JUDGMENT : (Prayer: This Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, against the Decree and Judgment passed in A.S.No. 138 of 2002 on the file of Additional District Fast Track Court No.1, Tindivanam on 07.03.2003 by which it has reversed the decree and Judgment passed in O.S.No. 784 of 1995 on the file of District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate Court, Vanur, on 30.07.1999.) 1. The plaintiff in O.S.No. 784 of 1995 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Vanur, is the appellant herein. 2. The suit in O.S.No. 784 of 1995 was originally filed before the Sub Court at Tindivanam and numbered as O.S.No. 188 of 1995 and had then been transferred to the District Munsif Court at Vanur was renumbered as O.S.No. 784 of 1995. It was filed by the plaintiff Kuppuswamy Pillai against two defendants Swaminatha Thanthiriyar and Ramamurthi Pillai, seeking a Judgment and Decree directing the first defendant to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff after receiving the balance sale consideration of Rs.22,300/- and in default for the Court to execute the sale deed on behalf of the first defendant and in the alternate to direct the first defendant to pay a sum of Rs.5,000/- being the earnest money received under the suit sale agreement from the plaintiff and also for permanent injunction restraining the second defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful possession of the suit property under the guise of any sham and nominal document and for costs of the suit. By Judgment dated 30.07.1999, the suit was decreed for the relief of specific performance. 3. The defendants then filed A.S.No. 69 of 1999 before the Sub Court at Tindivanam, which appeal suit was then transferred to the Additional District Court/Fast Track Court No.1, Tindivanam and renumbered as A.S.No. 138 of 2002. By Judgement dated 07.03.2003, the Appeal was allowed and the grant of relief of specific performance by the trial Court was set aside and in the alternate, a decree was passed for return of the advance amount of Rs.5,000/- together with interest. 4. Questioning that Judgment, the plaintiff had filed the present Second Appeal. 5. The Second Appeal had been admitted on the following two substantial questions of law:- “1. 4. Questioning that Judgment, the plaintiff had filed the present Second Appeal. 5. The Second Appeal had been admitted on the following two substantial questions of law:- “1. Whether the finding of the first Appellate Court that the agreement of sale Ex.A-1 is not valid is legally sustainable in as much as it has failed to note that the property has been allotted to the share of the 1st respondent and as such it is his absolute property? 2. Whether the finding of the 1st appellate Court that Ex.B-1 is valid and binding is legally sustainable in as much as it has not considered that Ex.B-1 has been created only to defeat the rights under Ex.A- 1?” 6. During the pendency of the Second Appeal, the second respondent/first defendant died and his legal representatives were brought on record as 3rd to 7th respondents. O.S.No. 784 of 1995 – District Munsif Court, Vanur: 7. The plaintiff Kuppuswamy Pillai claimed that the suit schedule property belonged to the first defendant Swaminatha Thanthiriyar. He offered to sell the property to the plaintiff for Rs.27,300/- and had received an advance of Rs.5,000/-. A sale agreement was also entered into on 01.09.1995. The balance sale consideration was to be paid within three months and the sale deed was to be executed on receipt thereof. It was stated that the first defendant had however executed a sale deed in favour of the second defendant Ramamurthi Pillai. It was stated that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement and had also demanded the first defendant to execute the sale deed in his favour on 07.09.1995. The plaintiff claimed to be in possession of the suit property. In view of aforesaid circumstances, the suit had been filed for the reliefs stated. 8. The suit property was situated in Vanur in Nesal Village, Vanur, Villupuram District, in dry S.No. 106/2 measuring 0.55 cents out of a total area of 1.74 acres. 9. The second defendant filed a written statement which was adopted by the first defendant. In the written statement, it had been stated that the agreement of sale relied on by the plaintiff is not true and not valid. It was stated that the suit property was the ancestral property of the first defendant, who had five daughters. Two daughters had been married before 1989. In the written statement, it had been stated that the agreement of sale relied on by the plaintiff is not true and not valid. It was stated that the suit property was the ancestral property of the first defendant, who had five daughters. Two daughters had been married before 1989. The third daughter was married in the year 1990. The fourth daughter was married in February 1996. He had one more daughter who was unmarried. It was therefore claimed that the said three daughters and the plaintiff were jointly entitled to the suit property since it was ancestral in nature. It was further stated that two of his daughters were also minors. It was therefore stated that the agreement entered into by the first defendant on 01.09.1995 is not valid in law and cannot be enforced. 10. It had been further stated that the first defendant had entered into an agreement of sale of the property with the second defendant on 20.05.1995. The second defendant was also put in possession. Subsequently, on 21.08.1995 the first defendant sold the property to the second defendant on his behalf and as guardian of his minor daughters. Necessity to sell the property was also stated in the sale deed. It was therefore stated that the second defendant had become the absolute owner of the property and the first defendant had no right to enter into an agreement of sale on 01.09.1995 with the plaintiff. It was also stated that the second defendant is a bona fide purchaser. It was stated that the plaintiff had created the agreement of sale mentioned by him in the plaint. It was therefore stated that the suit should be dismissed. 