JUDGMENT Ravi Shanker Jha, Chief Justice (Oral) - CM No. 2723-LPA of 2022 1. We have heard learned counsel for the parties on the application for condonation of delay. The delay of 33 days in filing the appeal, though vehemently opposed by learned counsel for the caveator-respondent No.1, is condoned. Application stands allowed. Letters Patent Appeal No. 1122 of 2022 Issue notice of motion to the respondents for 17.02.2023. 2. Mr. Prateek Pandit, Advocate, on the strength of caveat, accepts notice on behalf of respondent No.1. 3. This appeal has been filed by the appellants being aggrieved by the order dated 06.09.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge, wherein the learned Single Judge relying upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court dated 23.01.2019 passed in Civil Writ Petition No. 1137 of 2018 Mahesh Kumar Gupta vs. National Institute of Technology, Kurukshetra and others, has allowed the petition filed by the respondent-petitioner Raj Kumar Bansal and directed the respondent-authorities to grant the benefit of mapping and awarding him the academic grade pay of Rs.9500/- on the post of Associate Professor simply on the ground that he has completed the requisite number of years of service and has obtained 25 credit points without making him to go through the process of a Selection Committee to adjudge his suitability for grant of the said benefit. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that in view of the provisions of the Statutes governing grant of such benefit, apart from the fact that the petitioner (respondent No.1 herein) has the necessary and requisite number of years of service, he is also required to be found suitable by a Selection Committee for grant of benefit of mapping in the higher academic grade pay. He submits that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Mahesh Kumar Gupta's case (supra) relied upon by the learned Single Judge actually does not decide any issue and was passed on concession and therefore, cannot be treated as a precedent. 5. He submits that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Mahesh Kumar Gupta's case (supra) relied upon by the learned Single Judge actually does not decide any issue and was passed on concession and therefore, cannot be treated as a precedent. 5. He further submits that even if the said decision in Mahesh Kumar Gupta (supra) has decided the matter relating to interpretation of Note-1 (6) of Schedule-E of the First Statutes of the National Institutes of Technology (Amendment) Statutes, 2017, then in that eventuality, the interpretation given by the Division Bench to the said clause of the Schedule totally ignores the proviso and its impact on the interpretation which specifically provides that mapping for higher academic grade pay can be granted provided the candidate concerned has been found suitable by a Selection Committee constituted under the Statutes. 6. He submits that if the interpretation given by the Division Bench in Mahesh Kumar Gupta's case (supra) is permitted to stand, it renders the proviso otiose, redundant and meaningless. He submits that in case the interpretation given by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment, while relying upon the decision rendered by the Division Bench in Mahesh Kumar Gupta's case (supra), is permitted to be implemented, it would amount to granting the benefit of mapping and higher grade pay simply on completion of requisite number of years of service and credit points without the requirement of a person being found suitable by a Selection Committee. He has relied upon various decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in the cases of Baidyanath Yadav vs. Aditya Narayan Roy and others 2020(16) SCC 799 , National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences vs. Dr. K.Kalyana Raman, 1992 (suppl.2) SCC 481 and U.P.S.C. vs. K.Rajaiah and others 2005 (10) SCC 15 , to contend that the Selection Committee constituted for adjudging the suitability need not to record specific reasons for selection or non-selection of a candidate as the function discharged by such a Selection Committee is neither judicial nor adjudicatory and is purely administrative. It is submitted that in the absence of any such requirement in the Statutes, the Selection Committee is entitled to lay down its own criteria for the purposes of determining suitability of a candidate, which criteria is apart from the requirements mentioned in Note-1(6) mentioned above, regarding the requisite number of service and credit points. 7. It is submitted that in the absence of any such requirement in the Statutes, the Selection Committee is entitled to lay down its own criteria for the purposes of determining suitability of a candidate, which criteria is apart from the requirements mentioned in Note-1(6) mentioned above, regarding the requisite number of service and credit points. 7. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge relying upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Mahesh Kumar Gupta's case (supra) does not lay down the correct law. He further submits that in such circumstances the decision of the Division Bench rendered in Mahesh Kumar Gupta's case (supra) be referred to a larger Bench as it is resulting in misinterpretation of the provisions of the statute, though the decision was rendered on certain concessions and statements which are confined to the facts of that case and were recorded by the Division Bench in that context. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent, per-contra, has vehemently opposed by the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants. He submits that the only requirement and the very object and purpose of holding a Selection Committee is to see whether the concerned person fulfills the requisite number of years of service and has obtained the necessary credit points. He submits that this is so as the employee in question has already rendered several years of service after having obtained the necessary educational qualification except the qualification of Ph.D. and it is only on this count that the mapping is required to be done subject to suitability. He submits that the learned Single Bench as well as the learned Division Bench in the case of Mahesh Kumar Gupta's (supra) have rightly held that the object and purpose of holding of Selection Committee is superfluous and is merely to examine as to whether the candidate in question has the necessary and requisite number of years of service and possesses the necessary credit points and if he does so that is the end of the requirements which are required to be fulfilled under the Statutes and the person has to be granted the benefit of mapping in the higher grade pay. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. 9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. 9. For the purposes of better understanding the issue, it is apposite to reproduce relevant parts of Statute No.12 of the First Statutes of the National Institutes of Technology (Amendment) Statutes, 2017, by which the original statute has been amended as notified by the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department of Higher Education, Government of India, on 21.07.2017, which has been filed along with the petition and as part of the appeal as Annexure P-3:- '12. In Statue 23 of the Principal Statutes:- a) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx b) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx c) In sub-statute (5) for clause (a), the following shall be substituted, namely:- (a) The qualification and other terms and conditions of appointment of Academic Staff (excluding Director), or promotion shall be as specified in Schedule 'E' and the Selection Committee for making recommendations for appointment of Academic Staff (excluding Director) shall consist of the following members, namely:- (1) Director or Deputy Director - Chairman (2) Visitor's Nominee -Member (3) two nominee of the board one being an expert, but other than a member of the Board: -Member (4) one expert nominee of Senate from outside the Institute: -Member (5) Head of the Department concerned: -Member (for other than the post of Deputy Director and Professor) (d) In sub-statute (5), for clause (d), the following shall be substituted, namely:- (d) The Selection Committee for Senior Administrative and other comparable posts carrying pay scale of Assistant Professor and above shall consist of the following members, namely:- (1) Director or Deputy Director -Chairman (2) one Expert from outside the Institute- -Member (3) Nominee of Ministry of Human Resource Development- -Member (4) Nominee of Board- -Member (5) Registrar- -Member (e) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" 10. The above clauses specify the constitution of Selection Committees which are required to perform their duties under the Statutes. The qualification and the terms and conditions of the appointment of academic staff have been prescribed under Schedule-E appended to the Statutes. Note-1 (1) and (6) of Schedule-E of the First Statutes of the National Institutes of Technology (Amendment) Statutes, 2017 read as under:- Note 1: (1) Any change in the grade pay will be through open advertisement and on recommendation of duly constituted selection committee, except where specifically exempted in these rules. Note-1 (1) and (6) of Schedule-E of the First Statutes of the National Institutes of Technology (Amendment) Statutes, 2017 read as under:- Note 1: (1) Any change in the grade pay will be through open advertisement and on recommendation of duly constituted selection committee, except where specifically exempted in these rules. (6) The permanent faculty members who have put in more than ten years experience, but have not acquired Ph.D. qualification as on the date of these notification shall be mapped into four-tier flexible system as one time measure as per following norms:- a) Permanent faculty with age fifty or above: i) The Assistant Professors with Academic Grade Pay of Rs.7000 shall be mapped at the level of Assistant Professor with Academic Grade Pay of Rs.8000, provided they have at least 10 credit points in their lifetime. ii) The Assistant Professors with Academic Grade Pay of Rs.8000 shall be mapped at the level of Associate Professor with Academic Grade Pay of Rs.9500 provided they have at least 25 credit points in their lifetime. iii) The Associate Professors with Academic Grade pay of Rs.9000 shall be mapped at the level of Associate Professor with Academic Grade Pay of Rs.9500, provided they have at least 25 credit points in their lifetime; Provided they have been found suitable through a Selection Committee duly constituted under the Statutes." 11. The said statute was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Mahesh Kumar Gupta's case (supra) and after quoting Note-1(6) of the Statute, the Division Bench has held as under:- 'The real grievance that is conveyed by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the proviso to the said clause (6) provides for constitution of selection committee under the statutes for finding out whether the candidate is suitable or not for granting AGP of Rs. 9500/-. On this grievance, we have heard learned counsel for the rival parties for quite some time. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the real reason for constitution of selection committee is to verify as to whether the candidate at this age of the petitioner, complies with the conditions laid down in the notification and in particular the candidates having at least 25 credit points in their lifetime. Except this, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners and as is clear from the notification itself, there is no other object of constitution of selection committee. Except this, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners and as is clear from the notification itself, there is no other object of constitution of selection committee. To put in other words, the submission is that the selection committee is constituted formally to find out whether the said conditions and the ancillary conditions are satisfied or not and nothing beyond that. Upon reading of notification in entirety and upon hearing the learned counsel for the rival parties and the statement made by counsel for the respondent and upon perusal of the notification, we think that the submissions made by learned counsel for the respondents are correct. We are of the opinion that the petitioner who earned the experience as Associate Professor for about 10 years cannot be asked to have his merit tested by the selection committee. Thus, in our opinion, the process of finding out 25 credit points in their lifetime along with ancillary points by the selection committee, is in the nature of verification to achieve the object sought to be achieved. Not only that the respondents have also agreed to this interpretation which we have stated above. In the above background, the counsel for the petitioner also states that the petitioner was only worried about facing the selection committee. But in view of the discussion made above and the statement made by counsel for the respondents, we think the grievance of the petitioner does not survive. In the result, we make the following order:- ORDER (i) CWP No. 1137 of 2018 is partly allowed. (ii) The petition is disposed of with the above clarification. (iii) Interim order stands vacated. (iv) The respondents are entitled to go ahead with the process they have started." 12. In the result, we make the following order:- ORDER (i) CWP No. 1137 of 2018 is partly allowed. (ii) The petition is disposed of with the above clarification. (iii) Interim order stands vacated. (iv) The respondents are entitled to go ahead with the process they have started." 12. From a perusal of the decision given by the Division Bench in Mahesh Kumar Gupta's case, quoted above, it is evident that the Division Bench after quoting Note-1(6) has taken on record the statement of the respondent to the effect that 'the Selection Committee is to verify as to whether the candidate at this age of the petitioner, complies with the conditions laid down in the notification and in particulate the candidates having at least 25 credit points in their lifetime.' The Division Bench thereafter subsequently in the same paragraph has held that 'thus in our opinion, the process of finding out 25 credit points in their lifetime along with ancillary points by the selection committee, is in the nature of verification to achieve the object sought to be achieved. Not only that the respondents have also agreed to this interpretation which we have stated above.' 13. In the last paragraph, the Division Bench has gone on to state that 'the petitioner was only worried about facing the selection committee. But in view of the discussion made above and the statement made by counsel for the respondents, we think the grievance of the petitioner does not survive.' 14. The Division Bench thereafter while issuing the directions has not passed any direction that the process of adjudging the suitability of the candidate by the Selection Committee has to be waived of or not and if not what is the extent of scrutiny to be made by the Selection Committee and on the contrary it has been ordered that 'the respondents are entitled to go ahead with the process they have started', which incidentally was the process of holding a selection committee. 15. This part of the judgment of the Division Bench has been interpreted by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment to mean that the Division Bench has waived of the requirement of holding a Selection Committee or in any case reduced it to a mere formality of only examining as to whether the candidate has the necessary 25 credit points. 16. 16. Quite apart from the above, from a perusal of the part of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench in Mahesh Kumar Gupta's case (supra), which has been quoted by us in the preceding paragraphs, it is further evident that though the Division Bench at one point of time has stated that 'it is our opinion that the Selection Committee is merely a verification committee', in the ultimate no such direction has been issued by the Division Bench by clearly and specifically recording the fact that it is not required to do so as the grievance of the petitioner does not survive, evidently because of the consensual statement of the respondents and therefore, it is evident that there is no adjudication on merits which can be treated as a precedent. 17. The question that has been raised and arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether the Division Bench decision in Mahesh Kumar Gupta's case (supra) can be treated as a binding precedent firstly on account of the fact that it was delivered and decided on the basis of certain concessions made by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents therein and secondly on the ground that even if the decision has been rendered in the said case on-merits, whether the interpretation given to the Statutes has been given after due discussion or whether it has been given ignoring the principles of statutory interpretation and therefore, requires to be referred to a larger Bench. 