JUDGMENT : 1. The present petition has been filed, inter alia, for the following reliefs: "29.(b) Your Lordships be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of Mandamus and/or Certiorari and/or appropriate writ, order or direction to hold the action of the Respondent authorities not to reappoint them since the expiry of the contract of service on 31-03-2017 as illegal and quash and set aside the termination of the petitioners by the Respondent authorities with effect from as per the letters kept at Annexure-C collectively and direct the authorities to reappoint them at their respective posts of Technical Resources Person which they have been holding continuously since their initial appointment as shown in the Annexure A. (c) Your Lordships be pleased to direct the Respondent authorities to re-appoint the petitioners forthwith and restore the petitioners to the services they were holding up to 31-03-2017 and direct the authorities not to terminate the service of the petitioners in their respective posts of Engineer, Technical Resource Person (TRP) on contractual basis without giving any artificial brake till the regularly selected candidates are made available." 2. As the prayers made in the writ petition will suggest that the petitioners are seeking mandamus or any writ of certiorari or appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondent authorities to reinstate them in service, and declaring the action of the respondent authorities of not re-appointing them, after a contract of service was over on 31.03.2017, as illegal. 3. The established facts from the writ petition are that the petitioner Nos.1 to 5 were appointed on 16.08.2011, 27.07.2015, 12.02.2010, 03.05.2010 and 24.01.2012 respectively. It is not disputed that all the petitioners were appointed on contractual basis and their contracts were extended from time to time, after expiry of such contracts. They were appointed in the scheme or project known as "Sarva Siksha Abhiyan" run by the State authorities. After the last contract, which got over in the year 2017, more particularly on 31.03.2017, the same was not extended and as a consequence, the services of the petitioners were terminated. 4. Learned advocate Mr.Thomas appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the action of the respondent authorities of not extending the contracts of the petitioners is illegal since they were continued for so many years on contractual basis and the contracts were also renewed hence, the respondent authorities may be directed to reappoint them. 4. Learned advocate Mr.Thomas appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the action of the respondent authorities of not extending the contracts of the petitioners is illegal since they were continued for so many years on contractual basis and the contracts were also renewed hence, the respondent authorities may be directed to reappoint them. Reliance is placed by the learned advocate Mr.Thomas on the judgement of the Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 28.06.2019 passed in a group of petitions being Special Civil Application No.13505 of 2018 and allied matters. Learned advocate Mr.Thomas, while placing reliance on the order dated 24.11.2021/07.12.2021 passed in Special Civil Application No.15053 of 2019 and allied matter has submitted that since the contracts of the petitioners were not renewed on the ground that work of the petitioners were unsatisfactory, such action can be said to be stigmatic and hence, as per the aforesaid order passed in Special Civil Application No.15053 of 2019 and allied matter, their termination is required to be set aside. Reliance is also placed by the learned advocate Mr.Thomas on the judgement rendered by the Apex Court in the case of GRIDCO Limited v. Sadananda Dolo, (2011) 15 S.C.C. 16 and has submitted that the Court can always examine the termination of the contractual employee even when one of the contracting parties happened to be the State. 5. No further submissions are advanced by the learned advocate Mr.Thomas. 6. Per contra, learned advocate Mr.Meet Shah appearing for the respondent authorities has submitted that all the petitioners were appointed on contractual basis as per the conditions envisaged in their appointment orders. He has invited attention of this Court to the conditions attached to the appointment orders of the petitioners. He has submitted that pursuant to the aforesaid appointment orders, the petitioners were required to give an undertaking and accordingly they have also given such undertakings. He has submitted that as per condition No.1 attached to the appointment order, their services can be terminated, without any notice, after the contractual period gets over. He has submitted that since the petitioners are bound by the conditions attached to their appointment orders, it was well within the authority of the respondents not to renew such contracts. He has submitted that as per condition No.1 attached to the appointment order, their services can be terminated, without any notice, after the contractual period gets over. He has submitted that since the petitioners are bound by the conditions attached to their appointment orders, it was well within the authority of the respondents not to renew such contracts. 6.1 With regard to reliance placed by the learned advocate Mr.Thomas on the judgement dated 28.06.2019 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court rendered in a group of petitions being Special Civil Application No.13505 of 2018 and allied matters, learned advocate Mr.Shah has submitted that in Letters Patent Appeal No.498 of 2021 and allied matters vide order dated 22.10.2021, the Division Bench of this Court has admitted such appeals and the judgement dated 28.06.2019 passed by the Coordinate Bench is stayed. 