JUDGMENT : D. KRISHNAKUMAR, J. Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records relating to the first respondent vide Na. Ka. No. 7084/2018/A1 dated 14.1.2020 and consequential order of the first respondent vide proceedings Ref. No. 7084/2018/B1 dated 25.8.2018 and to quash the same and direct the first respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with all attendant benefits. 1. The petitioner, challenging the impugned order of the first respondent dated 14.1.2020 in and by which the petitioner's request seeking to revoke the order of suspension, came to be rejected, has filed the present writ petition. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he joined service in the Revenue Department as Village Administrative Officer, through Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission on 20.04.2012. The petitioner was trapped and arrested by the Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Erode on 24.08.2018 at 13.30 hours for the alleged demand and acceptance of bribe of Rs. 7,000/- for issuance of Possession Certificate. The petitioner was placed under suspension, vide order of the first respondent dated 25.08.2018, on account of lodging of FIR by the Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Erode in FIR No. 4/AC/2018 dated 23.08.2018. 3. According to the petitioner, though the FIR was lodged on 23.08.2018, till date charge sheet has not been filed in the criminal case and he has not been issued with any charge memo and therefore, he submitted a representation dated 18.02.2019 seeking revocation of suspension followed by another representation dated 09.08.2019. Aggrieved by the inordinate delay in prolonging the suspension, the petitioner has filed W.P. No. 33966 of 2019 and vide order dated 06.12.2019, this Court directed the respondent to consider the representation of the petitioner dated 09.08.2019 and to pass orders within a time frame. In compliance of the order passed by this Court, the first respondent has passed the impugned order dated 14.01.2020 stating that suspension cannot be revoked on account of the Government Letter dated 26.04.2016. Challenging the same, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 4. Mr. In compliance of the order passed by this Court, the first respondent has passed the impugned order dated 14.01.2020 stating that suspension cannot be revoked on account of the Government Letter dated 26.04.2016. Challenging the same, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 4. Mr. S. Vijayakumar, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the first respondent is bound to review the order of suspension once in three months as per the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary vs. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 291 and whereas, in the case on hand the order of suspension is prolonging till date and it is more than 4 years, since the order of suspension. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that in the impugned order, the first respondent has merely relied upon the Government letter dated 26.04.2016 and conveniently overlooked and ignored the earlier order passed by this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court and therefore, the impugned order is unsustainable and untenable in law. 5. Mr. C. Selvaraj, learned Additional Government Pleader for the respondents has drawn the attention of this Court to the counter affidavit of the first respondent wherein it has been stated that the petitioner was suspended after an FIR was registered against the petitioner by the Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Erode and trapped and remanding the petitioner for obtaining bribe and since he was remanded to judicial custody, he was suspended as per the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. The delay in filing the charge sheet is on the side of V&AC Department officials and not on the part of the respondents and since criminal case is pending against the petitioner, the petitioner cannot be reinstated as Village Administrative Officer as per Rule 17(e)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Discipline and Appeal Rules and also relied on the guidelines issued in Government Letter (Ms) No. 43/N/2015-3, P&AR dated 26.04.2016. The learned Additional Government Pleader has further contended that when the criminal case is being tried, the petitioner has to wait till the outcome of the criminal proceeding and only if the petitioner comes out unscathed from the criminal proceedings, he can stake his claim for revocation of suspension. In the said circumstances, the first respondents has rightly rejected the representation of the petitioner, seeking revocation of the suspension. 6. In the said circumstances, the first respondents has rightly rejected the representation of the petitioner, seeking revocation of the suspension. 6. This Court has considered the submissions made and also perused the entire materials available on record. 7. The fact remains that the petitioner, who is working as Village Administrative Officer, was kept under suspension with effect from 25.08.2018 on account of registration of FIR by V&AC Department, Erode for alleged demand and acceptance of bribe of Rs. 7,000/- for issuance of Possession Certificate. It appears that though the order of suspension came to be passed as early as on 25.08.2018, V&AC has not filed any charge sheet till date and therefore, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 18.02.2019 seeking to revoke the order of suspension and since the same was not considered, he earlier approached this Court by filing W.P. No. 33966 of 2019 and based on the direction given by this Court, the respondents had considered the petitioner's representation and passed the impugned order dated 14.01.2020. 