JUDGMENT Sanjib Banerjee, CJ. - The short question involved in this case is whether an applicant having taken advantage of a concession as regards any eligibility criterion in one category may again avail of the same concession in another category to be, in effect, the double or multiple beneficiary of the concession by virtue of such candidate belonging to two or more of the categories entitled to obtain the concession. 2. The issue is of some importance and despite the considerable industry on the part of Counsel appearing on either side, no direct precedent on the issue has been brought. 3. It must be recorded at the outset that this petition has been received since the Central Administrative Tribunal was not available as is recorded in the interim order of August 12, 2022, and that despite the petitioner's best efforts, the petition carried to the Tribunal could not be listed since August 5, 2022 while the selection process was being continued upon the petitioner being found ineligible to be considered for the post. 4. The petitioner applied for the post of Professor-cum-Principal in the College of Nursing of the North Eastern Indira Gandhi Regional Institute of Health and Medical Sciences, Shillong. In terms of the governing rules and the invitation to apply, the age limit for recruitment was 45 years. Indeed, the exact words are as follows:- 'Not exceeding 45 years (Relaxable by 5 years for Government Servants in accordance with the instruction of Central Govt.)' 5. Since the other eligibility criteria to be entitled to apply for the post are irrelevant for the present purpose, it is only the age criterion which is taken into consideration. 6. It is not in dispute that the petitioner belongs to a scheduled tribe. The petitioner is also in government service. At the time that the petitioner applied for the position, she was about 54 years of age and her application was rejected on the ground that she was overaged by about four years or so. It is against the rejection of her application, that the petitioner is before this Court. 7. The petitioner relies on an office memorandum of March 27, 2012 issued by the government of India that claims to be a consolidation of the orders on relaxation in upper age-limit allowed to various categories of Central government servants. It is against the rejection of her application, that the petitioner is before this Court. 7. The petitioner relies on an office memorandum of March 27, 2012 issued by the government of India that claims to be a consolidation of the orders on relaxation in upper age-limit allowed to various categories of Central government servants. It is important to notice the exact words of the relevant memorandum which is followed by a detailed table running into the next six pages: 'Consolidated orders on relaxation in upper age limit allowed to various categories of government servants. 'The undersigned is directed to invite attention to this Department's Notification No.2/101 /72-Estt(D) dated 07.03.1974 and to say that since then a number of instructions allowing relaxation in upper age to Central government servants for recruitment to various categories of posts under the Central government have been issued. For the facility of reference and guidance, the content of the important/relevant O.M.'s/orders on the subject have been consolidated. The number and date of original O.M.'s have been referred under each category for easy reference to the context.' 8. The petitioner relies on the first entry in the table pertaining to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The memorandum refers to a notification of March 7, 1974 and provides that in all posts filled by direct recruitment, there would be an age relaxation to the extent of five years for scheduled caste and scheduled tribe applicants. 9. The petitioner next places Rule 10 of the Recruitment Rules for Nursing Faculty and Other Posts of NEIGRIHMS, 2004. The relevant provision reads as follows: '10. Reservation of Schedule Caste & Schedule Tribe - Nothing in these Rules shall affect reservation, relaxation of age limit and other concessions required to be provided for Schedule Castes & Schedule Tribes and other special categories of person in accordance with the orders issued by the Central Government from time to time in this regard.' 10. The petitioner asserts that in view of the office memorandum of March 27, 2012 and the specific provision in the Recruitment Rules of 2004, the petitioner would be entitled to a further relaxation of five years of age over and above the relaxation of five years that she earned by virtue of the petitioner being a government servant. The petitioner asserts that in view of the office memorandum of March 27, 2012 and the specific provision in the Recruitment Rules of 2004, the petitioner would be entitled to a further relaxation of five years of age over and above the relaxation of five years that she earned by virtue of the petitioner being a government servant. The petitioner maintains that the unequivocal wording of Rule 10 virtually incorporates the memorandum of March 27, 2012 into the 2004 Rules and whatever other relaxation the petitioner may be entitled to by virtue of any other status, the petitioner cannot be denied the additional age relaxation of five years in terms of the memorandum of March 27, 2012. 11. For contrary purposes, the parties have placed reliance on the judgments reported at (2010) 3 SCC 119 (Jitendra Kumar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh); (2017) 12 SCC 680 (Deepa EV v. Union of India); and (2019) 7 SCC 383 (Niravkumar Dilipbhai Makwana v. Gujarat Public Service Commission). 12. Though, in the ultimate analysis, the judgments carried by the parties to Court may not throw any light on the particular issue which arises here, the judgments may be noticed. All three cases involved selection of aspirants to posts involving both reserved category candidates and unreserved category candidates. 13. In Jitendra Kumar Singh, it was held at paragraph 48 of the report that when a reserved category candidate secured such marks as would qualify an unreserved category candidate obtaining the same marks to be selected, then such meritorious reserved category candidate would be deemed to be selected as an unreserved category candidate. Though the principle has been enunciated in wide words, the ratio has to be read down in the context of the applicable rules. 