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2022 DIGILAW 2294 (MAD)

District Collector, Sivagangai v. K. R. Kanimozhi

2022-07-22

P.N.PRAKASH, R.HEMALATHA

body2022
JUDGMENT (Prayer: Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent seeking to set aside the order dated 18.11.2021 passed in W.P. (MD) No.10605 of 2014.) P.N. Prakash, J. 1. This intra-Court appeal has been preferred calling into question the legality and validity of the order dated 18.11.2021 passed by a learned single judge of this Court in W.P. (MD) No.10605 of 2014. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rank in the instant intra-Court appeal. 3. The District Collector, Sivagangai and the Child Development Project Officer, Singampunari are the appellants. 4. Before the learned single judge, the respondent was not present. Therefore, when this intra-Court appeal came up, we directed issuance of notice to her and she appeared before us on 29.06.2022. When asked whether she requires any assistance, she expressed her opinion in the affirmative. Accordingly, she engaged a counsel and contested the appeal. 5. In the writ petition, the respondent had challenged the order dated 29.05.2014 passed by the first appellant, besides seeking a direction to the first appellant to reinstate her as Anganwadi worker with effect from 15.10.2013 with all attendant benefits. After notice was ordered in the writ petition, a counter affidavit was filed by the second appellant on behalf of both the appellants. 6. The respondent filed another writ petition also, being W.P.(MD) No. 3750 of 2014 with the following prayer, subsequent to filing of the first writ petition. “to issue a writ of Certiorari calling for the records relating to the impugned order issued by the 1st Respondent Secretary vide G.O.Ms.No.4 Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme Department, dated 09.01.1995 quash the same in so far as the petitioner is concerned.” 7. Since the State of Tamil Nadu was also a party in that writ petition apart from the two appellants and a Government Order was under challenge therein, a counter affidavit dated nil October 2014 was filed by the Deputy Secretary to Government, Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme Department. 8. The learned single judge clubbed both the writ petitions together and passed a common order dated 18.11.2021. However, as against the common order made in two writ petitions, only the order passed in W.P.(MD) No.10605 of 2014 is sought to be challenged before us. 8. The learned single judge clubbed both the writ petitions together and passed a common order dated 18.11.2021. However, as against the common order made in two writ petitions, only the order passed in W.P.(MD) No.10605 of 2014 is sought to be challenged before us. There is no indication that any other separate intra-Court appeal has been filed challenging the order passed in the other writ petition, viz., W.P.(MD) No.13750 of 2014. 9. Insofar as the writ petition against which no appeal has been filed, i.e. W.P.(MD) No.13750 of 2014, the learned judge allowed that writ petition in the following terms:- “This Court holds that the 6 months period ought to be calculated after the deducting the statutory period of 3 months and if so then the petitioner had taken 4 months 11 days leave, which is well within the period prescribed under G.O.Ms.No.4 (Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme Department, dated 09.01.1995). Hence the writ petition in W.P.(MD) No.13750 / 2014 is allowed with the above observation.” 10. By the Government Order referred to above, the Social Welfare Department ordered that the Child Welfare Organisers were appointed on honorarium basis and no service rules have been framed, and that the Government servants regulations and the Fundamental Rules were not applicable to them. However, in paragraph 3(b) of the said Government Order, it was ordered as follows:- 11. Based on the above Government Order, the appellants contended that the respondent had availed more than 7 months and 11 days leave and as per the Government Order, she can be terminated as she was on leave for more than 6 months; however, the learned single judge has held that the respondent was entitled to statutory leave on grounds of maternity and therefore, if 3 months are deducted from the alleged absence, then, her leave period is only 4 months and 11 days which is not authorized, nevertheless, no action can be initiated for terminating her service on grounds of absence based upon the aforesaid G.O. 12. The fact that the Government Order provides for termination in case unauthorized leave is availed beyond a period 6 months and that the respondent is covered by the Government Order is not in controversy. We are also not rejecting the case of appellants on the ground that there was no challenge to the order dated 18.11.2011 made in W.P.(MD) No.13750 of 2014. We are also not rejecting the case of appellants on the ground that there was no challenge to the order dated 18.11.2011 made in W.P.(MD) No.13750 of 2014. This matter involves an important issue as to whether an Anganwadi worker is entitled to maternity benefit, including her leave of absence and whether she is covered by the relevant Government Orders. 13. The appellants, in their grounds of appeal, contended that the Anganwadi workers are selected / appointed on a scheme based on G.O.(Ms) No. 110, Social Welfare and Noon Meal Programme (NMP SW 7) Department dated 14.05.2012. It was stated that the programme was launched all over the country on 02.10.1975, the birthday of Mahatma Gandhi and the scheme was the brainchild of the UNICEF and wholly funded by the World Bank in the beginning and presently, the funding is shared on 60:40 basis between the Centre and State Government. 