8. It is the primordial contention of the petitioner that the petitioner has been kept under prolonged suspension for more than 4 years and neither any charge sheet has been filed in the criminal case nor any charge memo has been issued to proceed against him departmentally and therefore, it is the bounden duty of the respondents to review the order of suspension in the light of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu vs. Promod Kumar and Another, (2018) 17 SCC 677 and Ajay Kumar Choudhary vs. Union of India and Another, (2015) 7 SCC 291 . 9. The points to be decided in the writ petition are: (i) Whether the impugned order of the first respondent is legally sustainable? (ii) Whether the action of the respondents in prolonging the order of suspension dated 25.08.2018 despite expiry of nearly about 5 years, without recording the reasons for extension is justifiable? 10. 9. The points to be decided in the writ petition are: (i) Whether the impugned order of the first respondent is legally sustainable? (ii) Whether the action of the respondents in prolonging the order of suspension dated 25.08.2018 despite expiry of nearly about 5 years, without recording the reasons for extension is justifiable? 10. A perusal of the impugned order passed by the first respondent dated 14.01.2020 would disclose that the first respondent has relied upon the Government Letter (Ms.) No. 43/N/2015-3 of the Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, Chennai dated 26.04.2016 and more particularly to the following paragraphs: “In view of the above settled policy of the Government for at least temporarily keeping away the corruption charged public servants and/or the public servants charged on their moral turpitude either on their official and/or private capacity, till they are exonerated of the grave charges, by way of keeping them under suspension from public service so as to encourage cleanliness in the effective delivery of public services to the general public, it is clarified that the instructions issued already in Govt. Letter No. 13519/N/2015-1 dated 23.7.2015 to the effect that the time limit of three months on suspension cases specified therein, are applicable only to the suspension cases arising out of departmental disciplinary enquiries pertaining to non-vigilance and/or any non-criminal cases. In view of the admitted fact that the gravity of the Vigilance/Criminal cases is alarmingly more, than that of the seriousness of the non-vigilance/non-criminal cases in which allegation of corruption is not dealt with.” 11. The first respondent, citing the above Government Letter, has rejected the request made by the petitioner seeking revocation of the order of suspension. Except referring to the above Government Letter, no other reason has been assigned by the first respondent for rejecting the petitioner's request seeking revocation of the order of suspension. Further, there is no whisper about why the department has not initiated departmental proceedings against the petitioner by issuing any charge memo. The stand taken by the first respondent in the counter affidavit is that the delay in filing of charge sheet is on the side of the Vigilance and Anti Corruption department officials and not on the part of the respondents and the guidelines issued in G.O.Ms. The stand taken by the first respondent in the counter affidavit is that the delay in filing of charge sheet is on the side of the Vigilance and Anti Corruption department officials and not on the part of the respondents and the guidelines issued in G.O.Ms. No. 77, P&AR Dated 09.07.2002 is applicable only to Government officials, who were suspended for lacking in their duties and not for the officials who were suspended for allegation of corruption and other criminal activities and therefore, the contention of the petitioner is legally unsustainable. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision in State of Tamil Nadu vs. Promod Kumar and Another, (2018) 17 SCC 677 , after referring to its own decision in Ajay Kumar Choudhary vs. Union of India through its Secretary and Another (cited supra), has allowed the Civil Appeal Nos. 8427-8428 of 2018, vide its judgment dated 21.08.2018. Paragraph No. 23, the operative portion of the judgment is extracted herein under: “23. This Court in Ajay Kumar Choudary vs. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 291 has frowned upon the practice of protracted suspension and held that suspension must necessarily be for a short duration. On the basis o the material on record, we are convinced that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the first respondent under Civil Appeal Nos. 8427-8428 of 2018 decided on 21.08.2018 in W.P. No. 23238 of 2019 suspension any longer and that his reinstatement would not be a threat to a fair trial. We reiterate the observation of the High Court that the Appellate State has the liberty to appoint the first Respondent in a non sensitive post.” 7. The above case actually went on appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court from this Court, wherein, a Division Bench of this Court has actually allowed the case and interfered with the order of suspension and directed the reinstatement of an I.P.S. Officer.” 