JUDGMENT : Kakheto Sema, J. 1. The case in W.P.(C) No. 176/2019 being analogous to that in W.P.(C) No. 194/2020 both are dealt with by this common judgment & order. 2. In WP(C) No. 176/2019, the petitioner has sought for the following relief; (i) Quash and set aside the Certificate of Indigenous, Inhabitant of Nagaland bearing Regd. No. 762 dated 14/06/2013 (Annexure-K). (ii) Quash and set aside the recommendation dated 28/02/2019 of SDLRB in respect of private respondent No. 4 and appointment Order dated 01/08/2019 (Annexure-F & G). (iii) Direct the respondent authorities to appoint the petitioner to the post of Sweeper under the establishment of Additional Deputy Commissioner, Pughoboto in terms of her merit position in the select list dated 28/02/2019. And/or pass any other further order/orders as your Lordship may deem fit and proper. 3. Brief fact of the case in W.P.(C) No. 176/2019 is that vide the Advertisement No. CNE-A/RECT-BRD/17 dated 17/01/2018 issued by the Government of Nagaland, Office of the Commissioner, Nagaland, Kohima, applications were invited from eligible candidates for filling up of various post under the District Administration in Nagaland. In Serial No. 14 of the said advertisement, one Grade-IV post was also advertised for Pughoboto under the district of Zunheboto, Nagaland. Clause-IV of the advertisement prescribed the eligibility criteria for the Grade-IV post as under; 1. Should be an indigenous inhabitant of the district. 2. Land ownership claims as per standing Government order. 3. Minimum age-18 and maximum age-35 as on 19/02/2019. The present case pertains to the appointment for Grade-IV post under Pughoboto in the district of Zunheboto. Consequent to the advertisement dated 17/01/2018 the petitioner, the respondent No. 4 and others applied for the post. All the applicants being eligible were issued the admit card and called to appear for the interview before the Sub-Divisional Level Recruitment Board (SDLRB) on 28/02/2019 at 12:00 Noon. 4. The interview (Oral) was conducted by the SDLRB on 28/02/2019 and the mark secured by the candidates in order of merit was declared by the SDLRB on 28/02/2019. The petitioner secured 63.75% marks and was placed in Rank-2, while the respondent No. 4 secured 72.5% marks and placed in Rank-1. The mark secured by the candidates in the interview in order of merit is reproduced as under; Sl. The petitioner secured 63.75% marks and was placed in Rank-2, while the respondent No. 4 secured 72.5% marks and placed in Rank-1. The mark secured by the candidates in the interview in order of merit is reproduced as under; Sl. No. Name Marks obtained Rank 1 Khutoli Sheqi 72.5% 1 2 Tosheli 63.75% 2 3 Kimiyekali 62.5% 3 4 Hovito James Kitho 61.75% 4 5 Kashito A Swu 61.21% 5 6 Nikiqhe Assumi 60% 6 7 Khakuto Sheqi 58.75% 7 8 Ghovili Swu 55.25% 8 9 Boholi Achumi 53.75% 9 10 Toliho 53.5% 10 11 Jetoli 51% 11 12 Khuvili Absent 5. That in the light of the mark secured by the candidates and the recommendation made by the SDLRB, Pughoboto, the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Pughoboto, on the approval of the Commissioner, Nagaland, Kohima issued the Order No. ESTT-2/2018-19 dated 01/08/2019 appointing the respondent No. 4 as the Sweeper under the establishment of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Pughoboto. 6. Impugning the order dated 01/08/2019, Mr. Limawapang, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent No. 4 is not an "Indigenous Inhabitant of the State of Nagaland" and cannot be appointed to the said post. Mr. Limawapang submits that Lt. Kumar @ Inaxu Sheqi @ Inakhu, the father of the respondent No. 4 is a Non-Naga who came to Pughoboto as a carpenter in search of livelihood in between the year 1975-80 and therefore, the question of issuing the indigenous inhabitant certificate to the respondent No. 4 can never arise for the consideration. The learned counsel in support of his submission has drawn the Court's attention to the Notification No. AR-8/8/76 dated 28/04/1977 which is reproduced as under; "Government of Nagaland Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms (Administrative Reforms Branch) NOTIFICATION Dated Kohima, the 28th April, 1977 No. AR-8/8/76:- The Governor of Nagaland is pleased to decide that in order to qualify as an "Indigenous Inhabitant" of the State Nagaland for the purpose of employment as envisaged in the order No. APPT-16/6/67 dated 06/07/1973, a person should have settled permanently in Nagaland prior to 01/12/1963. The following shall be the criteria for determining a person to have had a permanent settlement in the State prior to 01/12/1963. (1) His/her name or name of parents or legitimate guardians, in case the person was then a minor should have been entered in the Electoral Roll published on 05/12/1963. OR. The following shall be the criteria for determining a person to have had a permanent settlement in the State prior to 01/12/1963. (1) His/her name or name of parents or legitimate guardians, in case the person was then a minor should have been entered in the Electoral Roll published on 05/12/1963. OR. (2) The person or his/her parents or legitimate guardian should have been paying house tax prior to 01/12/1963 OR. (3) The person or his/her parents or legitimate guardians should have acquired property and patta on it prior to 01/12/1963. 