JUDGMENT (Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying this Court to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records of the 3rd respondent dated 29.03.2012 in proceeding PRC No.B1/1645/2012 and consequent Award No.1/2012 dated 31.07.2012 and consequent revised Award No.1/2014 dated 30.05.2014 passed by the 3rd respondent and pending on the file of the 5th respondent, quash the same holding that the Land Acquisition proceedings have lapsed and in any event direct the respondents 2 and 3 to apply the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Act, 2013, to the impugned land acquisition proceedings relating to the scheduled mentioned land of the petitioners including for the purpose of determination of compensation.) 1. Seven parcels of land, as mentioned in the schedule annexed to the writ petition, purportedly belonging to the petitioners, were sought to be acquired for the purpose of establishment of a power sub-station at the behest of the 4th respondent by issuance of notification u/s 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘Act, 1894’) vide G.O. Ms. No.72 dated 7.9.2011 for acquisition of lands at Ilayanallur Village, Katpadi Talui, Vellore. The said lands were acquired for the establishment of 765/400 KV sub-station at Tiruvalam. The said acquisition was initiated by invoking the urgency provision u/s 17 of Act, 1894. 2. It is averred by the petitioners that a total extent of 42.88.5 hectares of land was sought to be acquired on the basis of the requisition made by the 4th respondent on 19.5.10 and the 1st respondent waited for over 15 months before issuing an order sanctioning the acquisition, by invoking the urgency clause u/s 17 (1) of Act, 1894. It is further averred by the petitioners that by issuing the notification u/s 4 (1) on 7.9.11, possession was taken on 25.12.12. It is further averred by the petitioner that invocation of Section 17 (1) is only for the purpose of dispensing with the enquiry u/s 5A of the Act, 1894, which clearly shows that the act of the respondents is arbitrary, unjust and in violation of principles of natural justice. 3. It is further averred by the petitioner that invocation of Section 17 (1) is only for the purpose of dispensing with the enquiry u/s 5A of the Act, 1894, which clearly shows that the act of the respondents is arbitrary, unjust and in violation of principles of natural justice. 3. It is the further averment of the petitioner that even the compensation awarded by the 3rd respondent was much less than the market value and inspite of the petitioner producing adequate materials to show the price of lands in the neighbourhood even during the year 2009, however, a paltry sum of Rs.56,800/- per acre had been fixed, though the market value of the property in the year 2012, even though in the year 2009 itself, the value was hovering around Rs.16 Lakhs per acre. It is the further averment of the petitioners that though they agreed to receive the compensation under protest, but the compensation was not tendered to a majority of the land owners, including the petitioner. 4. It is the further averment of the petitioner that at the rate of Rs.56,800/- per acre fixed and computed 80% of the compensation as payable in terms of Section 17 (3-A) of the Act, 1894 and based on the said award passed in Award No.1/2012, dated 31.7.2012, reference was made by the 3rd respondent to the Court vide proceeding dated 22.10.2012. 5. It is the further averment of the petitioner that while the 3rd respondent confirmed the date of taking possession vide proceeding dated 22.10.2012 and also the reasons for deposit, however, the compensation amount had not been deposited on the date of reference as mandated u/s 31 of Act, 1894. Pending the reference, which stood completed, vide proceeding dated 30.5.2014, the 3rd respondent passed the impugned revised award. It is the further averment of the petitioner that the reason for the revised award, as has been stated by the 3rd respondent, being the fact that the Court, upon examination of the award had found that 12% above the market value had not been calculated from the date of taking possession, which resulted in the returning back of the award. It is the further averment of the petitioner that the revised award was passed after 22 months from the date of passing of the original award. It is the further averment of the petitioner that the revised award was passed after 22 months from the date of passing of the original award. It is the further averment of the petitioner that the 3rd respondent, invoking the powers u/s 11 of Act, 1894, has, in effect passed a new/fresh award vide the impugned order dated 30.5.14 and not a revised award as the issue of interest is a substantial issue and not a mere correction of a clerical or arithmetical error on the face of the aware. It is therefore the stand of the petitioners that the award dated 30.5.2014 having been passed after the expiry of two years from the date of Declaration, the entire land acquisition proceedings stood lapsed as per Section 11-A of Act, 1894. 6. It is the further averment of the petitioners that as per Section 13 of Act, 1894, the 3rd respondent did not have any power to correct any arithmetical or clerical error in the award beyond the period of six months and further the compensation amount was deposited only on 23.6.14 and not on 22.10.12, viz., the date of reference, as is evident from the letter dated 12.11.14 of the 4th respondent and in such a backdrop, the award having become final on 31.7.12 no correction could be made beyond 30.01.2013. It is the further averment of the petitioners that though the award could not be corrected in exercise of powers u/s 11 of the Act, fresh award has been issued after 22 months of the original award, which is nothing but an attempt on the part of the 3rd respondent to deny the benefit of a higher compensation available to the petitioners under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Act, 2013 (for short ‘Act, 2013’) as by then, Act, 2013 had come into force and any award, viz., the award dated 30.5.2014 was a nullity by virtue of Section 11-A of Act, 1894. The act of the 3rd respondent had robbed the petitioners and deprived them of an higher compensation, which they would be otherwise entitled under Act, 2013. 