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Ajay Kumar Choudhary case (cited supra) has elaborately held that the suspension is only transitory or temporary in nature and must perforce be of short duration. In fact, in paragraphs No. 11 and 12, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has frowned upon the long period of suspension. Those paragraphs are also extracted hereunder: “11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Ajay Kumar Choudhary case (cited supra) has elaborately held that the suspension is only transitory or temporary in nature and must perforce be of short duration. In fact, in paragraphs No. 11 and 12, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has frowned upon the long period of suspension. Those paragraphs are also extracted hereunder: “11. Suspension, specially preceding the formulation of charges, is essentially transitory or temporary in nature and must perforce be of short duration. If it is for an indeterminate period or if its renewal is not based on sound reasoning contemporaneously available on the record, this would render it punitive in nature. Departmental/disciplinary proceedings invariably commence with delay, are plagued with procrastination prior and post the drawing up of the Memorandum of Charges, and eventually culminate after even longer delay. 12. Protracted periods of suspension, repeated renewal thereof, have regrettably become the norm and not the exception that they ought to be. The suspended person suffering the ignominy of insinuations, the scorn of society and the derision of his Department, has to endure this excruciation even before he is formally charged with some misdemeanour, indiscretion or offence. His torment is his knowledge that if and when charged, it will inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or inquiry to come to its culmination, that is to determine his innocence or iniquity. Much too often this has now become an accompaniment to retirement. Indubitably the sophist will nimbly counter that our Constitution does not explicitly guarantee either the right to a speedy trial even to the incarcerated, or assume the presumption of innocence to the accused. But we must remember that both these factors are legal ground norms, are inextricable tenets of common law jurisprudence, antedating even the Magna Carta of 1215, which assures that: “We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right.” In similar vein the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” 14. In same lines, various High Courts and particularly this Court have passed numerous orders setting aside the suspension order and directed the authorities concerned to post the suspended officers concerned in non-sensitive posts. In same lines, various High Courts and particularly this Court have passed numerous orders setting aside the suspension order and directed the authorities concerned to post the suspended officers concerned in non-sensitive posts. This was done keeping in mind public interest, as payment of huge subsistence allowance without extracting work from the employee concerned, drains public exchequer. Moreover, the person accused is entitled to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, in order to uphold the public interest and also constitutional imperatives, the suspension orders have been interfered with by the Courts. 15. At this juncture it is also to be noted that on a reference made to the two conflicting judgments rendered by the Division Benches of this Court on a challenge to the order of suspension, the Hon'ble Full Bench of this Court in W.P. Nos. 2165 of 2015 and 21628 of 2018 dated 15.03.2022 [P. Kannan vs. The Commissioner of Municipal Administration, Chennai] has answered as under: “(i) The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary, supra, does not lay down absolute proposition of law that an order of suspension cannot be continued beyond the period of three months if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet has not been served within three months, or if memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served without reasoned order of extension. (ii) The judgment in R. Balaji, supra, has no reference to the earlier judgments of co-equal strength and is thereby rendered per incuriam. (iii) The issue of challenge to the order of suspension should be analyzed on the facts of each case, considering the gravity of the charges and the rules applicable. (iv) Revocation of suspension with a direction to the employer to post the delinquent in a non-sensitive post cannot be endorsed or directed as a matter of course. It has to be based on the facts of each case and after noticing the reason for the delay in serving the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet.” 16. There are number of cases, where, this Court has passed orders by directing reinstatement of the employees, who came under prolonged suspension. However, the Courts have directed such reinstatement only against non-sensitive post, in many of the matters, where, suspension order was issued, on the basis of involvement of delinquent in corruption. There are number of cases, where, this Court has passed orders by directing reinstatement of the employees, who came under prolonged suspension. However, the Courts have directed such reinstatement only against non-sensitive post, in many of the matters, where, suspension order was issued, on the basis of involvement of delinquent in corruption. In fact, this Court order was referred to in W.P. No. 29209 of 2018 wherein an order dated 25.07.2019, was passed interfering with the order of suspension by directing the authority to post the petitioner therein to non-sensitive post. When such consistent view is taken by the Court even in matters of corruption prolonged suspension is not permissible following the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudary case (cited supra), this Court does not think that the petitioner