JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC is directed against the judgment of conviction recorded against the appellants herein for offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter called as 'NDPS Act') and sentence awarded them for rigorous imprisonment for 15 years and fine of Rs.2,00,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years each. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 26.8.2010 two appellants herein and one co-accused Maddal Baji (who died during the pendency of the trial) at 1 p.m. near forest Naka, Darbha, P.S. Darbha passing through the truck bearing registration No.AB 07 x 3859 and on search made by the police, the appellants were found in possession 24 quintal 68 kilograms ganja (narcotic substance) in 81 bags, which they transporting and thereby committed the offence. It is further case of the prosecution that on 26.8.2010 Inspector Mahendra Kumar Dhruw, who was posted as Station House Officer of Police Station Darbha at that point of time (who died during the pendency of trial) received secret information from the informant that the accused persons/appellants are carrying ganja in truck bearing registration No.AB 07 x 3859 via highway passing through Darbha. He entered the said information into 'Rojnamacha Sanha' of the said Police Station vide Ex.P31C at 22.25 p.m., he sent constable Kailash Bhaskar (PW-7) to call independent witnesses and entered the same in Rojnamacha Sanha of the Police Station (Ex.P34C). Said constable Kailash Bhaskar came with two independent witnesses namely Bhuvneshwar Sethiya (PW-1) and Sumaru Ram Kashyap (PW-2) at police station at 11 p.m. and entered into Rojnamacha Sanha vide Ex.P33C and on the same date, mukhbir suchna panchnama (Ex.P1) was prepared. Panchnama was also prepared regarding the fact of proceeding without search warrant (Ex.P21) and thereafter at 23.20 p.m constable Kaushal Joshi (PW6) was also directed to give secrete information to superior officer and said constable with two sets of Exs.P1, P21 and P21 proceeded towards the office of the SDOP, Jagdalpur and delivered written information to the Reader of SDOP, Jagdalpur and took acknowledgement vide Ex.P1. All these proceedings were duly entered into Rojnamacha Sanha of Police Station Darbha vide Ex.P34C. All these proceedings were duly entered into Rojnamacha Sanha of Police Station Darbha vide Ex.P34C. Thereafter Inspector Mukesh Kumar Dhruw proceeded towards the spot along with staff members & witnesses and at about 6.30 a.m. truck bearing registration No.AB 07 X 3859 which was proceeded from Rajmahendri (A.P.) towards Raipur (CG) via Darbha, was stopped by the police and Inspector Mahendra Kumar Dhruw asked the names of the persons sitting in vehicle and in turn, three accused persons disclosed their names as Buchhiraju Indukuri (Appellant No.1), Yaham (Appellant No.2 and Madal Baji (Accused No.3 who died during the pendency of trial). 3. It is further case of the prosecution that investigating officer Mahendra Kumr Dhruw has informed the accused persons about their right conferred under Section 50 of the NDPS Act vide Ex. P-3 and consent of the accused persons were also recorded and thereafter vehicle was searched, in which psychotropic substance (later identified as Ganja) was recovered from the offending truck, in which 81 bags were recovered, covered by coconut plants which were 300 in numbers. Search panchnama (Ex.P5) was prepared and recovery panchnama (Ex.P6) was also prepared. After physical verification, it was found that the recovered substance was ganja. Identification panchnama of substance i.e. ganja was prepared vide Ex.P-7. Thereafter, said substance was weighed and weighed panchnama was prepared vide Ex. P9 and in total 24 quintal 68 kilogram ganja was recovered. Prior to that, verification panchnama of scale and weight used for the purpose of weighing the recovered ganja was also prepared vide Ex.P8. Samras panchnama (Ex.P-10) by taking 2-2 samples of 25-25 grams from each bags of the seized ganja was prepared separately. Sample panchnama was also prepared. On the same date and same place, recovered and seized ganja along with other seized articles have been sealed by using seal bearing reflection of 'Police Station Darbha' in English and same seal panchnama was also drawn (Ex.P-12). Seizure memo of the seized article has also been prepared vide Ex.P-13. Accused persons were arrested vide Exs.P-16, P-15 and P-14 respectively. 4. Statements of the independent witnesses namely Bhuvneshwar Sethiya (PW-1) and Sumaru Ram Kashyap (PW-2) were taken as Exs.P-17 and P-18 respectively and thereafter FIR was registered against the accused persons/appellants herein vide Ex.P-30. Seizure memo of the seized article has also been prepared vide Ex.P-13. Accused persons were arrested vide Exs.P-16, P-15 and P-14 respectively. 