6.2 Reliance is also placed by the learned advocate Mr.Shah on the Division Bench judgement dated 27.04.2021 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No.776 of 2020 and has submitted that on similar issue, the Division Bench has held that the contractual employees will have no right on the post. Reliance is also placed by him on the judgement dated 18.11.2021 passed by this Court in a group of petitions being Special Civil Application No.3623 of 2013 and allied matters and also on the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Vidyavardhaka Sangha & Anr. v. Y.D.Deshpande & Ors., (2006) 12 S.C.C. 482 . Thus, he has submitted that the writ petition may not be entertained. 7. In response to the aforesaid submissions, learned advocate Mr.Thomas, while inviting attention of this Court to condition No.8 of the appointment orders of the petitioners, has submitted that the petitioners would be governed by the Rules and Regulations of 1996 framed by the Gujarat State Council for Primary Education Service and such rules more particularly, Rule 10 thereof specifies that the termination of the employees like the petitioners, who were employed on contract, can be effected without assigning any reason by a notice of one month in writing to the employee or on payment of one month's pay and allowances in lieu of such notice. 8. In rejoinder to the aforesaid submission, learned advocate Mr.Shah has submitted that the case of the petitioners would be governed by the provisions of sub-clause (I) of Clause (b) to Rule 10. 8. In rejoinder to the aforesaid submission, learned advocate Mr.Shah has submitted that the case of the petitioners would be governed by the provisions of sub-clause (I) of Clause (b) to Rule 10. He has submitted that sub-clause (4) of the Rules will not apply in the present case and the same would apply only in those cases where the employee during subsistence of the contract, is terminated from service however, in the present case, since the contract was not renewed, such non-renewal of the contract will not amount to termination thus, it is submitted that the writ petition may not be entertained. 9. The facts, which are not in dispute are that all the petitioners were appointed on contractual basis i.e. for 11 months. The relevant conditions, which are incorporated in the appointment orders for deciding the controversy in the present case are incorporated as under (translated from Gujarati): "Terms and conditions:- (1) This is on contract basis, i.e you will be considered relieved from your duties upon completion of period of the contract. However, if required, it will be considered to execute new agreement with you, taking into account your performance. The contract will be terminated without any notice if your performance/ conduct are not found satisfactory. (8) The matters resolved in the Gujarat Council of Primary Education Service Rules and Regulation 1996 shall be binding to the contract based employees and in case of its violation, the contract can be terminated without following any procedure." 10. Plain and simple reading of the aforesaid condition No.1 suggest that liberty is reserved for the respondents to extend the contract, if they so desire and the petitioners can be terminated from service, without issuance of any notice in case their work is found unsatisfactory. After completion of the last contract i.e. on 31.03.2017, the petitioners were not re-engaged by the respondents. 11. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the observations made by the Division Bench in the aforesaid judgement dated 27.04.2021 rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.776 of 2021, wherein the Division Bench, after considering array of the judgement of the Apex Court, on a similar issue has held thus: "11. None of the arguments advanced by Mr. Syed, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants appeal to us. None of the arguments advanced by Mr. Syed, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants appeal to us. This is not a case of replacement of temporary ad hoc employees by another set of ad hoc or temporary employees. The appellants were engaged on contractual basis for fixed period at fixed pay for specific work. Their period of engagement having come to an end there is no illegality in discontinuing their services. The appellants enjoyed the extension as and when the University thought it proper to grant them depending upon the requirement of work. 11.2 This is not a case of ad hoc replacing ad hoc employee. If the appellants were engaged for a specific work and their requirement was for a fixed period and if the same is disputed, apparently such disputed facts cannot be resolved under writ jurisdiction. 11.3 The next submission that there are vacancies in the University against which the appellants could be continued also fails for the above reason. Lastly that the University is exploiting by not filling up the regular posts would be a policy decision of the University and this Court cannot enter into that aspect. Insofar as Civil Applications are concerned, the challenge to the e- tender for engaging an outsourcing agency cannot be entertained for the reason that it was not the subject matter before the learned Single Judge. 