ORDER : A.V.Sesha Sai, J. Challenge in the present Writ Petition is to the Award, dated 07.10.2005, passed by the Lok Adalat, Kanigiri, Prakasam District in O.S.No.117 of 2003. The petitioners herein are the third parties to O.S.No.117 of 2003 instituted by one Smt Kopparapu Narasamma against one Sri Sunke Peda Venkateswarlu and five others. Smt Kopparapu Narasamma instituted the said suit for permanent injunction. The petitioners 1 to 8 claim to be the legal representatives of defendants 1 and 4 in the said suit and the petitioners 9 and 10 claim to be the purchasers of the schedule property from the defendants 1 and 3 and the legal representatives of the defendants 1 and 4 in O.S.No.117 of 2003. 2. According to the petitioners, petitioners 9 and 10 purchased an extent of 2710 square yards in Survey No.322/1 of Pamur Village and Mandal, Prakasam District by way of a registered sale deed, dated 05.06.2014. It is submitted that when the petitioners 1 and 2 wanted to deliver the subject property to the petitioners 9 and 10, an obstruction was made by B.S.R. Educational Society and the same prompted the petitioners 9 and 10 to institute O.S.No.51 of 2017 in the month of March, 2017 on the file of the Court of the I Additional District Judge, Ongole against the respondents 2 to 4, who are the legal representatives of the plaintiff in O.S.No.117 of 2003 and one Bijjam Usha, for the reliefs of the declaration of title and for possession. According to the petitioners, they came to know of the impugned Award, dated 07.10.2005 in O.S.No.117 of 2003 for the first time on 28.08.2017 on receipt of a written statement filed in O.S.No.51 of 2017 from the respondents 1 to 4 therein. Alleging fraud on the part of the respondents 2 to 4, the present Writ Petition is filed, questioning the Lok Adalat Award, dated 07.10.2005, in O.S.No.117 of 2003. 3. A counter affidavit deposed by the 2nd respondent is filed on his behalf and on behalf of the respondents 3 and 4, denying the allegations and averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition. 4. 3. A counter affidavit deposed by the 2nd respondent is filed on his behalf and on behalf of the respondents 3 and 4, denying the allegations and averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition. 4. Heard Smt. Kavitha Gottipati, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Sri S.Lakshmi Narayana Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the 1st respondent and Sri T.Sridhar, learned counsel for the respondents 2 to 4, apart from perusing the material available on record. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the impugned Award is highly illegal, arbitrary, erroneous and opposed to the very spirit and object of the provisions of the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 and the Rules and Regulations framed thereunder. It is also further submitted that the impugned Award is vitiated by fraud and impugned Award came to be signed only by the plaintiff and the 1st defendant in O.S.No.117 of 2003, as such, it is not a valid one. 6. On the other hand, Sri S.Lakshmi Narayana Reddy and Sri T.Sridhar, learned counsel for the respondents, resisting the very maintainability of the Writ Petition, contend that the present Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and abnormal delay. It is further submitted in elaboration that though the impugned Award came to be passed on 07.10.2005, without offering any explanation for the said delay, the present Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and as such, the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on the solitary ground of delay. It is also their submission that a mere allegation of fraud cannot be a ground for setting aside the Award and if the same is allowed there would not be any end for the litigation. Sri T.Sridhar, further contends that in the written statement filed in O.S.No.117 of 2003 the 1st defendant in the suit, from whom the petitioners herein are tracing out their right over the property pleaded that the subject property is the ancestral property of the 1st defendant which he got in a family partition in the year 1996 and in the wake of the said pleading in the written statement and as the rest of the defendants remained exparte, there are absolutely no merits in the case of the petitioners. In support of their submissions and contentions, learned Advocates appearing for the respondents place reliance on the judgments in the cases Vadiga Amose v. Vadiga Anjaneyulu and others, 2014 (2) ALD 676 (DB); P.V.Narayana v. APSRTC Hyderabad and others, 2013 (4) ALD 386 ; Kapilaben Ambalal Patel and 4 others v. State of Gujarat and another, 2020 (4) ALD (1) and H.S.Goutham v. Rama Murthy and others, (2021) 5 SCC 241 . 7. In the above background, now the issue that emerges for consideration of this Court in the present Writ Petition is: “Whether the petitioners herein are entitled for any relief from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case?” 8. The information available before this Court discloses that one Smt Kopparapu Narasamma instituted O.S.No.117 of 2003 on the file of the Court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kanigiri, Prakasam District against Sri Sunke Peda Venkateswarlu and five others, seeking the relief of permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with her possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property. It is not in dispute that in the said suit, the 1st defendant, Sri Sunke Peda Venkateswarlu, filed a written statement and paragraph No.3 of the said written statement reads as under: “Originally suit schedule property is the ancestral property of this defendant and fallen to the share of this defendant in a family partition took place in the year 1996. The suit schedule property fallen in the share of this defendant and ever since this defendant is in exclusive possession and enjoyment of suit schedule property with absolute rights.” 