadev Dehuri only as a replacement of the original sebayat. In fact, the Petitioner is the son of the daughter of Parikhit Dehuri, whereas, the Proforma OP Nos.7 to 11 and 16 to 18 belong to the other branch. The interest of Petitioner, even though he has not been a party, was saved by the presence of Proforma OPs including the sons of Parikhit Dehuri, who were arrayed as OP Nos.8 to 11 in the revision proceeding. So, in the considered view of the Court, the challenge to the decision of OP No.1 in W.P.(C) No.14813 of 2009 would definitely cover the rights and interest of the Petitioner, if he has any. So, in the considered view of the Court, the challenge to the decision of OP No.1 in W.P.(C) No.14813 of 2009 would definitely cover the rights and interest of the Petitioner, if he has any. Rather, according to OP No.6, with reference to Section 13 of the Bhumibidhi of Sonepur State Code (Annexure-4), the interest of the sebayats, who were looking after the seva puja would be recognized unless the interest is jointly recorded with the co-sharers of the sebayats assigning the duties and liabilities separately declared by the Ruler and for that matter, the State. If such view is accepted, then it may be said that the Petitioner, who claims to have succeeded the interest of Parikhit Dehuri, who was not a sebayat cannot be said to have any interest over the share of the schedule land either. In any ways, looking at the limited ground that the Petitioner was not made a party, the Court reaches at a conclusion that there is no need of remand of the matter for a fresh decision by OP No.1 since the same depends on the result in W.P.(C) No.14183 of 2009, if at all it is pending or in case disposed of, the decision thereof would evenly apply and concern the rights of the Petitioner. In other words, the Court finds no reason to set aside the impugned order under Annexure-1 for a de novo hearing as has been prayed for by the Petitioner. 11. Accordingly, it is ordered. 12. In the result, the writ petition stands dismissed. Consequently, the order of stay dated 19th February, 2010 directed by this Court in M.C. No.16875 of 2009 is hereby vacated.