4. Statements of the independent witnesses namely Bhuvneshwar Sethiya (PW-1) and Sumaru Ram Kashyap (PW-2) were taken as Exs.P-17 and P-18 respectively and thereafter FIR was registered against the accused persons/appellants herein vide Ex.P-30. Seized ganja and samples were kept in malkhana of Police Station Darbha and entry has been made in this regard into japti mal register of Police Station Darbha (Ex.P-19 and certified copy of the same is Ex.P-19C). Following the procedure as stated above, the action taken report (Ex.P-23) was prepared and sent to the SDOP, Jagdalpur. Thereafter, samples of seized ganja were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur vide Ex.P-41 and receipt of the same is Ex.P-42. The Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur in its report vide Ex.P-43 confirmed the fact that seized substance is ganja. After completion of investigation, chargesheet was filed against the accused persons before the Special Judge under NDPS Act. The appellants abjured the guilt and entered into defence. It is their case that they have falsely been implicated by the prosecution. 5. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited 44 documents Exs.P-1 to P-44 in support of case of the prosecution. The defence examined none and did not produce any documents in support of their defence. 6. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 28.7.2014, found the prosecution case proved beyond reasonable doubt and proceed to convict the appellants for offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act and sentenced them as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment. 7. Mr.Devershi Thakur, learned counsel for the appellants herein, would submit that the trial Court has committed grave legal error in convicting the appellants for aforesaid offence. He would further submit that there is total non-compliance of Section 42 of the NDPS Act regarding search of alleged narcotic substance from the appellants as independent witnesses namely Bhuvneshwar Sethiya (PW-1) and Sumaru Ram Kashyap (PW-2) both have not supported the case of the prosecution and they have turned hostile, as such, on this ground, the judgment of conviction recorded and sentence awarded deserves to be set aside. He would also submit that samples collected from seized ganja have not been deposited in Police Station and there is no entry in Rojnamcha Sanha, hence, benefit of doubt should be extended in favour of the appellants as there is all possibility of tempering with the samples so collected. He would also submit that there is also complete non-compliance of Section 55 of the NDPS Act and as such, the prosecution has failed to prove the sanctity of the sealed samples. Therefore, FSL report cannot form the basis for conviction. He would rely upon the judgment of this Court in the matters of Sidhartha Gautam v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2009) 2 CGLJ 250 and Mohd Guddu v. State of Chhattisgarh through Station In-Charge Officer, (2019) 4 CriCC 598 , the judgment of the Orissa High Court in the matter of Mohammad Awesh Memon and another v. State of Odisha, (2020) 4 CRICC 538, the judgments of the Patna High Court in the matters of Sona Mati Devi v. State of Bihar, (2017) 178 AIC 432 and Bhulan Das @ Bhulan Ravidas v. State of Bihar, (2018) 1 Crimes 468, the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in the matter of Mithu Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 3 CriCC 520 and the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the matter of Radha Kishan v. State, (2001) 1 AD(Delhi) 309. 8. On the other hand, Mr.Sudeep Verma, learned Deputy Government Advocate for the respondent/State, would support the impugned judgment and submit that Section 42 of the NDPS Act has been complied with fully and its compliance has been proved in accordance with law. He would further submit that conviction can be based on sole testimony of official witnesses and looking to the quantity of seized ganja i.e. 24 quintal 68 kilogram from the conscious possession of the appellants herein, the conviction of the appellants is strictly in accordance with law. He would also submit that no suggestion was put by the defence to Pramod Shrivastava (PW-10) that the samples which were sent for the purpose of Forensic Science Laboratory is not one which was collected from seized ganja. He would also submit that no suggestion was put by the defence to Pramod Shrivastava (PW-10) that the samples which were sent for the purpose of Forensic Science Laboratory is not one which was collected from seized ganja. However, Pramod Shrivastava (PW-10) has clearly stated that ganja was recovered from the appellants, which was being illegally transported from them in truck and which was also covered by the appellants from the plants of coconut, as such, this witness has proved the prosecution documents of seizure of ganja samples vide panchnama memo, which has been sent to FSL for examination, in which it was found to be ganja, as such, there is complete compliance of Section 55 of the NDPS Act. He would rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Baldev Singh v. State of Haryana, (2015) 17 SCC 554, Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 9 SCC 627 and Rajesh Dhiman v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020) 10 SCC 740 to buttress his submission. 