Indra Vikram Singh S/o. Shri Chhatar Singh Chouhan v. State of Rajasthan, Through The Principal Secretary, Secondary Education Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur
2022-08-05
REKHA BORANA
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed against the impugned order dated 19.08.2019 whereby the petitioner was directed to be posted with the Elementary Education Department. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as Teacher Grade-III with the Education Department. Vide order dated 26.09.2013, he was sent on deputation as PFT Manager/Coordinator to Rajasthan Gramin Aajivika Vikas Parishad (hereinafter referred to as ‘Council’). The said order of deputation strictly mentioned that the deputation can be cancelled at any stage and delinquent would be required to join back his parent department with immediate effect. During the time when the petitioner was working on deputation with the Council, he was promoted as Teacher Grade-II vide order dated 03.12.2016 by his parent department. As the petitioner was working on deputation with the Council, he moved an application on 12.12.2016 to his parent department requesting for grant of proforma promotion. The same was not allowed and ultimately, he was relieved from his deputed department i.e. Council on 29.05.2019. After being relieved, the petitioner approached his parent department and vide order dated 19.08.2019, a direction was issued by the Competent Authority of the Secondary Education Department to the District Education Officer of the Elementary Education Department to provide an appropriate posting to the petitioner. Against the said order dated 19.08.2019, the present petition has been preferred. 3. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that as he had been promoted as Teacher Grade-II vide order dated 03.12.2016, he could not have been directed to be posted with the Elementary Education Department. Learned counsel submitted that he ought to have been posted with the Secondary Education Department and the order impugned is bad in the eyes of law. Learned counsel submitted that as soon as the order of promotion dated 03.12.2016 was issued, he applied for proforma promotion on 12.12.2016 and the same ought to have been accepted by the respondent-parent department. Learned counsel submitted that similarly situated employees were granted the proforma promotion by the Department and for the same, he relied upon an office order dated 20.12.2016 whereby, the proforma promotion was granted to other employees (Annex.-5). 4.
Learned counsel submitted that similarly situated employees were granted the proforma promotion by the Department and for the same, he relied upon an office order dated 20.12.2016 whereby, the proforma promotion was granted to other employees (Annex.-5). 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that after the promotion order being passed, he even applied to the Council for being relieved but he was not relieved and to substantiate his submission, learned counsel relied upon the document dated 25.11.2016 whereby a communication was sent by the council to the Secondary Education Department for further instructions. 5. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied upon the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Keshar Singh Rajpurohit Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.; S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.7490/2017 decided on 05.03.2018. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the present one is a clear case of defiance of the orders of the Department by the petitioner. Learned counsel submitted that the consent for deputation was granted by the parent department in the year 2013 which ended in the year 2015 and thereafter, there was no cause for the petitioner not to join back the parent department. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner did not ever wish to join back his parent department and therefore, this was a clear case of forgoing of the promotion in terms of the promotion order. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner was relieved way back by the deputed department (Council) but against the order of relieving, the petitioner preferred a writ petition before this Court and an interim order was passed in his favour initially in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.7690/2016 and further in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8209/2019. It is only after the dismissal of his writ petition No.8209/2019 on 14.08.2019 that he came back to join the parent department. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner never ever applied or requested to be relieved from his place of deputation to enable him to join his parent department. Rather it is a case where the petitioner tried his very best to remain at his place of deputation and therefore, it was a clear case of breach of the condition of order of promotion whereby he was directed to join last by 31.12.2016.
Rather it is a case where the petitioner tried his very best to remain at his place of deputation and therefore, it was a clear case of breach of the condition of order of promotion whereby he was directed to join last by 31.12.2016. As the petitioner did not join by 31.12.2016, the order of promotion ipso facto stood cancelled and it would be deemed that the petitioner had forgone his promotion. Therefore, the order dated 19.08.2019 being totally in terms of law deserves to be upheld. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. In the year 2013, the petitioner was sent on deputation with the Council and the consent by the parent department for the same was given in the year 2013. A perusal of the order dated 14.08.2019 passed in writ petition No.8209/2019 preferred by the petitioner makes it clear that at the first instance when in the year 2016, the deputation of the petitioner was sought to be cancelled by the Council, he challenged the same and an interim order was granted in his favour, by virtue of which, he remained on deputation with the Council. Further again when vide order dated 29.05.2019, the deputation of the petitioner was terminated and he was repatriated to his parent Department, he preferred a writ petition against the same being the writ petition No.8209/2019. The said writ petition was ultimately dismissed on 14.08.2019. Meaning thereby, it was not the Council who was inclined to continue the deputation of the petitioner but it was the petitioner himself who wanted to remain on his deputed post without consent of his parent department. 9. The Court reached to a specific finding in the order dated 14.08.2019 that the consent by the parent department was never extended after the year 2015 and the petitioner was under an obligation to join his parent department after that. 10. Moresoever, there is not a single document on record to suggest that the Council ever recommended to the parent department for grant of the proforma promotion to him. Rather the Council has specifically stated that it was only because of the interim order that the petitioner is being continued with the Council. 11.
10. Moresoever, there is not a single document on record to suggest that the Council ever recommended to the parent department for grant of the proforma promotion to him. Rather the Council has specifically stated that it was only because of the interim order that the petitioner is being continued with the Council. 11. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that despite his application, he was not relieved cannot be held to be tenable as it is clear on record that the Council could not have relieved him because there were interim orders operating in his favour. Had the petitioner any intention to join his parent department, he could have very well withdrawn the writ petition wherein the interim orders had been passed in his favour. The petitioner, on the one hand obtained interim orders to continue with the Council and on the other hand very cursorily requested the Council to relieve him. The said request cannot be termed to be anything more than an eyewash. 12. In view of the above observations, it is clear that the petitioner had no intent ever to join his parent department, rather he wanted to remain clinged to his post of deputation. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the petitioner was restrained or was unable because of any valid reason to join his promotional post after the order of promotion being passed. Viewed from any angle, it is a clear case of breach of conditions of order of promotion whereby the petitioner was required to join his place of posting on being promoted lastly by 31.12.2016. The petitioner having not joined till 31.12.2016, the promotion ipso facto stood cancelled and the same would be deemed to be forgone by the petitioner. So far as the judgment of Keshar Singh Rajpurohit (supra) relied upon by the petitioner is concerned, the same would not apply to the present case as Keshar Singh Rajpurohit was a case wherein it was specifically proved on record that the petitioner therein was very much inclined to join back his parent department. In that case, the petitioner continuously requested to be relieved and it was the deputed department which did not relieve him from his place of deputation and therefore, the petitioner therein was unable to join his promotional posting with his parent department.
In that case, the petitioner continuously requested to be relieved and it was the deputed department which did not relieve him from his place of deputation and therefore, the petitioner therein was unable to join his promotional posting with his parent department. In those circumstances, the Court granted indulgence and held that the petitioner therein would be entitled to proforma promotion. The present case being totally contrary to the facts of Keshar Singh Rajpurohit’s case (supra) cannot be governed by the ratio as laid down in the said judgment. 13. In view of the above observations, the present writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. 14. All pending applications also stand disposed of.