JUDGMENT Anoop Kumar Dhand, J. - The issue involved in this appeal is "Whether legal representatives of the injured-claimant are entitled to prosecute the claim petition after death of the injured during pendency of the claim petition?" This question needs to be answered in this appeal. 2. Facts in brief of the case are that the injured-Rajesh submitted a claim petition under the provision of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 ('Act of 1923', for short) before the Commissioner of Wrokemen's Compensation, Kota (hereinafter referred to as 'the Commissioner') stating therein that he was employed with the contractor for completion of work at the premises of the appellant-Padam Singh. During the course of the employment/work, he sustained certain grievous injuries, fractures and permanent disability, hence he suffered loss of income. A prayer was made in the claim petition that appropriate amount of compensation be awarded for the injuries, permanent disability and loss of income suffered by him. 3. The appellant-non-claimant Padam Singh filed reply and submitted that the injured Rajesh was not working in his employment and prayed for rejection of the claim petition. Non-claimant-respondent No. 2-Bhawani Shankar submitted reply and denied the averments of the claim petition and denied the factum of relationship of employer and employee and prayed for rejection of the claim petition. 4. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the Commissioner framed as many as five issues. In support of the claim petition, statements of the witnesses, Kalibai, Chhotulal, Madhu Bai and Narayan were recorded and as many as 36 documents were exhibited and on the other hand, non-claimant-appellant Padam Singh examined himself and no evidence was led on behalf of the respondent-non-claimant-Bhawani Shankar. In absence of the non-claimant-respondent No. 2-Bhawani Shankar, ex-parte proceedings were initiated against him by the Commissioner vide order dated 22.09.2016. During the pendency of the claim petition, injured died on 04.11.2013. Thereafter, his legal representatives submitted an application for substitution as claimants in the claim petition and the said application was allowed after hearing the arguments of both the sides, the Commissioner vide judgment and award dated 27.12.2018 and directed the appellant-Non-claimant and the non-claimant-respondent No. 2 to pay the compensation of Rs. 4,04,646/- for loss of income and of Rs. 13,764/- for the medical expenses occurred in treatment of the injured. 5. 4,04,646/- for loss of income and of Rs. 13,764/- for the medical expenses occurred in treatment of the injured. 5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment and award dated 27.12.2018 passed by the Commissioner, instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant-non-claimant-Padam Singh. 6. Counsel for the appellant-non-claimant submits that the injured-claimant-Rajesh died during the pendency of the claim, hence the claim petition was liable to be rejected as legal representatives of the deceased were not having any right to continue with the claim petition. Counsel further submits that the right to sue did not survive, in case of the death of the injured-deceased and the legal representatives of the injured deceased were not entitled to continue with the claim and to get any sort of compensation except loss of estate. Counsel submits that there was no relationship between the employer and the injured-deceased but this fact was overlooked by the Commissioner and the Commissioner has committed an error in allowing the claim petition directing the appellant and the non-claimant-respondent No. 2 to pay the compensation as indicated above. 7. In support of her contention, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a judgment delivered by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Jenabai & Ors. v. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation and Ors., reported in . 8. Lastly, she argued that under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act are not applicable. She further submitted that in the instant case, the claim petition was filed under the Act of 1923 and during the pendency of the claim petition, the injured expired, hence his legal representatives were not having any right to continue the claim petition. 9. She prayed that in view of the submissions made above, the impugned judgment passed by the Commissioner be quashed and set aside. 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the claimants-respondents opposed the arguments raised by the counsel for the appellant and submitted that so far as the contention of the counsel for the appellant with regard to the fact that there existed no relationship between the employer and employee concerned. 11. This fact was decided by the Commissioner by recording the fact which cannot be adjudicated by the High Court by exercising its jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Act of 1923. 12. 11. This fact was decided by the Commissioner by recording the fact which cannot be adjudicated by the High Court by exercising its jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Act of 1923. 12. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgments of "Golla Rajanna Etc. v. The Divisional Manager And Anr." reported in 2017(1) SCC 45 & North East Karnataka Transport Corporation v. Smt. Sujatha" reported in 2019 (11) SCC 514 . 