9. We have heard the learned appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act provides as under:- “20. Punishment for contravention in relation to cannabis plant and cannabis. Whoever, in contravention of any provisions of this Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder, (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) produces, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports, inter-State, exports inter-State or uses cannabis, shall be punishable (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) where such contravention relates to subclause (b), - (A) and (B) xxx xxx xxx (C) and involves commercial quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees. Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees.” 11. Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees.” 11. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provisions would show that whoever in contravention of this Act possesses, transports cannabis shall be punishable and where the quantity of ganja is commercial quantity, the accused shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees. 12. It would be appropriate to notice Section 42 of the NDPS Act, which states as under : “42. Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorisation. 12. It would be appropriate to notice Section 42 of the NDPS Act, which states as under : “42. Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorisation. (1) Any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the departments of central excise, narcotics, customs, revenue intellegence or any other department of the Central Government including paramilitary forces or armed forces as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government, or any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon,sepoy or constable) of the revenue, drugs control, excise, police or any other department of a State Government as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the State Government, if he has reason to believe from persons knowledge or information given by any person and taken down in writing that any narcotic drug, or psychotropic substance, or controlled substance in respect of which an offence punishable under this Act has been committed or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of the commission of such offence or any illegally acquired property or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act is kept or concealed in any building, conveyance or enclosed place, may between sunrise and sunset, - (a) enter into and search any such building, conveyance or place; (b) in case of resistance, break open any door and remove any obstacle to such entry; (c) seize such drug or substance and all materials used in the manufacture thereof and any other article and any animal or conveyance which he has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under this Act and any document or other article which he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the commission of any offence punishable under this Act or furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure of freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act; and (d) detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under this Act: [Provided that in respect of holder of a licence for manufacture of manufactured drugs or psychotropic substances or controlled substances, granted under this Act or any rule or order made thereunder, such power shall be exercised by an officer not below the rank of sub-inspector : Provided further that if such officer has reason to believe that a search warrant or authorisation cannot be obtained without affording opportunity for the concealment of evidence or facility for the escape of an offender, he may enter and search such building, conveyance or enclosed place at any time between sunset and sunrise after recording the grounds of his belief. (2) Where an officer takes down any information in writing under Sub-section (1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso thereto, he shall within seventy-two hours send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior.” 13. Section 42 of the NDPS Act came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in the matter of Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2009) 8 SCC 539 in which their Lordships considered the statutory requirement of writing down and conveying information to superior officer prior to entry, search and seizure, while resolving the conflict between two earlier decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the matters of Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 2 SCC 513 and Sajan Abraham v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 692 and held that whether there is adequate or substantial compliance with Section 42 or not is a question of fact to be decided in each case and while total non-compliance with requirements of Sections 42(1) and (2) is impermissible, delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation about the delay will be acceptable compliance with