14. It was also contended that the Integrated Child Development Scheme is implemented through 49,499 main Anganwadi Centres and 4,940 mini Anganwadi Centres totaling 54,439 Anganwadi Centres and more than a lakh of persons are employed and if they proceed on leave, it will create problems to the children attached to the centres; initially, these employees were paid monthly honorarium and from 1988 onwards, they were brought under the non-standardized scale of pay of Rs.40/- to Rs.110/- per month as per G.O.Ms.No.2, Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme Department dated 03.01.1996; a present, the Anganwadi Workers are drawing salary on the basis of the recommendation of the Seventh Pay Commission Pay Scale vide G.O.Ms.No.303 Finance (Pay Cell) dated 11.10.2017 in the special scale of Rs.7,700 - 24,200. 15. It was also contended by the appellants that the Fundamental Rules, more particularly, Rule 18(1) will not apply to these workers and they can be terminated if they remain absent or they avail leave for more than 6 months; they are not protected by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 15. It was also contended by the appellants that the Fundamental Rules, more particularly, Rule 18(1) will not apply to these workers and they can be terminated if they remain absent or they avail leave for more than 6 months; they are not protected by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. It was also stated that the scheme was implemented by giving effect to Article 45 (provision for early childhood care) and Article 47 (duty of the State to raise level of nutrition); while it is laudable that the State Government, in collaboration with the Central Government, are implementing the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in Part IV of the Constitution, they cannot forget another mandate provided under Article 42 which reads as follows: “Provision for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief:- The State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief.” 16. The appellants further contended that it is not as if the Anganwadi Workers do not have the benefit of any maternity leave. The appellants have admitted in ground no.14, the relevant Government Order providing for maternity leave and it reads as follows:- “The Government of Tamil Nadu vide G.O.Ms.No.29 Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme Department dated 27.04.2015 has increased the maternity leave for Anganwadi Workers who are in service at-least for 1 year from 3 months to 6 months for two live births of the workers in terms of the Letter of the Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development No. 1-3/2010-CD-1 dated 09.07.10 and the Letter No. 13965/FR-3/2015 Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department dated 20.04.2015 inter-alia ordered to sanction: (i) paid absence of maternity leave for 180 days beginning from 8th month of pregnancy; (ii) Such leave on two occasions; (iii) 1 surviving children.” 17. It was further argued that in State of Karnataka v Ameerbi [ 2007 (11) SCC 681 ], the Supreme Court has held that the post of Anganwadi Workers are not statutory posts and they are created in terms of the scheme and hence, they do not hold any civil post; they are appointed under a scheme which is not of a permanent nature, although it might have continued for a long time. 18. However, a similar contention was raised before this Court before a learned single judge in D.Pothumallee Vs. 18. However, a similar contention was raised before this Court before a learned single judge in D.Pothumallee Vs. District Collector, Tiruvarur [ 2010 (5) MLJ 46 ]. When the very same judgment was cited, the learned single judge, in paragraph 5.3, explained the aforesaid judgment in the following words:- “5.3. The question that came up for consideration in that case was whether the State Administrative Tribunal constituted under Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 can entertain an application from the Anganwadi workers and whether they are holders of civil posts and whether the Tribunal can entertain applications at the instance of such Anganwadi workers in relation to their service grievances.” 19. In Pothumallee (supra), the learned single judge also explained in paragraph 6.2 as to how these employments were public employments in the following lines:- “6.2. It must be noted that the post of noon meal organizer, Cook and Assistant Cook as well as Helper in the Anganwadi Centres are not created by any rule framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. It is not a constituted service. But, nevertheless since the Government took over to maintain the scheme and had created a separate Ministry for administering the scheme and bearing the entire cost of the scheme, including provisions, utensils and overhead expenditures, salaries of all employees, it is none the less a public employment. Any appointment to such posts must be subjected to the touchstone of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Whatever may be the circumstances which prevailed earlier, the Government has now directly started implementing mammoth the scheme at the level of a Secretary to the Government and the District Collector at the District level. It is a public employment. In case of any public employment, equality doctrine with exception for rule of reservation are available subjected to qualification prescribed therein.” 