2. It has been further decided that only those certificates issued by a Deputy Commissioner or an Additional Deputy Commissioner shall be accepted and with immediate effect the form of certificate as annexed shall be used. 3. This supersedes this Department's Notification of even number dated 17th December, 1976. Sd/- A. Shanmugan Joint Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland." 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn the attention of the Court to the Office Memorandum dated 07/12/2016, issued by the Department of P & AR (Administrative Reforms Branch) which provides the procedures for filling up Grade-III & IV post in the district administration only by persons indigenous to the district. 8. A bare perusal of the notification dated 28/04/1977, the learned counsel submits, makes it very obvious that the respondent No. 4 is not an indigenous inhabitant of the State of Nagaland and accordingly not eligible to be appointed to the Grade-IV post in terms of the Advertisement dated 17/01/2018. On the other hand, it is submitted that since the petitioner posses all the requisite qualification and has also been placed in Rank No. 2 in the merit list, her case should be considered for appointment. 9. Mr. E. Thiba Phom, learned Government Advocate for the State respondents submits that the interview for the said post was conducted by the Board as per the guidelines laid down by the Government and the merit list was prepared basing purely on the performance of the candidates. All the candidates including the respondent No. 4 were allowed to appear the interview as they were found qualified and eligible. However consequent to the issuance of the order dated 01/08/2019 appointing the respondent No. 4 as the indigenous inhabitant certificate issued to the said respondent was questioned in the present writ petition, the Addl. All the candidates including the respondent No. 4 were allowed to appear the interview as they were found qualified and eligible. However consequent to the issuance of the order dated 01/08/2019 appointing the respondent No. 4 as the indigenous inhabitant certificate issued to the said respondent was questioned in the present writ petition, the Addl. D.C., Pughoboto conducted a verification and found that the respondent No. 4 did not qualify the notification dated 28/04/1977 to be an indigenous inhabitant of the State of Nagaland. The Addl. D.C., Pughoboto therefore passed the order dated 10/12/2019 cancelling the Schedule Tribe Certificate dated 14/06/2013 and the Indigenous Inhabitant Certificate dated 14/06/2013 issued to the respondent No. 4 by his predecessor. Mr. E. Thiba Phom has also submitted that since the result of the interview is valid only for 6(six) months and the said time has lapsed, a fresh District Level Recruitment will be conducted to give equal opportunity to all the indigenous inhabitants of the district. 10. Mr. T. Khezhie, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 submits that the respondent No. 4 being eligible was allowed to appear the interview for the Grade-IV post in which she was successful. The petitioner who had participated in the interview without raising any objection, on being unsuccessful in the interview, therefore cannot be allowed to question or challenge the appointment of the respondent No. 4. Mr. T. Khezhie also submits that the respondent No. 4 was born to a Naga mother and a Bengali father who had settled in Nagaland prior to 1960 and was adopted by a Naga (Sumi) family by observing all the customary norms and practices. The learned counsel further submits that the name of the maternal grandfather of the respondent No. 4 is entered in the Electoral Roll of Pughoboto A/C 1963 under Lazami village and the name of the respondent's father is also entered in the Electoral Roll of 13th Pughoboto A/C 1977. The learned counsel therefore submits that the respondent No. 4 qualifies to be an Indigenous Inhabitant of the State of Nagaland as provided for in the notification dated 28/04/1977 and the respondent No. 4 cannot be denied with the appointment. In support of the submission that the respondent No. 4 is a Naga and an Indigenous Inhabitant of the State, the learned counsel has placed reliance in the case of the State of Nagaland -versus- Ms. In support of the submission that the respondent No. 4 is a Naga and an Indigenous Inhabitant of the State, the learned counsel has placed reliance in the case of the State of Nagaland -versus- Ms. Neilatuou Suokhrie, reported in (1998) 2 GLT 112 wherein the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court has inter-alia held that the petitioner born to a Naga mother and of a father hailing from Kashmir but was adopted as a son by an Angami Naga, much prior to the petitioner father's marriage with her mother can be treated as a Naga entitling the petitioner to be considered for nomination to the MBBS course under the State Rules. 