9. Subsequently, by recording a compromise, the Lok Adalat passed an Award on 07.10.2005 and the terms of the compromise are as follows: (A) That the matter is referred to Lok Adalath. (B) That the plaintiff should enjoy the property shown in the 'A' Schedule of the Award (Part of the Suit Schedule property) with full and absolute rights as she has taken separate possession by metes and bounds of the 'A' Schedule property. (C) That the 1st Defendant should enjoy the property shown in the 'B' Schedule property of the Award (part of the suit schedule property) with full and absolute rights as he has taken separate possession by metes and bounds of the 'B' Schedule property. (C) That the 1st Defendant should enjoy the property shown in the 'B' Schedule property of the Award (part of the suit schedule property) with full and absolute rights as he has taken separate possession by metes and bounds of the 'B' Schedule property. A-Schedule Property: Prakasam Dt., Kanigiri Sub-District, Pamuru Mandal and Panchayat, Village P.No.289, S.No.322/1, total extent of Ac.0.84 cents bounded by: East : Road South : Defendants property of the S.No.322/1, an extent of Ac.0.28 cents. West : Pamur to Pothavaram Road North : Muppasani Gopala Krishna's land within the boundaries Ac.0.56 cts. – 0.22 Hec. B-Schedule: Prakasam Dt. Kanigiri Sub-District, Pamur Mandal, Panchayat and Village, P.No.289, S.No.322/1, total extent Ac.0.84 cents bounded by: East : Road South : Vanka West : Pamur to Pothavaram Road North : Plaintiffs land S.No.322/1 Ac.0.56 cts. of land within the boundaries Ac.0.28 cents, Hc.0-11 all the ways and extents rights. 10. Admittedly, the said Award came to be passed 17 years back. According to the petitioners, they came to know of the said Award only on receipt of written statement filed in O.S.No.51 of 2017 by the respondents 2 to 4 on 28.08.2017, obviously, to get over the issue of delay. In this context it may be appropriate to refer to the certified copy of the Award, dated 07.10.2005, which is filed along with the Writ Petition as a material paper. The said certified copy clearly shows that an application was made for the certified copy on 08.09.2015 and the same was made available by the office of the Court on 11.09.2015. The said aspect, in clear and vivid terms, falsifies the stand taken by the petitioners that they had the knowledge of the impugned Award only after receipt of the written statement on 28.08.2017 in O.S.No.51 of 2017. In this context it may be appropriate to refer to the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondents. In Vadiga Amose’s case (one supra) it was held as follows : “An award passed under Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, is deemed to be a decree of civil Court. A decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court can be challenged by a third party to the suit by filing a suit for declaration. In Vadiga Amose’s case (one supra) it was held as follows : “An award passed under Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, is deemed to be a decree of civil Court. A decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court can be challenged by a third party to the suit by filing a suit for declaration. In order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to put an end to the litigation once for all, the best course open to the petitioner is to approach jurisdictional civil Court for redressal.” 11. In P.V.Narayana’s Case (second supra) it was held as follows : 26. In Bhailal Bhai's case, the Constitution Bench held that no Rule can be laid down for universal application for condoning the delay under Article 226 and the law of limitation has no application. However, it was observed that as a general Rule if there has been unreasonable delay the Court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party in exercise of the extraordinary power of mandamus. It was further observed that the maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a Civil Court must be brought may ordinarily taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. The Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the court to hold it as unreasonable. Of course, these observations were made in the context of a claim made for recovery of illegally collected tax. But, from this it can be said where there is unreasonable delay, the Court should normally decline to condone the lapse. 34. In Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Motilal Agarwal and Others Civil Appeal No. 3604 of 2011 dated 26.04.2011 where the matter relates to challenge to the acquisition of land for public purpose placing reliance on the decision in Bhailal Bhai's case (26 supra) the Apex Court held: 16. 