20. The learned single judge further held as to how the subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court had also dealt with the case of Anganwadi and Noon Mean workers in paragraphs 7.1 to 7.5 which are as follows:- “7.1. It must also be noted that subsequent to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka Vs. Ameerbi case (cited supra), the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the status of Anganwadi workers relating to their recruitment in two subsequent decisions. 7.2. It must also be noted that subsequent to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka Vs. Ameerbi case (cited supra), the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the status of Anganwadi workers relating to their recruitment in two subsequent decisions. 7.2. The Supreme Court in Dipitimayee Parida v. State of Orissa reported in (2008) 10 SCC 687 in paragraphs 11 and 14 held as follows: "11. The matter relating to recruitment of Anganwadi workers is not governed by any statute. Recruitments are made pursuant to a scheme framed by the Central Government. The State, therefore, while making recruitments in such projects in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 162 of the Constitution of India, may issue such guidelines and/or circulars as it may deem fit and proper. The said guidelines are ordinarily binding on all the functionaries working in terms of the “scheme” including the Selection Committees constituted for the recruitment of Anganwadi workers. ……. 14. .... It is one thing to say that the criteria fixed by the State for the purpose of the recruitment of Anganwadi workers are illegal or ultra vires but it is another thing to say that although they are valid, in their application some relaxation could be granted." 7.3. The Supreme Court vide its judgment in State of W.B. v. Kaberi Khastagir reported in (2009) 3 SCC 68 , (relating to the recruitment of Angawandi workers under ICDS Scheme), had observed in paragraphs 31 and 36 as follows: "31. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we find ourselves unable to agree with the reasoning either of the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench of the High Court in holding that the writ petitioners were project employees in respect of the ICDS Project and not employees of the State Government and that their services were coterminous with the Project. Para 35 of the Scheme clearly provides that though the same was a Centrally sponsored scheme, its implementation was left to the respective State Governments with 100% financial assistance from the Central Government for inputs other than supplementary nutrition which was identified as the responsibility of the State Government. Para 35 of the Scheme clearly provides that though the same was a Centrally sponsored scheme, its implementation was left to the respective State Governments with 100% financial assistance from the Central Government for inputs other than supplementary nutrition which was identified as the responsibility of the State Government. In fact, Para 47 of the Scheme, which has been extracted hereinabove, in no uncertain terms makes it very clear that even though funds for the Scheme would be provided by the Central Government, the staff would be borne on the appropriate cadres of the States which would sanction the posts in the appropriate corresponding State pay scale. In the face of such provision it is difficult to accept that the writ petitioners were project workers and not employees of the State Government. ….. 36. All the aforesaid Rules promulgated by the State Government under Para 47 of the Integrated Child Development Scheme leave little room for doubt that Respondents 1, 2 and 3 and others similarly situated, were, in fact, State Government employees. The learned Single Judge, as well as the Division Bench of the High Court, appear to have been swayed by the submissions made on behalf of Respondents 1, 2 and 3 (writ petitioners before the High Court) that the State of West Bengal is merely a nodal agency to supervise the implementation of the Scheme which was in the nature of a project and that the employees thereunder were, therefore, project employees, overlooking the overall intention and object of the Scheme that in order to provide child care and nutrition for children and lactating mothers, the Central Government was willing to fund the entire project but left the implementation thereof to the State Governments who were authorised under the Scheme to appoint the staff of the Project, who were to be borne on the appropriate cadres of the States. Para 35 of the Scheme, which deals with the functional responsibilities, makes this position very clear." 7.4. Further, the Supreme Court had entertained a Public Interest Litigation filed by the Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) represented by its Rajasthan unit in April, 2001. They sought legal enforcement of the Right to Food. The said matter was taken on file as WP(C)No.196/2001, and the case is now known as Right to Food case. Further, the Supreme Court had entertained a Public Interest Litigation filed by the Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) represented by its Rajasthan unit in April, 2001. They sought legal enforcement of the Right to Food. The said matter was taken on file as WP(C)No.196/2001, and the case is now known as Right to Food case. In one of its interim order, (which is binding on the State Government) issued on 07.10.2004, the Supreme Court held that every efforts should be made that all Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes hamlets/habitation in the Country to have Anganwadicentres as early as possible. Such direction may take its own time to provide necessary logistics. Filling up of posts cannot wait till Centres are established in all habitants and hamlets lived by Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 7.5. The Supreme Court vide its order, dated 20.4.2004, gave the following directions: “Having regard to the aforesaid, in respect of cooked Mid-Day Meals scheme, we issue the following directions: 1. All such States and Union Territories who have not fully complied with the order dated 28th November, 2001 shall comply with the said directions fully in respect of the entire State/Union Territory, preferably, on the re-opening of the primary schools after a long vacation of 2004 and, in any case, not later than 1st September, 2004. 2. All Chief Secretaries/Administrators are directed to file compliance report in regard to directions No.1 on or before 15th September, 2004. 3. omitted. 4. In appointment of cooks and helpers, preference shall be given to Dalits, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes." ” 21. In that decision, the learned single judge also held that the employments will come under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 45/1994 providing for reservation, in public employment in paragraph 7.6 to para 7.8 which is as follows:- “7.6. Apart from this, it must also be noted that the Tamil Nadu State Legislature has enacted the Tamil Nadu Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation of Seats in Educational Institutions and of Appointments or Posts in the Services under the State) Act, 1993 (Act 45 of 1994). The Act provides for mandatory reservation in not only Educational Institutions, but also in the Appointments or posts in the services under the State. The Act provides for mandatory reservation in not only Educational Institutions, but also in the Appointments or posts in the services under the State. 7.7.Section 5 of the Act reads as follows: 5.Reservation in appointment or posts in the services under the State.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court or other authority, having regard to the inadequate representation in the services under the State of the Backward Classes of citizens and the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, who constitute the majority of the total population of the State of Tamil Nadu, the reservation for appointments or posts in the services under the State, for the Backward Classes of citizens and for the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, shall be sixty-nine percent. Explanation.-For the purposes of the Act, "services under the State" includes the services under- (i)the Government; (ii)the Legislature of the State; (iii)any local authority; (iv)any corporation or company owned or controlled by the Government' or (v)any other authority in respect of which the State Legislature has power to make laws. (2)the reservation referred to in sub-section (1) shall in respect of the persons belonging to the Backward Classes, the Most Backward Classes and Denotified Communities, the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, be as hereunder.- a.Backward classes Thirty Percent b. Most Backward Classes and denotified communities Twenty Percent c. Scheduled Castes Eighteen d. Scheduled Tribes One percent 7.8.Appointment in services under the State has been widely defined under the explanation provided in the said section and certainly, appointments made to Noon Meal Centres and Anganwadi Centres will attract the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 45 of 1994.” 22. It must be stated that after the judgment of the learned single judge, the Government of Tamil Nadu issued G.O.Ms.No.142, Social Welfare Department dated 06.07.2010 and implemented the rule of reservation in the employments of Anganwadi helpers and noon meal workers. Having accepted such an interpretation and also the position that these employees are having public employment, it is too late in the day for the appellants to contend otherwise. Besides, we are also in full agreement with the interpretation given by the learned single judge as to the status of the Anganwadi workers. Having accepted such an interpretation and also the position that these employees are having public employment, it is too late in the day for the appellants to contend otherwise. Besides, we are also in full agreement with the interpretation given by the learned single judge as to the status of the Anganwadi workers. When maternity relief is also a Constitutional obligation, it is not open to the appellants to contend that giving maternity leave will make the beneficiary children suffer if the employees absent themselves frequently. On the other hand, the Government itself had amended Fundamental Rule 101(a) with effect from 07.11.2016 and had increased the period of maternity leave from 180 days to 270 days. 23. In the present case, the facts are not in dispute. The respondent had joined service on 17.05.2011. She had delivered twin children on 11.06.2014. Before delivery, she had put in 2 years of service. Though it was contended that she was on leave from 14.03.2013 and that she had taken leave on piecemeal basis and that she had resorted to IVF procedure for her pregnancy which was not informed to the department and that after giving notices, she was finally terminated on 29.05.2014 by the department, the only question to be answered is whether she is eligible for a longer maternity leave and whether she was not in unauthorized absence so as to have her services terminated on grounds of absence beyond authorized leave. The various leave letters and the notices issued form part of the typed set filed before us. 24. In the operative portion of the impugned order of termination, the first appellant had stated as follows:- “TAMIL“ 25. The learned single judge has set aside the aforesaid order and while allowing the writ petition, viz., W.P.