7. It is the further averment of the petitioners that Act, 2013, was enacted on 26.9.13 and came into force on 1.1.2014 vide Gazette Notification dated 19.12.13. The act of the 3rd respondent had robbed the petitioners and deprived them of an higher compensation, which they would be otherwise entitled under Act, 2013. 7. It is the further averment of the petitioners that Act, 2013, was enacted on 26.9.13 and came into force on 1.1.2014 vide Gazette Notification dated 19.12.13. It is the further averment of the petitioners that in the absence of compensation being paid in respect of an award passed under Act, 1894, and where the said award was passed five years or more prior to the commencement of Act, 2013, in the absence of either taking physical possession or payment of compensation, the acquisition proceedings shall deemed to have lapsed. It is further averred by the petitioners that Act, 1894 does not provide for an adhoc determination of compensation u/s 23 (1-A) and, therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction by the 3rd respondent, once again u/s 11 to pass another award, but yet continue the reference on the basis of the fresh award is wholly impermissible, as such a procedure has not been contemplated under Act, 1894. It is therefore the averment of the petitioner that an exercise of power u/s 11 to conduct an enquiry and make an award results altogether in a new award, in which case, as per Section 11-A of Act, 1894, the period for making the award being beyond two years from the date of publication of declaration, it would only mean that no award is passed within the period prescribed u/s 11-A and, therefore, the whole acquisition proceeding stood lapsed. Therefore, aggrieved by the proceedings of the 3rd respondent, which is in violation of the provisions of Act, 1894, the present writ petition has been filed. 8. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submit that though the award was passed within the period prescribed u/s 11-A of Act, 1894 and reference was made to the Court on 22.10.2012, yet the compensation amount was not deposited as mandated u/s 31 of Act, 1894. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel that once the Court returns back the reference citing mistakes in the calculation of the compensation, any recalculation would be only u/s 11, which would be nothing but a fresh award and it cannot be said to be a mere revision, as such a procedure is not envisaged u/s 11 of Act, 1894. 9. 9. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel that even according to the 3rd respondent, upon recalculation, award was passed and amount was deposited only on 23.6.14, which is evident from the letter of the 4th respondent dated 12.11.2014 and not on 22.10.12, the date on which reference had been made to the Court. Such being the case, Act, 2013 having come into force on and from 1.1.2014, any award, even under the guise of a revision, would only be an award in terms of Act, 2013 and if not, such an award passed on 30.5.2014 would be an award passed beyond the period of expiry of two years from the date of declaration and would render the land acquisition proceedings lapsed as per Section 11-A of the Act. It is therefore the submission of the learned senior counsel that it is not open to the 3rd respondent to have the cake and eat it too, viz., claiming that award would be only under the Act, 1894, which stood repealed on enactment of Act, 2013 and also claim that Section 11-A of Act, 1894 would not stand attracted as Act, 2013 has come into force. 10. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel that Section 24 (1) (a) of Act, 2013, contemplates that where the award is not made as on 1.1.2014, , the date of commencement of Act, 2013, the proceedings would not lapse, but compensation has to be determined as per the provisions of Act, 2013. It is the submission of the learned senior counsel that the Award having been passed on 30.5.2014, necessarily, the compensation should be quantified on the basis of Act, 2013 and it cannot be on the basis of Act, 1894. 11. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel that a reference to the Court should be accompanied by the compensation payable for the acquisition. 11. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel that a reference to the Court should be accompanied by the compensation payable for the acquisition. It is the submission of the learned senior counsel that though the petitioners were ready and willing to receive the compensation under protest, yet the compensation was not paid and inspite of reference to the Court the compensation was not deposited and on the reference being returned by the Court below, the award was revisited in terms of Section 11 of the Act, resulting in the passing of a fresh award, which has been passed beyond the period of two years from the date of declaration. Such being the case, it is the submission of the learned senior counsel that either the acquisition proceedings should be deemed to have lapsed as the award passed was beyond the period of two years as prescribed u/s 11-A of Act, 1894 or the compensation should be calculated and paid on the basis of Act, 2013, as the award had been passed on 30.5.2014 after the repealing of Act, 1894 and coming into force of Act, 2013. 12. It is also the further submission of the learned senior counsel that even the invocation of the urgency provision u/s 17 is a farce, as the notification has been issued after a period of 22 months from the date the requisitioning body requested for acquisition and allotment of land and the said urgency provision had been invoked only to curtail the rights of the land owners in the enquiry u/s 5-A, which has been deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions. Therefore, the invocation of urgency provision u/s 17 requires to be looked into by this Court in the light of the further sequence of events culminating in the passing of the award, the reference to the court, the non-deposit of the compensation amount at the time of reference and also the enactment of Act, 2013. Therefore, on the aforesaid scenario, it is fairly submitted by the learned senior counsel that either this Court quash the acquisition proceedings in view of non-compliance of Section 11-A of Act, 1894 or in the alternative direct the 3rd respondent to compute the compensation on the basis of Act, 2013 so that the rights of the petitioners are not curtailed. 