JUDGMENT : CHAKRADHARI SHARAN SINGH, J. A judgment and order dated 19.02.2021 passed by a Division Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna, in OA/050/00836/2018 is under challenge in the present writ application, whereby the termination of the petitioner’s service by the respondents has been upheld and the petitioner’s application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, has been dismissed. 2. The relevant facts, which are not in dispute, are short. The petitioner was appointed as a temporary Cadet Orderly against the reserved vacancy of Other Backward Class in Officers Training Academy (OTA) at Gaya. The said appointment letter dated 08.01.2014 has been brought on record by way of Annexure-1 to the writ application. Clause 3(a) and 3(b) of the said offer of appointment are relevant for the present adjudication and are, therefore, being reproduced hereinbelow: - “3. Your appointment is purely temporary and provisional subject to the provisions in accordance with the CCS (Temporary) Service Rules framed thereunder and amended from time to time and also such orders and directions as have been or may be issued of India from time to time. Your provisional appointment will be with effect from the date of your reporting to Officers Training Academy, Gaya based on this Offer letter and subject to followings:- (a) You will be governed by normal rules for civilians. (b) You will be on probation for a period of two years from the date of your appointment which may be extended for a further period not exceeding one year. During the period of probation, you will be liable to be discharged from service without assigning any reason by giving a notice of 30 years or pay and allowances in lieu thereof. On satisfactory completion of the period of probation, you will be considered for confirmation in that post. xxx xxx xxx” (Underlined for emphasis) 3. There is an assessment report brought on record by way of annexure to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India dated 27.11.2015 for the period 25.02.2014 to 31.03.2015, from which it appears that the petitioner was reported unfit for retention in service. There is another assessment report on record for the period 01.04.2015 to 31.03.2016, wherein the petitioner was found fit for retention. The fact, however, remains that no order was passed confirming the petitioner’s service on successful completion of the period of probation. There is another assessment report on record for the period 01.04.2015 to 31.03.2016, wherein the petitioner was found fit for retention. The fact, however, remains that no order was passed confirming the petitioner’s service on successful completion of the period of probation. The petitioner, however, continued in service. There is a third assessment report available on record for the period 01.04.2016 to 31.03.2017, which was brought on record by way of Annexure-R/5 to the written statement filed on behalf of the Union of India before the Tribunal which discloses that the petitioner was found unfit for retention. 4. Subsequently, the petitioner was communicated through a letter dated 23.06.2017 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) issued by the Lieutenant-General at OTA, Gaya, terminating the services of the petitioner based on assessment of his service during the probationary period. It is evident from the said letter dated 23.06.2017 that the decision to terminate the petitioner’s service was taken by a confirmatory board based on assessment of petitioner’s service during the probationary period. The said communication dated 23.06.2017 clearly stipulated that the petitioner’s service would stand terminated upon completion of 30 days from the issuance of the notice. 5. The petitioner put to challenge the said notice dated 23.06.2017 by filing the aforementioned OA/050/00836/2018 mainly on the ground that his service stood impliedly confirmed on the lapse of the period of two years from the date of the initial appointment as there was no communication to the petitioner extending the period of probation. It was also the petitioner’s case that in terms of the offer of appointment, the period of probation could be extended for a further period but not exceeding one year. The extended period of one year after completion of two years of probation also came to an end in February, 2017. It was thus the petitioner’s case that as he was allowed to continue even after completion of three years from the date of his joining, he stood impliedly confirmed in the service and, therefore, he could not have been treated to be still under probation as on the date, when the impugned notice dated 23.06.2017 was issued. It was the further case of the petitioner that the impugned notification is stigmatic in nature, which could not be treated to be an order in the nature of termination simpliciter. It was the further case of the petitioner that the impugned notification is stigmatic in nature, which could not be treated to be an order in the nature of termination simpliciter. In such a view of the matter, the order was in violation of principles of natural justice. Further, without following due process, requisite for removal from service, the respondents could not have dispensed with his service inflicting clause 3 of the offer of appointment. 6. The Tribunal, upon examination of the materials on record including adverse annual assessment reports, periodic warnings, and extension of the probation period, concluded that the termination of the petitioner’s service was in accordance with the terms of the letter of appointment. The petitioner had placed reliance, before the Tribunal, on a Supreme Court’s decision in the case of V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab, reported in (2000) 3 SCC 239 , to make out a case that the impugned notice of termination of service was in fact stigmatic in nature. The said contention of the petitioner has been repelled by the Tribunal by its impugned order. This is also to be noticed that in one of the service certificates dated 07.03.2017 issued to the petitioner by the department, he was shown as a permanent official. The said entry has been held by the Tribunal to have been made out of mistake. The Tribunal has held that the petitioner could not take advantage of the said mistake to establish a case that he was a confirmed employee as on the date of issuance of notice of termination from service. 7. Assailing the Tribunal’s impugned judgment and order, Mr. Alok Kumar Sinha, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has submitted that upon completion of the period of probation of two years from the date of petitioner’s appointment, in the absence of any communication to the effect that the probation period was being extended in terms of subclause (b) of clause 3, the petitioner should be deemed to have been impliedly confirmed in service. He has submitted that there was no requirement of the passing of any separate order confirming the petitioner’s service after the completion of two years. He has submitted that there was no requirement of the passing of any separate order confirming the petitioner’s service after the completion of two years. He has secondly submitted that even if the period after completion of two years is treated to be on probation upon implied extension of the period of probation, the petitioner was admittedly allowed to work even after completion of the extended period of probation. In such circumstance, the petitioner ought to have been treated to have been impliedly confirmed, in any view of the matter. He has referred to the impugned communication and other materials brought on record by the Union of India before the Tribunal by way of the written statement to persuade us that the petitioner’s termination cannot be treated to be a termination simpliciter, rather the same is palpably stigmatic in nature in the background of comments against him in the assessment reports. He has, therefore, submitted that such order having been passed without giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing is unsustainable being in breach of the principles of natural justice. He has placed reliance on a Supreme Court’s decision in the case of State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh ( AIR 1968 SC 1210 ) to contend that in view of the stipulation in the offer of appointment, there being no provision for extension of the period of probation beyond three years, since the petitioner was allowed to continue beyond three years, the petitioner’s service stood impliedly confirmed. 8. Mr. Manoj Kumar Singh, learned Central Government Counsel appearing on behalf of Union of India, on the other hand, has defended the impugned order passed by the Tribunal and has submitted that there is no illegality in the order requiring this Court’s interference. 9. We have carefully perused the pleadings including the materials that were brought on record before the Tribunal, by the parties and have been made part of the pleadings in the present writ application. We have also given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties. 10. Based on the pleadings and materials on record and rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, in our opinion, there are two core issues, which have emerged for this Court to consider for adjudication of this case. We have also given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties. 10. Based on the pleadings and materials on record and rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, in our opinion, there are two core issues, which have emerged for this Court to consider for adjudication of this case. Firstly, whether in the absence of any order of confirmation, the petitioner could be treated to be impliedly confirmed in the background of the facts noted above and in the light of the clear stipulation made in the offer of appointment? Secondly, whether the impugned communication dated 23.06.2017 can be treated to be stigmatic in nature? 11. We have purposefully quoted the relevant portion of the offer of appointment at the very outset, considering the nature of dispute raised in the present writ application. There is no gainsaying that a right or liability of an employee is determined on the basis of the stipulations in the offer of appointment and the service rules governing such appointment. As has been noted above, it was clearly mentioned in the offer of appointment that the petitioner would be on probation for a period of two years from the date of appointment. Admittedly, the petitioner had joined his service on 20.02.2014. The appointment letter further stipulated that on satisfactory completion of the period of probation, the petitioner would be considered for confirmation in that post. It is noteworthy at this juncture that there is a statement made in paragraph 11 of the writ application that no letter of extension of probation period was served to the petitioner. This statement made in the writ application has been specifically denied in paragraph 13 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India stating specifically that an order extending probation period had been served on the petitioner on 24.05.2016. This specific statement made in paragraph 13 of the counter affidavit has not been denied by the petitioner though a rejoinder affidavit has been filed on his behalf to the said counter affidavit. Thus, the fact that an order of extension of probation period after completion of two years of probation was served on the petitioner through the letter dated 24.05.2016 has remained uncontroverted and, therefore, admitted applying the principles of non-traverse. Thus, the fact that an order of extension of probation period after completion of two years of probation was served on the petitioner through the letter dated 24.05.2016 has remained uncontroverted and, therefore, admitted applying the principles of non-traverse. The petitioner did not question the correctness nor did he raise any objection regarding the extension of the probation period by the said letter dated 24.05.2016. In such circumstance, in our view, the petitioner’s contention that after completion of two years of probation period, the service of the petitioner stood confirmed is wholly untenable and is thus rejected. 12. As has been noticed, sub-clause (b) of clause 3 of the offer of appointment stipulated that the period of probation can be extended for a further period not exceeding one year. We have mentioned that it is the petitioner’s case that after completion of the extended period of one year of probation, the petitioner’s service impliedly stood confirmed. In the Court’s opinion, the clear stipulation that the petitioner would be considered for confirmation upon satisfactory completion of the period of probation as mentioned in the offer of appointment is of much significance. It clearly indicates that the offer of appointment did not stipulate automatic confirmation of service after completion of the period of probation. It is evincible that there were two requirements before confirmation of service. Firstly, there should be satisfactory completion of the period of probation and secondly, there would be a consideration on the point of confirmation, thereafter. 13. There is no material on record to suggest that the petitioner had satisfactorily completed the period of probation either upon completion of the initial two years or after an extended period of probation of one year. On the contrary, from Annexure-R/5 to the written statement filed on behalf of the Union of India, which is the assessment report for the period 01.04.2016 to 31.03.2017, and which has been made part of the writ petition, it is evident that the petitioner was in the know of the fact about the adverse remarks as on 08.05.2017 and the fact that he was found unfit for retention. As a matter of fact, the petitioner’s signature is available in the said Annexure-R/5. 14. Apparently thus, the petitioner was knowing that his service had not been confirmed after the completion of the extended period of one year of probation. 15. The reliance placed by Mr. As a matter of fact, the petitioner’s signature is available in the said Annexure-R/5. 14. Apparently thus, the petitioner was knowing that his service had not been confirmed after the completion of the extended period of one year of probation. 15. The reliance placed by Mr. Alok Kumar Sinha, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner on the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Dharam Singh (supra), in our view, is of no avail for the petitioner’s case. In case of Dharam Singh (supra), the Supreme Court has clearly held in paragraph 3 as under: “ 3. This Court has consistently held that when a first appointment or promotion is made on probation for a specific period and the employee is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the period without any specific order of confirmation, he should be deemed to continue in his post as a probationer only, in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the service rules. In such a case, an express order of confirmation is necessary to give the employee a substantive right to the post, and from the mere fact that he is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the specified, period of probation it is not possible to hold that he should deemed to have been confirmed…..” 16. The relief was granted by the Supreme Court in the case of Dharam Singh (supra) in the light of the extant service rules viz., Rule 6(3) of Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952, which forbade extension of the period of probation beyond three years. In the present case, on the other hand, the offer of appointment itself clearly stipulated that the confirmation upon completion of the period of probation would be considered upon satisfactory completion of such period. In the Court’s view, the Supreme Court decision in the case of Dharam Singh (supra) has no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case, particularly in the light of the clear language used in the offer of appointment itself, as noted above. 17. In the Court’s view, the Supreme Court decision in the case of Dharam Singh (supra) has no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case, particularly in the light of the clear language used in the offer of appointment itself, as noted above. 17. It is well settled legal position that unless the order of appointment or the rules specifically stipulate that upon completion of probationary period if no order is passed, the officer is deemed to have been confirmed, the officer continues to be on probation. In the case of Tarsem Lal Verma v. Union of India, reported in (1997) 9 SCC 243 , the Supreme Court has laid down that where the original period of two years was extended by a further period of another year because of the work and conduct was not satisfactory during the original period, the mere expiry of one year beyond the original period will not result in automatic confirmation. 18. Further, we do not find any force in the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned communication dated 28.03.2017 containing notice of termination of petitioner’s service is stigmatic in nature. The said communication is evidently based on the assessment of the petitioner’s work during the period of probation for the purpose of taking a decision regarding his retention in service. Assessment of work for the purpose of discharge of probationer does not amount to stigma, in our considered view. 19. Further, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that it is dealing with the matter of termination simpliciter of an employee in a Military Establishment. Taking into account the facts and circumstances in totality, as noted above, in our opinion, no case is made out for interference by this Court with the impugned order of the Central Administrative Tribunal. The said order, in our opinion, does not suffer from any legal infirmity requiring this Court’s interference. 20. This application, in our view, has no merit and is accordingly dismissed. 21. There shall be no order as to cost.