JUDGMENT : Petitioner, a transporter in business of transportation of fuels, has approached this Court challenging impugned show cause notice dated 17.1.2020 (Annexure P-12) as well as decision of termination of Transport Agreement dated 1.1.2019 and forfeiture of security deposit communicated vide letter dated 14.2.2020 (Annexure P-14) issued by respondent No. 2, on the ground that impugned action of respondents taken through respondent No. 2 is illegal, arbitrary, unjust and outcome of vendetta against the petitioner for blowing whistle, against illegalities, irregularities being committed by local officials of respondent-Corporation in P.O.L. Depot Nalagarh, by submitting various applications/complaints, including complaints dated 4.10.2019 and 4.12.2019 (Annexure P-15) to the higher authorities and filing CWP No. 628 of 2019 in this High Court against respondent-Corporation and private persons. 2. Undisputed facts of present case are that Bulk Petroleum Road Transport Agreement (herein after referred to as the ‘Transport Agreement’) dated 1.1.2019 was entered between petitioner Vikrant Oil Carrier and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (herein after referred as ‘HPCL’) for road transport of bulk petroleum products from various storage points of HPCL to its consumers/other storage points. Under aforesaid Transport Agreement, petitioner has offered four tank trucks (TTs) bearing registration No. HR-39D-9470, HR-39D-1004, HR-56B-5852 and HR-56B-8795. These TTs were inducted and started plying w.e.f. 2.1.2019. On 7.2.2019, petitioner had made a written request to replace two TTs bearing No. HR-39D-9470 and HR-39D-1004 with two other TTs bearing registration No. HR-56B-8491 and HR-56B-4366. Despite the request, these trucks were not replaced, leading to issuance of notice by petitioner through counsel to respondent No. 2, wherein along with issue of replacement, various other illegalities and irregularities being committed at Nalagarh Depot of respondent-Corporation were brought in the notice of respondent-Corporation with request to take appropriate action and to allow the petitioner to replace the TTs. Instead of taking any action, as requested in the legal notice, successive letters were issued to the petitioner to continue the Trucks already inducted, which were sought to be replaced by the petitioner. In response to such letters, petitioner had informed that he had stopped the above referred two Trucks as they had been indulged in illegal activities with further submission that in replacement petitioner has already given documents of two vehicles, sought to be replaced. Correspondences in this regard continued from both sides. 3. In response to such letters, petitioner had informed that he had stopped the above referred two Trucks as they had been indulged in illegal activities with further submission that in replacement petitioner has already given documents of two vehicles, sought to be replaced. Correspondences in this regard continued from both sides. 3. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner had also filed Civil Writ Petition No. 628 of 2019 on 30.3.2019 against respondent-Corporation and some private respondents, whose trucks were inducted by the officials of Corporation for transportation of petroleum products but without genuine Calibration Certificate, on the basis of a fake Calibration Certificate managed and fabricated in connivance with the officials of the Corporation. 4. It is case of the petitioner that officials at Nalagarh Depot started providing lesser work to the TTs of petitioner to mount pressure upon him to withdraw CWP No. 628 of 2019, but instead of succumbing to the pressure, petitioner had stopped plying its third truck HR-65B-5852 on 30.10.2019 and fourth truck HR-26B-8795 w.e.f. 18.12.2019 with information about reason for doing so. 5. As per respondents, petitioner had stopped plying its truck without any information, whereas claim of the petitioner is that he had given written information to the concerned authority. Further vide communication dated 31.10.2019 sent to respondent No. 3 in response to communication dated 26.10.2019 and in continuation to communication of the petitioner dated 14.10.2019, petitioner had asked reasons for not replacing his two TTs, documents whereof he had already submitted. Vide communication dated 3.1.2020, petitioner had communicated that reasons for stopping TTs Nos. HR-39D-9470 and HR-39D-1004 has already been given by him in his communication submitted at the time of stopping these vehicles in February, 2019 and again informing that owners of these trucks were having partnership with those persons against whom petitioner had filed a Writ Petition in H.P. High Court, Shimla and, therefore, there was reasonable apprehension to the petitioner that for blacklisting the petitioner those persons may do any illegal activity while plying their trucks under transport Agreement of the petitioner and, thus, petitioner had expressed his inability to continue these trucks. It was further informed by the petitioner that remaining two trucks have been stopped from plying by him for the reason that officials of the Corporation at Nalagarh Depot were taking side of the persons involved in unlawful and illegal activities and were mounting pressure upon the petitioner to withdraw the case filed by him in the Court and had also stopped EMD payment to the petitioner and further that petitioner was being harassed and snubbed by the officials at Nalagarh Depot. Lastly, it was stated that despite having address of petitioner available on the letter head, officials of Nalagarh Depot had been corresponding with petitioner at address of Hisar. Petitioner has also communicated to the respondents that he would not be able to ply the trucks unless and until his grievances are redressed. 