11. In so far as the order dated 10/12/2019 cancelling the Schedule Tribe and the Indigenous Inhabitant Certificate of the respondent No. 4 is concerned, the learned counsel submits that a separate writ petition has been filed and therefore the validity of the order dated 10/12/2019 may be adjudicated in the said writ petition. 12. The question as to whether the respondent No. 4 is an Indigenous Inhabitant of the State of Nagaland as provided for in the notification dated 28/04/1977 will require a detail verification/enquiry by the authorities concerned. But the pertinent issue to decide the present writ petition is whether the petitioner after having participated in the selection process without raising any objection and on being unsuccessful can question the selection process and the consequent appointment of the respondent No. 4. The petitioner has primarily challenged the order dated 01/08/2019 appointing the respondent No. 4 to the post of Sweeper in the establishment of the Addl. D.C., Pughoboto on the ground that the respondent No. 4 is not an Indigenous Inhabitant of the State of Nagaland. Interestingly however such an objection was never raised by the petitioner when the respondent No. 4 applied for the post in response to the advertisement dated 17/01/2018 nor on 28/02/2019 when the interview for all the candidates was conducted by the SDLRB. Even after the result of the interview was declared on 28/02/2019, the petitioner chooses to remain silent. It was only after the order dated 01/08/2019 was issued by the Government appointing the respondent No. 4 to the Grade-IV post did the petitioner filed the present writ petition impugning the selection process and the appointment of the respondent No. 4. Even after the result of the interview was declared on 28/02/2019, the petitioner chooses to remain silent. It was only after the order dated 01/08/2019 was issued by the Government appointing the respondent No. 4 to the Grade-IV post did the petitioner filed the present writ petition impugning the selection process and the appointment of the respondent No. 4. The petitioner having consciously taken part in the selection process held on 28/02/2019 without raising any objection, cannot on being unsuccessful, question the selection process and the candidature of the respondent No. 4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of decision has held that once a person voluntarily and without any objection takes part in the process of selection and is not found fit for appointment, the said person is estopped from challenging the process of selection. 13. In the case of the Madras Institute of Development Studies & Another -versus- K. Sivasubarmaniyan & Others, reported in (2016) 1 SCC 454 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus; "13. Be that as it may, the respondent, without raising any objection to the alleged variations in the contents of the advertisement and the Rules, submitted his application and participated in the selection process by appearing before the Committee of experts. It was only after he was not selected for appointment that he turned around and challenged the very selection process. Curiously enough, in the writ petition the only relief sought for is to quash the order of appointment without seeking any relief as regards his candidature and entitlement to the said post. 16. In Madan Lal vs. State of J & K, similar view has been reiterated by the Bench which held that: (SCC p. 493, para 9) "9. Before dealing with this contention, we must keep in view the salient fact that the petitioners as well as the contesting successful candidates being respondents concerned herein, were all found eligible in the light of marks obtained in the written test, to be eligible to be called for oral interview. Up to this stage there is no dispute between the parties. The petitioners also appeared at the oral interview conducted by the Members concerned of the Commission who interviewed the petitioners as well as the contesting respondents concerned. Thus, the petitioners took a chance to get themselves selected at the said oral interview. Up to this stage there is no dispute between the parties. The petitioners also appeared at the oral interview conducted by the Members concerned of the Commission who interviewed the petitioners as well as the contesting respondents concerned. Thus, the petitioners took a chance to get themselves selected at the said oral interview. Only because they did not find themselves to have emerged successful as a result of their combined performance both at written test and oral interview, they have filed this petition. It is now well settled that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview, then, only because the result of the interview is not palatable to him, he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or the Selection Committee was not properly constituted. In Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla it has been clearly laid down by a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court that when the petitioner appeared at the examination without protest and when he found that he would not succeed in examination he filed a petition challenging the said examination, the High Court should not have granted any relief to such a petitioner." 