11.4 The judgment in the case of State of Haryana and others v. Piara Singh and others (supra), would have any application to the facts of the present case. It was a case considering the regularization of the ad hoc/temporary employees and the observations made in paragraphs 46 and 47 to the effect that an ad hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad hoc or temporary employee but should be replaced by a regularly selected candidate in order to avoid arbitrary action on the part of the employer. In the present case, the stand of the University is that the University does not require any further services in the office/department where the appellants were working. So it is not a case of replacement of ad hoc by ad hoc or contractual by contractual. The question is as to whether the work exists for which services would be required or not would be a question of fact and can be only decided by leading evidence by the parties. So it is not a case of replacement of ad hoc by ad hoc or contractual by contractual. The question is as to whether the work exists for which services would be required or not would be a question of fact and can be only decided by leading evidence by the parties. Such disputed question or issue cannot be decided under Article 226 of the Constitution." 11.1 The Division Bench has categorically held that if the period of engagement on contractual basis comes to an end, there is no illegality in discontinuing their services of such employees and they enjoyed the extension as and when their service was required. The Division Bench has also held that such action cannot be said to be replacement of temporary ad hoc employees by another set of ad hoc or temporary employees. 12. The Apex Court in the case of Vidyavardhaka Sangha (supra) has held that the persons who are appointed on ad hoc or temporary for a fixed period, their appointment comes to an end by the efflux of time. The Apex Court has held thus: "4. It is now well-settled principle of law that the appointment made on probation/ad hoc basis for a specific period of time comes to an end by efflux of time and the person holding such post can have no right to continue on the post. In the instant case as noticed above, the respective respondents have accepted the appointment including the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment orders and joined the posts in question and continued on the said post for some years. The respondents having accepted the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment order and allowed the period for which they were appointed to have been elapsed by efflux of time, they are not now permitted to turn their back and say that their appointments could not be terminated on the basis of their appointment letters nor they could be treated as temporary employee or on contract basis. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents to the said effect has no merit and is, therefore, liable to be rejected. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents to the said effect has no merit and is, therefore, liable to be rejected. It is also well-settled law by several other decisions of this Court that appointment on ad hoc basis/temporary basis comes to an end by efflux of time and persons holding such post have no right to continue on the post and ask for regularisation etc." 13. While examining a similar issue, the Supreme Court in the case of Yogesh Mahajan v. R.C.Deka, Director, All India Institute of Medical Sciences, 2018(3) S.C.C. 218 has observed thus: "It is settle law that no contract employee has a right to have his or her contract renewed from time to time. That being so, we are in agreement with the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court that the petitioner was unable to show any statutory or other right to have the contract extended beyond 30th June, 2010, at best, the petitioner could claim that the concerned authorities should consider extending his contract. We find that in fact due consideration was give to this and in spite of a favourable recommendation having been made, the All India Institute of Medical Sciences did not find it appropriate or necessary to continue with his services on a contractual basis. We do not find any arbitrariness in the view taken by the concerned authorities and therefore reject this contention of the petitioner." 14. The Apex Court in the case of Gridco Limited (supra), on which the reliance is placed by the petitioner, has reiterated the principle of law with regard to the termination of contractual employees: The observations are thus: "26. A conspectus of the pronouncements of this court and the development of law over the past few decades thus show that there has been a notable shift from the stated legal position settled in earlier decisions, that termination of a contractual employment in accordance with the terms of the contract was permissible and the employee could claim no protection against such termination even when one of the contracting parties happened to be the State. Remedy for a breach of a contractual condition was also by way of civil action for damages/compensation. With the development of law relating to judicial review of administrative actions, a writ Court can now examine the validity of a termination order passed by public authority. Remedy for a breach of a contractual condition was also by way of civil action for damages/compensation. With the development of law relating to judicial review of administrative actions, a writ Court can now examine the validity of a termination order passed by public authority. It is no longer open to the authority passing the order to argue that its action being in the realm of contract is not open to judicial review. A writ Court is entitled to judicially review the action and determine whether there was any illegality, perversity, unreasonableness, unfairness or irrationality that would vitiate the action, no matter the action is in the realm of contract. Having said that we must add that judicial review cannot extend to the Court acting as an appellate authority sitting in judgment over the decision. The Court cannot sit in the arm chair of the Administrator to decide whether a more reasonable decision or course of action could have been taken in the circumstances. So long as the action taken by the authority is not shown to be vitiated by the infirmities referred to above and so long as the action is not demonstrably in outrageous defiance of logic, the writ Court would do well to respect the decision under challenge." 