13. 13. To substantiate the aforesaid contentions, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners placed reliance on the following decisions :- i. Sunder – Vs – Union of India (2002 (2) LW 39 :: 2001 (7) SCC 211 ); ii. Chinamlal Hargovinnddas – Vs – Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona & Anr. ( 1998 (3) SCC 751 ); iii. Bai Shakriben (Dead) by Natwar Melsingh & Ors. – Vs – Special Land Acquisition Officer & Anr. ( 1996 (4) SCC 533 ) 14. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for the 4th respondent submitted that award was passed as early as on 31.7.2012 much before the enactment of Act, 2013 and, therefore, there was no necessity for payment of compensation under Act, 2013. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel that as early as on 10.7.12, notice was sent to all the land owners to come and collect the compensation to the tune of 80%, which was deposited as per Section 17 of Act, 1894 and as the petitioner did not turn up to collect the amount, the same was deposited in the Reference Court along with reference on the request of the petitioner u/s 18 of Act, 1894. 15. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel that Award was passed as early as on 22.10.2012, but the said reference was returned on 17.10.13 by the Court for certain errors in the computation of the Award on the basis of market value u/s 23 (1)(a) of Act, 1894, which resulted in recomputation of the compensation and passing of the corrected Award on 30.5.2014 and the balance amount was deposited on 23.6.14. 16. It is the submission of the learned senior counsel that the award having been passed on 31.7.2012 and reference was made on 16.8.12, on the request of the petitioner, the petitioner is estopped from contending that there was no valid award. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel that the Award having been passed and reference made even prior to the enactment of Act, 2013, the application of the provisions of Act, 2013 for determining the compensation will not be applicable to the case of the petitioners. 17. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel that the Award having been passed and reference made even prior to the enactment of Act, 2013, the application of the provisions of Act, 2013 for determining the compensation will not be applicable to the case of the petitioners. 17. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel that subsequent to the passing of the Award on 31.7.2012 by the proceedings of the District Collector, the District Collector becomes functus officio and in such a back drop, there cannot be two awards and in such a scenario, the Award dated 31.7.2012 alone is a valid award and the contention that the Land Acquisition Officer corrected the Award by passing a fresh award on 30.5.2014, is wholly erroneous as the corrected Award is a nullity in view of the above position. 18. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel that Section 24 (1) (b) of Act, 2013 makes it clear that if the Award is passed before coming into force of Act, 2013, all further proceedings would be only under Act, 1894. That being the case, it is submitted by the learned senior counsel that Award having been passed on 31.07.2012 and the Act, 2013 having come into force only on 1.1.14, the proceedings have to be continued only under Act, 1894 and the provisions of Act, 2013 would not be applicable to the case on hand. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel that at best, for non-payment of compensation, the petitioners could only claim interest u/s 34 of Act, 1894 and there could be no lapsation of acquisition proceedings or payment of compensation Act, 2013. 19. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel that the Reference Court itself is clothed with power to calculate the 12% additional market value and merely because the Reference Court had returned the reference for computation of 12% additional market value that would not make the recomputation a fresh Award passed u/s 11 of Act, 1894. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunder – Vs – Union of India ( 2001 (7) SCC 211 ). Therefore, it is prayed that this Court may dismiss the present petition. 20. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunder – Vs – Union of India ( 2001 (7) SCC 211 ). Therefore, it is prayed that this Court may dismiss the present petition. 20. This Court gave its careful consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials available on record as also the various decisions relied on by the respective counsel in support of their contentions. 21. Certain undisputed dates in the whole of the acquisition process, which have a bearing on the case could be tabulated as under:- Date of Notification u/s 4 (1) of Act, 1894 07.09.2011 Date of Declaration u/s 6 of Act, 1894 22.09.2011 Date of Passing of Award 31.07.2012 Date of Reference to Court 22.10.2012 Return of Reference by Court 17.10.2013 Date of passing of subsequent Award 30.05.2014 Date of coming into force of Act, 2013 01.01.2014 22. The crucial issues that emanate from the materials on record, which have fallen before this Court for consideration are:- i. Whether the Award dated 30.5.2014 passed by the 3rd respondent is a fresh award in terms of Section 11 of Act, 1894 or is a continuation of the Award dated 31.07.2012; ii. Whether the reference made u/s 18 to the Reference Court would save the Award dated 30.5.2014 to be a continuation of the Award dated 31.7.2012; and iii. If the Award dated 30.5.2014 is a fresh award, whether the acquisition proceedings would stand lapsed in view of Section 11-A of Act, 1894 or under which Act, whether under Act, 1894 or under Act, 2013 the compensation is determinable. 