Section 42. Their Lordships further held that non-compliance of Section 42 of the Act of 1985 may not vitiate the trial if it does not cause any prejudice to the accused and observed in paragraph 35 as under: “35. In conclusion, what is to be noticed is that Abdul Rashid did not require literal compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) nor did Sajan Abraham hold that the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) need not be fulfilled at all. The effect of the two decisions was as follows : (a) The officer on receiving the information (of the nature referred to in Sub-section (1) of section 42) from any person had to record it in writing in the register concerned and forthwith send a copy to his immediate official superior, before proceeding to take action in terms of clauses (a) to (d) of section 42(1). (b) But if the information was received when the officer was not in the police station, but while he was on the move either on patrol duty or otherwise, either by mobile phone, or other means, and the information calls for immediate action and any delay would have resulted in the goods or evidence being removed or destroyed, it would not be feasible or practical to take down in writing the information given to him, in such a situation, he could take action as per clauses (a) to (d) of section 42(1) and thereafter, as soon as it is practical, record the information in writing and forthwith inform the same to the official superior. (c) In other words, the compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) in regard to writing down the information received and sending a copy thereof to the superior officer, should normally precede the entry, search and seizure by the officer. But in special circumstances involving emergent situations, the recording of the information in writing and sending a copy thereof to the official superior may get postponed by a reasonable period, that is after the search, entry and seizure. The question is one of urgency and expediency. (d) While total non-compliance of requirements of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 42 is impermissible, delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation about the delay will be acceptable compliance of section 42. To illustrate, if any delay may result in the accused escaping or the goods or evidence being destroyed or removed, not recording in writing the information received, before initiating action, or non-sending a copy of such information to the official superior forthwith, may not be treated as violation of section 42. But if the information was received when the police officer was in the police station with sufficient time to take action, and if the police officer fails to record in writing the information received, or fails to send a copy thereof, to the official superior, then it will be a suspicious circumstance being a clear violation of section 42 of the Act. Similarly, where the police officer does not record the information at all, and does not inform the official superior at all, then also it will be a clear violation of section 42 of the Act. Similarly, where the police officer does not record the information at all, and does not inform the official superior at all, then also it will be a clear violation of section 42 of the Act. Whether there is adequate or substantial compliance with section 42 or not is a question of fact to be decided in each case. The above position got strengthened with the amendment to section 42 by Act 9 of 2001.” 14. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held in paragraph 35(d) of Karnail Singh (supra) that while total non-compliance of requirements of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 42 is impermissible, delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation about the delay will be acceptable compliance of section 42. If any delay may result in the accused escaping or the goods or evidence being destroyed or removed, not recording in writing the information received, before initiating action, or non-sending a copy of such information to the official superior forthwith, may not be treated as violation of section 42. But if the information was received when the police officer was in the police station with sufficient time to take action, and if the police officer fails to record in writing the information received, or fails to send a copy thereof, to the official superior, then it will be a suspicious circumstance being a clear violation of section 42 of the Act. The principle of law laid down in Karnail Singh (supra) has further been followed by the Supreme Court recently in the matter of Boota Singh v. State of Haryana, (2021) SCC Online SC 324. 