13. Counsel further submitted that the controversy involved in this petition has been set at rest by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Kahlon @ Jasmail Singh Kahlon (deceased) through his legal representative Narinder Kahlon Gosakan and another in Civil Appeal No. 4800/2021. Counsel submits that the Hon'ble Apex court has categorically held that the legal representatives of the injured are entitled to get the amount of loss of estate which would include expenditure on medicines/treatment/diet/attendant, Doctor's fee etc., including income and future prospects. Counsel submits that only under the head of pain and sufferings being personal injuries, legal representatives are not entitled to get the same. 14. Heard the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. 15. This fact is not in dispute that the injured-deceased was working at the site of the appellant under the contract of non-claimant-respondent No. 2 and during the course of the that employment, he sustained injuries on 23.05.2011 which resulted in 100% permanent disability, this fact is clear from his disability certificate (Ex. 36) issued by the M.B.S. Hospital, Kota (Raj.). 16. The injured submitted claim petition before the Commissioner claiming loss of income and medical expenses occurred in his treatment. Unfortunately, the injured died during the pendency of the claim and thereafter, an application was submitted by the legal representatives of the injured-deceased Rajesh before the Commissioner and the said application was allowed and legal representatives were allowed to continue with the claim petition. After appreciating the evidence and documents available on record and hearing the arguments of both the sides, learned Commissioner held that at the time of accident, age of the injured-Rajesh was 37 years and his salary/income was Rs. After appreciating the evidence and documents available on record and hearing the arguments of both the sides, learned Commissioner held that at the time of accident, age of the injured-Rajesh was 37 years and his salary/income was Rs. 3,510/- per month and applying the method contained in Schedule 4 of Section 4 of the Act of 1923 and looking to the 100% permanent disability of the injured, the Tribunal held that the injured has suffered loss of income of Rs. 4,07,646/- and also held that the legal representatives of the injured-deceased would be entitled to get the aforesaid amount with interest @ 12% from the date of accident that is 23.05.2011. Apart from above, a sum of Rs. 13,764/- was awarded towards medical expenses occurred for the treatment of the injured-deceased. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kahlon (supra) has dealt with the issue in question in para Nos. 18, 20 and 21 which reads as under:- "18. The Tribunal, on technicalities rejected his claim for salary, medical expenses and percentage of disability and granted a measly compensation of Rupees one lakh only by a cryptic order. We are therefore, of the opinion that while the claim for personal injuries may not have survived after the death of the injured unrelated to the accident or injuries, or during the pendency of the appeal, but the claims for loss of estate caused was available to and could be pursued by the legal representatives of the deceased in the appeal. 20. We see no reasons to deviate from the consistent judicial view taken by more than one High Court that loss of estate would include expenditure on medicines, treatment, diet, attendant, Doctor's fee, etc. including income and future prospects which would have caused reasonable accretion to the estate but for the sudden expenditure which had to be met from and depleted the estate of the injured, subsequently deceased. 21. However, the compensation under the head pain and suffering being personal injuries is held to be unsustainable and is disallowed. The High Court has not awarded anything towards medical expenses despite hospitalization of six months being an admitted fact." 17. 21. However, the compensation under the head pain and suffering being personal injuries is held to be unsustainable and is disallowed. The High Court has not awarded anything towards medical expenses despite hospitalization of six months being an admitted fact." 17. From the bare perusal of the above judgment of Kahlon (supra) delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is clear that the loss of estate would include expenditure on medicines, treatment, diet, attendant and Doctor's fee etc., including income of future prospects which would have caused reasonable accretion to the estate. The only distinction which has been made by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the legal representatives of the injured-deceased would not be entitled to get any sort of compensation under the head of pain and sufferings of the injured-deceased being personal injuries. The principle of "actio personalis moritur cum persona" is not applicable in such cases. Thus, it is clear that claim for personal injuries would not survive after death of the injured unrelates to the accident or injuries, during pendency of the claim but the claim for loss of estate could be pursued by the legal representatives of the injured after his death. 