34. In Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Motilal Agarwal and Others Civil Appeal No. 3604 of 2011 dated 26.04.2011 where the matter relates to challenge to the acquisition of land for public purpose placing reliance on the decision in Bhailal Bhai's case (26 supra) the Apex Court held: 16. In our view, even if the objection of delay and laches had not been raised in the affidavits filed on behalf of BDA and the State Government, the High Court was duty-bound to take cognizance of the long time gap of nine years between the issue of declaration under Section 6(1) and filing of the writ petition, and declined relief to Respondent 1 on the ground that he was guilty of laches because the acquired land had been utilised for implementing the residential scheme and third-party rights had been created. The unexplained delay of about six years between the passing of award and filing of the writ petition was also sufficient for refusing to entertain the prayer made in the writ petition. 17. It is true that no limitation has been prescribed for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution but one of the several rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by the superior courts is that the High Court will not entertain petitions filed after long lapse of time because that may adversely affect the settled/crystallized rights of the parties. If the writ petition is filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing a civil suit for similar cause, the High Court will treat the delay unreasonable and decline to entertain the grievance of the petitioner on merits. 52. On the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, the relevant considerations that may be taken into account in determining the issue of delay and laches may be summarized thus: (1) Though no period of limitation is prescribed for the Writ Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or to file a writ petition, a person aggrieved should approach the Court without loss of time. In appropriate cases, where there is delay and the same has properly been explained with cogent reasons, Court may condone the delay as an exception to meet the ends of justice. In appropriate cases, where there is delay and the same has properly been explained with cogent reasons, Court may condone the delay as an exception to meet the ends of justice. But, it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. (2) Courts have evolved rules of self-imposed restraints or fetters where the High court may not enquire into belated or stale claim and deny relief to a party if he is found guilty of laches. One who is tardy, not vigilant and does not seek intervention of the Court within a reasonable time from the date of accrual of cause of action or alleged violation of the constitutional, legal or other right, is not entitled to relief under Article 226. (3) No hard and fast rule can be laid down for universal application and every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (4) There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts. (5) There is no lower limit or upper limit and it will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose. (6) The principle on which the Court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (7) Where there is remiss or negligence on the part of a party approaching the Court for relief after an inordinate and unexplained delay, in such cases, it would not be proper to enforce the fundamental right. (7) Where there is remiss or negligence on the part of a party approaching the Court for relief after an inordinate and unexplained delay, in such cases, it would not be proper to enforce the fundamental right. As a general rule if there has been unreasonable delay the Court ought not ordinarily to lend it said to a party in exercise of the extraordinary power of mandamus. (8) There is no waiver of fundamental right. But, while exercising discretionary jurisdiction Court can take into account delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a Writ Court. (9) Though the High Court in exercise of the power under Article 226 in its discretion grant relief in cases where the fundamental rights are violated, but, in such cases also, High Court, to meet the ends of justice, shall refuse to exercise its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of a party who has been guilty of laches and where there are other relevant circumstances which indicate that it would be inappropriate to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction. (10) The maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. (11) If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Courts have applied the rule of delay with greater rigor in service matters. (12) The benefit of a judgment cannot be extended to a case automatically. The Court is entitled to take into consideration the fact as to whether the petitioner had chosen to sit over the matter and wake up after the decision of the Court. If it is found that the petitioner approached the Court with unreasonable delay, the same may disentitle him to obtain a discretionary relief. Long Delay disentitles a party to the discretionary relief under Articles 32 and 226 and persons who had slept over their rights for long and elected to wake up when they had the impetus from the judgment of similarly placed persons. Long Delay disentitles a party to the discretionary relief under Articles 32 and 226 and persons who had slept over their rights for long and elected to wake up when they had the impetus from the judgment of similarly placed persons. (13) Where during the intervening period rights of third parties have crystallized, it would be inequitable to disturb those rights at the instance of a person who has approached the Court after long lapse of time and where there is no cogent explanation for the delay. (14) Where the appellate authority acting within its jurisdiction condoned the delay after being satisfied with the facts stated in relation thereto, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution should not ordinarily interfere with the order. 