15. In the case in hand, it is the finding of the learned Special Judge that 24 quintal 68 kilograms ganja was recovered from possession of three accused persons/appellants herein. It is submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that Section 42 of the NDPS Act has not been complied with as two independent witnesses namely Bhuvneshwar Sethiya (PW-1) and Somaru Ram Kashyap (PW-2) have not supported the case of the prosecution and they have turned hostile. It is submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that Section 42 of the NDPS Act has not been complied with as two independent witnesses namely Bhuvneshwar Sethiya (PW-1) and Somaru Ram Kashyap (PW-2) have not supported the case of the prosecution and they have turned hostile. However, it is the case of the respondent/State that though they have turned hostile, but it has been proved by the testimony of Pramod Shrivastava (PW-10), who has been examined by prosecution to acknowledge & prove the proceedings under the NDPS Act and the said witness was posted as Assistant Sub-inspector at the same point of time in Police Station Darbha. 16. It is pertinent to note that investigating officer Mahendra Kumar Dhruw died during the pendency of trial and the prosecution has examined Pramod Shrivastava (PW-10) who was also aware with the proceedings drawn under the NDPS Act in the present case. In his statement before the Court, Pramod Shrivastava (PW-10) has acknowledged and proved the entire proceeding done by investigating officer Mahendra Kumar Dhruw. Huge quantity of ganja i.e. 24 qunital 68 kilograms has been recovered from conscious possession of the appellants herein vide seizure memo Ex.P-13. Memo of the collected samples from seized ganja is also proved vide Exs.P-10 & P-11 and thereafter samples were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory on 28.8.2010 vide Ex.P-41 and acknowledgement is Ex.P-42 and FSL report which has come with a finding that samples sent to FSL have contained prohibited substance ganja vide Ex.P-43. Though seizure witnesses namely Bhuvneshwar Sethiya (PW-1) and Somaru Ram Kashyap (PW-2) have not supported the case of the prosecution, but at the same time, they have not denied their signatures in official papers/memos. 17. The question for consideration is, whether evidence of police officials can be discarded in absence of support by independent evidence ? 18. The issue so posed has been considered by the Supreme Court time to time and it has been held that there is no legal presumption that evidence of the police officials, unless supported by independent evidence, is unworthy of acceptance. 19. The Supreme Court in the matter of Girja Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 7 SCC 625 has clearly held that no infirmity is attached to the testimony of police officials merely because they belong to police force and that conviction can be based on the testimony of police officials. 20. 19. The Supreme Court in the matter of Girja Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 7 SCC 625 has clearly held that no infirmity is attached to the testimony of police officials merely because they belong to police force and that conviction can be based on the testimony of police officials. 20. Relying upon Girja Prasad (supra), the Supreme Court in the matter of Baldev Singh (supra) has held that mere fact that they are police officials does not by itself give rise to any doubt about their creditworthiness. It was observed as under:- “10. There is no legal proposition that evidence of police officials unless supported by independent evidence is unworthy of acceptance. Evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. Prudence however requires that the evidence of police officials who are interested in the outcome of the result of the case needs to be carefully scrutinized and independently appreciated. Mere fact that they are police officials does not by itself give rise to any doubt about their creditworthiness.” 21. Similarly, in the matter of Rizwan Khan (supra), the Supreme Court has held that testimony of official witnesses cannot be rejected on the ground of non corroboration by independent witnesses. It was further held that examination of independent witness is not an indispensable requirement and such non-examination is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution case and relying upon State of H.P. v. Pardeep Kumar, (2018) 13 SCC 808 held as under: “14. Applying the law laid down by this Court on the evidence of police officials/police witnesses to the facts of the case in hand, referred to hereinabove, we are of the opinion as the police witnesses are found to be reliable and trustworthy, no error has been committed by both the courts below in convicting the accused relying upon the deposition of the police officials.” 22. Similarly, in the matter of Rajesh Dhiman (supra) it has been held by the Supreme Court that non-examination of independent witnesses would not ipso facto entitle one to seek acquittal. Though a heightened standard of care is imposed on the court in such instances. 23. Similarly, in the matter of Rajesh Dhiman (supra) it has been held by the Supreme Court that non-examination of independent witnesses would not ipso facto entitle one to seek acquittal. Though a heightened standard of care is imposed on the court in such instances. 