JUDGMENT : 1. With consent of the parties, hearing of the matter has been done through video conferencing and there is no complaint whatsoever regarding audio and visual quality. 2. The instant intra-court appeal, under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 15.09.2020 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 4315 of 2018 whereby and whereunder the writ petition was dismissed declining to interfere with order dated 22.06.2018 by which the writ petitioner was dismissed from service w.e.f. 10.03.2018. 3. The brief facts of the case, as per pleadings made in the writ petition, which are require to be enumerated, read as hereunder: The writ petitioner was appointed on the post of Dumper Operator, Category-I on 20.04.1979. A notice for retirement under superannuation was served upon him vide notice dated 16.10.2017, whereby it was informed that he is going to retire w.e.f. 31.03.2018. But, before superannuation, charge-sheet dated 13.12.2017 was drawn against the petitioner vide Memo No. 2162 dated 13.12.2017, whereby the petitioner was show caused as to why the petitioner be not dismissed from service on the allegation that he impersonated to be son-in-law of one Dinu, ex-employee, Kargali Washery, CCL, Bokaro. The writ petitioner submitted reply denying the charges leveled against him but the authorities concerned being dissatisfied with reply initiated disciplinary proceeding after framing of charge. The enquiry officer concluded the enquiry and submitted enquiry report in which the petitioner was found guilty of the charges. Pursuant thereto second show cause along with copy of enquiry report was handed over to the petitioner vide show cause notice dated 16.03.2018, to which he replied vide letter dated 22.03.2018 denying all the charges leveled against him. However, during pendency of the disciplinary proceeding, petitioner preferred a writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 381 of 2018 with a prayer to quash the charge-sheet issued against him on the ground that punishment of dismissal was indicated in the chargesheet itself. The Co-ordinate learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties passed interim order dated 14.02.2018 directing the enquiry officer not to pass any final order in the departmental proceeding. The aforesaid writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 11.04.2018, however, later, vide order dated 22.06.2018 the writ petitioner was dismissed from service w.e.f. 10.03.2018. The Co-ordinate learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties passed interim order dated 14.02.2018 directing the enquiry officer not to pass any final order in the departmental proceeding. The aforesaid writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 11.04.2018, however, later, vide order dated 22.06.2018 the writ petitioner was dismissed from service w.e.f. 10.03.2018. Being aggrieved with the order of dismissal, writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 4315 of 2018 was filed on the ground that the order of dismissal since was passed after superannuation of writ petitioner i.e., after 31.03.2018, it is void ab initio as there is no provision under the relevant Discipline & Conduct Rules to pass order of dismissal after superannuation of one or the other workmen from service. The CCL-Management appeared and contested the case taking the ground that the appointment of the writ petitioner was found to be obtained on the basis of fraud committed by him as he impersonated himself to be son-in-law of one Dinu, the ex-employee of Kargali Washery, CCL, Bokaro, who died in harness, for which, a preliminary enquiry was conducted, in which, the allegation leveled against the petitioner was found to be prima facie true. Therefore, show cause notice was issued to writ petitioner to reply the allegation of impersonation in getting employment on compassionate ground due to death of said Dinu, ex-employee, Kargali Washery, CCL, Bokaro. The aforesaid allegation was denied but the same being found not satisfactory, the writ petitioner was subjected to domestic enquiry, in which, he participated and availed the opportunity to defend himself as also cross-examined the witnesses produced by the CCL-Management. The enquiry officer found the charges proved against the petitioner, basis upon which the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of dismissal from service. It was further contended that at the stage of pendency of domestic enquiry, the writ petitioner had preferred one writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 381 of 2018 for quashing charge-sheet wherein interim order was passed vide order dated 14.02.2018 restraining the CCL-Management the enquiry officer to pass any final order in the departmental proceeding. According to respondents-CCL, as there was ad interim stay in passing final order in the departmental proceeding, no decision could be taken. But, in the meanwhile, the writ petitioner superannuated from service w.e.f. 31.03.2018 and after superannuation