ORDER : Learned trial court dismissed plaintiff’s application filed under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure vide order dated 25.11.2021. This order was not interfered with by the First Appellate Court in its judgment dated 31.12.2021. Aggrieved, plaintiff has invoked the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the constitution of India by means of present petition. 2. Facts in brief:- 2(a) A civil suit for permanent prohibitory as well as mandatory injunction was instituted by the petitioner/plaintiff against the respondent/defendant. The civil suit was in respect of land comprised in Khata No.6 min Khtauni No.6 min Khasra No.60 measuring 5 Kanals 04 Marlas, situated in Mohal Bassi P.O. Bhoranj, Tehsil Bhoranj, District Hamirpur H.P. By relying upon the jamabandi for the year 2007-08, the petitioner/plaintiff pleaded that he was co-owner in possession over the suit land. The land was not partitioned. That the respondent was one of the co-owners and had started to collect construction material intending to raise construction over the best portion of the suit land by grabbing more land than his share. That the respondent was threatening to dispossess the petitioner from the suit land forcibly and illegally. He had also started to block the light and air of petitioner’s house which existed over the suit land since 2006-2007. That the respondent was threatening to change the nature of the suit land without getting the same partitioned. Alongwith the civil suit, an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of CPC was moved by the petitioner, seeking to restrain the respondent from digging the suit land, collecting construction material, raising construction, dispossessing the applicant/plaintiff/petitioner from the suit land forcibly, blocking the light and air of the applicant’s/plaintiff’s house existing over the suit land. 2(b) The respondent opposed the application. His case was that parties were in settled separate possession of the suit land under a family arrangement. Pursuant to this family arrangement, petitioner as well as petitioner’s brother Kartar Chand had already raised their respective construction over the land in question. Respondent also submitted that he had carried out levelling work on the land in the year 2018 and had already raised the construction upto second floor by 19.06.2019. Petitioner had never objected to raising of construction by the respondent. Respondent also submitted that he had carried out levelling work on the land in the year 2018 and had already raised the construction upto second floor by 19.06.2019. Petitioner had never objected to raising of construction by the respondent. Respondent in his reply also raised an objection that the petitioner had not even spelled out the basis for his claiming right of light and air. Respondent stated that there was no hindrance of light and air to the petitioner. He also denied covering area in excess to his share over the suit land. 2(c) After considering the pleadings and on hearing learned counsel for the parties, learned trial court vide order dated 25.11.2021 dismissed the application. The appeal filed by the plaintiff against this order was also dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court on 30.12.2021. Both the learned courts below while dismissing the application held that well settled principles for grant of temporary injunction were not met with in the instant case. The plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case in his favour. Balance of convenience was also not in his favour. The plaintiff had also concealed material facts about his having raised residential house over the suit land. It was, therefore, held that the plaintiff could not seek temporary injunction against the defendant for restraining him from raising construction over the joint land. 3. Submissions 3(a) Learned senior counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff argued that both the learned courts below did not appreciate the case of the petitioner/plaintiff in proper perspective. It was wrongly concluded by the learned Courts below that the petitioner/plaintiff had concealed the material facts about his having raised house over the suit land, whereas the fact was that the petitioner/plaintiff had himself pleaded that the respondent/defendant was blocking the light and air of plaintiff’s house existing over the suit land. This pleading amounts to an admission on part of the petitioner/plaintiff that he had raised a house over the suit land. Once the petitioner/plaintiff had not denied about construction raised by him over the suit land then he could not have been denied the relief of temporary injunction on the ground that he had allegedly concealed the material facts of having raised construction over the suit land. Once the petitioner/plaintiff had not denied about construction raised by him over the suit land then he could not have been denied the relief of temporary injunction on the ground that he had allegedly concealed the material facts of having raised construction over the suit land. Learned senior counsel next submitted that both the learned courts below erred in observing that the petitioner/plaintiff has not been able to show any irreparable loss to be caused to him in case of non