18. Having heard learned counsel for the parties on this issue, we are of the considered opinion that the law to the effect that the decision rendered on the basis of concession is not a binding precedent is well settled and for this purpose the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Kulwant Kaur and others vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by L.Rs. and others 2001(4) SCC 262 , can be relied upon. 19. and others 2001(4) SCC 262 , can be relied upon. 19. Apart from the above, from a bare perusal and reading of Note-1(6) of Schedule-E of the First Statute, as quoted in the preceding paragraph, it is evident that the faculty members holding posts of Assistant Professor(s), who have put in more than 10 years experience but do not possess Ph.D. qualification, are required to be mapped into four-tier flexible system as one time measure, being above 50 years of age, if being in the grade pay of Rs.7000/- have at least 10 credit points in their life time; if in the grade pay of Rs.8000/- have 25 credit points in their life time; and if in the grade pay of Rs.9000/- have 25 credit points in their life time, provided they are found suitable through a Selection Committee duly constituted under the Statute. 20. Evidently, apart from adjudging and calculating the age, the pay scale and the credit points, the suitability of a candidate has to be adjudged by a Selection Committee and therefore, a plain reading of the Statute makes it clear that adjudging suitability of a candidate is a requirement which is in addition to and apart from the requirement of age, grade pay and credit points. 21. We are constrained to say so as the proviso clearly states that the benefit under the Statute on the basis of age, grade pay and credit points can be given 'provided that a candidate is found suitable through a Selection Committee'. As the law requires that the words used in a provision of law have to be given full meaning and effect to, it is evident that a candidate apart from fulfilling the criteria regarding age, grade pay and credit points must also be found to be suitable by a duly constituted Selection Committee. A plain reading of the Statute makes it clear that the effect and import of the word 'suitable' used in the proviso to the Statute in question cannot be confined only to the exercise of calculating the credit points as that exercise can be done even without adjudging suitability of a candidate. A plain reading of the Statute makes it clear that the effect and import of the word 'suitable' used in the proviso to the Statute in question cannot be confined only to the exercise of calculating the credit points as that exercise can be done even without adjudging suitability of a candidate. Prima-facie, we have serious reservations in accepting that the word 'suitability' used in the Statute is confined only to calculating the credit points and we are of the prima-facie of the opinion that the word 'suitability' has a much larger connotation and that the Statute requires that the suitability of a candidate apart from age, grade pay and credit points, has to be adjudged by a Selection Committee comprising of experts by taking all aspects into consideration. We can profitably refer to a decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Union of India through its Secretary and others vs. Major General Manomoy Ganguly 2018(9) SCC 65 in support of the aforesaid proposition. 22. In the circumstances, in our humble opinion, the correctness of the aforesaid observations/decision rendered by the Division Bench in Mahesh Kumar Gupta's case (supra), requires and deserves to be referred to a larger Bench for consideration. Accordingly, the following questions are referred for decision to the larger Bench:- i) Whether in view of the observations made by the Division Bench in Mahesh Kumar Gupta's case (supra), the order passed therein constitutes a binding precedent or whether it being an order passed on recording a statement of the respondent cannot be treated as such. ii) Whether the first proviso contained in Note-1(6) of Schedule-E of the Statutes has to be given full meaning and effect thereby permitting the authorities to hold the Selection Committee for adjudging the suitability of a candidate for grant of mapping under the Statutes. iii) Whether the extent of adjudging the suitability of a candidate by the Selection Committee, as contained in the proviso to Note-1(6) of Schedule-E, is confined only to verifying as to whether the candidate has the requisite number of years of service and possesses the necessary credit points or whether the Selection Committee has the power to adjudge the suitability of a candidate by taking all aspects into consideration. iv) Whether the decision given in Mahesh Kumar Gupta's case by the Division Bench lays down the correct law or is liable to be overruled. 23. iv) Whether the decision given in Mahesh Kumar Gupta's case by the Division Bench lays down the correct law or is liable to be overruled. 23. As we have referred the matter to a larger Bench, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and the interim prayer made by learned counsel for the appellants, it is ordered that in the meanwhile, operation of the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge shall remain stayed. 24. The matter may be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders.