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2022 DIGILAW 229 (MAN)

Gegin v. Khwairakpam Manglembi Devi

2022-11-25

SANJAY KUMAR

body2022
JUDGMENT 1. By Judgment and Order dated 29.06.2019, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Manipur at Lamphelpat, disposed of Motor Accident Claims Case No. 46 of 2017 filed by respondent No.1 herein. Thereby, the Tribunal directed respondent No. 2 in the Claims Case to deposit the compensation amount of Rs. 11,25,182/- (Rupees Eleven Lakh Twenty-Five Thousand One Hundred and Eighty-Two only) along with interest thereon @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till realization. A copy of the said Judgment and Order was directed to be furnished to respondent No. 2 for information and compliance. Aggrieved thereby, respondent No. 2 filed this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity, 'the Act of 1988'). As there was a delay of 54 days on his part in doing so, he filed MC(Mac App). No. 3 of 2019 seeking condonation thereof. However, when the said miscellaneous case was taken up for hearing on 26.11.2019, Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel appearing for the applicant/appellant, made an endorsement to the effect that no application for condonation of delay was necessary and that the miscellaneous case may be closed as withdrawn. Recording the same, MC(Mac App). No. 3 of 2019 was closed as withdrawn. Thereafter, when the matter came up on 28.11.2019, the issue arose as to how and when the appellant received a copy of the judgment and order under appeal. The matter was accordingly directed to be listed under the caption 'Maintainability'. However, the Registry misunderstood this direction and numbered the case itself as 'Maintainability No. 1 of 2019'. 2. The delay of 54 days in the filing of the appeal is yet to be condoned. Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel, relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhagmal and others v. Kunwar Lal and others [ (2010) 12 SCC 159 : 2010 Legal Eagle (SC) 514], wherein it was held that a formal application for condonation of delay is not an essential requisite. Similar was the edict of the Supreme Court in Sesh Nath Singh and another v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd. and another [ (2021) 7 SCC 313 : 2021 Legal Eagle (SC) 213]. Similar was the edict of the Supreme Court in Sesh Nath Singh and another v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd. and another [ (2021) 7 SCC 313 : 2021 Legal Eagle (SC) 213]. It was observed therein that a plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, makes it amply clear that it is not mandatory to file an application in writing before relief can be granted thereunder and all that is required is a plea to condone the delay. Therefore, withdrawal of MC (Mac App). No. 3 of 2019 is of no consequence and would not bar this Court from considering the plea of the appellant to condone the delay of 54 days in the filing of the appeal at this stage. 3. Heard Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel for the applicant/appellant; and Mr. W. Niranjit, learned counsel for respondent No.1, viz., the claimant. 4. It is pertinent to note that the appellant herein, being respondent No. 2 in Motor Accident Claims Case No. 46 of 2017, put in his appearance before the Tribunal but was set ex parte, vide order dated 03.11.2018 passed by the Tribunal, owing to his absence. He asserts that the Judgment and Order dated 29.06.2019 passed by the Tribunal was delivered to him on 14.10.2019 by the claimant and it was only then that he came to know of its existence. This claimed lack of knowledge on his part is what he offers as 'sufficient cause' for condoning the delay in the filing of this appeal. 5. Both sides pressed into service an abundance of case law on principles relating to condonation of delay. However, each individual case would have to turn upon its own peculiar facts, basing on the broad legal principles adumbrated over time. It would not be necessary, therefore, to burden this order with all the cited case law. Relevant legal principles culled out from the judgments cited by both sides will suffice. Two considerations are important in the context of condonation of delay - upon expiration of the period of limitation, a decree holder obtains a benefit under the law of limitation to plead that the decree is beyond challenge and such a legal right should not be light heartedly disturbed. Two considerations are important in the context of condonation of delay - upon expiration of the period of limitation, a decree holder obtains a benefit under the law of limitation to plead that the decree is beyond challenge and such a legal right should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration is that if sufficient cause for excusing the delay is shown, discretion is given to the Court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. This discretion is conferred upon the Court to advance substantial justice. In the absence of a reasonable, satisfactory or an appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of the delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. The law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. Laws of limitation are founded on public policy as an unlimited and perpetual threat of litigation would create insecurity and uncertainty. The principle is based on the maxim: Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, i.e., the interest of the State requires that there should be an end to litigation. Discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously, based on the facts and circumstances of each case. 'Sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bonafides is attributed to the party (See Ramlal, Motilal, Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [ AIR 1962 SC 361 : 1961 Legal Eagle (SC) 239]; P.K.Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another [ AIR 1998 SC 2276 : 1997 Legal Eagle (SC) 1243]; Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project [ (2008) 17 SCC 448 : 2008 Legal Eagle (SC) 1445]; Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [ (2013) 14 SCC 81 : 2013 Legal Eagle (SC) 629]; and Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi and others [Civil Appeal No. 7696 of 2021, decided on 16.12.2021 : 2021 Legal Eagle (SC) 922]. 