grant of temporary injunction. Learned senior counsel argued that the petitioner had categorically submitted that respondent’s construction would block light and air of the plaintiff’s house existing over the suit land. The petitioner/plaintiffs, therefore, had pointed out the prejudice being caused to him by the construction being raised over the suit land by the respondent/defendant. Learned senior counsel inviting attention to the local commissioner’s report dated 29.01.2022 argued that this report also supported the pleadings of the petitioner-plaintiff that the defendant was raising construction in a way, which was causing obstruction to air and light towards the northern side of the house of the plaintiff/petitioner and that projection of ground-floor and first floor of the construction raised by the defendant exceeded the construction raised by the plaintiff-petitioner. In support of his submission, learned senior counsel relied upon HLJ 2017 (HP) 606, titled Piar Chand & Ors. Vs Sandhya Devi & Ors. 2016(1) SLC, titled Ashok Kapoor Vs. Murtu Devi and 2006 (1) SLC 97, titled Shiv Ram Vs. Nuratta and Ors. Prayer was made for setting aside the impugned orders passed by the learned trial Court on 25.11.2021 and by the learned First Appellate Court on 31.12.2021. 3(b) Learned counsel for the respondent-defendent defended the impugned order. It was argued that the petitioner/plaintiff had neither any prima facie case nor balance of convenience in his favour. Learned counsel for the defendant argued that the plaintiff had already raised construction over the suit land. This fact was not disclosed by the plaintiff-petitioner. Plaintiff had already covered the land adjoining to the road more than his share in the suit land. Plaintiff had raised construction over the best and most valuable portion of the suit land.The plaintiff had even allowed his brother Sh. Kartar Chand to raise construction over the suit land. No objection was raised by the petitioner/plaintiff against the construction raised by his brother Kartar Chand. Plaintiff had raised construction over the best and most valuable portion of the suit land.The plaintiff had even allowed his brother Sh. Kartar Chand to raise construction over the suit land. No objection was raised by the petitioner/plaintiff against the construction raised by his brother Kartar Chand. The respondent/defendant alongwith his two brothers are the co-sharers on 26 marlas in terms of their shares recorded in the jamabandi. Brothers of the defendant had given their no objections to the defendant for raising construction over 26 marla of the suit land. The defendant had raised huge loan for carrying out the construction over the suit land. Defendant had started levelling the suit land for raising the construction in the year 2018. Two stories had already been constructed by the defendant by 01.01.2020 when the petitioner filed the instant civil suit. He is now estopped even by his conduct to seek injunction against the defendant. Learned counsel for the respondent/defendant also contended that the petitioner/plaintiff cannot take advantage of report of the local commissioner for proving the prejudice allegedly being caused to him as the report is yet to be proved in accordance with law by leading cogent evidence. Objection filed by the respondent/defendant against the report of the local commissioner is pending for adjudication before the learned Trial Court. During hearing of the case, learned counsel for the defendant also produced copy of the plaint filed by the plaintiff/petitioner to contend that essential pleadings in respect of easementry rights with respect to air and light of the house of the plaintiff/petitioner allegedly being blocked by defendant’s construction, were lacking in the plaint. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the defendant relied upon (2022) 4 SCC 181 titled Garmet Craft Vs Prakash Chand Goel, CMPMO NO.555/2018, titled Ajay Kumar & Ors. Vs. Ishwar Dutt and RSA No.287/2007 titled Piar Chand & Ors Vs. Sandhya Devi & Ors. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and gone through the case file. 5. Following points are of paramount importance for adjudication of the instant petition:- 5(a) It is not in dispute that the plaintiff had already raised construction over the suit land alleged by him to be the joint land of the parties alongwith other co-sharers. This fact was not disclosed by the plaintiff in the manner it ought to have been stated in the plaint. This fact was not disclosed by the plaintiff in the manner it ought to have been stated in the plaint. Plaintiff in a round about manner averred that the defendant was trying to block the air and light of the house of the plaintiff existing over the suit land. Prima facie observation of both the learned courts below that the plaintiff had himself raised construction on the best and most valuable portion of the suit land also assumes significance. It is well settled that when a person seeks equity, he must come with clean hands. 