6. Ultimately a show cause notice dated 17.1.2020 was issued to the petitioner. In response thereto, communication dated 30.1.2020 was submitted by petitioner, re-iterating his request for replacement of two vehicles with further information that officials at Nalagath Depot, namely, Gopal Dass and Manasri Dixit used to snub the proprietor of petitioner firm and they were not taking any action despite submission of proof of 22 vehicles which were plying fraudulently for the reasons that either they were conniving with the transporters of these 22 vehicles or they were having their business shares in that and, therefore, it was informed that till matter is listed in the Court, petitioner would not be able to ply the vehicles. 7. Finally, vide impugned communication dated 14.2.2020 Transport Agreement of the petitioner was terminated and security deposit in the form of bank guarantee of Rs.8,00,000/- was forfeited, leading to filing of present Writ Petition. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that petitioner had stopped plying his vehicles for illegalities and irregularities pointed out by him as a Whistle blower and under protest to the pressure being mounted upon him to withdraw the case and in this regard respondent No. 2 in the impugned communication dated 14.2.2020 has concluded that allegations raised by the petitioner were baseless, incorrect and was a futile attempt to divert from main issue of unauthorized stoppage of TTs despite issuance of various letters by and on behalf of Corporation. 9. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that CWP No. 628 of 2019 filed by the petitioner has been allowed by a Single Bench of this High Court by holding that private respondents therein were plying their trucks on the basis of fake Calibration Certificates and LPA No. 4 of 2021 preferred by private respondents against it has also been dismissed by the Principal Division Bench of this High court vide judgment dated 15.6.2021, whereas Corporation has accepted the verdict of the Single Bench and has taken action against the guilty transporters and all this substantiates correctness of allegations levelled by the petitioner and, therefore, the very reason assigned for rejecting the representation/reply of the petitioner, terminating Transport Agreement and forfeiting security of the petitioner, is contrary to the true factual matrix and, therefore, petition deserves to be allowed. He has further submitted that petitioner has full faith in higher authorities of HPCL and thus, in alternative he has prayed for referring the dispute to the Higher authorities of the Corporation for deciding afresh after setting aside the impugned show cause notice and decision of termination of Transport Agreement and forfeiting the security. 10. It has been submitted on behalf of petitioner that petitioner has not been blacklisted or his Transport Agreement has not been terminated for commission of any illegal act or in violation of Oil Industry Transport Discipline Guidelines, but Transport Agreement has been terminated for acting as a whistle blower against the illegal activities in Nalagarh Depot and, therefore, termination of Transport Agreement is malafide, arbitrary and illegal and an act of arm twisting to pressurize the petitioner to keep quite. Whereas petitioner had raised voice on various issues and the version of the petitioner has been affirmed by the verdict of the Courts as another Writ Petition CWP No. 3542 of 2021 filed by the petitioner has also been allowed vide judgment dated 6.9.2021 and Review Petition No. 102 of 2021, preferred therein has also been dismissed vide order dated 23.11.2021 by the Division Bench of this High Court. 11. 11. Petition has been opposed mainly on the ground that issue involved in present case, i.e. termination of Transport Agreement, falls in the domain of private law and impugned decision is a post contract decision taken for breach of terms of the agreement and is governed by law of contract and falls in domain of private law and for adjudication of issues of private law, petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not maintainable. In support of this plea, reliance has been placed on pronouncement of the Supreme Court in K.K. Saksena Vs. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage and others (2015) 4 SCC 670 , referring its paras 43 and 44, which read as under :- “43. What follows from a minute and careful reading of the aforesaid judgments of this Court is that if a person or authority is a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, admittedly a writ petition under Article 226 would lie against such a person or body. However, we may add that even in such cases writ would not lie to enforce private law rights. There are catena of judgments on this aspect and it is not necessary to refer to those judgments as that is the basic principle of judicial review of an action under the administrative law. Reason is obvious. Private law is that part of a legal system which is a part of Common Law that involves relationships between individuals, such as law of contract or torts. Therefore, even if writ petition would be maintainable against an authority, which is “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution, before issuing any writ, particularly writ of mandamus, the Court has to satisfy that action of such an authority, which is challenged, is in the domain of public law as distinguished from private law. 44. Within a couple of years of the framing of the Constitution, this Court remarked in Election Commission of India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210 that administrative law in India has been shaped in the English mould. Power to issue writ or any order of direction for “any other purpose” has been held to be included in Article 226 of the Constitution 'with a view apparently to place all the High Courts in this country in somewhat the same position as the Court of the King's Bench in England. Power to issue writ or any order of direction for “any other purpose” has been held to be included in Article 226 of the Constitution 'with a view apparently to place all the High Courts in this country in somewhat the same position as the Court of the King's Bench in England. It is for this reason ordinary “private law remedies” are not enforceable through extraordinary writ jurisdiction, even though brought against public authorities (See Administrative Law, 8th Edn., H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, p. 656). In a number of decisions, this Court has held that contractual and commercial obligations are enforceable only by ordinary action and not by judicial review.” 