he withdrew writ petition and immediately thereafter the impugned order of dismissal was passed on 22.06.2018. According to respondents-CCL, as there was ad interim stay in passing final order in the departmental proceeding, no decision could be taken. But, in the meanwhile, the writ petitioner superannuated from service w.e.f. 31.03.2018 and after superannuation he withdrew writ petition and immediately thereafter the impugned order of dismissal was passed on 22.06.2018. The issue which has been agitated by writ petitioner about passing of dismissal order after superannuation of writ petitioner was seriously contested on the ground that since in the enquiry culpability of the writ petitioner had surfaced about committing impersonation as he presented himself as son-in-law of ex-employee, namely, Dinu, who died in harness and got appointment. Therefore, the appointment since is based upon fraud, considering the settled position of law that fraud vitiates everything, apart from the order of dismissal, the CCL-Management had also passed order declaring the appointment of the writ petitioner to be nullity. As such, even accepting that there is no provision to take any decision to pass order of dismissal after superannuation of the workmen, then also since the fact finding was arrived at holding therein that the writ petitioner committed fraud in getting the appointment, the appointment of the writ petitioner is treated to be based upon fraud, therefore, nullity. The respondents-authorities considering the appointment of the petitioner nullity held the writ petitioner not entitled to get post retiral benefits. The CCL-Management has also taking the fact into consideration that since the writ petitioner rendered his service, no decision on recovery of salary etc. was passed. The learned Single Judge, taking into consideration the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and considering the fact that the appointment of the petitioner was found to be on the basis of impersonation i.e., fraud, declined to interfere with the order of dismissal, which is the subject matter of present intra-court appeal. 4. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Harsh, learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant, assailing the order passed by learned Single Judge, has submitted that learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that in absence of any authority the order of dismissal cannot be passed. Herein, according to learned senior counsel, there is no rule prescribing the respondents-CCL to dismiss an employee after superannuation. Therefore, the order of dismissal is nothing but without jurisdiction and as such the same ought to have been quashed and set aside. Herein, according to learned senior counsel, there is no rule prescribing the respondents-CCL to dismiss an employee after superannuation. Therefore, the order of dismissal is nothing but without jurisdiction and as such the same ought to have been quashed and set aside. It has further been submitted that since the order of dismissal itself is without jurisdiction, therefore, merely on the basis of fact finding arrived at by the enquiry officer about commission of impersonation, the appointment of writ petitioner cannot be treated to be nullity in the eye of law. He has put reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 263 of 2018 [Abdul Rajak Vs. The Central Coalfields Ltd. & Ors] disposed of vide order dated 04.11.2020. 5. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the respondents-CCL has submitted that plea which is being taken by learned counsel for the appellant about jurisdictional error in passing the impugned order of dismissal, is not fit to be accepted for the reason that it is the writ petitioner who has come to this Court during pendency of the departmental proceeding by filing writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 381 of 2018 wherein interim order dated 14.02.2018 was passed restraining the respondents-CCL to take any final decision in the departmental proceeding. The writ petitioner, in the meanwhile superannuated from service w.e.f. 31.03.2018 and thereafter, the writ petition was withdrawn vide order dated 11.04.2018. Therefore, the respondents-CCL in compliance to order passed by this Court could not be able to pass final order due to ad interim order passed by this Court vide order 14.02.2018. He has further submitted that this Court is required to look into that nobody be allowed to play with judicial system. The writ petitioner approached the writ Court by filing writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 381 of 2018 by assailing charge-sheet wherein interim order was passed restraining the respondents to pass final decision in the departmental proceeding and that is the reason no final decision could be taken and during pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner retired from service and, thereafter he withdrew the writ petition, which shows the conduct of the writ petition that how he played with the