5(b) It is admitted fact that Sh. Kartar Chand brother of the petitioner/plaintiff and one of the co-sharer had also raised construction over the suit land in the year 2010. It is not the case of the petitioner/plaintiff that he had objected to the construction work done by his brother over the suit land or that the plaintiff had instituted any civil suit for restraining his brother from raising construction over the suit land. It is apparent that the petitioner/plaintiff has selectively chosen the respondent/defendant for filing the suit for injunction. At this stage, it will be relevant to notice following references :- In (2010) 3 Shimla L.C. 205, titled Payar Singh Vs. Narayan Dass and others, the respondents pleaded themselves to be in settled separate possession of joint land in family partition over which they were raising construction. They also took up a stand that petitioner had also constructed his house over the land in his possession. The Court upheld the contentions of the respondents. Following observations made in the judgment are material :- “12. The respondents in the written statement have specifically pleaded that parties are in separate possession under family arrangement. The petitioner has also constructed his house on the joint land. It is not the stand of the petitioner that respondents are raising construction on an area which is more than their share. The case of the respondents is that petitioner has constructed his house on a better portion of the land. The under construction house of the respondents is away from the National Highway 21 whereas the house of the petitioner abuts N. H.21. The respondents have placed on record on the file of revision photographs construction of under construction house of the respondents. The under construction house of the respondents is away from the National Highway 21 whereas the house of the petitioner abuts N. H.21. The respondents have placed on record on the file of revision photographs construction of under construction house of the respondents. The photographs indicate sufficient gap between the already constructed house of petitioner and under construction house of the respondents over which even slab has been placed. It is the case of the respondents in written statement that they are in separate possession of the land in family arrangement. This fact has not been denied by filing replication. The respondents are claiming possession over the suit land under family arrangement i.e. with the consent of the petitioner over which they are raising construction. The respondents have thus established prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable loss in their favour. In these circumstances, no fault can be found with the impugned judgment. In revision the scope is limited as held in The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad and another Vs. Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase and Stores) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad, AIR 1973 SC 76 . The suit is for permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction. The rights of the parties will be decided in the suit. It has not been established that the view taken by the learned District Judge does not emerge from the material on record.” In (2016) 1 Shim. L.C. 207, titled Ashok Kapoor Vs. Murtu Devi, following principles were culled out after considering several judgments on the inter-se rights and liabilities of co-sharers :- “41.The exposition of law as enunciated in the various judgments referred above including those of this High Court, insofar as the rights and liabilities of the co-owners is concerned, gives rise to the following propositions:- 1. A co-owner has an interest in the whole property and also in every parcel of it. 2. Possession of joint property by one co-owner is in the eye of law, possession of all even if all but one are actually out of possession. 3. A mere occupation of a larger portion or even of an entire joint property does not necessarily amount to ouster as the possession of one is deemed to be on behalf of all. 4. The above rule admits of an exception when there is ouster of a co-owner by another. 3. A mere occupation of a larger portion or even of an entire joint property does not necessarily amount to ouster as the possession of one is deemed to be on behalf of all. 4. The above rule admits of an exception when there is ouster of a co-owner by another. But in order to negative the presumption of joint possession on behalf of all, on the ground of ouster, the possession of a co-owner must not only be exclusive but also hostile to the knowledge of either as, when a co-owner openly asserts his own title and denies that of the other. 5. Passage of time does not extinguish the right of the co-owner who has been out of possession of the joint property except in the event of ouster or abandonment. 6. Every co-owner has a right to use the joint property in a husband like manner not inconsistent with similar rights of other co-owners. 7. Where a co-owner is in possession of separate parcels under an arrangement consented by the other co-owners, it is not open to any body to dispute the arrangement without the consent of others except by filing a suit for partition. 8. The remedy of a co-owner not in possession, or not in possession of a share of the joint property, is by way of a suit for partition or for actual joint possession, but not for ejectment. Same is the case where a co-owner sets up an exclusive title in himself. 