23. As all the aforesaid issues, though on a broader perspective look disjuncted, however, in view of the nature of the case and the interconnected facts relating to the acquisition, this Court deems it fit and proper that answering all the issues conjunctly would be more proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. 24. 23. As all the aforesaid issues, though on a broader perspective look disjuncted, however, in view of the nature of the case and the interconnected facts relating to the acquisition, this Court deems it fit and proper that answering all the issues conjunctly would be more proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. 24. Though certain decisions have been placed before this Court for its consideration, however, in view of the fact that the issue in the present case does not devolve around the interpretation of any particular law vis-à-vis its applicability to the present case, but more on the procedural aspect of the particular provision of law and its ultimate effect on the Award passed and its legitimacy, this Court is not adverting to the said decisions. 25. Though argument has been advanced on the invocation of the urgency provision, which per se, is not only attractive, but also sustainable, but in view of the fair stand taken by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that in pursuance of the acquisition proceedings, the lands have been taken possession of by the respondents and the project has also been established, it would not stand to reason for this Court to deliberate on the said issue, as the same would be an exercise in futility. Suffice to say that the act of the respondents in invoking the urgency provision for the present acquisition is not only bad, but the materials available on record right from requisition to the issuance of Notification u/s 4 (1) leaves much to be said, which definitely renders the acquisition invoking the urgency provision an act to defeat the rights of the land owners, which is a statutory right and as held by the Hon’be Apex Court in Radhy Shyam – Vs – State of U.P. ( 2011 (5) SCC 553 ), “the property of a citizen cannot be acquired by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities without complying with the mandate of Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the Act. A public purpose, however laudable it may be does not entitle the State to invoke the urgency provisions because the same have the effect of depriving the owner of his right to property without being heard. A public purpose, however laudable it may be does not entitle the State to invoke the urgency provisions because the same have the effect of depriving the owner of his right to property without being heard. Only in a case of real urgency, can the State invoke the urgency provisions and dispense with the requirement of hearing the landowner or other interested persons.” However, as aforestated, this Court is not deliberating on the said issue, as much water has flown by now and it would serve no purpose to deliberate on the said issue. Suffice to say that the invocation of urgency provision is not only unsustainable, but the reason for which lands were acquired would not fall within the four corners of urgency as codified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Radhy Shyam’s case (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “the acquisition of land for residential, commercial, industrial or institutional purposes can be treated as an acquisition for public purposes within the meaning of Section 4 but that, by itself, does not justify the exercise of power by the Government Under Sections 17(1) and/or 17(4). The court can take judicial notice of the fact that planning, execution and implementation of the schemes relating to development of residential, commercial, industrial or institutional areas usually take few years. Therefore, the private property cannot be acquired for such purpose by invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17(1). In any case, exclusion of the Rule of audi alteram partem embodied in Sections 5-A(1) and (2) is not at all warranted in such matters”. 26. Be that as it may. Before adverting to the factual aspects of the matter, the relevant provisions of law, pertaining to Act, 1894 and Act, 2013, around which the case revolves and which have a bearing on the case on hand are extracted hereunder for deliberation :-. Provisions under Act, 1894 11. 26. Be that as it may. Before adverting to the factual aspects of the matter, the relevant provisions of law, pertaining to Act, 1894 and Act, 2013, around which the case revolves and which have a bearing on the case on hand are extracted hereunder for deliberation :-. Provisions under Act, 1894 11. Enquiry and award by Collector:- On the day so fixed, or ny other day to which the enquiryhas been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections (if any) which any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under section 9 to the measurements made under sectiuon 8 , and into the value of the land {Ins.by Act 38 of 1923, s.5}[ at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1)], and into the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation and shall make an award under his hand of-- (i) the true area of the land ; (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land ; and (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him. 11. A Period within which an award shall be made: (1) The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse : Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amended) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984) the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation : In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding tom be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. 18. Explanation : In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding tom be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. 