6. Notably, in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649 : 2013 Legal Eagle (SC) 701, the Supreme Court set out the principles for condonation of delay after examining a plethora of case law. 6. Notably, in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649 : 2013 Legal Eagle (SC) 701, the Supreme Court set out the principles for condonation of delay after examining a plethora of case law. The Supreme Court observed that there should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay as Courts are not supposed to legalize injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. It was further observed that the terms 'sufficient cause' should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose, regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. Per the Supreme Court, no presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but gross negligence on the part of the counsel or the litigant is to be taken note of. Similarly, lack of bonafides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. Further, the concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. The Supreme Court observed that there is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration, for to the former the doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants a strict approach whereas the second calls for liberal delineation. 7. In Brahampal @ Sammay and another v. National Insurance Company [ (2021) 6 SCC 512 ], the Supreme Court observed that though the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, would not apply to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it is relevant to note that while interpreting 'sufficient cause' under the Limitation Act, 1963, Courts have given it a liberal interpretation. Upon considering earlier case law, the Supreme Court went on to state that the importance of introducing the concept of 'reasonableness' had been highlighted in those decisions while giving 'sufficient cause' a liberal interpretation. The Supreme Court also cautioned about the necessity of distinguishing cases where the delay is of few days, as against cases where the delay is inordinate as it might cause prejudice to the rights of the other party. 8. The Supreme Court also cautioned about the necessity of distinguishing cases where the delay is of few days, as against cases where the delay is inordinate as it might cause prejudice to the rights of the other party. 8. In the case on hand, the Judgment and Order dated 29.06.2019 in Motor Accident Claims Case No. 46 of 2017 specifically directed that a copy thereof should be furnished to respondent No. 2 therein, viz., the present appellant. However, there is no evidence of furnishing of the said judgment and order to him by the Registry of the Tribunal. On the other hand, it is an admitted fact that the certified copy received by him on 14.10.2019 was supplied by the claimant, viz., respondent No. 1 herein. Therefore, there was a clear violation of the direction in that regard of the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal and also the mandate of Section 168(2) of the Act of 1988, which unequivocally states that the Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and, in any case, within a period of 15 days from the date of the award. 9. The next question that would arise is whether the appellant can claim ignorance of the passing of the judgment and order in Motor Accident Claims Case No. 46 of 2017 when he had participated in the proceedings therein, till he was set ex parte. In this regard, Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel, placed reliance on the decision of the Madras High Court in Murugayyan Kangiar v. Marudayyammal [ (1956) 2 MLJ 86 : 1956 Legal Eagle (MAD) 211], wherein it was held that even if it is assumed that the defendant in the suit knew that there was a suit pending against him, that would not necessarily mean that he was aware of the fact that a decree had been passed against him. According to the Madras High Court, the statement of the defendant that he became aware of the decree on a particular date would have to be contradicted and disproved before rejecting such a claim. According to the Madras High Court, the statement of the defendant that he became aware of the decree on a particular date would have to be contradicted and disproved before rejecting such a claim. On the same lines, in Pichai Ammal v. Vellayya Thevar @ Ochi Thevar [AIR 1963 Madras 198 : 1962 Legal Eagle (MAD) 168], a Division Bench of the Madras High Court observed that knowledge of the date of hearing of the suit would not necessarily mean knowledge of the fact that a decree had been passed on that date or subsequent to that date. According to the Division Bench, it would be necessary to ascertain when the defendant applying for setting aside such a decree had knowledge thereof and mere knowledge of the date of the suit would not be enough for that purpose. Presently, no evidence has been adduced to disprove the claim of the appellant that he did not have knowledge of the passing of the judgment and order in Motor Accident Claims Case No. 46 of 2017 till he received a certified copy thereof on 14.10.2019 from the claimant. Having received the same, he filed this appeal on 27.11.2019. That being so and as the delay is not inordinate in itself, being a mere 54 days, this Court is of the opinion that the appellant cannot be non-suited at the threshold on the technical ground of limitation. Sufficient cause has been shown by him to entertain this appeal despite the delay of 54 days on his part. This Court therefore deems it proper to entertain this appeal by condoning the delay of 54 days in its institution. The Registry is directed to number the appeal and the miscellaneous case filed therein, if they are otherwise found to be in order, and list the same forthwith before the appropriate Court for further proceedings.