herein can be treated differently as the facts would disclose that the petitioner came under order of suspension as early as on 25.08.2018 and he is continued to be under suspension as on date for more than 4 years. It is also to be reiterated that the respondents so far have not initiated departmental proceedings on the petitioner by issuing charge memo. 17. The pendency of the criminal case cannot be the basis for denial of the relief to the petitioner herein. When the period of suspension is for more than 4 years, enormous and severe anguish is experienced by the delinquent impinging upon the right of the delinquent to live with dignity and earn her livelihood. The prolonged suspension even in matters of corruption like the present one, by itself, constitute a grave prejudice to the right of the citizens to have speedy trial and justice. Further the subsistence allowance which is required under law to be paid to the suspended employee would be a loss to the public exchequer, as the suspended Government servants draw their subsistence allowance without any corresponding duty to work and earn their livelihood. 18. It is also well settled during the pendency of criminal proceedings, there is no bar to continue the departmental proceedings simultaneously on the ground of misconduct. There are certain cases wherein even after retirement, attainment of finality in the criminal case, subsequently departmental proceedings have been initiated and thereby the Government has issued Letter (Ms) No. 1118/Per N/89 dated 22.12.1987 as well as passed G.O.Ms. There are certain cases wherein even after retirement, attainment of finality in the criminal case, subsequently departmental proceedings have been initiated and thereby the Government has issued Letter (Ms) No. 1118/Per N/89 dated 22.12.1987 as well as passed G.O.Ms. No. 40, Personnel and Administrative (N) Department dated 30.01996 in relation to expeditious disposal of charges framed. In G.O.Ms. No. 40 dated 30.01.1996, it has been stated as under: “where the Departmental proceedings/the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption enquiries have not been finalized within 3/6 months, the concerned departmental officers/the Director of Vigilance and Anti Corruption should report to the higher authority/the Government, with reasons for the delay and for the need for continuing the Government servant under suspension beyond 3/6 months. If the Disciplinary Authority who had ordered the suspension is subordinate to the Head of the Department, such report should be submitted to the Head of the Department concerned. If the Disciplinary Authority is the Head of the Department himself, such report should be submitted to the Government.” This Court has also passed several orders insisting upon strict compliance of the aforesaid circular and observed that there shall not be inordinate delay in framing of charges or proceeding with the criminal cases before the criminal Court. The Hon'ble Full Bench of this Court in the decision supra has categorically held that revocation of suspension with a direction to the employer to post the delinquent in a non-sensitive post cannot be endorsed or directed as a matter of course and it has to be based on the facts of each case and after noticing the reason for the delay in serving the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet. 19. In the case on hand, the petitioner has been kept under prolonged suspension for more than 4 years and according to the petitioner, the respondents have neither chosen to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings and nor produced any material before this Court for such non-initiation of disciplinary proceedings. According to the petitioner, charge sheet has not been filed by the V&AC, Erode in the pending criminal proceedings till date. Therefore, there is a clear lapse on the part of the respondents in keeping the petitioner under prolonged suspension for more than four years, without proceeding further in the criminal investigation or in the departmental proceedings. According to the petitioner, charge sheet has not been filed by the V&AC, Erode in the pending criminal proceedings till date. Therefore, there is a clear lapse on the part of the respondents in keeping the petitioner under prolonged suspension for more than four years, without proceeding further in the criminal investigation or in the departmental proceedings. In the light of the Full Bench decision of this Court and taking into consideration the gravity of the offence, this Court is unable to find any acceptable and justifiable reason for non-initiation of departmental proceedings and well as non-filing of charge sheet in the criminal proceedings and therefore, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the impugned order of the first respondent is legally unsustainable and the action of the respondents in prolonging the order of suspension dated 25.08.2018 despite expiry of more than 4 years, without recording the reasons for extension, is totally unjustifiable. 20. In the light of the above discussion and the well settled legal position as enumerated in the decisions cited supra, this Court has no hesitation in allowing the writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the proceedings of the first respondent in Ref. No. 7084/2018/B1 dated 25.08.2018 and Na. Ka. No. 7084/2018/A1 dated 14.01.2020 are set aside. The first respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner in any non-sensitive post forthwith. It is left open to the respondents to initiate departmental proceedings against the petitioner in accordance with the relevant rules and regulations. No costs.