18. Reference to Court: (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may by written application in the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or to the persons to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken. Provided that every such application shall be made,- (a) if the prson making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the collector under section 12 sub-section (2), within six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire. Note : The last date of the award should be excluded calculating the period of six months. See note under section 17(1). 31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court : (1) On making an award under section 11, the collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section. (2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation of the Court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted; Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount. Provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under section 18; Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto. (3) Notwithstanding anything in this section, the Collector may, with the sanction of Provincial Government instead of awarding a money compensation in respect of any land, make any arrangement with a person having a limited interest in such land, either by the grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land revenue on other lands held under the same title, or in such other way as may be equitable having regard to the interest of the parties concerned. (4) Nothing in the last foregoing sub-section shall be construed to interfere with or limit the power of the Collector to enter into any arrangement with any person interested in the land and competent to contract in respect thereof. Provisions under Act, 2013 24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.–(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,— (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 27. Payment of compensation is dealt with in Section 31 (1), which provides that the Collector shall tender payment of compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them unless prevented by someone or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section. Sub-section (2) to Section 31 provides the contingencies, which relates to the person not giving his consent to receive the compensation or that there is no person to receive the compensation or if there exists any dispute as to the title or as to apportionment of compensation, in such a scenario, the Collector shall deposit the amount of compensation in the Court to which a reference u/s 18 would be submitted. Proviso is provided thereto that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount. 28. It is not disputed that the lands were acquired and possession has been taken over by the respondents. However, the compensation, according to the petitioners, has not been paid on invocation of the urgency provision as per the procedure mandated u/s 17 of Act, 1894. Though it is the claim of the petitioners that they were ready to receive the compensation under protest, however, the compensation was not paid, but contra to the same is claimed by the respondents submitting that the petitioners did not turn up to receive the compensation. 29. Though it is the claim of the petitioners that they were ready to receive the compensation under protest, however, the compensation was not paid, but contra to the same is claimed by the respondents submitting that the petitioners did not turn up to receive the compensation. 29. A careful perusal of sub-section (1) to Section 31 reveals that tendering of payment to the person interested is a condition mandatory and only in the event of the person interested not willing to receive the compensation, the contingencies as envisaged u/s (2) to Section 31 comes into play. In the case on hand, there is no material placed before this Court to show that in pursuant to Award No.1/2012 dated 31.7.2012, the compensation was tendered, which, on refusal to be received, was deposited in Court. 30. One other contingency envisaged under sub-section (2) is that on the person interested not receiving the compensation, the same shall be deposited in Court to which a reference u/s 18 would be submitted. Further, two provisos are provided to sub-section (2), of which the first proviso provides for receipt of compensation under protest by the person interested and the second proviso provides that no person other than the person who has received the compensation under protest would be entitled to make an application u/s 18 requesting reference to the Court for enhancement of compensation. 31. Therefore, for satisfying the requirements u/s 31, the person interested, who has received the compensation under protest has to file an application to the Collector requesting for a reference u/s 18 of Act, 1894 based on which reference can be made and that only when the person interested is not inclined to receive the compensation, the said compensation can be deposited in the Court to which reference would be submitted. 32. Coming to the case on hand, as stated above, though the petitioners allege that they were ready to receive the compensation under protest, yet the compensation was not paid to them. However, the respondents have conceded that reference has been to the Court u/s 18 for enhancement of compensation. It is also the stand of the respondents that in furtherance to the award No.1/2012 dated 31.7.2012, the 3rd respondent made a reference to the Court vide proceeding dated 22.10.2012 and that the amount of compensation due and payable to the petitioners was also deposited in Court vide the aforesaid proceedings. It is also the stand of the respondents that in furtherance to the award No.1/2012 dated 31.7.2012, the 3rd respondent made a reference to the Court vide proceeding dated 22.10.2012 and that the amount of compensation due and payable to the petitioners was also deposited in Court vide the aforesaid proceedings. 