17. In Manish Kumar Shahi vs. State of Bihar, this Court reiterated the principle laid down in the earlier judgments and observed: SCC p. 584, para 16) "16. We also agree with the High Court that after having taken part in the process of selection knowing fully well that more than 19% marks have been earmarked for viva voce test, the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the criteria or process of selection. Surely, if the petitioner's name had appeared in the merit list, he would not have even dreamed of challenging the selection. The petitioner invoked jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India only after he found that his name does not figure in the merit list prepared by the Commission. This conduct of the petitioner clearly disentitles him from questioning the selection and the High Court did not commit any error by refusing to entertain the writ petition." 14. In the case of Ashok Kumar & Another -versus-State of Bihar & Others, reported in (2017) 4 SCC 357 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that; "13. The law on the subject has been crystallised in several decisions of this Court. In the case of Ashok Kumar & Another -versus-State of Bihar & Others, reported in (2017) 4 SCC 357 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that; "13. The law on the subject has been crystallised in several decisions of this Court. In Chandra Prakash Tiwari v. Shahkuntala Shukla, this court laid down the principle that when a candidate appears at and examination without objection and is subsequently found not to be successful, a challenge to the process is precluded. The question of entertaining a petition challenging and examination would not arise where a candidate has appeared and participated. He or she cannot subsequently turn around and contend that the process was unfair or that there was lacuna therein, merely because the result is not palatable. In Union of India v. Vinodh Kuma, this Court held that: (SCC p. 107, para 18) "18. It is also well settled that those candidates who had taken part in the selection process knowing fully well the procedure laid down therein were not entitled to question the same. (See Munindra Kumar v. Rajiv Govil and Rashmi Mishra v. M.P. Public Service Commission.)" 17. In Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil Joshi, candidates who were competing for the post of Physiotherapist in the State of Uttarakhand participated in the written examination held in pursuance of an advertisement. This Court held that if they had cleared the test, the respondents would not have raised any objection to the selection process or to the methodology adopted. Having taken a chance of selection, it was held that the respondents were disentitled to seek relief under Article 226 and would be deemed to have waived their right to challenge the advertisement or the procedure of selection. This Court held that : (SCC p. 318, para 18) "18. It is settled law that a person who consciously takes part in the process of selection cannot, thereafter, turn around and question the method of selection and its outcome." 18. In Chandigarh Admn. v. Jasmine Kaur, it was held that a candidate who takes a calculated risk or chance by subjecting himself or herself to the selection process cannot turn around and complaint that the process of selection was unfair after knowing of his or her non-selection. In Pradeep Kumar Rai V. Dinesh Kumar Pandey, this Court held that: (SCC p. 500, para 17) "17. In Pradeep Kumar Rai V. Dinesh Kumar Pandey, this Court held that: (SCC p. 500, para 17) "17. Moreover, we would concur with the Division Bench on one more point that the appellants had participated in the process of interview and not challenged it till the results were declared. There was a gap of almost four months between the interview and declaration of result. However, the appellants did not challenge it at that time. This, it appears that only when the appellants found themselves to be unsuccessful, they challenged the interview. This cannot be allowed. The candidates cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. Either the candidates should not have participated in the interview and challenged the procedure or they should have challenged immediately after the interviews were conducted." This principle has been reiterated in a recent judgment in Madras Institute of Development Studies v. K. Sivasubramaniyan." 15. In the light of the discussions made above and the law laid down the Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the order dated 01/08/2019 appointing the respondent No. 4 to the post of sweeper under the establishment of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Pughoboto. 16. In W.P.(C) No. 194/2020, the petitioner has sought for the following relief; "In the presence, it is most respectfully prayed that, you Lordship may be pleased to admit this petition, call for the records, issue rule calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why: 1. The impugned letter No. ADC/ESTT-34/2019/671 dated 15/11/2019 wrote to the Principal Secretary & Commissioner, Nagaland, Kohima by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Pughoboto, seeking clarification and clear cut written directive from the Commissioner for suo moto cancellation of petitioner indigenous inhabitant certificate and schedule tribe certificate of Nagaland of the petitioner. 