(MD) 10605 of 2014, gave the following directions:- *“Since the leave is well within the said G.O.Ms.No.4, the impugned termination order is set aside. *"The petitioner is entitled to reinstatement and the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith. * As far the service benefits is concerned the petitioner is entitled to continuity of service. * As far the monetary benefits, since the petitioner had not worked from 14.10.2013 to 14.01.2014, but covered under the Maternity Benefits Act the petitioner is entitled to the monetary benefits for this period. * As far the service benefits is concerned the petitioner is entitled to continuity of service. * As far the monetary benefits, since the petitioner had not worked from 14.10.2013 to 14.01.2014, but covered under the Maternity Benefits Act the petitioner is entitled to the monetary benefits for this period. * As far as the period from 14.1.2014 to 30.6.2014 (the date of filing of the writ petition), the petitioner is entitled to 50% monetary benefits. *As far as the period from 30.06.2014 till the date of this order the petitioner is entitled to 1/3rd of the monetary benefits. * Thereafter the petitioner is entitled to full salary from the next date of this order and the respondents will pay full salary thereafter. With the above directions the writ petition in W.P.(MD) No.10605 of 2014 is allowed.” 26. From the facts narrated, it is clear that the respondent had delivered twins on 11.06.2014 and her termination from service was on 29.05.2014 and the termination was clearly during her absence for pregnancy. Though the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, has not been notified to apply to these employments, and they are covered by the Government Servants Rules including Fundamental Rules, the spirit behind Section 12 (1) of the Maternity Benefit Act will squarely apply to her case. Sec.12(1) reads as follows:- “Sec.12(1): Dismissal during absence of pregnancy.- (1) When a woman absents herself from work in accordance with the provisions of this Act, it shall be unlawful for her employer to discharge or dismiss her during or on account of such absence or to give notice of discharge or dismissal on such a day that the notice will expire during such absence, or to vary to her disadvantage any of the conditions of her service.” 27. Though the history for bringing a maternity benefit legislation was briefly narrated by the learned single judge, its entire history is worth to be set out. The first provincial law in this field was the Bombay Maternity Benefit Act of 1929 and this was followed by the C.P. Maternity Benefit Act of 1930. As a result of the Royal Commission's recommendation on the subject, Maternity Benefit Acts were passed in Madras, U.P., Bengal, Punjab and Assam. 28. The Central Government also passed a Mines Maternity Benefit Act in 1941 extending maternity benefits to women employed in mines. As a result of the Royal Commission's recommendation on the subject, Maternity Benefit Acts were passed in Madras, U.P., Bengal, Punjab and Assam. 28. The Central Government also passed a Mines Maternity Benefit Act in 1941 extending maternity benefits to women employed in mines. The Act which came into force in December 1942 is the first instance of a Central measure dealing with maternity benefits. 29. The Bombay Act was adopted with some modifications by Ajmer- Merwara in 1933 and by Delhi in 1937. Sind Province adopted it at the time of separation and amended it in 1939. The Bengal Maternity Benefits (Tea Estates) Bill, 1941, was introduced by the Bengal Government with a view to regulating maternity benefits for women workers in tea factories and plantations in accordance with the recommendations of the Royal Commission. The Bill has been passed by the local Legislative Council, but, is still before the Legislative Assembly. A draft Maternity Benefit Bill is under the consideration of the Bihar Government. 30. The Labour Investigation Committee appointed by the Government of India, vide its reference made by the Tripartite Labour Conference in its resolution in September, 1943 with reference to Maternity Benefits in its report, dated 05.03.1946, in page 378, made the following recommendations: "As regards child birth, in most of the Provinces, there are Maternity Benefit Acts and there is also the Mines Maternity Benefit Act (which is a Central measure) which impose the liability for the payment of maternity benefit upon the employer. However, we are not satisfied that these Acts are being properly observed or enforced especially in the smaller concerns. There are various devices adopted to evade liability under the Acts. Moreover, there has been some lack of uniformity amongst the various provincial measures and it is satisfactory that the Government of India propose to include child birth also in their proposed Unified Insurance Scheme for factory workers.” 