9. Where a portion of the joint property is, by common consent of the co-owners, reserved for a particular common purpose, it cannot be diverted to an inconsistent user by a co-owner, if he does so, he is liable to be ejected and the particular parcel will be liable to be restored to its original condition. It is not necessary in such a case to show that special damage has been suffered. 46. It is not necessary in such a case to show that special damage has been suffered. 46. On consideration of the various judicial pronouncements and on the basis of the dominant view taken in these decisions on the rights and liabilities of the co-sharers and their rights to raise construction to the exclusion of others, the following principles can conveniently be laid down:- (i) a co-owner is not entitled to an injunction restraining another co-owner from exceeding his rights in the common property absolutely and simply because he is a co-owner unless any act of the person in possession of the property amounts to ouster prejudicial or adverse to the interest of the co-owner out of possession. (ii) Mere making of construction or improvement of, in, the common property does not amount to ouster. (iii) If by the act of the co-owner in possession the value or utility of the property is diminished, then a co-owner out of possession can certainly seek an injunction to prevent the diminution of the value and utility of the property. (iv) If the acts of the co-owner in possession are detrimental to the interest of other co-owners, a co-owner out of possession can seek an injunction to prevent such act which is detrimental to his interest. (v) before an injunction is issued, the plaintiff has to establish that he would sustain, by the act he complains of some injury which materially would affect his position or his enjoyment or an accustomed user of the joint property would be inconvenienced or interfered with. (vi) the question as to what relief should be granted is left to the discretion of the Court in the attending circumstances on the balance of convenience and in exercise of its discretion the Court will be guided by consideration of justice, equity and good conscience. 47. (vi) the question as to what relief should be granted is left to the discretion of the Court in the attending circumstances on the balance of convenience and in exercise of its discretion the Court will be guided by consideration of justice, equity and good conscience. 47. The discretion of the Court is exercised to grant a temporary injunction only when the following requirements are made out by the plaintiff :- (i) existence of a prima facie case as pleaded, necessitating protection of the plaintiff’s rights by issue of a temporary injunction; (ii) when the need for protection of the plaintiff’s rights is compared with or weighed against the need for protection of the defendant’s right or likely infringement of the defendant’s rights, the balance of convenience tilting in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury being caused to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted. In addition, temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiff’s conduct is free from blame and he approaches the Court with clean hands.” In judgment dated 03.09.2021, delivered in CMPMO No. 555 of 2018, Ajay Kumar Vs. Ishwar Dutt, it was held that when a co-sharer himself raises a construction over the joint land, when a co-sharer does not object to raising of construction over the joint land by some other co-owners, then, he cannot seek to restrain one specific co-owner from raising construction over part of suit land, more so, when the construction being raised by that particular co-owner is over a portion, which, as per the revenue record, is in his possession alongwith others and when the plaintiff has not been shown in possession of this specific portion of land. Placing reliance upon various authorities, defendants in CMPMO No. 77 of 2021, titled Smt. Vyasa Devi Vs. Harish Kumar were permitted to undertake construction inter-alia on the ground that the plaintiff had also carried out construction on the joint land. Material observations made by the Court on facts are as under :- “10. The facts involved in the case have been narrated by me hereinabove and the same are not being repeated for the sake of brevity. Harish Kumar were permitted to undertake construction inter-alia on the ground that the plaintiff had also carried out construction on the joint land. Material observations made by the Court on facts are as under :- “10. The facts involved in the case have been narrated by me hereinabove and the same are not being repeated for the sake of brevity. It is not in dispute that the parties are co-sharers of the suit land but the petitioners herein are recorded to be in possession of the portion of the suit land in issue alongwith other co-sharers. It is further not in dispute that the respondents herein are not recorded to be in possession of the suit land. It is also not in dispute that the respondents herein have also carried out construction activities by raising constructions over the joint land, as is evident from the record. In these circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioners herein, who besides being the co-owners of the suit land are also recorded to be in possession thereof, cannot be estopped from raising