53. An analysis of the case law discussed above would amply make it clear that issue of a writ of a mandamus or certiorari is largely a matter of sound discretion and will not be granted if there is negligence or omission on the part of the person to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party. Therefore, burden lies on the workman who has to establish that in spite of his best efforts and diligence he was prevented from approaching the authority within the period of limitation provided for or the Writ Court within a reasonable period of time. If the workman is notable to satisfactorily explain with cogent reasons for the delay he is not entitled to seek for condonation of the delay. It is true that the punishment imposed cannot be sustained in law because of the illegality crept in it in not conducting a prior enquiry. But, still the workman is under a statutory obligation to challenge the same within the time provided by the statutory rules or regulations or within a reasonable period of time before the Writ Court. If delay of 5 to 18 years is condoned, for no reason or fault on the part of the authority, the proceedings which had attained finality are to be set aside. If delay of 5 to 18 years is condoned, for no reason or fault on the part of the authority, the proceedings which had attained finality are to be set aside. Setting aside of such order at a belated stage and allowing of a stale claim, may, as rightly held by the Division Bench in Esa Ali's case, inspire the workman to seek for consequential benefits of promotion as well, in which event, the rights of the third parties would adversely be affected for no fault of theirs. A work man who is tardy and not diligent for years in availing a statutory remedy or in approaching the Court of law, in our view, cannot be encouraged or permitted to contend that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court the punishment cannot be sustained in law, therefore, delay to any extent is to be condoned automatically in exercise of the power conferred on the appellate or revisional authorities or by the writ courts in exercise of the discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Courts can come to the aid of a person who is diligent and vigilant but unable to approach the authority or court of law for redressal of his grievance in spite of his best efforts and reasons beyond his control but not to a person who is tardy and negligent or slept over the matter in availing the statutory or legal remedies. 12. In Kapilaben Ambalal Patel’s case (third supra) it was held as follows : 9. The Division Bench first proceeded to hold that the application filed by the land owners under Section 21 of the 1976 Act was barred by limitation having been filed after 1139 days from the date of commencement of the 1976 Act. It ought to have been filed before 3.4.1979, whereas, it was filed on 22.8.1985 and there was no power bestowed on the competent authority to entertain such delayed application. Having said that, it went on to hold that all the land owners had not challenged the decision of the competent authority. The appeal under Section 33, however, was preferred only by Ramanbhai Parsottambhai Patel and Tribhovandas Chotabhai Patel, the Power of Attorney holders of Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel. No other appellant had preferred the said appeal and thus they allowed the order dated 15.12.1986 rejecting the application under Section 21 to attain finality. The appeal under Section 33, however, was preferred only by Ramanbhai Parsottambhai Patel and Tribhovandas Chotabhai Patel, the Power of Attorney holders of Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel. No other appellant had preferred the said appeal and thus they allowed the order dated 15.12.1986 rejecting the application under Section 21 to attain finality. The Division Bench then proceeded to consider the objection taken by the State regarding delay in filing the subject writ petition by these appellants, to question the Possession Panchnama dated 20.3.1986 after lapse of 14 years, in 2001. While considering this objection, the Division Bench noted thus: “41. The appellant-State has taken specific plea that the order taking possession was never challenged before the appellate authority or the reviewing authority. It was only challenged in the writ petition after a long delay. Though the aforesaid stand was taken before the learned Single Judge, it was not properly discussed. 42. The appellant State has taken specific plea that the order taking possession was never challenged before the appellate authority or the reviewing authority. It was only challenged in the writ petition after long delay. Though the aforesaid stand was taken, but not properly discussed by the learned Single Judge. 43. In the case of Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1990 SC 2281 the Supreme Court while dealing Sec. 10 of the Act held that the writ petition under Article 226 for reopening the proceeding on the ground that the competent authority had not taken into consideration certain fact, filed after ten years, after the excess land was vested in the State Government was rightly summarily dismissed by the High Court. 44. While deciding the question of delay and laches in preferring the petition under Article 226, Supreme Court in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig reported in JT 1999 (10) SC 336 held that the equitable doctrine, namely, „delay defects equity' has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a gobye to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law. 45. In the present case, we have noticed that possession of the land was taken on 20th March 1986. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a gobye to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law. 45. In the present case, we have noticed that possession of the land was taken on 20th March 1986. The order rejecting the application u/Sec. 21 reached finality on 15th December 1986 against all the petitioners, except one Ramanbhai Purshottambhai Patel. The writ petition was preferred against the petitioners being not vigilant in exercise of their rights, learned Single Judge ought not to have entertained the petition against the order taking possession after such a long delay.” (emphasis supplied) The Division Bench accordingly allowed the appeal preferred by the State and dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants herein by setting aside the judgment and order of the learned single Judge and declaring that the possession of the land has been rightly taken over by the competent authority of the State on 20.3.1986. 10. Feeling aggrieved, the land owners have approached this Court. It is urged that there is no tittle of evidence to substantiate the fact asserted by the respondent-State that physical possession of the land in question has been taken over on 20.3.1986. It was merely a paper possession in the form of Possession Panchnama. According to the appellants, de facto possession of the subject land as on the date of the repeal Act is crucial and entail in abatement of all the actions of the State authorities under the 1976 Act. Mere issuance of notification under Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act regarding deemed vesting of the land in the State is not enough for the purposes of the repeal Act. Reliance has been placed on Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar vs. Deputy Collector and Competent Authority & Ors. (2012) 4 SCC 718 (paragraphs 9 to 11), State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280 (paragraphs 36-37), Gajanan Kamlya Patil vs. Additional Collector and Competent Authority (ULC) & Ors. (2014) 12 SCC 523 (paragraphs 10 and 12) and Mangalsen vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2014) 15 SCC 332 (paragraphs 10 to 14). The consistent view of this Court is that physical possession must be taken by the State authorities, failing which the proceedings shall abate on account of the repeal Act. (2014) 12 SCC 523 (paragraphs 10 and 12) and Mangalsen vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2014) 15 SCC 332 (paragraphs 10 to 14). The consistent view of this Court is that physical possession must be taken by the State authorities, failing which the proceedings shall abate on account of the repeal Act. The appellants have relied on Revenue records to show that the continued possession remained with the appellants/land owners even after the Possession Panchnama was made on 20.3.1986. The Revenue entries have presumptive value and the respondent State had failed to rebut the same. It is further contended that the purported Possession -Panchnama dated 20.3.1986 is not a reliable document at all. It is vague and bereft of details. Its authenticity and contents have been disputed by the appellants. It is intriguing that although the subject land is dispersed and not one continuous piece of land, yet one common Possession Panchnama is drawn without any explanation as to the manner in which the possession of five noncontiguous plots came to be taken by the authorities concerned. Further, the Panchnama does not bear any time. All these deficiencies lead to the only conclusion that the Possession Panchnama was prepared by the officials sitting in their office without visiting the site. Secondly, the Possession Panchnama has not been signed by any of the twelve (12) land owners. The appellants are also relying on the observations made by the learned single Judge recording the factum of possession being in favour of the appellants to hold that the Possession Panchnama was illegal. It is then urged that the authorities could not have recorded Possession Panchnama until the application under Section 21 of the 1976 Act was finally decided by the competent authority. Admittedly, the said application was filed on 22.8.1985 and was pending on 20.3.1986. This is impermissible in law and the action is vitiated even on that count. To bolster this position, reliance is placed on the dictum in Full Bench of the High Court in M/s. Avanti Organisation vs. Competent Authority & Additional Collector, Urban Land Ceiling Act, Rajkot & Anr. AIR 1989 Guj 129 and also on Samrathben Manilal Chokshi & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. (1994) 35(1) GLR 203 and Savitaben Ramanbhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. (1999) 40(1) GLR 860. AIR 1989 Guj 129 and also on Samrathben Manilal Chokshi & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. (1994) 35(1) GLR 203 and Savitaben Ramanbhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. (1999) 40(1) GLR 860. Reliance is also placed on the decision of this Court in Darothi Clare Parreira (Smt.) & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (1996) 9 SCC 633 (paragraphs 5 and 6). Reliance is also placed on South India Corporation (P) Ltd. vs. Secretary, Board of Trivandrum & Anr. AIR 1964 SC 207 (paragraph 19), wherein it is held that Sections 10 and 21, both, fall under Chapter III of the Act, and thus, Section 21 operates “in spite of Section 10”. Reliance is