2. Impugned letter No. ADC/ESTT-34/2019/684 dated 22/11/2019 issued by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Pughoboto, Nagaland, directing the petitioner to furnish documentary evidences as a schedule tribe and indigenous inhabitant of Nagaland along with the original certificates. 3. Impugned letter No. CNJ-HC/10/2016/404 dated 07/12/2019 issued by the Assistant Commissioner (Hq) Office of the Commissioner, Nagaland, directing for immediate cancellation of Indigenous Inhabitant Certificate and Schedule Tribe Certificate of the petitioner and 4. 3. Impugned letter No. CNJ-HC/10/2016/404 dated 07/12/2019 issued by the Assistant Commissioner (Hq) Office of the Commissioner, Nagaland, directing for immediate cancellation of Indigenous Inhabitant Certificate and Schedule Tribe Certificate of the petitioner and 4. Impugned Order No. ADC/ESTT-34/2019/dated 10/12/2019 cancelling the Indigenous Inhabitant Certificate and Schedule Tribe Certificate of the petitioner by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Pughoboto should not be quashed and set aside and on cause/causes being shown and after hearing the parties be pleased to make the rule absolute and/or pass any such other or further order/orders as to your Lordship may deem fit and proper." 17. All the impugned letters/orders above has been issued by the authorities for cancelling the Schedule Tribe Certificate dated 14/06/2013 and the Indigenous Inhabitant Certificate dated 14/06/2013 of the petitioner who is the respondent No. 4 in the earlier W.P.(C) No. 176/2019. From the pleadings of W.P.(C) No. 176/2019, it is seen that the Indigenous Inhabitant Certificate dated 14/06/2013 issued to the petitioner is also a subject matter of challenge in the said writ petition. It is therefore, discernible that the impugned order(s) under challenge in the present writ petition were issued when W.P.(C) No. 176/2019 was pending disposal before the Court. Mr. T. Khezhie, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned letters/orders passed by the authorities is patently illegal as it interferes in the dispensation of justice by the Court. Mr. E. Thiba Phom, learned Government Advocate on the other hand submits that the certificates issued to the petitioner was cancelled as it was in violation of the guidelines contained in the notification dated 19/01/1979 which provided that "Officers authorised to issue Indigenous Inhabitant Certificate should not issue such certificate to non-local adopted son/daughter without the prior approval of the Government." The action of the respondents authorities in issuing the impugned letters/orders when the same subject matter is pending adjudication before the Court clearly demonstrates interference/obstruction in the administration of justice by the judicial Court. Such actions of the respondents authorities not being tenable in law are liable to be struck down as void and illegal. The action of the respondent authorities also clearly violates the established norms and discipline of not interfering in sub-judice matter which is pending adjudication before the Court(s). Such actions of the respondents authorities not being tenable in law are liable to be struck down as void and illegal. The action of the respondent authorities also clearly violates the established norms and discipline of not interfering in sub-judice matter which is pending adjudication before the Court(s). The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amarinder Singh -versus-Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha & Others, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 113 while deciding the question as to whether the impugned acts of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha violated the norms that should be respected in relation to sub-judice matters has inter-alia held that; "86. It is a settled principle that normally the content of legislative proceedings should not touch on sub-judice matters. As indicated in the extract quoted above, the rationale for this norm is that legislative debate or scrutiny over matters pending for adjudication could unduly prejudice the rights of the litigants. In the case at hand, the allegedly improper exemption of land (measuring 32.10 acres) from the Amritsar Improvement Scheme had already being questioned before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. Thus the Punjab Vidhan Sabha ought not to have constituted a committee to enquiry into the same." The ration laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amarinder Singh (supra) is squarely applicable to the present case. 18. The next issue which arises for the consideration of this Court is whether the principle of natural justice was followed by the authorities before issuing the impugned order dated 10/12/2019. It is the case of the petitioner that consequent to the issuance of the notice dated 22/11/2019, the petitioner submitted the originals of her Schedule Tribe and Indigenous Inhabitant