order passed by this Court. However, later vide order dated 22.06.2018 the writ petition was dismissed from service w.e.f. 10.03.2018. However, later vide order dated 22.06.2018 the writ petition was dismissed from service w.e.f. 10.03.2018. Therefore, it cannot be said that in the given facts of the case that the order passed by the concerned authority is without jurisdiction. Further submission is that even accepting that there is no provision to pass order of punishment after superannuation from service of a workman since no stipulation has been made in this regard in the certified standing order, but even then the question would be that when the appointment of the writ petitioner itself was found to be obtained by impersonation, which is a fraud, therefore, such conclusion was arrived at by the authority, in that circumstance, validating the service of the petitioner will be nothing but allowing a wrong doer to enjoy the fruits of service on the basis of commission of fraud. In furtherance to such submission, it has been submitted that as per settled position of law fraud vitiates everything and when the fraud has been established the appointment of the petitioner will be treated to be nullity in the eye of law and once the appointment of the writ petitioner is treated to be nullity he cannot be allowed to take the fruits of such appointment, which is based upon fraud and declared nullity. In the backdrop of these submissions, it has been submitted that order passed by the learned Single Judge may not be interfered with. 6. We, before appreciating the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, deem it fit and proper to refer certain undisputed facts in this case. The writ petitioner was appointed on the post of Dumper Operator, Category-I on 20.04.1979. The writ petitioner was to retire from service w.e.f. 31.03.2018, for which, a notice for retirement under superannuation dated 16.10.2017 was served upon him. But in the meanwhile, a charge-sheet dated 13.12.2017 was drawn against the petitioner vide Memo No. 2162 dated 13.12.2017, whereby the petitioner was show caused as to why he be not dismissed from service on the allegation that he impersonated himself to be son-in-law of one Dinu, ex-employee, Kargali Washery, CCL, Bokaro, who died in harness. The writ petitioner denied the charges leveled against him but the authorities concerned being dissatisfied with the same decided to initiate a domestic enquiry. The petitioner participated in the enquiry. The writ petitioner denied the charges leveled against him but the authorities concerned being dissatisfied with the same decided to initiate a domestic enquiry. The petitioner participated in the enquiry. The enquiry officer concluded the enquiry and found the petitioner guilty of the charges. At this juncture, this Court, in order to scrutinize as to whether the writ petitioner was given adequate opportunity of hearing or not in inquiry proceeding has gone across the enquiry report, wherefrom it is evident that the writ petitioner had fully participated in the enquiry proceeding and cross-examined the witnesses produced by the Management. From the enquiry report, it further transpires that family members of said Dinu, ex-employee, Kargali Washery, CCL, Bokaro, who died in harness, namely, Bano Devi (daughter), Phulmani Devi (daughter), Deglal Kewat (grandson) and Ram Prasad Kewat (grandson) deposed that the writ petitioner does not belong to their family and wife of the writ petitioner, namely, Smt. Bimla Devi is also not the member of their family. Further, the Block Development Officer, Petarwar vide letter no. 297 dated 23.02.2018 has stated that said Dinu Kewat, ex-CCL employee had four sons and two daughters, namely, Smt. Pendari Devi and Doli Devi. The enquiry officer, on the basis of statement made by family members of said Dinu, ex-employee as also other relevant materials available before found the charges leveled against the petitioner proved and submitted enquiry report dated 10.03.2018. In the meanwhile, the writ petitioner approached this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 381 of 2018 wherein interim order dated 14.02.2018 was passed restraining the respondents-CCL to pass final order in the departmental proceeding. It is evident that though, due to interim order passed by this Court, no final order could be passed in the departmental proceeding but before superannuation of petitioner, the enquiry was concluded on 10.03.2018 finding the charges leveled against the petitioner proved. However, during pendency of the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 381 of 2018 the petitioner superannuated from service w.e.f. 31.03.2018 and thereafter, writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 11.04.2018. After withdrawal of the writ petition, dismissal order of the writ petitioner was passed on 22.06.2018 by respondent-CCL. However, during pendency of the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 381 of 2018 the petitioner superannuated from service w.e.f. 31.03.2018 and thereafter, writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 11.04.2018. After withdrawal of the writ petition, dismissal order of the writ petitioner was passed on 22.06.2018 by respondent-CCL. The writ petitioner questioned the order of dismissal by filing another writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 4315 of 2018 on the ground that after superannuation from service in absence of any power to pass order of punishment of dismissal, the impugned order of dismissal was passed, which cannot be said to be sustainable in the eye of law being without jurisdiction. 