construction pending the adjudication of the civil suit. It is settled law that injunction cannot be granted against a co-sharer and further as the respondents herein themselves have constructed their houses over the joint suit land, in these circumstances, they cannot be permitted to restrain other co-sharers, i.e. present petitioners, from doing so. The construction, which is being carried out by the petitioners, however obviously shall be subject to the final adjudication of the suit as also partition proceedings, if any, and if the area upon which construction being carried out by the present petitioners ultimately falls in the share of the plaintiffs in partition proceedings, then, of course, consequences will ensue. However, this does not means that till the suit land is partitioned, the petitioners herein should be restrained from raising construction over the parcel of the suit land in their possession.” CMPMO No.522/2017, decided on 29.11.2018 titled Chanchal Kumar Vs. Prem Parkash & Anr. was a case where plaintiff was one of the co-sharers over the suit land. He raised construction and filed suit for prohibitory injunction to restrain the respondents from raising construction on the vacant portion of land. Prem Parkash & Anr. was a case where plaintiff was one of the co-sharers over the suit land. He raised construction and filed suit for prohibitory injunction to restrain the respondents from raising construction on the vacant portion of land. The Court held that :- “…..Once, plaintiff himself raised construction over one portion of the land, it is not understood, how he could raise objection, if any, qua the construction on the other portion of land, by the defendants, who are admittedly co-owners of suit land to the extent of one half share. Needless to say, applicant, while seeking relief of injunction is required to show that he/she has a prima facie case in his/her favour and balance of convenience also lies in his/her favour, but, in the instant case, aforesaid basic ingredients/conditions are totally missing, rather, very conduct of the plaintiff suggests that he wants to take advantage of the situation.” 5(c) Petitioner/plaintiff has projected a theory of prejudice having been caused to him by the construction raised by respondent/defendant inasmuch as that light and air of his already existing house on the suit land has allegedly been blocked by the defendant’s construction. Plea of prejudice being caused to the petitioner/plaintiff by raising of construction by the defendant/respondent cannot be accepted at this stage. It has been observed by both the learned Courts below that the construction was started by the respondent/defendant in the year 2018. Plaintiff did not object to the construction at that time. The defendant had already completed two stories at the time of filing of the civil suit on 01.01.2020. It is the case of the respondent/defendant that he has raised huge loans for raising the construction. Under the circumstances, petitioner/plaintiff cannot be heard to say that the prejudice is being caused to him on account of alleged blockage of light and air of his house by the construction raised by the defendant. From the perusal of the plaint produced during hearing of the case, prima facie, it appears that the essential pleadings in this regard are lacking in the plaint. This aspect though is to be examined by the learned trial Court in accordance with law but it assumes significance in view of law laid down in (2008) 17 SCC 491 titled Bachhaj Nahar Vs. Nilima Mandal and another wherein it was held as under :- “17. This aspect though is to be examined by the learned trial Court in accordance with law but it assumes significance in view of law laid down in (2008) 17 SCC 491 titled Bachhaj Nahar Vs. Nilima Mandal and another wherein it was held as under :- “17. It is thus clear that a case not specifically pleaded can be considered by the court only where the pleadings in substance, though not in specific terms, contains the necessary averments to make out a particular case and the issues framed also generally cover the question involved and the parties proceed on the basis that such case was at issue and had led evidence thereon. As the very requirements indicate, this should be only in exceptional cases where the court is fully satisfied that the pleadings and issues generally cover the case subsequently put forward and that the parties being conscious of the issue, had led evidence on such issue. But where the court is not satisfied that such case was at issue, the question of resorting to the exception to the general rule does not arise. The principles laid down in Bhagwati Prasad and Ram Sarup Gupta (supra) referred to above and several other decisions of this Court following the same cannot be construed as diluting the well settled principle that without pleadings and issues, evidence cannot be considered to make out a new case which is not pleaded. Another aspect to be noticed, is that the court can consider such a case not specifically pleaded, only when one of the parties raises the same at the stage of arguments by contending that the pleadings and issues are sufficient to make out a particular case and that the parties proceeded on that basis and had led evidence on that case. Where neither party puts forth such a contention, the court cannot obviously make out such a case not pleaded, suo moto. 18. A perusal of the plaint clearly shows that entire case of the plaintiffs was that they were the owners of the suit property and that the first defendant had encroached upon it. The plaintiffs had not pleaded, even as an alternative case, that they were entitled to an easementary right of passage over the schedule property. 