14. Thankfully, the seemingly wide dictum in Jitendra Kumar Singh has been appropriately whittled down in the discussion in Niravkumar Dilipbhai Makwana. At paragraphs 24 and 25 of the report in Makwana, the later judgment noticed the following stipulation which applied in the Jitendra Kumar Singh case: '3(6) If a person belonging to any of the categories mentioned in sub-section (1) gets selected on the basis of merit in an open competition with general candidates, he shall not be adjusted against the vacancies reserved for such category under sub-section (1).' 15. To boot, the following written instruction was issued by the authorities and governed the decision in Jitendra Kumar Singh: 'It shall be immaterial that he has availed any facility or relaxation (like relaxation in age-limit) available to reserved category.' 16. The rationale for treating a meritorious reserved category candidate, who obtains such marks as would entitle an unreserved category candidate obtaining the same marks to be selected, as an unreserved selectee is that even if there were no reservation, such candidate would have succeeded in being selected by virtue of her merit. However, if the relevant reserved category meritorious candidate participated in the selection process by availing of any relaxation in the qualification criteria, then she would have taken benefit of the affirmative action and, unless the applicable rules permit her to be catapulted as an unreserved category selectee, having taken the benefit of any concession by virtue of her status to participate in the selection process, she would have to be regarded as a reserved category selectee. Any relaxation of the eligibility criteria for certain specified categories is, by itself, affirmative action. 17. The dictum in Jitendra Kumar Singh has to be read against the backdrop that the applicable rules expressly permitted a reserved category candidate, who secured such marks as would entitle an unreserved category candidate obtaining the same marks to be selected, to be regarded as an unreserved category selectee irrespective of whether such candidate had obtained the benefit of any concession to be eligible to participate in the selection process. Such distinction was noticed and brought out in the judgment in Makwana. 18. On the other hand, in Makwana, there was a government notification, as noticed at paragraph 14 of the report, that permitted the meritorious reserved category candidates to be adjusted in the unreserved category based on the marks obtained. However, there was a January 29, 2000 circular that added a caveat that a reserved category candidate would jump to occupy an open category seat by dint of performance only if such candidate had not availed of any relaxation 'viz. However, there was a January 29, 2000 circular that added a caveat that a reserved category candidate would jump to occupy an open category seat by dint of performance only if such candidate had not availed of any relaxation 'viz. age-limit, experience, qualification, number of chances to appear in the examination ...' In other words, in the altered scenario in Makwana, as opposed to Jitendra Kumar Singh, only such reserved category candidates who secured as much marks as the last qualifying unreserved category candidate, would be regarded as appointees in the unreserved category if the candidates had not availed of any relaxation by virtue of such candidates' status, qua age, experience, number of chances to apply and the like. 19. In Deepa EV, the Supreme Court noticed an office memorandum of the Union Department of Personnel and Training of July 1, 1998 that provided as follows in its third paragraph: '3. In this connection, it is clarified that only such SC/ST/OBC candidates who are selected on the same standard as applied to general candidates shall not be adjusted against reserved vacancies. In other words, when a relaxed standard is applied in selecting an SC/ST/OBC candidates, for example in the age limit, experience, qualification, permitted number of chances in written examination, extended zone of consideration larger than what is provided for general category candidates etc., the SC/ST/OBC candidates are to be counted against reserved vacancies. Such candidates would be deemed as unavailable for consideration against unreserved vacancies.' 20. Upon considering the effect of the office memorandum of July 1, 1998 in a case pertaining to selection, it was held in Deepa EV that if the reserved category candidate, who had obtained higher marks than the last qualifying unreserved category candidate, had not obtained any benefit of relaxation in the eligibility criteria, such reserved category candidate would be regarded as unreserved category appointee. However, if the concerned reserved category candidate had obtained the benefit of any concession, the candidate would be considered successful in the relevant reserved category rather than being catapulted to the unreserved category. 21. With respect, none of the judgments cited nor the office memorandum of July 1, 1998 has any material bearing on the present case, despite the strenuous effort on behalf of the respondents to rely on the last sentence of the third paragraph from the memorandum of July 1, 1998. 21. With respect, none of the judgments cited nor the office memorandum of July 1, 1998 has any material bearing on the present case, despite the strenuous effort on behalf of the respondents to rely on the last sentence of the third paragraph from the memorandum of July 1, 1998. Even the last sentence from the relevant memorandum has to be read in the context of what precedes it; that is to say, the last sentence would be applicable only in a selection scenario and not when it comes to considering whether a candidate was eligible to be considered for selection. The argument made on behalf of the respondents to the effect that the last sentence in the said memorandum of July 1, 1998 would govern the eligibility position in a solitary post selection process, does not appeal and is expressly rejected. 22. A participant in a selection process may have no entrenched right to be selected, but, equally, such candidate has a right to be fairly considered for selection, subject to the candidate being eligible for participation in the process. The petitioner's grievance is not that she has not been selected, but that she has not been considered for selection. It is the petitioner's ouster from the process that she challenges as unfair and arbitrary. 