33. The above stand of the respondents defies logic and proper understanding of the provisions provided u/s 31 of Act, 1894. Section 31 provides that deposit can be made only when person interested is not ready to receive the amount and that reference can be made only when an application is given by the person interested, who has received the compensation under protest. If the stand of the respondents is to be accepted that reference has been made, under what authority have the respondents deposited the compensation in the court below, when it is the clear mandate of the provision u/s 31 that only on the compensation being received by the person interested under protest and on application, reference could be made. From the above, it is clear that there is flagrant violation of the provisions of Section 31 of Act, 1894. 34. Be that as it may. The moot question that falls for consideration is the interpretation of the two Awards passed, one passed on 31.7.2012 and the other passed on 30.5.2014 and the application of the particular Act for determination of compensation. 35. Section 11 clearly spells out the manner in which the enquiry is to be conducted and award is to be passed by the Collector. It provides therein that enquiry shall be proceeded with by the Collector to enquire into the objections which have been received upon causing of notice issued u/s 9 or 8 as the case may be, whereinafter, following the other provisions u/s 11, Award shall be made by the Collector. 36. The crucial part of the award comes after complying with the procedures contemplated u/s 11. After hearing the objections, Award is made u/s 11-A of Act, 1894. Sub-section (1) to Section 11-A provides that the Collector shall make an award u/s 11 within a period of two years from the date of publication of the Declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of land shall lapse. 37. Sub-section (1) to Section 11-A provides that the Collector shall make an award u/s 11 within a period of two years from the date of publication of the Declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of land shall lapse. 37. In the case on hand, there is no quarrel that Award 1/2012 was passed on 31.7.2012, which is very much within the period prescribed u/s 11-A of Act, 1894. But the whole issue arises thereafter. On a reference made by the Collector, which is per se wrongful, as has been discussed above, received by the Reference Court on 22.10.2012, the Reference Court had, vide its communication dated 17.10.2013, returned the Reference for certain errors in the determination and computation of the market value of the land u/s 23(1-A) of Act, 1894. 38. Section 13-A provides for correction of clerical errors, which can be done at any time, but not later than six months from the date of the award, or where the Collector has been required u/s 18 to make a reference, correct any clerical or arithmetical mistakes in the award and that such correction shall not affect prejudicially any person and that the person should be given reasonable opportunity before making such correction. 39. It has been the consistent view of the Courts that an Award should be made within two years from the date of Declaration u/s 6 and that the proviso to Section 11-A is mandatory and failure to pass an award within the time stipulated is fatal. In the case on hand, it is not disputed that an award was initially passed on 31.7.2012 and that reference was made on 22.10.2012. Once an award is passed, the only inference that could be drawn from the same is that same has been approved by the Government, as could be evident from the proviso to Section 11 (iii) of Act, 1894. This clearly shows that prior to the making of the Award on 31.7.2012 the mandatory procedure of the Government approving the award passed by the Collector, as provided u/s 11, is deemed to have been fulfilled, as without the final approval of the Government, the award could not be termed to be final and the reference and the alleged deposit on 22.10.2012 could not have been made. Therefore, for all purposes, the Award has reached finality as on 31.7.2012, the date on which it is passed by the Collector, as it is deemed to have been approved by the Government as provided u/s 11 prior to it being passed by the Collector. 40. In the aforestated scenario, the further Award, which has been passed on the Reference Court returning the Reference on account of erroneous determination of compensation requires to be looked into to determine its legitimacy and applicability of the Award, which has been passed on 30.05.2014. 41. As could be evident from the time lapse between the Declaration u/s 6 and the subsequent Award dated 30.05.2014, it is beyond the period of two years and, therefore, for all purposes, the acquisition proceedings would stand lapsed if the award, passed on 31.7.12 is not treated to be a final award. However, as already pointed above, the approval of the Government is sine qua non to making the award by the Collector, and, therefore, the award dated 31.7.12 could only be termed to be a final award and any fresh award passed thereafter would be grossly against the provisions of Act, 1894. 42. In this backdrop, it is relevant to refer to Section 23 (1-A) of Act, 1894, which has a bearing on this case and for better understanding the same is extracted hereunder:- “23. Matters to be considered in determining compensation.- * * * * * * * * * (1A) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market-value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.” (Emphasis Supplied) 43. A scrutiny of Section 23 (1-A) of Act, 1894, reveals that on the award passed, the Court shall, in every case, award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of publication of the notification u/s 4 (1) in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. 