31. Subsequent to those recommendations, no uniform legislation by the Central Government was immediately passed. In the meanwhile, the Constitution of India was adopted on 27th January, 1950. For the first time, the care for woman and maternity relief was recognised by the Constitution of India under Article 42, which has already been set out above. Subsequent to those recommendations, no uniform legislation by the Central Government was immediately passed. In the meanwhile, the Constitution of India was adopted on 27th January, 1950. For the first time, the care for woman and maternity relief was recognised by the Constitution of India under Article 42, which has already been set out above. It was after 11 years after the Constitution was adopted, the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 came to be enacted on 12.12.1961 to regulate the employment of women in certain establishments for certain periods before and after child birth and to provide for maternity benefit and certain other benefits. 32. The purpose for bringing this legislation after 11 years after the Constitutional guarantee was given in the form of Article 42 was because Convention No.103 of International Labour Organisation, had guaranteed maternity protection with effect from 07.09.1955. Article 2 of Convention No.103 reads as follows: "For the purpose of this Convention, the term "woman" means any female person, irrespective of age, nationality, race or creed, whether married or unmarried, and the term "child" means any child whether born of marriage or not." Article 4 reads as follows: "1.While absent from work on maternity leave in accordance with the provisions of Article 3, the woman shall be entitled to receive cash and medical benefits." 33. Recommendation No.95 reiterated the said convention. Thereafter, a Commission, which was appointed during the International Women's Decade, submitted its report on National Plan of Action, 1976, identifying the areas of health, family planning, nutrition, education, employment, social welfare for formulating and implementing the action programme for women and called for action plans to improve the conditions of women in India. 34. Subsequent to the said report, a National Perspective Plan for Women for the year 1988-2000 A.D. was prepared by the Department of Women and Child Development through the Core Group set up by the Ministry of Human Resource Development. It published its report in the year 1988 and its recommendations with reference to maternity benefits. The Core Group recommended that the Maternity Benefit Act should be examined and wherever there is possibility, the same should be extended to unorganised and agricultural sectors. 35. As per the original Act, an employee was entitled to 12 weeks paid maternity leave. However, as on date, the Act has been amended to provide 26 weeks with effect from 27.3.2017. 36. 35. As per the original Act, an employee was entitled to 12 weeks paid maternity leave. However, as on date, the Act has been amended to provide 26 weeks with effect from 27.3.2017. 36. Even for temporary workers who were paid on 6 day week basis, the Supreme Court upheld an order of the Labour Court that those temporary employees will have to be paid 84 days of wages and not 72 days of wages vide its decision in B.Shah v Labour Court [ (1977) 4 SCC 384 ] and held as follows:- "18....It has also to be borne in mind in this connection that in interpreting provisions of beneficial pieces of legislation like the one in hand which is intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to women workers employed in the plantations and which squarely fall within the purview of Article 42 of the Constitution, the beneficent rule of construction which would enable the woman worker not only to subsist but also to make up her dissipated energy, nurse her child, preserve her efficiency as a worker and maintain the level of her previous efficiency and output has to be adopted by the Court. 19. The interpretation placed by us on the phraseology of sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 5 of the Act appears to us to be in conformity not only with the legislative intendment but also with paras 1 and 2 of Article 4 of Convention 103 concerning Maternity Protection Convention (Revised), 1952 adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation which are extracted below for facility of reference: Article 4: 1. While absent from work on maternity leave in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 the woman shall be entitled to receive cash and medical benefits. 2. The rates of cash benefit shall be fixed by national laws or regulations so as to ensure benefit sufficient for the full and healthy maintenance of herself and her child in accordance with a suitable standard of living." 37. The Maternity Benefit Act also provides for a non-obstante clause under Section 27, which reads as follows: "27. 2. The rates of cash benefit shall be fixed by national laws or regulations so as to ensure benefit sufficient for the full and healthy maintenance of herself and her child in accordance with a suitable standard of living." 37. The Maternity Benefit Act also provides for a non-obstante clause under Section 27, which reads as follows: "27. Effect of laws and agreements inconsistent with this Act.