12. In rebuttal to the aforesaid contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that respondent-Corporation is a public Corporation and work of transportation of bulk of petroleum products is a Government largess and process of allotment by way of tender and termination thereof, including post contract termination for alleged breach of contract has to be completely transparent and as per public policy, decision must be reasoned based on true and correct facts and as in present case the reasons assigned for termination and forfeiture are contrary to factual matrix, the rejection of present petition by treating it as a petition belonging to domain of private law would be against public policy resulting into miscarriage of justice. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contention that present petition is maintainable despite the issue in question is having fragrance of belonging to domain of private law, has referred pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Mahabir Auto Stores and others Vs. Indian Oil Corporation and others, (1990) 3 SCC 752 , LIC of India and another Vs. Consumer Education and Research Centre and others (1995) 5 SCC 482 and judgment dated 21.06.2019 passed by a Division Bench of High Court of Gujarat in Special Civil Application No. 7814 of 2019, titled as Aakash Exploration Services Limited through Director Heman Navinbhai Haria Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited. 14. After going through aforesaid pronouncements, it cannot be safely concluded that arbitrariness/malafide can shift the matter belonging in private law field to public law field and in all such cases whether public law or private law governs the rights, it depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case and for which, there cannot be any straight jacket formula. 14. After going through aforesaid pronouncements, it cannot be safely concluded that arbitrariness/malafide can shift the matter belonging in private law field to public law field and in all such cases whether public law or private law governs the rights, it depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case and for which, there cannot be any straight jacket formula. Public authorities are expected to act for public good and in public interest. The impact of every action is also on public interest. It imposes public law obligation and impresses with that character upon public authority. Therefore, in case, challenge is made on the ground of violation of Article 14 by alleging that the impugned act is arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable, the fact that the dispute also falls within the domain of contractual obligation would not relieve the State or its instrumentality of its obligation to comply with the basic requirements of Article 14. To this extent, the obligation is of a public character invariably in every case irrespective of there being any other right or obligation in addition thereto. An additional contractual obligation cannot divest the claimant of the guarantee under Article 14 of non-arbitrariness at the hands of the State or its instrumentality in any of its actions. Even in commercial contracts where there is a public element, it is necessary that relevant considerations are taken into account and the irrelevant consideration discarded. Even in contractual matters public authorities have to act fairly; and if they fail to do so, approach under Article 226 would always be permissible because that would amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Further the arms of the High Court are not shackled with technical rules or procedure. The action of the State, its instrumentality, any public authority or person whose actions bear insignia of public law element or public character are amenable to judicial review and the validity of such an action would be tested on the anvil of Article 14. While exercising the power under Article 226 the Court would circumspect to adjudicate the disputes arising out of the contract depending on the facts and circumstances in a given case. 15. In an appropriate case, a Writ Petition against the State or an instrumentality of the State, arising out of contractual obligation is maintainable. While exercising the power under Article 226 the Court would circumspect to adjudicate the disputes arising out of the contract depending on the facts and circumstances in a given case. 15. In an appropriate case, a Writ Petition against the State or an instrumentality of the State, arising out of contractual obligation is maintainable. While entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition, the Court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs vests under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power, and this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction. 16. In present case, public element is involved because a decision of an authority of an institution, covered under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, terminating the contract on account of post-contract events is under challenge. Such action under public policy, is expected to be transparent, reasonable, rationale and non-arbitrary. Petitioner has not only raised issue, but has also been able to prove illegalities and irregularities in functioning of officials/officer of the Corporation as evident from pronouncements rendered by this Court in CWP No. 3542 of 2021 and CWP No. 628 of 2019. But the authority has rejected the claim of the petitioner and has terminated the agreement without verifying the true facts. 17. For reference, following portion of verdict in CWP No. 628 of 2019 and CWP No. 3542 of 2021 would be relevant. CWP No. 628 of 2019 (SB) “37. But the authority has rejected the claim of the petitioner and has terminated the agreement without verifying the true facts. 