44. In the case on hand, it is the case of the respondents that the Reference was returned by the Court on the ground that 12% additional market value of the land as provided u/s 23 (1-A) of Act, 1894, has not been awarded while computing the compensation and passing the award. This Court is at a loss to understand as to the legality of the said stand of the respondents, as even as per Section 23 (1-A), it is for the Court before which Reference is made to award at the rate of twelve per centum per annum in addition to the market value computed and awarded. The onus has not been placed on the acquisitioning body to award the twelve per centum in addition to the market value and if at all something is not awarded, it could only be termed to be a no award on that head and in such a scenario, it is only on the Court, while determining the compensation, to award such amount. Such being the provision, if at all the Court had returned the Reference u/s 23 (1-A), the proper course for the respondents would have been to place the matter back to the Court pointing out the above provision and proposition of law on that aspect and without doing so, the 3rd respondent has taken upon itself the task of redetermining the compensation which has resulted in the passing of the fresh award on 30.5.14. When the award has been recomputed, it could only be deemed that necessary approval has been taken from the Government for passing a fresh Award as without the approval of the Government, such a course could not be undertaken by the acquisitioning authority. 45. When the award has been recomputed, it could only be deemed that necessary approval has been taken from the Government for passing a fresh Award as without the approval of the Government, such a course could not be undertaken by the acquisitioning authority. 45. In the above backdrop, if the contention of the respondents is to be accepted that compensation has merely been recalculated on the basis of the directions of the Court, which had entertained the Reference, which has resulted in the passing of the Award dated 30.5.14, the only inference that could be drawn is that the earlier award dated 31.7.12 has been replaced with a fresh award, which has been passed with the approval of the Government. This inference could be the only inference possible and plausible, as the fresh Award alone could be sent as Reference once again back to the Court and there would be no earlier award in the eye of law, which could subsist. 46. Once the Award dated 30.5.14 is deemed to be the final Award for all purposes, then the question that would fall before this Court is as to whether Act, 1894 or Act, 2013 would be applicable for determining the compensation payable to the petitioners. 47. As already pointed out above, respondents vociferously submit that it is only Act, 1894 which should be invoked for the purpose of computation of compensation, while it is countered by the petitioners contending that subsequent to the passing of Act, 2013, which had come into force on 1.1.14, as the final Award having been passed on 30.5.14, only Act, 2013 would be applicable and if the contention of the respondents is to be accepted, then this Court has to quash the acquisition proceedings, as having lapsed, as award has been passed after a lapse of two years from the date of Declaration u/s 6. 48. The aforesaid contention pressed into service on behalf of the petitioners deserves acceptance, as it could be evident from Act, 1894, more particularly Section 11-A that the Collector shall make an award u/s 11 within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of land shall lapse. Once this Court has held that the Award dated 30.5.14 would only survive, necessarily, the acquisition proceedings would be hit by Section 11-A and would, therefore, lapse. 49. It is not in dispute that the lands have been taken possession by the respondents and that the 4th respondent has also utilized the lands for the purpose for which it was acquired and a sub-station has also been put up on the lands. Therefore, at this distant point of time, quashing the acquisition proceedings would have a cascading effect not only on the exchequer but would also very much affect the interest of the public. 50. Keeping in mind the factual position, learned senior counsel for the petitioners fairly conceded that the petitioners, at this point of time are not pressing for quashing the acquisition proceedings in the interest of the State and the welfare of the public at large and the petitioners would be contended if the compensation is paid to the petitioners on the basis of Act, 2013. 51. The statement of objects and reasons for repealing Act, 1894 and enactment of Act, 2013 assumes significance and for better appreciation, the the relevant portion of the same is quoted hereunder:- “Statement of Objects and Reasons.- The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is the general law relating to acquisition of land for public purposes and also for companies and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on account of such acquisition. The provisions of the said Act have been found to be inadequate in addressing certain issues related to the exercise of the statutory powers of the State for involuntary acquisition of private land and property. The Act does not address the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement to the affected persons and their families. The definition of the expression “public purpose” as given in the Act is very wide. It has, therefore, become necessary to re-define it so as to restrict its scope for acquisition of land for strategic purposes vital to the State, and for infrastructure projects where the benefits accrue to the general public. The provisions of the Act are also used for acquiring private lands for companies. It has, therefore, become necessary to re-define it so as to restrict its scope for acquisition of land for strategic purposes vital to the State, and for infrastructure projects where the benefits accrue to the general public. The provisions of the Act are also used for acquiring private lands for companies. This frequently raises a question mark on the desirability of such State intervention when land could be arranged by the company through private negotiations on a “willing seller-willing buyer” basis, which could be seen to be a more fair arrangement from the point of view of the land owner. In order to streamline the provisions of the Act causing less hardships to the owners of the land and other persons dependent upon such land, it is proposed to repeal Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and to replace it with adequate provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement for the affected persons and their families.” 