23. Thus, though independent witnesses namely Bhuvneshwar Sethiya (PW-1) and Somaru Ram Kashyap (PW-2) have not supported the case of the prosecution, but considering the statement of Pramod Shrivastava (PW-10), compliance of procedure prescribed under Section 42 of the NDPS Act has been established and proved by the prosecution. 24. Next submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that ganja allegedly seized from the possession of the appellants herein has not been deposited in malkhana of Police Station Darbha as there is no entry in Rojnamcha Sanha and therefore, it is non-compliance of Section 55 of the NDPS Act and the benefit should be extended in favour of the appellants. In this regard, no suggestion has been made on behalf of the defence to the prosecution witnesses that the samples which were sent for the purpose of FSL is not one which was collected from seized ganja. Pramod Shrivastava (PW-10) in his statement before the Court has categorically stated that ganja was recovered from the appellants, which was unauthorizedly being transported by them in truck covered by plants of coconut. Huge quantity i.e. 24 qunital 68 kilograms ganja was recovered from possession of the appellants. 25. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 55 of the NDPS Act which provides as under: “55. Police to take charge of articles seized and delivered.- An officer-in-charge of a police station shall take charge of and keep in safe custody, pending the orders of the Magistrate, all articles seized under this Act within the local area of that police station and which may be delivered to him, and shall allow any officer who may accompany such articles to the police station or who may be deputed for the purpose, to affix his seal to such articles or to take samples of and from them and all samples so taken shall also be sealed with a seal of the officer-in-charge of the police station.” 26. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that officer-in-charge of the police station shall take charge for safe custody of articles seized under the Act within his jurisdiction and which may be delivered to him and shall allow the officer bringing such articles to affix his seal to such articles or to take samples and the Officer-in-charge shall also seal the articles with his own seal. As such, object of this provision is two folds. Firstly, actual articles seized are produced at the time of trial and samples of the said articles are sent for analysis by expert and secondly, after the articles are produced before the Officer-in-charge, these are not substituted by some other articles. These safeguards have been provided both for prosecution and the accused and have to be followed scrupulously. In other words, this provision has to be complied with strictly. 27. Kamlesh Nirmalkar (PW-8) has clearly stated that seized ganja was simply kept in Malkhana of Police Station Darbha and japti mal register has been proved by him vide Ex.P-19. This witness has also stated that Constable Kailash Bhaksar (PW-7) has taken samples of sealed packets to FSL, Raipur and the FSL laboratory has acknowledged the sealed samples through its receipt vide Ex.P-42. Though proper entry in this regard could not be made in Rojnamcha Sanha, but still factum regarding safe custody of the recovered ganja is duly proved by testimonies of Kamlesh Nirmalkar (PW-8) and Kailash Bhakar (PW-7) and ultimately, in FSL report, seized substance has been found to be ganja. As such, chain of circumstances commencing from seizure of ganja and its chemical analysis was complete in all respect. Even the defence has not challenged the seal panchnama which is duly drawn by the police vide Ex.P-12. The appellants have failed to lay any reasonable doubt on prosecution case and as such, the recovery of 24 qunital 68 kilograms ganja from the possession of the accused much less conscious possession has been established and once the possession is established, burden was on the appellants to prove that they were not in conscious possession of the offending articles, as such, learned Special Judge has rightly convicted them for offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act. In view of finding reached hereinabove, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in the matters of Sidhartha Gautam (supra), Mohd Guddu (supra), Mohammad Awesh Memon (supra), Sona Mati Devi (supra), Bhulan Das (supra), Mithu Singh (supra) and Radha Kishan (supra) are clearly distinguishable to the facts of the present case. 28. It was lastly contended by Mr.Devershi Thakur, learned counsel for the appellants, that the trial Court has imposed the sentence more than the minimum sentence as prescribed under Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act, but failed to advert the factors as mentioned in Section 32-B of the NDPS Act. Therefore, the sentence awarded more than the minimum sentence is of 10 years is liable to be set aside. 29. However, it has been contended by Mr.Sudeep Verma, learned Deputy Government Advocate for the respondent/State that there is no mandatory requirement on the part of the Special Court to take into consideration the factors which are provided in clauses (a) to (f) of Section 32-B of the NDPS Act while awarding the punishment higher than the minimum punishment. He would rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Rafiq Qureshi v. Narcotic Control Bureau, Eastern Zonal Unit, (2019) 6 SCC 492 . 