11. On the basis of the above pleadings, the District Munsif, Vanur, framed the following issues for trial:- i) Whether the agreement dated 01.09.1995 between the plaintiff and the first defendant was a created agreement?; ii) Whether the agreement dated 01.09.1995 suffers owing to non participation of the legal heirs of the first defendant?; iii) Whether the plaintiff was in possession over the suit property from the date of the agreement?; iv) Whether the agreement between the first and second defendants dated 20.05.1995 and the sale deed dated 21.08.1995 are both legally valid and binding?; v) To what other reliefs is the plaintiff entitled to?” 12. During the course of trial, on the side of the plaintiff, quite apart from the plaintiff who examined himself as PW-1, five other witnesses were examined as PW-2 to PW-6. On the side of the defendants, the second defendant was examined as DW-1 and another witness was examined as DW-2. The plaintiff marked Exs. A-1 to A-5. Ex.A-1 was the agreement dated 01.09.1995. Exs. A-3 to A-5 were the registers of the stamp vendors. The defendants marked Ex. B-1 sale deed dated 21.08.1995 executed by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant. 13. On the basis of the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, the learned District Munsif observed that the agreement dated 01.09.1995 marked as Ex.A-1 does not suffer owing to non participation of the minor daughters of the first defendant. The District Munsif also found fault with the defendants for not having produced the earlier agreement of sale dated 20.05.1995 between the first and second defendants. It was also found that though the sale deed was executed on 21.08.1995 by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant, it was kept pending by the Sub Registrar Office owing to inadequate stamps being presented and thereafter was registered only on 04.09.1995. It was held that the said sale deed had been executed only to defeat the rights of the plaintiff. It was declared that the sale deed dated 21.08.1995 in favour of the second defendant was null and void and not binding. In view of the above reasons, the suit was decreed. A.S.No. 138 of 2002: 14. The defendants then filed a first appeal which came up for consideration before the Additional District Court/Fast Track Court No.1, Tindivanam on 07.03.2003. The learned Additional District Judge, framed the following points for consideration:- “i) Whether the agreement dated 01.09.1995 is valid?; ii) Whether the suit property was the exclusive property of the first appellant? iii) Whether the sale deed in favour of the second appellant was true and legally valid?; iv) Whether the respondent was in possession of the suit property?; and v) To what other reliefs, the appellants entitled to?” 15. The learned Additional District Judge took up for consideration the points framed and found that Ex.B-1/sale deed had been executed by the first appellant on his behalf and on behalf of two minor daughters. The learned Additional District Judge took up for consideration the points framed and found that Ex.B-1/sale deed had been executed by the first appellant on his behalf and on behalf of two minor daughters. In the recital, it had been stated that the property was his ancestral property. It was also found that the witness on behalf of the respondents/plaintiffs had also stated that the property belonged to the joint family of the first appellant. It was therefore held that the agreement relied on by the respondent dated 01.09.1995 was legally not valid since it was executed only by the first defendant. 16. The learned Additional District Judge then took up for consideration the further points and found that Ex.B-1/sale deed had been executed by the first appellant on his behalf and on behalf of two minor daughters. In the recital, it had been stated that the property was his ancestral property. It was also found that the witness on behalf of the respondents/plaintiffs had also stated that the property belonged to the joint family of the first appellant. It was therefore held that the agreement relied on by the respondent dated 01.09.1995 was legally not valid since it was executed only by the first defendant. It was also found that the sale deed is legally valid and is binding. It was also found that the suit was instituted after coming to know about the registration of the sale deed. In view of the above reasons, the Judgment and Decree of the trial Court was set aside and the Appeal Suit was allowed. S.A.No. 1686 of 2003: 17. The plaintiff then filed the present Second Appeal. The Second Appeal had been admitted the following two substantial questions of law:- “1. Whether the finding of the first Appellate Court that the agreement of sale Ex.A-1 is not valid is legally sustainable in as much as it has failed to note that the property has been allotted to the share of the 1st respondent and as such it is his absolute property? 2. Whether the finding of the 1st appellate Court that Ex.B-1 is valid and binding is legally sustainable in as much as it has not considered that Ex.B-1 has been created only to defeat the rights under Ex.A- 1?” 18. The facts are simple and straight forward. 2. Whether the finding of the 1st appellate Court that Ex.B-1 is valid and binding is legally sustainable in as much as it has not considered that Ex.B-1 has been created only to defeat the rights under Ex.A- 1?” 18. The facts are simple and straight forward. I would refer to the appellant as plaintiff and to the respondents as defendants. 19. The plaintiff had instituted the suit on the basis of an agreement of sale dated 01.09.1995/Ex.A-1. This Agreement of sale had been entered into between the plaintiff and the first defendant. Even prior to that the first defendant acting on his behalf and on behalf of the minor daughter had sold the property to the second defendant by registered sale deed dated 21.08.1995. The said document was actually registered on 04.09.1995. 20. The first substantial question of law is whether the finding of the First Appellate Court that the Ex.A-1/agreement of sale is not valid without considering whether the share mentioned in the property had been allotted to the first defendant. 21. The fact to be established is whether the property mentioned in the agreement Ex.A-1 was the exclusive property of the first defendant, would depend on the establishment of that fact, that a said share was actually allotted to the first defendant. There is no evidence for that. There is no document presented to establish that particular fact. Even prior to execution of Ex.A-1, the property had already been sold by sale deed dated 21.08.1995. The same was kept pending in the Office of the Sub Registrar and later on payment of additional stamps had been registered on 04.09.1995. Section 47 of the Registration Act is as follows:- “47. Time from which registered document operates.