Certificates to the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Pughoboto along with the letter dated 21/10/2019. But the petitioner was not given an opportunity of hearing nor the certificates furnished by the petitioner properly considered by the authorities by conducting necessary enquiry. On the other hand, the learned Government Advocate has submitted that though the petitioner has complied with the notice 22/11/2019 since it was found that the Schedule Tribe Certificate dated 14/06/2013 and the Indigenous Inhabitant Certificate dated 14/06/2013 were issued by the then Additional Deputy Commissioner, Pughoboto without following the guidelines laid down in the notification dated 19/01/1979 the same was cancelled by the order dated 10/12/2019. Mr. Mr. Limawapang, learned counsel for the respondent No. 7 submits that when the admitted position is that the father of the petitioner is a Non-Naga further enquiry to establish as to whether the petitioner is a Schedule Tribe or the Indigenous Inhabitant of the State of Nagaland does not arise. From the submissions made by the parties, it is evident that before cancelling the Schedule Tribe and the Indigenous Inhabitant Certificates of the petitioner no opportunity was afforded nor proper enquiry conducted to enable the petitioner to prove herself as a Schedule Tribe and an Indigenous Inhabitant of the State of Nagaland. The order dated 10/12/2019, issued by the Addl. D.C., Pughoboto had not only erased the identity of the petitioner as a Schedule Tribe and an Indigenous Inhabitant of the State of Nagaland but had also debarred the petitioner from perpetually availing Grade-III & IV employment in the State. As the order dated 10/12/2019 had serious repercussion on the petitioner, it was therefore highly incumbent on the authorities to have afforded all reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to prove her case before issuing the impugned letter dated 07/12/2019 and the order dated 10/12/2019. 19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Canara Bank & Others -versus- Debasis Das & Others, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 557 has held that; "15. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the "Magna Carta". The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to "vocate interrogate and adjudicate". In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works the principle was thus stated: (ER p. 420) "Even God himself did not pass a sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. 'Adam' (says God), 'where art thou has thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof, I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?'" Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing of a diamond. 16. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice. 19. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression 'civil consequences' encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression 'civil consequences' encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life." 20. In the case of Haryana Financial Corporation & Another -versus- Kailash Chandra Ahuja, reported in (2008) 9 SCC 31 has held that; "31. At the same time, however, effect of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem has to be considered. Even if hearing is not afforded to the person who is sought to be affected or penalized, can it not be argued that "notice would have served no purpose" or "hearing could not have made difference" or "the person could not have offered any defence whatsoever". In this connection, it is interesting to note that under the English Law, it was held few years before that non-compliance with principles of natural justice would make the order null and void and no further inquiry was necessary. 32. In the celebrated decision of Ridge v. Baldwin it was contended that an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent would have served no purpose. Negativing the contention, however, Lord Reid stated; (All ER p. 73 F-G) "It may be convenient at this point to deal with an argument that, even if as a general rule a watch committee must hear a constable in his own defence before dismissing him, this case was so clear that nothing that the appellant could have said could have made any difference. It is at least very doubtful whether that could be accepted as an excuse". (emphasis supplied) 34. This Court expressed the same opinion. In Board of High School v. Chitra Srivastava, the Board cancelled the examination of the petitioner who had actually appeared at the examination on the ground that there was shortage in attendance at lectures. Admittedly, no notice was given to her before taking the action. On behalf of the Board it was contended that the facts were not in dispute and therefore, 'no useful purpose would have been served' by giving a show cause notice to the petitioner. Admittedly, no notice was given to her before taking the action. On behalf of the Board it was contended that the facts were not in dispute and therefore, 'no useful purpose would have been served' by giving a show cause notice to the petitioner. This Court, however, set aside the decision of the Board, holding that the Board was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and, therefore, it ought to have observed the principles of natural justice. 