- (1)The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law or in the terms of any award, agreement or contract of service, whether made before or after the coming into force of this Act: Provided that where any such award, agreement, contract of service or otherwise, a woman is entitled to benefits in respect of any matter which are more favourable to her than those to which she would be entitled under this Act, the woman shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefit in respect of that matter, notwithstanding that she is entitled to receive benefits in respect of other matters under this Act. (2) Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to preclude a woman from entering into an agreement with her employer for granting her rights or privileges in respect of any matter which are more favourable to her than those to which she would be entitled under this Act." 38. Though an Act providing for maternity benefit was enacted by the Parliament in 1961, insofar as the Government employees (both Central and State), they were having their own leave rules providing for maternity leave and relief liberally. With regard to regular Government servants, the leave rules are more liberal and there is also an introduction of paternity leave for the fathers to take care of the newly born children. Therefore, it is not open to the appellants to contend that the respondent is not eligible for maternity leave and in any event, beyond 180 days, especially when they are holding a public employment and a regular service budgeted by the Government to fulfil the Constitutional obligations. If the due maternity leave is deducted from the alleged days of absence, then, certainly, overstayal was within the permissible limit. In that respect, we are in full agreement with the conclusions reached by the learned single judge. 39. If the due maternity leave is deducted from the alleged days of absence, then, certainly, overstayal was within the permissible limit. In that respect, we are in full agreement with the conclusions reached by the learned single judge. 39. Even otherwise, the appellants have not conducted any enquiry before issuing the order of termination except issuing some show cause notices and therefore, the principles of natural justice are clearly violated. The contention of the appellants that the employment of respondent will not attract Article 311(2) inasmuch as the termination is for a misconduct of unauthorized leave and the appellants having not conducted any enquiry worth its name, the order of termination is liable to be set aside on that ground also. 40. In this context, we may draw support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi Transport Corporation v D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress [1991 Supp. (1) SCC 600], wherein, it was held that notwithstanding the Constitutional protection under Article 311(2), an employee’s service cannot be dispensed with without minimum procedure. The relevant passage from the said judgment reads as under: “This minimal procedure should be made part of the procedure lest the exercise of the power is capable of abuse for good as well as for whimsical or capricious purposes for reasons best known to the authority and not germane for the purpose for which the power was conferred. The action based on recording reasoning without communication would always be viewed with suspicion. There- fore, 1 hold that conferment of power with wide discretion without any guidelines, without any just, fair or reasonable procedure is constitutionally anathema to Arts. 14, 16(1), 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution.” 41. Even for taking action on the ground of unauthorized absence, the Supreme Court laid down two options open to an employer vide State of Punjab v Dr.P.L.Singla [ (2008) 8 SCC 469 ] in para 11 which is as follows:- “Unauthorized absence (or overstaying leave), is an act of indiscipline. Whenever there is an unauthorised absence by an employee, two courses are open to the employer. The first is to condone the unauthorized absence by accepting the explanation and sanctioning leave for the period of the unauthorized absence in which event the misconduct stood condoned. The second is to treat the unauthorized absence as a misconduct, hold an enquiry and impose a punishment for the misconduct.” 42. The first is to condone the unauthorized absence by accepting the explanation and sanctioning leave for the period of the unauthorized absence in which event the misconduct stood condoned. The second is to treat the unauthorized absence as a misconduct, hold an enquiry and impose a punishment for the misconduct.” 42. Very recently, the Supreme Court interfered with a punishment for unauthorized absence of a lower grade employee in Union of India v R.K.Sharma in Civil Appeal No.4059 of 2015 decided on 30.6.2022, wherein, it was observed as under:- “The short question which falls for consideration is whether the punishment of dismissal from service on account of absence from duty for the period mentioned in Article 1 of the Charge-memo, is proportionate, reasonable and in conformity with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India? ….we are satisfied that the punishment of dismissal from service is too harsh, disproportionate and not commensurate with the nature of the charge proved against the respondent. We are, therefore, of the view that the ends of justice would have been adequately met by imposing some lesser but major penalty upon the respondent. … The doctrine of proportionality is employed to examine whether the penalty that is imposed upon is congruent with the charges brought against the delinquent employee.” 43. The learned single judge, while allowing the writ petition, has also disallowed monetary benefit to a certain extent while granting continuity of service and reinstatement. Under the said circumstances, we do not think that this is a fit case which calls for our interference. Resultantly, this intra-Court appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. Costs made easy. Connected C.M.P. stands closed.