18. Bare perusal of the impugned award dated 27.12.2018 clearly indicates that the Commissioner has passed the award only two parts; i.e. loss of income and the medical expenditure occurred during treatment but no compensation has been awarded to the legal representatives of the injured-deceased under the head of personal injuries which resulted in pain and sufferings. The amount of compensation so awarded by the Commissioner falls within the purview of estate and the Tribunal has not committed any error in awarding the same amount of compensation to the respondents-claimants. Now, this Court is dealing second contention raised by the counsel for the appellant with regard to the fact that there was no relationship between the injured and the appellant. The aforesaid fact is a finding of fact which has already been adjudicated by the Commissioner by recording the findings, which cannot be re-appreciated by this Court by exercising its jurisdiction contained under Section 30 of the Act of 1923 as the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of "Golla Rajanna Etc. v. The Divisional Manager And Anr." reported in 2017(1) SCC 45 . It has been held in Para No. 8 & 10 as under: "8. v. The Divisional Manager And Anr." reported in 2017(1) SCC 45 . It has been held in Para No. 8 & 10 as under: "8. Section 30 of the Act provides for appeal to the High Court. To the extent, the provision reads as follows; 30. Appeals.-(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely: (a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum; [(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty Under Section 4A;] (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment; (c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased workman, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant; (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 12; 24. or (e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions: Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in Clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees (Emphasis supplied) 10. Under the scheme of the Act, the workmen's Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. The Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial question of law, being a welfare legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to re-appreciate the evidence and recorded its own findings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act." 19. The similar view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of "North East Karnataka Transport Corporation v. Smt. Sujatha" reported in 2019 (11) SCC 514 . It has specifically held in Para Nos. 9 to 12 as under: "9. The similar view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of "North East Karnataka Transport Corporation v. Smt. Sujatha" reported in 2019 (11) SCC 514 . It has specifically held in Para Nos. 9 to 12 as under: "9. At the outset, we may take note of the fact, being a settled principle, that the question as to whether the employee met with an accident, whether the accident occurred during the course of employment, whether it arose out of an employment, how and in what manner the accident occurred, who was negligent in causing the accident, whether there existed any relationship of employee and employer, what was the age and monthly salary of the employee, how many are the dependants of the deceased employee, the extent of disability caused to the employee due to injuries suffered in an accident, whether there was any insurance coverage obtained by the employer to cover the incident etc. are some of the material issues which arise for the just decision of the Commissioner in a claim petition when an employee suffers any bodily injury or dies during the course of his employment and he/his LRs sue(s) his employer to claim compensation under the Act. 10. The aforementioned questions are essentially the questions of fact and, therefore, they are required to be proved with the aid of evidence. Once they are proved either way, the findings recorded thereon are regarded as the findings of fact. 11. The appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner lies only against the specific orders set out in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 30 of the Act with a further rider contained in the first proviso to the section that the appeal must involve substantial questions of law. 12. In other words, the appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner is not like a regular first appeal akin to Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which can he heard both on facts and law. The appellate jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the appeal is confined only to examine the substantial questions of law arising in the case." 20. This Court finds no ground to call for any interference on any of the factual findings. The appellate jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the appeal is confined only to examine the substantial questions of law arising in the case." 20. This Court finds no ground to call for any interference on any of the factual findings. The judgment submitted by the counsel for the appellant in the case of Jenabai (supra) is not applicable in this case. 21. Hence, this Misc. appeal accordingly stands dismissed. 22. Stay application and all pending application, if any, also dismissed. 23. The Tribunal is directed to release the amount of compensation to the claimants-respondents in terms of the award. 24. Office is directed to return the record of the Tribunal.