52. From the above, it is amply evident that the main reason for enactment of Act, 2013 is for giving certain benefit to the land owners, whose lands are sought to be acquired, so that the said land owners are not affected on account of the acquisition process. Therefore, the provision is a benevolent enactment for the welfare of the land losers to give them the best possible benefit as well as rehabilitation and resettlement. 53. With the above object in mind, saving provision with regard to the land acquisition process made under Act, 1894 is provided u/s 24 of Act, 2013, which has been extracted supra. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of Act, 2013 provides that where no award u/s 11 of Act, 1894 has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply and clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 provides that where an award u/s 11 of Act, 1894 has been made, then the proceedings shall continue under the provisions of Act, 1894 as if the said Act has not been repealed. 54. This Court has already held that no award in the eye of law was subsisting on the date when Act, 1894 was repealed and Act, 2013 came into force as the final Award has been passed only on 30.5.14 in respect of the acquisition proceedings, which were taken up under Act, 1894. 54. This Court has already held that no award in the eye of law was subsisting on the date when Act, 1894 was repealed and Act, 2013 came into force as the final Award has been passed only on 30.5.14 in respect of the acquisition proceedings, which were taken up under Act, 1894. Such being the undisputed position, Section 24 (1)(a) of Act, 2013 would come into play and the proceedings with regard to determination of compensation should be made only under Act, 2013 as the benefits, which have been provided in Act, 2013, should enure to such of those land owners, whose lands have been acquired under Act, 1894. The respondents cannot curtail the benefit that the petitioners would be entitled to by harping on the fact that award has been passed and, therefore, only Section 24 (1)(b) would be applicable, when the act of the respondents themselves had set at naught the application of Section 24 (1)(b), which would have otherwise been available, but for the fresh award dated 30.5.14. 55. The reference, which had been made by the respondents before the learned Subordinate Judge, Vellore, has since been returned on 17.10.2013 and, as such there is no reference before the said Court. However, it is the stand of the petitioners that they are ready to receive the compensation awarded under protest and have also sought for reference seeking enhancement of compensation. Therefore, necessarily, the respondents should be directed to make a reference to the appropriate Court on the claim of the petitioners seeking enhancement and the computation at the time of reference should be in terms of the provisions of Act, 2013. 56. Accordingly, the issues framed by this Court above are answered in the following terms:- Issue No.1 Whether the Award dated 30.5.2014 passed by the 3rd respondent is a fresh award in terms of Section 11 of Act, 1894 or is a continuation of the Award dated 31.07.2012; Answer No.1 The Award dated 30.5.2014 passed by the 3rd respondent is a fresh award in terms of Section 11 of Act, 1894. Issue No.2 Whether the reference made u/s 18 to the Reference Court would save the Award dated 30.5.2014 to be a continuation of the Award dated 31.7.2012; Answer No.2 The Award dated 30.5.2014 cannot partake the character of a continuation of Award dated 31.7.2012 and mere reference would not save the Award dated 30.5.14 to be a continuation of Award dated 31.7.12. Issue No.3 If the Award dated 30.5.2014 is a fresh award, whether the acquisition proceedings would stand lapsed in view of Section 11-A of Act, 1894 or under which Act, whether under Act, 1894 or under Act, 2013 the compensation is determinable. Answer No.3 Once an award is not passed within two years from the date of Declaration u/s 6, the acquisition proceedings could be continued only under Act, 2013 as otherwise, the acquisition proceedings would lapse in terms of Section 11-A if it is under Act, 1894. 57. In view of the answers aforesaid to the issues framed by this Court, this Court is inclined to dispose of this writ petition with the following directions:- i.Considering the fact that pursuant to the acquisition, the project has been implemented, exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court is not interfering with the acquisition process, but holds that the Award dated 30.5.14 shall be deemed to be the final award passed in relation to the acquisition of lands of the petitioners by continuing the acquisition proceedings under Act, 2013 as provided u/s 24 (1)(a); ii.The petitioners would be entitled to compensation under Act, 2013; iii.The compensation as determined by the land acquisition officer as per the Award dated 30.5.2014 is directed to be paid to the petitioners by the 3rd respondent within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. iv.The 5th respondent, viz., Sub Court, Vellore, which is seized of the reference for enhancement in LAOP No.8/2015 is directed to deal with the said reference, relating to payment of enhanced compensation to the petitioners, in terms of Act, 2013, and pass orders on the said reference as expeditiously as possible, keeping in mind the fact that the acquisition of lands were as early as in the year 2011. 58. Accordingly, this writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid observations and directions. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 58. Accordingly, this writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid observations and directions. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.