30. In order to decide the question so raised, it would be appropriate to notice the provisions contained in Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act which states as under: “21. Punishment for contravention in relation to manufactured drugs and preparations.- Whoever, in contravention of any provisions of this Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports inter-State, exports inter-State or uses any manufactured drug or any preparation containing any manufactured drug shall be punishable, (a) and (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) where the contravention involves commercial quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees which may extend to two lakh rupees. Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees.” 31. Section 32-B was inserted by Act 9 of 2001 in the NDPS Act w.e.f. 02.10.2001 which states as under: “32B. Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees.” 31. Section 32-B was inserted by Act 9 of 2001 in the NDPS Act w.e.f. 02.10.2001 which states as under: “32B. Factors to be taken into account for imposing higher than the minimum punishment. - Where a minimum term of imprisonment or amount of fine is prescribed for any offence committed under this Act, the court may, in addition to such factors as it may deem fit, take into account the following factors for imposing a punishment higher than the minimum term of imprisonment or amount of fine, namely : (a) the use or threat of use of violence or arms by the offender; (b) the fact that the offender holds a public office and that he has taken advantage of that office in committing the offence; (c) the fact that the minors are affected by the offence or the minors are used for the commission of an offence; (d) the fact that the offence is committed in an educational institution or social service facility or in the immediate vicinity of such institution or faculty or in other place to which school children and students resort for educational, sports and social activities.; (e) the fact that the offender belongs to organised international or any other criminal group which is involved in the commission of the offences; and (f) the fact that the offender is involved in other illegal activities facilitated by commission of the offence.” 32. The question raised herein as to whether in absence of any factors enumerated in clauses (a) to (f) of Section 32-B of the NDPS Act, the trial Court is justified in awarding punishment higher than the minimum punishment came-up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the matter of Rafiq Qureshi (supra) in which following two issues were framed by their Lordships: 7.1 Whether in the absence of any of the factors enumerated in Section 32-B from clauses (a) to (f) whether the trial court could have awarded punishment higher than the minimum term of imprisonment ? 7.2 Whether the trial court could not take any other factor into consideration apart from factors mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) while imposing punishment higher than the minimum term of imprisonment? 7.2 Whether the trial court could not take any other factor into consideration apart from factors mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) while imposing punishment higher than the minimum term of imprisonment? Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rafiq Qureshi (supra) have held that Section 32-B from clauses (a) to (f) enumerates various factors for imposing punishment higher than the minimum term of imprisonment. However, specific word used in Section 32-B that court may, in addition to such factors as it may deem fit, clearly indicates that the court's discretion to take such factor as it may deem fit, is not fettered by factors which are enumerated in clauses (a) to (f) of Section 32-B of the NDPS Act. Quantity of substance with which accused is charged, is a relevant factor, which can be taken into consideration while fixing quantum of punishment. It was further held that clauses (a) to (f) of Section 32-B do not enumerate any factor regarding quantity of substance as a factor for determining punishment. It was observed as under: “16. The statutory scheme indicates that the decision to impose a punishment higher than the minimum is not confined or limited to the factors enumerated in clauses (a) to (f). The Court’s discretion to consider such factors as it may deem fit is not taken away or tinkered. In a case a person is found in possession of a manufactured drug whose quantity is equivalent to commercial quantity, the punishment as per Section 21(c) has to be not less than ten years which may extend to twenty years. But suppose the quantity of manufactured drug is 20 times of the commercial quantity, it may be a relevant factor to impose punishment higher than minimum. Thus, quantity of substance with which an accused is charged is a relevant factor, which can be taken into consideration while fixing quantum of the punishment. Clauses (a) to (f) as enumerated in Section 32-B do not enumerate any factor regarding quantity of substance as a factor for determining the punishment. In the event the Court takes into consideration the magnitude of quantity with regard to which an accused is convicted, the said factor is relevant factor and the court cannot be said to have committed an error when taking into consideration any such factor, higher than the minimum term of punishment is awarded. 