36. The recent trend, however, is of 'prejudice'. Even in those cases where procedural requirements have not been complied with, the action has not been held ipso facto illegal, unlawful or void unless it is shown that non-observance had prejudicially affected the applicant. 38. In Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa, it was contended that natural justice was violated inasmuch as the petitioner was not allowed to lead evidence and the material gathered behind his back was used in determining his guilt. Dealing with the contention, the Court stated: (SCC p. 394, para 5) "5……We have to look to what actual prejudice has been caused to a person by the supposed denial to him of a particular right". (emphasis supplied) 42. Recently, in P.D. Agrawal v. SBI this Court restated the principles of natural justice and indicated that they are flexible and in the recent times, they had undergone a 'sea change'. If there is no prejudice to the employee, an action cannot be set aside merely on the ground that no hearing was afforded before taking a decision by the authority." 21. Another important point to be considered is the manner in which the impugned order dated 10/12/2019 was passed. The said order is reproduced below; "GOVERNMENT of NAGALAND OFFICE of THE ADDITIONAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER PUGHOBOTO : NAGALAND No. ADC/ESTT-34/2019/ Pughoboto, dated 10th Dec. 2019 ORDER Miss Khutoli Sheqi D/o. Late. Inaxu Sheqi and Mrs. Anne from Lazami village was issued Schedule Tribe and Indigenous Inhabitant Certificate of Nagaland from this Office on 14/06/2013. Her Certificate was questioned by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court after she had qualified for the post of Sweeper in the Office of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Pughoboto which was conducted by the SDLRB Pughoboto on 28/02/2019. Inaxu Sheqi and Mrs. Anne from Lazami village was issued Schedule Tribe and Indigenous Inhabitant Certificate of Nagaland from this Office on 14/06/2013. Her Certificate was questioned by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court after she had qualified for the post of Sweeper in the Office of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Pughoboto which was conducted by the SDLRB Pughoboto on 28/02/2019. Basing on the Hon'ble High Court Order No. W.P.(C) 125(K)/2019 and W.P.(C) 138(K)/2019 dated 22nd November 2019, this Office had given Miss Khutoli a time period of 16(sixteen) days w.e.f. 23/11/2019 to 09/12/2019 to prove herself as a Schedule Tribe belonging to Sumi Naga tribe by blood and Indigenous Inhabitant of Nagaland. Now, since Miss. Khutoli Sheqi cannot prove herself as a Schedule Tribe and Indigenous Inhabitant of Nagaland, her certificates that give her rights as Schedule Tribe and Indigenous Inhabitant of Nagaland is hereby cancelled from this the 10th of December 2019. Sd/- (T. MOA LEMTUR) Additional Deputy Commissioner Pughoboto, Nagaland." 22. Mr. T. Khezhie, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Hon'ble High Court, neither in, W.P.(C) No. 125/2019 nor in W.P.(C) No. 138/2019 had passed such an order which is purportedly brought out in the impugned order dated 10/12/2019. On bringing the order dated 10/12/2019 to the notice of the learned Government Advocate, Mr. E. Thiba Phom submits that there has been some wrong entry in paragraph-3 of the order which has been corrected/rectified in paragraph-5 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Government. The paragraph-5 of the Government affidavit has been perused and it reads as follows; "5. That in regard to the statement made in paragraph-11 of the writ petition, the answering deponent humbly begs to state that the Additional Deputy Commissioner's statement was not meant to mislead anyone, it was an inadvertent error in the sentence formation, which is unfortunate. The paragraph-5 of the Government affidavit has been perused and it reads as follows; "5. That in regard to the statement made in paragraph-11 of the writ petition, the answering deponent humbly begs to state that the Additional Deputy Commissioner's statement was not meant to mislead anyone, it was an inadvertent error in the sentence formation, which is unfortunate. It should be read as "basing on Hon'ble High Court Order No. W.P.(C) 125(K) 2019 and W.P.(C) 138(K)2019, this Office by letter dated 22nd November 2019, had given Miss Khutoli a time period of 16(sixteen) days w.e.f. 23/11/2019 to 09/12/2019 to prove herself as a Schedule Tribe belong to Sumi Naga Tribe by blood and Indigenous Inhabitant of Nagaland." On a comparative reading of paragraph-3 of the impugned order dated 10/12/2019 and the corrected version as brought out in the paragraph-5 of the Government affidavit, it is seen that paragraph-5 of the affidavit has made improvements to paragraph-3 of the impugned order by stating that the order (notice) dated 22/11/2019 mentioned in the impugned order has been passed by the Government authorities and not by the Court. This Court has also perused the case records of W.P.