7. It is admitted position that the writ petitioner superannuated from service w.e.f. 31.03.2018 and thereafter he was dismissed from service on 22.06.2018 w.e.f. 10.03.2018. In the aforesaid backdrop, this Court is required to answer: “Whether when there is no fault on the part of the respondents-CCL in passing the final decision in course of service of writ petitioner and the finding recorded by the enquiry about commission of fraud, has been accepted by the disciplinary authority and in consequence thereof the order of dismissal was passed, can it be quashed on the ground of jurisdictional error, keeping the fact into consideration that enquiry officer has found the charges of commission of fraud as he impersonated himself as son-in-law of said Dinu, ex-employee of respondents-CCL proved against the petitioner?” 8. There is no dispute about the fact that the order of dismissal or any order of punishment can only be passed with authority of law. It is also not in dispute that the order of dismissal, if passed, after superannuation of the concerned employee/workman, in absence of any provision to pass order of punishment after superannuation even by conducting the departmental proceeding, the same will be considered to be without any authority of law. But in the given facts of this case, when the authorities have come to the conclusion, declaring the appointment of the writ petitioner to be nullity in the eye of law, in that pretext the effect of order of dismissal after superannuation is also required to be answered by this Court. But in the given facts of this case, when the authorities have come to the conclusion, declaring the appointment of the writ petitioner to be nullity in the eye of law, in that pretext the effect of order of dismissal after superannuation is also required to be answered by this Court. It is not in dispute, so far as legal position is concerned, that the fraud is an extrinsic, collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice but in order to sustain an action to impeach a judgment, actual fraud must be shown. 9. This Court, in order to consider the aforesaid aspect of the matter, deems it fit and proper to consider the definition of fraud as provided under Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. For ready reference the same is being reproduced hereunder: “17. ‘Fraud’’ defined –‘‘Fraud’’ means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract:- (1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (3) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (4) any other act fitted to deceive; (5) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.” In this regard, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Hamza Haji v. State of Kerala and Another [(2006) 7 SCC 416] at paragraphs 10 to 13 has been pleased to hold as under:- “10.It is true, as observed by De Grey, C.J., in R. v. Duchess of Kingston [2 Smith LC 687] that: “ ‘Fraud’ is an extrinsic, collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. Lord Coke says it avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical and temporal.” 11. Lord Coke says it avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical and temporal.” 11. In Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, it is stated that: “In applying this rule, it matters not whether the judgment impugned has been pronounced by an inferior or by the highest court of judicature in the realm, but in all cases alike it is competent for every court, whether superior or inferior, to treat as a nullity any judgment which can be clearly shown to have been obtained by manifest fraud.” 12. It is also clear as indicated in Kinch v. Walcott [1929 AC 482 : 1929 All ER Rep 720 : 141 LT 102 (PC)] that it would be in the power of a party to a decree vitiated by fraud to apply directly to the court which pronounced it to vacate it. According to Kerr: “In order to sustain an action to impeach a judgment, actual fraud must be shown; mere constructive fraud is not, at all events after long delay, sufficient … but such a judgment will not be set aside upon mere proof that the judgment was obtained by perjury.” 13. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 49, para 265, it is acknowledged that: “Courts of record or of general jurisdiction have inherent power to vacate or set aside their own judgments.” In para 269, it is further stated: “Fraud or collusion in obtaining judgment is a sufficient ground for opening or vacating it, even after the term at which it was rendered, provided the fraud was extrinsic and collateral to the matter tried and not a matter actually or potentially in issue in the action.” It is also stated: “Fraud practised on the court is always ground for vacating the judgment, as where the court is deceived or misled as to material circumstances, or its process is abused, resulting in the rendition of a judgment which would not have been given if the whole conduct of the case had been fair.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in A.V. Papayya Sastry and Others v. Govt. of A.P. and Others [ (2007) 4 SCC 221 ] while dealing with the definition of ‘fraud’ has been pleased to hold that fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another. of A.P. and Others [ (2007) 4 SCC 221 ] while dealing with the definition of ‘fraud’ has been pleased to hold that fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. At paragraph 39 of the aforesaid judgment it has been laid down that once the fraud has been established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practising or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. Thus, the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, in the judgment referred hereinabove lays down that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit those persons who have committed fraud or misrepresented, in such circumstances, the Court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining petitions on their behalf. 10. Thus, the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, in the judgment referred hereinabove lays down that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit those persons who have committed fraud or misrepresented, in such circumstances, the Court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining petitions on their behalf. 10. Herein, in the given facts of this case, as would be evident from the enquiry report, in which, the writ petitioner has participated fully even he has cross-examined the witness, thereafter, the enquiry officer has submitted its report giving finding therein about proving of charge, as would appear from conclusion part of enquiry report, which reads as under: 12-vkjksfir dehZ Jh tkudh ,oa muds lgdehZ ,d Hkh dkxtkr ,oa xokg vius cpko esa izLrqr ugh fd;s vkSj mUgksaus fd os Lo0 nhuw ds nkekn ;g izekf.kr djus ds fy, dksbZ lk{; izLrqr ugha fd,A mijksDr fu”d”kZ ds vk/kkj ij nksuksa i{kksa }kjk izLrqr fd, x, dkxtkr ,oa izcU/ku izfrfuf/k ,oa vkjksfir dkexkj ds c;ku] muds izfrijh{k.k] xokgksa ds c;ku ,oa muds izfrijh{k.k dk leh{kk@lq{e ijh{k.k djus ds ckn ;g ik;k x;k fd Jh tkudh] MEij vkijsVj] ,0,0Mh0vks0lh0,e0 Lo0 nhuw ds nkekn ugh gS] mUgksaus /kks[kk/kM+h ls cksdkjks ,oa djxyh {ks+=] lh0lh0,y0 esa Jh nhuw dk nkekn cudj fu;kstu izkIr fd;k vkSj dEiuh dks xyr lwpuk fn;kA vr,o Jh tkudh ds mij yxk, x, vkjksi izekf.kr gksrs gSA Thus, it is evident from bare reading of enquiry report that the writ petitioner has failed to prove any connection with the family of the deceased-employee, rather, family members of the deceased-employee in unequivocal terms deposed before the enquiry officer that petitioner has no connection with his family. 11. Then the question would be how the writ petitioner has got appointment on compassionate ground under National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA) which contains a specific provision to provide appointment on compassionate ground even to the sonin- law in case direct dependent is not available, as would be evident from condition stipulated under clause 9.3.0 of the NCWA. 12. The writ petitioner had participated fully in the enquiry proceeding and thereafter the enquiry officer came to the finding of proving of charge of impersonation in getting appointment, which is nothing but on the basis of commission of fraud appointment was obtained by the writ petitioner. In the aforesaid backdrop, the departmental proceeding was conducted. 12. The writ petitioner had participated fully in the enquiry proceeding and thereafter the enquiry officer came to the finding of proving of charge of impersonation in getting appointment, which is nothing but on the basis of commission of fraud appointment was obtained by the writ petitioner. In the aforesaid backdrop, the departmental proceeding was conducted. However, the final decision could not have been taken before superannuation of writ petitioner, due to interim order passed by this Court vide order dated 14.02.2018, as referred above. But the writ petitioner in a very clever manner withdrew the writ petition immediately after superannuation but during pendency of the writ petition no final decision could have been taken due to interim order passed by the learned Co-ordinate Single Judge in the aforesaid writ petition. Thereafter, the order of dismissal was passed by the respondents-Management. This Court, considering such conduct of the petitioner, is of the view that the petitioner did not act in a fair manner before the Court of law rather we are constrained to hold that the writ petitioner has made the judicial system a tool to get undue advantage by withdrawing the writ petition after retirement/superannuation. 13. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the writ petitioner was found to have got appointment on the basis of impersonation, as would be evident from enquiry report and, therefore, this Court is not hesitant in holding that the appointment got by the writ petitioner on compassionate ground is nothing but based upon commission of fraud. 14. Therefore, since it is settled position of law that fraud vitiates everything as such appointment of the writ petitioner, if treated to be nullity in the eye of law by the respondents-authority, the order of punishment of dismissal cannot be said to suffer from any error, even the order of dismissal is held to be without jurisdiction. Further since the appointment of the writ petitioner has been held to be nullity, as such the writ petitioner is not entitled to get the fruits of the service rendered by him since his appointment itself was based upon fraud which he has got by impersonation. 15. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has though tried to impress upon this Court by placing reliance upon the order dated 04.11.2020 passed by this Court in L.P.A. No. 263 of 2018 [Abdul Rajak Vs. 15. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has though tried to impress upon this Court by placing reliance upon the order dated 04.11.2020 passed by this Court in L.P.A. No. 263 of 2018 [Abdul Rajak Vs. The Central Coalfields Limited & Ors.] that the impugned order of dismissal since has been passed without jurisdiction, is not sustainable. 16. We have gone through the order passed in Abdul Rajak (surpa) and found therefrom that in the aforesaid case, the writ petitioner was appointed on 21.09.1978 as an employee of respondent-CCL. While discharging duty, he was served notice dated 06.09.2011 to the effect that he will retire w.e.f. 30.09.2011. But, before retirement, i.e. on 16.08.2011, an explanation was sought for from the petitioner on the charge that he fraudulently and deceiving the complainant entered into service of respondent-CCL. Thereafter, a full-fledged enquiry was conducted, in which, the charge leveled against him was found proved but no final decision was taken before he retired from service. This Court in that circumstances has held that since no final decision could have been taken on the basis of enquiry report wherein charges have been proved, therefore, the post retiral benefit i.e. gratuity etc. could not have been withheld. But, herein in the given facts of the case, against the writ petitioner the order of dismissal was passed after his superannuation only because of ad interim order dated 14.02.2018 passed in W.P. (S) No. 381 of 2018, which further suggests conduct of the writ petitioner that taking advantage of Court’s interim order, after retirement, withdrew the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 381 of 2018, Further, as per the finding recorded by the enquiry officer, the writ petitioner had fully participated, cross-examined the witnesses and thereafter, the enquiry officer came to the conclusion that the initial appointment of the petitioner based upon commission of fraud as he impersonated himself as son-in-law of one Dinu, ex-employee of respondents-CCL, who died in harness. It further appears that from the fact of L.P.A. No. 263 of 2018 that the respondents-CCL has relied upon the finding recorded in the preliminary enquiry. 17. It further appears that from the fact of L.P.A. No. 263 of 2018 that the respondents-CCL has relied upon the finding recorded in the preliminary enquiry. 17. Therefore, even applying decision passed by this Court in LP.A. No. 263 of 2018 in the given fact of this case and even considering the order of dismissal to be without jurisdiction then also the appointment of the writ petitioner cannot be said to be legalized since it is based upon impersonation, which has conclusively been proved by the enquiry officer. 18. This Court, therefore, is of the view that even accepting the order of dismissal to be without jurisdiction the writ petitioner cannot be allowed to take advantage of getting the post retiral benefit on the ground that the service of the writ petitioner is treated to be nullity in the eye of law. Therefore, once the appointment of the writ petitioner will be treated to be nullity in the eye of law, he will not be entitled to enjoy the fruits of rendering such service. 19. This Court, after discussing the facts in entirety, as above, has gone across the order passed by the learned Single Judge and found therefrom that the learned Single Judge has considered these facts and the effect of fraud, which led the learned Single not to interfere with the impugned order of dismissal, is of view that the order passed by learned Single Judge suffers from no infirmity and requires no interference by this Court. 20. Accordingly, the appeal fails, and is dismissed.