18. In the event the Court takes into consideration the magnitude of quantity with regard to which an accused is convicted, the said factor is relevant factor and the court cannot be said to have committed an error when taking into consideration any such factor, higher than the minimum term of punishment is awarded. 18. The specific words used in Section 32-B that court may, in addition to such factors as it may deem fit clearly indicates that Court’s discretion to take such factor as it may deem fit is not fettered by factors which are enumerated in clauses (a) to (f) of Section 32B. 23. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that punishment awarded by the trial court of a sentence higher than the minimum relying on the quantity of substance cannot be faulted even though the Court had not adverted to the factors mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) as enumerated under Section 32B. However, when taking any factor into consideration other than the factors enumerated in Section 32B, (a) to (f), the Court imposes a punishment higher than the minimum sentence, it can be examined by higher Courts as to whether factor taken into consideration by the Court is a relevant factor or not. Thus in a case where Court imposes a punishment higher than minimum relying on an irrelevant factor and no other factor as enumerated in Section 32B(a to f) is present, award of sentence higher than minimum can be interfered with. 24. In the present case the High Court held that although gross quantity of 8.175 Kg. of Heroin was alleged to have been recovered from the appellant but actual quantity of Heroine which was found to be in possession was only 609.6 gm. The High Court held that since the appellant was found to be in possession of Narcotic Drugs as per the analysis report to 609.6 gm. which is much higher than the commercial quantity, punishment higher than the minimum is justified. The High Court reduced the punishment from 18 years to 16 years. The High Court held that since the appellant was found to be in possession of Narcotic Drugs as per the analysis report to 609.6 gm. which is much higher than the commercial quantity, punishment higher than the minimum is justified. The High Court reduced the punishment from 18 years to 16 years. We, thus, uphold the judgment of the trial court and the High Court awarding the punishment higher than the minimum, however, looking to all the facts and circumstances of the present case including the fact that it was found by the High Court that the appellant was only a carrier, we find that the ends of justice will be sub-served in reducing the sentence from 16 years to 12 years. Thus, while maintaining the conviction of the appellant the appellant is sentenced to undergo 12 years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 2 lakhs and in default of payment of such fine the appellant shall further undergo for a simple imprisonment for six months. The appeal is partly allowed to the extent as indicated above.” 33. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Rafiq Qureshi (supra), it is quite vivid that though factors as mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of Section 32-B of the NDPS Act have not been considered while awarding punishment higher than the minimum (ten years), but gross quantity i.e. 24 quintal 68 kilograms ganja was recovered from the possession of three accused and commercial quantity of ganja is 20 k.g. In view of gross commercial quantity of ganja i.e. 24 quintal 68 kilograms, which is more than 122 times of the commercial quantity, which is the relevant factor to impose punishment higher than the minimum punishment as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rafiq Qureshi (supra). Thus, the trial Court is justified in taking into consideration the magnitude of quantity of seized ganja for which the appellants have been convicted and it cannot be held that the learned Special Court (NDPS) has committed an error in imposing the sentence higher than the minimum term of punishment. 34. We do not find any merit in submission made by learned counsel for the appellants and it is accordingly rejected. 34. We do not find any merit in submission made by learned counsel for the appellants and it is accordingly rejected. We hereby affirm the judgment of the learned Special Judge convicting the appellants and sentencing them for the period as noticed in opening paragraph of this judgment. Accordingly, the criminal appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.