also placed on Special Officer & Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings, Hyderabad & Anr. vs. P.S. Rao, (2000) 2 SCC 451 (paragraph 4) wherein it is observed that unless the quantum of excess land is determined, the land owner cannot be expected to surrender the excess land or seek exemption under Sections 20 or 21 or 22 of the 1976 Act. Moreover, the period of filing the application under Section 21 ought to be reckoned from the date of withdrawal of the exemption under Section 20 of the 1976 Act and not from the date of commencement of the Act i.e. 17.2.1976, as such. It is urged that notice was not served upon all the land owners in respect of action(s) under Section 10 of the 1976 Act. Hence, the Possession Panchnama would be of no avail and is void and illegal. This Court in Hariram (supra) has expounded that requirement of giving notice under Section 10(5) and/or 10(6) is mandatory and failure to do so would entail in the land owner being dispossessed without notice, which cannot be countenanced. It is urged that the respective shares of the four (4) noticees are as follows: S. Individual Total land Land Excess No owned permitted Land . (sq. mt.) under ULC (sq. mt.) Act (sq. mt.) 1. Ambalal 7329.50 1500 5829.50 2. Bhikhabhai 2613.50 1500 1113.50 3. Natwarbhai 1546.40 1500 46.40 4. Jayantibha 1758.30 1500 258.30 i Although the competent authority recognised twelve (12) land owners, it chose to issue notice only to selected four (4) land owners. The notice served on them cannot bind the other land owners. mt.) Act (sq. mt.) 1. Ambalal 7329.50 1500 5829.50 2. Bhikhabhai 2613.50 1500 1113.50 3. Natwarbhai 1546.40 1500 46.40 4. Jayantibha 1758.30 1500 258.30 i Although the competent authority recognised twelve (12) land owners, it chose to issue notice only to selected four (4) land owners. The notice served on them cannot bind the other land owners. In absence of notice, plea regarding vesting of land qua such land owners cannot be countenanced. Reliance is placed on Ramanlal Bhailal Patel & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat and Har Pyari (Smt.) vs. IInd Additional Judge, Moradabad & Ors. As regards Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel, he had expired on 31.12.1985. As a result, notice issued to Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel admittedly remained unserved on his legal representatives. Further, Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel's share is 5829.50 square meters of total surplus/excess land, which must be excluded and no further action can be taken in that regard in view of the repeal Act. In substance, the grievance is that the Division Bench ought not to have interfered with the decision of the learned single Judge, which was a well-considered decision and a just approach, considering the facts of the present case. 13. In H.S.Goutham’s case (fourth supra) it was held as follows: “35. Now, so far as the procedure adopted by the High Court calling for the report from the learned Principal City Civil Judge on whether the decree was obtained by fraud or not is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that at the time when the High Court passed such an order, there was already an order passed by the learned Executing Court dated 03.03.1998 overruling the objections raised by the judgment debtors that the decree was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. As observed by the learned Executing Court in the order dated 03.03.1998, the judgment debtors except the averments that the decree was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, neither any further submissions were made on that nor even the judgment debtors led any evidence in support of the same. Therefore, as such, learned Executing Court was justified in overruling the objection that the decree was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation etc. 36. As per the settled principle of law, when the fraud is alleged the same is required to be pleaded and established by leading evidence. Mere allegation that there was a fraud is not sufficient. Therefore, as such, learned Executing Court was justified in overruling the objection that the decree was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation etc. 36. As per the settled principle of law, when the fraud is alleged the same is required to be pleaded and established by leading evidence. Mere allegation that there was a fraud is not sufficient. Therefore, subsequent order passed by the High Court calling for the report from the learned Principal City Civil Judge on the question whether the decree was obtained by fraud or not, can be said to be giving an opportunity to the judgment debtors to fill in the lacuna. Therefore, the course adopted by the High Court calling for the report from the learned Principal City Civil Judge cannot be approved.” 14. In the instant case, a perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition shows that there is no reasonable explanation for the delay. The petitioners herein have not offered any sort of explanation for the abnormal delay in approaching this Court. The explanation offered during the course of arguments while referring to the date of receipt of the written statement in O.S.No.51 of 2017 also falls to the ground in view of the date of obtaining the certified copy of the Award in the year 2015. In view of the above reasons, this Court is of the opinion that there are no merits in the present Writ Petition. 15. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any, in this Writ Petition shall stand closed.