23. The matter may be seen with an example to elicit the principle that would govern the present scenario. Reference in this regard will again be made to the memorandum of 2012 that the petitioner cites as a trump card. The discussion here is confined to relaxation in age-limit and such discussion may be relevant in respect of similar relaxed qualifying criteria like years of experience or number of chances permitted to apply; but may not be relevant for other criteria like educational qualifications or place of residence or the like. 24. It is possible that several types of concessions or relaxations are provided to several categories of persons. It would not follow that if a person belongs to several of the categories, the quantum of concession that such candidate would be entitled to avail would be the sum of the concession available in every applicable category. 24. It is possible that several types of concessions or relaxations are provided to several categories of persons. It would not follow that if a person belongs to several of the categories, the quantum of concession that such candidate would be entitled to avail would be the sum of the concession available in every applicable category. In other words, if age relaxation, which is the issue involved in the present case, is to be taken into consideration and if the applicable rules permit age relaxation for scheduled caste candidates and also for persons with disability, a scheduled caste candidate with disability would not be entitled to duplication of the concession unless the rules expressly permit the same. 25. To clarify, when a concession as to any qualifying criteria is conferred and such concession is available to several classes of persons, when a person answers to more than one description of the classes, such person may not be entitled to take advantage of the concession more than once unless the rules expressly permit so. Logically, that ought to be the principle. 26. To continue with the example, in the above scenario of age relaxation for scheduled caste candidates and also for persons with disability, if there was a further concession for local candiates and the concession in respect of all three categories was an age relaxation of five years, an absurd situation would arise if the aggregate concession by covering all the categories were to be obtained. If, in such a case, the upper age-limit for the post is fixed at 48, a local scheduled caste candidate with disability, by adding up the concession in the three categories, would be eligible to apply at age 63; which would be absurd. 27. Thus, the answer in the present case has to be that when a candidate falls in several of the categories entitled to the some relaxation, the candidate may avail of the maximum relaxation in any one category once, unless the rules or the advertisement or the like permit a duplication or multiplication thereof. 28. One may now return to the March, 2012 office memorandum that the petitioner has cited. In the table following the substance of the matter set out hereinabove, several categories of persons are indicated. The first category, as referred to above, pertains to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The third category pertains to persons with disabilities. 28. One may now return to the March, 2012 office memorandum that the petitioner has cited. In the table following the substance of the matter set out hereinabove, several categories of persons are indicated. The first category, as referred to above, pertains to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The third category pertains to persons with disabilities. For SC and ST candidates, an age relaxation of five years across the board is permitted and for PWD an age relaxation of 10 years is permitted. If nothing else were to be indicated in the relevant memorandum, an SC or ST candidate suffering from any disability would not be entitled to age relaxation of 15 years. However, the relevant memorandum expressly specifies in its second page that both the age relaxation could be availed of by a SC and ST candidate who is disabled. In the absence of this express specification, the benefit in aggregate could not have been taken. 29. Much is made of Rule 10 of the said Rules of 2004 and the apparent non-obstante clause that it begins with. A proper reading of the rule would imply that if SC and ST candidates were entitled to any concession which was not indicated in the foregoing rules, but which was pursuant to any Central government orders, they would be entitled to avail of the same. That would imply that if a person applying for the post of Principal-cum- Professor in the nursing college were to be an SC or ST candidate, she could also have availed of the age relaxation of five years in terms of the March, 2012 office memorandum. 30. However, the rules cannot be seen to imply that a government servant who belongs to a scheduled tribe would be entitled to a further five-year age relaxation over and above the relaxation obtained by virtue of being a government servant. If the extents of relaxation were different in respect of several categories, a candidate belonging to multiple categories may take the benefit of the maximum concession, but not the sum total thereof corresponding to the number of categories whereunder she qualifies. 31. The principle will apply with greater force in a selection process for the appointment of a solitary, open category candidate; as in the present case. 32. 31. The principle will apply with greater force in a selection process for the appointment of a solitary, open category candidate; as in the present case. 32. Since nothing in the relevant advertisement or the applicable rules permitted a candidate belonging to several categories to obtain the aggregate of the concession pertaining to a particular criterion, the petitioner herein was appropriately found ineligible to participate in the process or be considered for selection. 33. Accordingly, there is no merit in the petition. The petitioner's application was rightly rejected and the petitioner's candidature not considered since the petitioner was seeking to take advantage of the age relaxation twice over which the rules did not expressly or otherwise permit. 34. WP (C) No.303 of 2022 is dismissed. 35. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 36. There will be no impediment to the selection process being completed or for any appointment to the relevant post being made in accordance with law.