17. For reference, following portion of verdict in CWP No. 628 of 2019 and CWP No. 3542 of 2021 would be relevant. CWP No. 628 of 2019 (SB) “37. Accordingly, this petition is allowed to the extent that acceptance of the tenders of the private respondents for the purpose of work allotted to them by respondents No.1 and 2 based upon Notice Inviting Tenders (Annexure P-1), is held to be bad and the same is also ordered to be quashed and set aside having been obtained on the basis of procured calibration certificate.” CWP No. 3542 of 2021 (DB) “27….therefore, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, we for the time being deem it expedient in the interest of justice to pass the following directions: The Board of Directors of HPCL is directed to constitute a special team of its officials, holding sufficiently high ranks and unconnected with the affairs of finalization of contract in issue between HPCL and Sai Roadways, to inquire into all the issues involved in the instant case and to take appropriate action against the wrong doers, if any, in accordance with law. This entire exercise shall be completed within a period of 6 weeks from the date of this judgment and compliance shall be reported to this Court.” 18. Present petition cannot be rejected out rightly only on the ground that termination of agreement is a matter related to breach of terms of the contract after award of the contract. The impugned decision is an administrative decision taken by an officer of the Corporation which must be transparent and reasoned based on true facts. Judicial review of such decision is permissible. Respondent No. 2 in impugned communication dated 14.2.2020 has wrongly stated that petitioner had removed/stopped plying of two trucks without any specific reason and also that he did not inform the stoppage/removal of two trucks and had stopped plying these vehicles without reasons whereas petitioner in each and every communication had been stating the reasons for withdrawal/stopping/discontinuing his trucks from plying under the Transport Agreement and those reasons have been found merit worthy on adjudication by the Court in CWP No. 628 of 2019 as well as CWP No. 3542 of 2021. Therefore, reasons assigned for termination of contract, that allegations raised by the petitioner were baseless, incorrect and was a futile attempt to divert the main issue of stoppage of TTs, is factually incorrect and, therefore, impugned termination of contract for the reasons assigned in the communication dated 14.2.2020 is not sustainable. 19. It has also been contended on behalf of respondent-Corporation that for having arbitration clause in the Transport Agreement, Writ Petition is not maintainable rather petitioner should have taken steps for appointment of arbitrator in terms of clauses of Transport Agreement for redressal of grievances. 20. Petition was filed in the month of March, 2020 and reply thereto was filed on 21.12.2020. No such objection was ever taken either in reply or otherwise till the stage of addressing arguments and, therefore, in my opinion respondent-Corporation has no right to raise this issue at this juncture, on the ground of waiver. Therefore, plea raised on behalf of respondents with respect to arbitration clause is rejected. 21. Lastly, it is contended on behalf of respondents that for breach of contract petitioner is entitled only for damages and, therefore, remedy available for the petitioner is somewhere else, but not present Writ Petition. In the peculiar facts and circumstances, background of the dispute arisen between the parties and verdict of this High Court in CWP Nos. 628 of 2011 and 3542 of 2021, I find that present matter involved issues which are more than breach of contract simplicitor and, therefore, petition should have been entertained and has rightly been entertained by this Court and is not liable to be dismissed on this count. 22. Corporation has no mechanism to test the validity of order, passed at first level, within institution. Contract contains arbitration clause, but none of the parties is interested to refer the matter for Arbitration. That is why no such objection has been taken in reply of the Corporation. Therefore, issue in reference in petition can be adjudicated in a petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution. 23. I am of the considered opinion that Corporation must evolve a mechanism for testing of veracity and validity of order passed by lowest or lower authority/officer by higher authority/officer with adherence of norms of Natural Justice. As on date no such arrangement/provision has been brought in my notice. 23. I am of the considered opinion that Corporation must evolve a mechanism for testing of veracity and validity of order passed by lowest or lower authority/officer by higher authority/officer with adherence of norms of Natural Justice. As on date no such arrangement/provision has been brought in my notice. Therefore, also review of decision of the concerned authority under Article 226 of the Constitution is warranted. However, Corporation is also directed to evolve such mechanism in future. 24. In view of aforesaid discussion, present petition is allowed and impugned communication dated 14.2.2020 is quashed and set-aside and the Director (Marketing), HPCL, Hindustan Bhavan, 8, Shoorji Vallabhdas Marg, P.B. No.155, Mumbai, Maharashtra, Mumbai, 400001, is directed to decide the issue afresh after giving due opportunity of hearing, and if desired, permitting filing of fresh written response to the show cause notice, in the light of observations made hereinabove as well as verdict in CWP No. 628 of 2019 and CWP No.3542 of 2021. Respondent No.4 shall take decision on or before 14.02.2022. 25. It is made clear that setting aside order/letter dated 14.02.2020 shall not entitle the petitioner to consider revival of Transport Agreement. However, in case higher authority fails to take a decision by 14.02.2022 as discussed and directed in present petition, the Transport Contract/Agreement shall be considered to have been revived w.e.f. 15.02.2022. Petition stands disposed of in aforesaid terms alongwith pending applications, if any.