18. A perusal of the plaint clearly shows that entire case of the plaintiffs was that they were the owners of the suit property and that the first defendant had encroached upon it. The plaintiffs had not pleaded, even as an alternative case, that they were entitled to an easementary right of passage over the schedule property. The facts to be pleaded and proved for establishing title are different from the facts that are to be pleaded and proved for making out an easementary right. A suit for declaration of title and possession relates to the existence and establishment of natural rights which inhere in a person by virtue of his ownership of a property. On the other hand, a suit for enforcement of an easementary right, relates to a right possessed by a dominant owner/occupier over a property not his own, having the effect of restricting the natural rights of the owner/occupier of such property. 19. Easements may relate to a right of way, a right to light and air, right to draw water, right to support, right to have overhanging eaves, right of drainage, right to a water course etc. Easements can be acquired by different ways and are of different kinds, that is, easement by grant, easement of necessity, easement by prescription, etc. A dominant owner seeking any declaratory or injunctive relief relating to an easementary right shall have plead and prove the nature of easement, manner of acquisition of the easementary right, and the manner of disturbance or obstruction to the easementary right. 20. The pleadings necessary to establish an easement by prescription, are different from the pleadings and proof necessary for easement of necessity or easement by grant. In regard to an easement by prescription, the plaintiff is required to plead and prove that he was in peaceful, open and uninterrupted enjoyment of the right for a period of twenty years (ending within two years next before the institution of the suit). He should also plead and prove that the right claimed was enjoyed independent of any agreement with the owner of the property over which the right is claimed, as any user with the express permission of the owner will be a licence and not an easement. He should also plead and prove that the right claimed was enjoyed independent of any agreement with the owner of the property over which the right is claimed, as any user with the express permission of the owner will be a licence and not an easement. For claiming an easement of necessity, the plaintiff has to plead that his dominant tenement and defendant's servient tenement originally constituted a single tenement and the ownership thereof vested in the same person and that there has been a severance of such ownership and that without the easementary right claimed, the dominant tenement cannot be used. We may also note that the pleadings necessary for establishing a right of passage is different from a right of drainage or right to support of a roof or right to water course. We have referred to these aspects only to show that a court cannot assume or infer a case of easementary right, by referring to a stray sentence here and a stray sentence there in the pleading or evidence. 21. A right of easement can be declared only when the servient owner is a party to the suit. But nowhere in the plaint, the plaintiffs allege, and nowhere in the judgment, the High Court holds, that the first or second defendant is the owner of the suit property. While concluding that the plaintiffs were not the owners of the suit property, the High Court has held that they have a better right as compared to the first defendant and has also reserved liberty to the plaintiffs to get their title established in a competent court. This means that the court did not recognize the first defendant as the owner of the suit property. If the High Court was of the view that defendants were not the owners of the suit property, it could not have granted declaration of easementary right as no such relief could be granted unless the servient owner is impleaded as a defendant. It is also ununderstandable as to how while declaring that plaintiffs have only an easementary right over the suit property, the court can reserve a right to the plaintiffs to establish their title thereto by a separate suit, when deciding a second appeal arising from a suit by the plaintiffs for declaration of title. It is also ununderstandable as to how while declaring that plaintiffs have only an easementary right over the suit property, the court can reserve a right to the plaintiffs to establish their title thereto by a separate suit, when deciding a second appeal arising from a suit by the plaintiffs for declaration of title. Nor is it understandable how the High Court could hold that the apart from plaintiffs, other persons living adjacent to and north of the suit property were entitled to use the same as passage, when they are not parties, and when they have not sought such a relief. 