—A registered document shall operate from the time which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration.” 22. It is very clear that though the document was registered on 04.09.1995, it takes effect from 21.08.1995. This would indicate that the second defendant had obtained title to the property on 21.08.1995, the date of the sale deed. This would further indicate that on 01.09.1995, the first defendant had no manner of right, title or interest to enter into the agreement of sale. This would indicate that the second defendant had obtained title to the property on 21.08.1995, the date of the sale deed. This would further indicate that on 01.09.1995, the first defendant had no manner of right, title or interest to enter into the agreement of sale. The said agreement of sale Ex.A-1 is a nullity and the plaintiff cannot seek any relief based on the same. Even in the recitals in the sale deed in favour of the second defendant/Ex.B-2 the first defendant had very clearly stated that the property is a joint family property and that therefore the sale deed was executed by him on his behalf and on behalf of his two minor daughters. Thus viewed from any angle, Ex.A-1 agreement is not legally valid and is unenforceable and is a nullity. The first substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 23. The second substantial question of law is whether Ex.B-1 sale deed is valid and binding and the issue whether it was created to defeat the rights of the plaintiff had been considered. 24. The sale deed Ex.B-1 had been lawfully executed by the first defendant on his behalf and on behalf of his minor daughters. The property has been identified. It has been properly described. The sale deed had disclosed that the property is a joint family property. The sale deed had been executed by the first defendant on his behalf and on behalf of his minor daughters. The sale deed had been executed on 21.08.1995 and presented for registration. It had also been registered on 04.09.1995. Under Section 47 of the Registration Act, the effect of such registration is that it relates back to the date of the sale, namely, 21.08.1995. Much after this particular date, the first defendant and the plaintiff had entered into an agreement of sale. It is inconceivable to even consider that Ex.B- 1 had been created to defeat the rights of the plaintiff since on the date when Ex.A-1 agreement was entered into the first defendant had no manner right, title or interest to offer the property for sale. The property had already been sold. 25. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act is as follows:- “54. “Sale” defined.—‘‘Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. The property had already been sold. 25. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act is as follows:- “54. “Sale” defined.—‘‘Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made.—3 Such transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. 1In the case of tangible immovable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. Contract for sale.—A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.” 26. In AIR 1977 SC 774 (or) (1977) 3 SCC 247 [Narandas Karsondas Vs. S.A. Kamtam and Anothers], alibeit while dismissing a right of redemption vis-a-vis an agreement of sale, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- “In India there is no equity or right in property created in favour of the purchaser by the contract between the mortgagee and the proposed purchaser. In India, there is no distinction between legal and equitable estates. The law of India knows nothing of that distinction between legal and equitable property in the sense in which it was under- stood when equity was administered by the Court of Chancery in England. Under the Indian law, there can be but one owner that is, the legal owner. See Rani Chhatra Kumari v. Mohan Bikram (1) (1) (1931) 58 I.A. 279. A contract of sale does not of itself create any inter- est in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. See Rambaran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra(1) & Ors. C) The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognised in section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and in section 91 of the Trusts Act. This is expressly declared in s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. See Rambaran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra(1) & Ors. C) The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognised in section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and in section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal obligation created by a contract of sale is de- scribed in section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the owner- ship of property, but not amounting to, an interest or easement therein. In India, the word "transfer" is defined with reference to the word "convey". The word "transfer" in English law in its narrower and more usual sense refers to the transfer of an estate in land. Section 205 of the Law of Property Act in England defines: "Conveyance" includes a mortgage, charge, lease, assent, vesting declaration, vesting instru- ment. The word "conveys" in section 5 of the transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying owner- ship.” 27. The facts reveal that the plaintiff is only an agreement holder. It is very clear that an agreement of sale does not create any interest or charge on the property. On the other hand, sale is a transfer of ownership. Thus title had passed on to the second defendant as on 20.08.1995, even though the document was registered on 01.04.1995, since under Section 47 of the Registration Act stipulates that the effect of registration relates back to the date of the agreement. Thus A-1 cannot be even minutely conceived to have created rights on the plaintiff. There cannot be any question of defeating any right. The second substantial question of law is answered thus. 28. In view of the above reasons, the Second Appeal stands dismissed with costs. The Judgment and Decree in A.S.No. 138 of 2002 dated 07.03.2003 by the Additional District/Fast Track Court No.1, Tindivanam, is confirmed.