15. Finally, way back in 1950, the Constitution Bench in the case of Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India, AIR 1953 SC 25, in a similar is- sue has enunciated thus: "12. There was no compulsion on the petitioner to enter into the contract he did. He was as free under the law as any other person to accept or to reject the offer which was made to him. Having accepted, he still has open to him all the rights and remedies available to other persons similarly situated to enforce any rights under his contract which have been denied to him, assuming there are any, and to pursue in the ordinary courts of the land such remedies for a breach as are open to him to exactly the same extent as other persons similarly situated. He has not been discriminated against and he has not been denied the protection of any laws which others similarly situated could claim. The remedy of a writ is misconceived. 13. Article 16(1) is equally inapplicable. The whole matter rests in contract. He has not been discriminated against and he has not been denied the protection of any laws which others similarly situated could claim. The remedy of a writ is misconceived. 13. Article 16(1) is equally inapplicable. The whole matter rests in contract. When the petitioner's first contract (the five year one) came to an end, he was not a permanent government servant and Government was not bound either to re-employ him or to continue him in service. On the other hand, it was open to Government to make him the offer it did of a continuation of his employment on a temporary and contractual basis. Though the employment was continued, it was in point of fact, and in the eyes of the law, under a new and fresh contract which was quite separate and distinct from the old even though many of its terms were the same. Article 16(1) deals with equality of opportunity in all matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. The petitioner has not been denied any opportunity of employment or of appointment. He has been treated just like any other person to whom an offer of temporary employment under these conditions was made. His grievance, when analysed, is not one of personal differentiation but is against an offer of temporary employment on special terms as opposed to permanent employment. But of course the State can enter into contracts of temporary employment and impose special terms in each case, provided they are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and those who chose to accept those terms and enter into the contract are bound by them, even as the State is bound. When the employment is permanent there are certain statutory guarantees but in the absence of any such limitations Government is, subject to the qualification mentioned above, as free to make special contracts of service with temporary employees engaged in works of a temporary nature, as any other employer." 16. Thus, the synopsis of the aforenoted observations of the Apex Court is as under: a) Article 16(1) of the Constitution is not applicable and everything is governed by contract. The persons holding the temporary/ad hoc or contractual for a fixed period do not have any right to such posts, and their appointment comes to an end after such period gets over. Such right is not available even if the contract is renewed intermittently. The persons holding the temporary/ad hoc or contractual for a fixed period do not have any right to such posts, and their appointment comes to an end after such period gets over. Such right is not available even if the contract is renewed intermittently. b) Having accepted the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment orders, they are not permitted to turn back and say that the termination was illegal after they were discontinued or terminated after the efflux of time for which they were appointed. c) The contractual employees have no right to have his or her contract renewed from time to time. d) The termination of a contractual employment in accordance with the terms of the contract is permissible and the employee could claim no protection against such termination even when one of the contracting parties happens to be the State, and it is not bound to re-employee the employee. e) the State can enter into contracts of temporary employment and impose special terms in each case, provided they are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and those who choose to accept those terms and enter into the contract are bound by them, even as the State is bound. f) The writ Court can examine the termination if it is demonstrably outrageous and in defiance of logic. 17. Thus, in the present case, it cannot be said that the respondent authorities have acted illegally since the petitioners are relieved after the contract period was over and not during the subsistence of the contract. Merely, because their contract was extended, the same will not create any right of holding the post. An absolute right vests in the respondents, whether the petitioners can be appointed or engaged by way of fresh contract or not. 18. With regard to the submission advanced by the learned advocate Mr.Thomas apropos the condition No.8, which stipulates that the petitioners would be governed by the Gujarat State Council for Primary Education Service Rules and Regulations, 1996. It would be apposite to incorporate Rule 10 of Chapter-4 of the said rules. 18. With regard to the submission advanced by the learned advocate Mr.Thomas apropos the condition No.8, which stipulates that the petitioners would be governed by the Gujarat State Council for Primary Education Service Rules and Regulations, 1996. It would be apposite to incorporate Rule 10 of Chapter-4 of the said rules. The same reads as under: "(10) Termination of Service of an employee on contract: (a) The services of a contract employee may be terminated by the appointing authority without assigning any reason by a notice of one month in writing to the employee or on payment of one month's pay and allowances in lieu of such notice. (b) Without prejudice to the provision of clause (a) the service of a contract employee shall stand terminated. (I) If his appointment is made for a specified period on the expiry of such period unless the appointment is extended for a further period, or (II) If his appointment is made against a temporary post, on the abolition of the post or on the expiry of the period for which the post is created, or (III) If he fails to resume duty on the expiry of the maximum period of extra ordinary leave granted to him and after his explanation, if any in replay to show cause notice, which should be given in all such cases, has been taken into account. (IV) If he is found unfit to wrok (sic) or unsuitable to continue him in service on any account by a notice of one month in writing to the employee or on payment of one month's pay and allowance in lieu of such notice." 19. Learned advocate Mr. Thomas has asserted on the aforesaid Rule and has submitted that since no notice was given prior to termination of services of the petitioners, such termination is required to be set aside since, as per the affidavit filed by the respondent authorities, the services of the petitioners are terminated due to unsatisfactory work. 20. Close reading of Rule 10 would suggest that the case of the petitioners would fall under Rule 10, more particularly Rule 10(b)(IV). The same will suggest the termination of an employee by giving one month's notice or one month's pay, in case he is found unfit for work however, the same will apply in those cases, where the contract period is in subsistence and not after such contact is over. The same will suggest the termination of an employee by giving one month's notice or one month's pay, in case he is found unfit for work however, the same will apply in those cases, where the contract period is in subsistence and not after such contact is over. The services of the petitioners are not terminated, while their contracts were in operation, but no new contract has been entered with the petitioners and they are not engaged after the contracts were over. In the considered opinion of this Court, such discontinuation of the petitioners would not amount to termination, but in fact they are not engaged again by the respondent authorities, after their contract period was over. Hence, the reliance placed on Rule 10(b)(IV) is misconceived. The petitioner is bound by the terms and conditions of the contract, more particularly, the condition no.1, which stipulates that the contract can be terminated looking to his performance of work. Since, the work of the four petitioners was found unsatisfactory, no fresh contract was entered. 21. The contention raised by the petitioners referring their termination as stigmatic and illegal since the same is passed without departmental inquiry does not merit acceptance. It is no more res integra that if a contractual employee has been terminated in view of misconduct without holding any departmental inquiry, the Court can set aside such termination. In the present case, the termination of the petitioners from service in fact cannot be said to stigmatic in any terms. In fact they are simply disengaged from work, after their contracts were over. Reliance placed by the petitioners on the order dated 24.11.2021/07.12.2021 passed in Special Civil Application No.15053 of 2019 and allied matter is also misconceived since it is the case of the petitioners that their termination of service can be said to be stigmatic as they were terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory work. Reliance is placed on the observations recorded in the order dated 17.02.2021 passed by the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No.270 of 2021 in the case of District Development officer v. Dipeshkumar Somabhai Vasava more particularly, paragraph No.9. The same specifically indicates that the Division Bench has clearly opined that full-scale departmental inquiry will have to be undertaken, if initiation of action on the basis of unsatisfactory work, gross negligence or indiscipline or any act which may tantamount to be stigmatic. The same specifically indicates that the Division Bench has clearly opined that full-scale departmental inquiry will have to be undertaken, if initiation of action on the basis of unsatisfactory work, gross negligence or indiscipline or any act which may tantamount to be stigmatic. In the present case, the said proposition of law will not attract as their contracts are not renewed and they are bound by the conditions attached to such contract and observations are to be read in conjunction with misconduct, gross negligence, which would amount to stigma and not compulsory termination. As noticed herein above, the services of the petitioners are not discontinued in the middle of contract or during the subsistence of the contract, which would attract issuance of notice. No fresh contract is entered with them looking to their performance, as per condition no.1 of their appointment order. The writ court while exercising its power cannot compel the respondents to renew the contract with the petitioners and reappoint them. There would not be any "reinstatement", but it would be "re- appointment" since the contract is over. 22. In view of the foregoing reasons and analysis, the writ petition fails, the same is dismissed. RULE is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.