22. The observation of the High Court that when a plaintiff sets forth the facts and makes a prayer for a particular relief in the suit, he is merely suggesting what the relief should be, and that it is for the court, as a matter of law, to decide upon the relief that should be granted, is not sound. Such an observation may be appropriate with reference to a writ proceeding. It may even be appropriate in a civil suit while proposing to grant as relief, a lesser or smaller version of what is claimed. But the said observation is misconceived if it is meant to hold that a civil court may grant any relief it deems fit, ignoring the prayer. 23. It is fundamental that in a civil suit, relief to be granted can be only with reference to the prayers made in the pleadings. That apart, in civil suits, grant of relief is circumscribed by various factors like court fee, limitation, parties to the suits, as also grounds barring relief, like res judicata, estoppel, acquiescence, non-joinder of causes of action or parties etc., which require pleading and proof. Therefore, it would be hazardous to hold that in a civil suit whatever be the relief that is prayed, the court can on examination of facts grant any relief as it thinks fit. In a suit for recovery of Rs.one lakh, the court cannot grant a decree for Rs. Ten lakhs. In a suit for recovery possession of property 'A', court cannot grant possession of property 'B'. In a suit praying for permanent injunction, court grant a relief of declaration or possession. The jurisdiction to grant relief in a civil suit necessarily depends on the pleadings, prayer, court fee paid, evidence let in, etc. 24. Ten lakhs. In a suit for recovery possession of property 'A', court cannot grant possession of property 'B'. In a suit praying for permanent injunction, court grant a relief of declaration or possession. The jurisdiction to grant relief in a civil suit necessarily depends on the pleadings, prayer, court fee paid, evidence let in, etc. 24. In the absence of a claim by plaintiffs based on an easementary right, the first defendant did not have an opportunity to demonstrate that the plaintiffs had no easementary right. In the absence of pleadings and an opportunity to the first defendant to deny such claim, the High Court could not have converted a suit for title into a suit for enforcement of an easementary right. The first appellate court had recorded a finding of fact that plaintiffs had not made out title. The High Court in second appeal did not disturb the said finding. As no question of law arose for consideration, the High Court ought to have dismissed the second appeal. Even if the High Court felt that a case for easement was made out, at best liberty could have been reserved to the plaintiffs to file a separate suit for easement. But the High court could not, in a second appeal, while rejecting the plea of the plaintiffs that they were owners of the suit property, grant the relief of injunction in regard to an easementary right by assuming that they had an easementary right to use the schedule property as a passage.” 5(d) Reliance upon report of Local Commissioner is also misplaced. No advantage can be taken by the petitioner from the report of the Local Commissioner at this stage as the report is yet to be proved in accordance with law. Admittedly, the objections preferred by the respondent/defendant against this report are pending adjudication before the learned trial Court. The contentions putforth by learned counsel for the petitioner are to be proved during trial in accordance with law. Acceptance of such prayer at this stage would virtually amount to decreeing the suit, at this stage. 5(e) It would be beneficial to refer here to (2022) 4 SCC 181 titled Garmet Craft vs Prakash Chand Goel, wherein the nature and scope of exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 was reiterated. Acceptance of such prayer at this stage would virtually amount to decreeing the suit, at this stage. 5(e) It would be beneficial to refer here to (2022) 4 SCC 181 titled Garmet Craft vs Prakash Chand Goel, wherein the nature and scope of exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 was reiterated. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court does not act as a Court of First Appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. Power under Article 227 is to be exercised where there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly came to such a conclusion arrived at by the Courts below. Relevant part of the judgment reads as under:- “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. 16. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. 16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. has observed: (SCC pp. 101-102, para 6) “6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.” For the foregoing reasons, I find no merit in the instant petition and the same is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications if any shall also stand disposed of. It is clarified that observations made in this judgment shall remain confined only to the adjudication of this petition. Learned trial Court shall decide the civil suit on merit without being influenced by the observations made in this judgment.