(C) No. 125/2019 and W.P.(C) No. 138/2019, both of which were filed challenging the appointment of the present petitioner but were subsequently dismissed as withdrawn on 14/12/2021 and 19/09/2019 respectively. In none of this two writ petitions, it is seen that the Court has passed any orders/directions as brought out in the impugned order dated 10/12/2019. The order dated 10/12/2019 is therefore ex-facie illegal being passed in clear abuse of the process of the Court. No amount of explanation can change the illegal nature of the order dated 10/12/2019 for the very reason that the direction/order brought out in the impugned order was never passed by the Court. Furthermore, it is also needless to mention the settled position of law that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds its validity must be judged by the reason so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reason in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. In the case of T.P. Senkumar, IPS -versus- Union of India & Others, reported in (2017) 6 SCC 801 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows; "85. In the case of T.P. Senkumar, IPS -versus- Union of India & Others, reported in (2017) 6 SCC 801 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows; "85. The law has been well settled for many year now that when an order is passed in exercise of a statutory power on certain ground, its validity must be judged by the reason mentioned in the order. Those reasons cannot be supplemented by other reason through an affidavit or otherwise. Were this not so, an order otherwise bad in law at the very outset may get validated through additional grounds later brought out in the form of an affidavit." The present case is one of such instance. 23. In the light of the discussions made above, this Court is of the considered view that the letter dated 15/11/2019 (Annexure-8), the notice dated 22/11/2019 (Annexure-10), the letter dated 07/12/2019 (Annexure-12) and the order dated 10/12/2019 (Annexure-13) impugned in the present writ petition are all liable to be quashed and set aside. 24. W.P.(C) No. 176/2019 is accordingly dismissed and W.P.(C) No. 194/2020 is allowed. 25. The Additional Deputy Commissioner, Pughoboto, Nagaland is directed to allow Smti. Khutoli Sheqi, the respondent No. 4 in W.P.(C) No. 176/2019 to join her service as the Sweeper under the establishment of the Additional Deputy Commissioner Office Pughoboto forthwith in terms of the Order No. ESTT- 2/2018-19, dated 01/08/2019, issued by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Pughoboto. 26. Considering the important issue raised in the present writ petition as to whether the petitioner is an Indigenous Inhabitant of the State of Nagaland and also a Schedule Tribe of the State, this Court deems it proper to direct the Addl. D.C., Pughoboto to enquire and verify as to whether Smti. Khutoli Sheqi, D/o. Lt. Inaxu Sheqi @ Inakhu @ Kumar qualifies the condition to be an Indigenous Inhabitant of the State of Nagaland as spelt out in the Notification No. AR-8/8/76, dated 28/04/1977, issued by the Government of Nagaland, Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms (Administrative Reforms Branch) and also as a Schedule Tribe of the State. In doing so, all reasonable opportunity shall be afforded to the petitioner and all the stakeholders. The Addl. D.C., Pughoboto shall also summon and examine the village authorities/elders of Lazami village, Mishilimi village and Pughoboto town to authenticate as to whether Smti. Khutoli Sheqi is an Indigenous Inhabitant of Pughoboto/Nagaland. In doing so, all reasonable opportunity shall be afforded to the petitioner and all the stakeholders. The Addl. D.C., Pughoboto shall also summon and examine the village authorities/elders of Lazami village, Mishilimi village and Pughoboto town to authenticate as to whether Smti. Khutoli Sheqi is an Indigenous Inhabitant of Pughoboto/Nagaland. All the statements of the village authorities/elders shall be recorded in writing. The Addl. D.C., Pughoboto shall be at liberty to take recourse to all reasonable measure as may be deemed necessary in the conduct of the enquiry. On completion of the exercise, the Addl. D.C., Pughoboto shall forward his findings along with all the records of the enquiry to the Government of Nagaland, Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms (Administrative Reforms Branch) and/or the appropriate authority, for a decision in terms of the Office Memorandum No. AR-8/8/76, dated 19/01/1979 and in accordance with law. While taking the decision the Government shall also take into consideration the judgment & order dated 13.05.1998, passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in the case of the State of Nagaland -versus- Ms. Neilatuou Suokhrie, reported in (1998) 2 GLT 112. All such exercises and decision(s) on the matter shall be completed by the respondents authorities within a period of 6(six) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment & order. The action taken by the Government consequent to the direction passed by the Court shall be immediately intimated to the petitioner and all the stakeholder.